THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. EDUARDO PRIETO (ALIAS EDDIE VALENCIA), DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The appellant was prosecuted in the People’s Court for treason on 7 counts.
After pleading not guilty he entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7,
and maintained the original plea as to counts 4, 5 and 6. The special prosecutor
introduced evidence only on count 4, stating with reference to counts 5 and 6
that he did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them. The defendant was
found guilty of count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 and was sentenced to
death and to pay a fine of P20,000.

Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do not coincide
on any single detail. Juanito Albaño, the first witness, testified that in
March, 1945, the accused with other Filipino undercovers and Japanese soldiers
caught an American aviator and had the witness carry the American to town on a
sled pulled by a carabao; that on the way, the accused walked behind the sled
and asked the prisoner if the sled was faster than the airplane; that the
American was taken to the Kempetai head quarters, after which he did not know
what happened to the flier. Valentin Cuison, the next witness, testified that
one day in March, 1945, he saw the accused following an American whose hands
were tied; that the accused struck the flier with a piece of rope; that with the
American and the accused were Japanese and other Filipinos.

These witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions. The last
witness stated that the American was walking as well as his captors, And there
was no sled, he said, nor did he see Juanito Albaño, except at night when he and
Albaño had a drink of tuba together.

This evidence does not satisfy the two-witness principle. The two witnesses
failed to corroborate each other not only on the whole overt act but on any part
of it, (People vs. Apolinar Adriano, 44 Off. Gaz., 4300; Cramer
vs. U.S., 65 S. Ct. 918.)

The lower court believes that the accused is “guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries,” with “the
aggravating circumstances mentioned above.” Apparently, the court has regarded
the murders and physical injuries charged in the information, not only as crimes
distinct from treason but also as modifying circumstances. The Solicitor General
agrees with the decision except as to the technical designation of the crime. In
his opinion, the offense committed by the appellant is a “complex crime of
treason with homicide.”

Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows:

“1. On or about October 15, 1944, in the Municipality of Mandaue, Province of
Cebu, Philippines, said accused being a member of the Japanese Military Police
and acting as undercover man for the Japanese forces with the purpose of giving
and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a
patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers to the barrio of Poknaon,
for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and locating their hideouts; that
said accused and his companions did apprehend Abraham Puno, tie his hands behind
him and give him fist blows; thereafter said Abraham Puno was taken by the
accused and his Japanese companions to Yati, Liloan, Cebu, where he was severely
tortured by placing red hot iron on his shoulders, legs and back and from there
he was sent back to the Japanese detention camp in Mandaue and detained for 7
days;

“2. On or about October 28, 1944, in the Municipality of Mandaue, Province of
Cebu, Philippines, said accused acting as an informer and agent for the Japanese
Military Police, with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and
comfort to the enemy, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably, lead, guide and accompany a group of Filipino undercovers for the
purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla suspects; that the herein
accused and his companions did in fact apprehend Guillermo Ponce and Macario
Ponce from their house; that said accused and his companions did tie the hands
of said Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce behind their backs, giving them fist
blows on the face and in other parts of the body and thereafter detained them at
the Kempei Tai Headquarters; that Guillermo Ponce was released the following day
while his brother Macario Ponce was detained and thereafter nothing more was
heard of him nor his whereabouts known;

“3. Sometime during the month of November, 1944, in the Municipality of
Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, for the purpose of giving and with the
intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces, said
accused acting as an enemy undercover did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously, and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of some 6
Filipinos and 2 Japanese soldiers to barrio Pakna-an, Municipality of Mandaue
for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla suspects, and said
patrol did in fact apprehend as guerrilla suspects Damian Alilin and Santiago
Alilin who were forthwith tied with a rope, tortured and detained for 6 days;
that on the 7th day said Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin were taken about ½
kilometer from their home and the accused did bayonet them to death;

“7. In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in conspiracy with the enemy
and other Filipino undercovers, said accused did cause the torture of Antonio
Soco and the killing of Gil Soco for guerrilla activities.”

The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and
the infliction of physical injuries on others are not offenses separate from
treason. Under the Philippine treason law and under the United States
constitution defining treason, after which the former was patterned, there must
concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. One without
the other does not make treason.

In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be
accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or
physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer vs. U.S.,
ante.) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a
criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the
deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes identified with the latter
crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in
combination with treason to increase the penalty as Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a
prosecution for smoking the identical drug, end a robber cannot be held guilty
of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because
possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in
robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a
separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it
is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason. This rule would not, of
course, preclude the punishment of murder or physical injuries as such if the
government should elect to prosecute the culprit specifically for those crimes
instead of relying dn them as an element of treason. It is where murder or
physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason that they can not be
regarded separately under their general denomination.

However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were
carried out may be taken as an aggravating circumstance. Thus, the use of
torture and other atrocities on the victims instead of the usual and less
painful method of execution will be taken into account to increase the penalty
under the provision of article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code,
since they, as in this case, augmented the sufferings of the offended parties
unnecessarily to the attainment of the criminal objective.

This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the mitigating circumstance
of plea of guilty. It is true that the accused pleaded not guilty to counts 4, 5
and 6 but count 4 has not been substantiated while counts 5 and 6 were
abandoned.

In his first assignment of error, counsel seeks reversal of the judgment
because of the trial court’s failure to appoint “another attorney de oficio for
the accused in spite of the manifestation of the attorney de oficio (who
defended the accused at the trial) that he would like to be relieved for obvious
reasons”.

The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions in favor of the
legality and regularity of all the proceedings of the trial court, including the
presumption that the accused was not denied the right to have counsel. (U.S.
vs. Labial, 27 Phil. 82.) It is presumed that the procedure prescribed
by law has been observed unless it is made to appear expressly to the contrary.
(U.S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 743.) The fact that the attorney
appointed by the trial court to aid the defendant in his defense expressed
reluctance to accept the designation because, as the present counsel assumes, he
did not sympathize with the defendant’s cause, is not sufficient to overcome
this presumption. The statement of the counsel in the court below did not
necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty to protect the interest of
the accused. As a matter of fact, the present counsel “sincerely believes that
the said Attorney Carin did his best, although it was not the best of a willing
worker,” We do not discern in the record any indication that the former counsel
did not conduct the defense to the best of his ability. If Attorney Garin did
his best as a sworn member of the bar, as the present attorney admits, that was
enough; his sentiments did not cut any influence in the result of the case and
did not imperil the rights of the appellant.

In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and guilty of
treason as charged in counts 1, 2, 3 and 7. There being an aggravating
circumstance and a mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is
reclusiòn perpetua. The judgment of the lower court will be modified in
this respect accordingly. In all other particulars, the same will be affirmed.
It is so ordered, with costs of this instance against the appellant.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, and
Padilla, JJ., concur.

PARÁS, J.:

I concur in the result. Appellant is guilty of murder.