REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JOSE V. BAGTAS, DEFENDANT. FELICIDAD M. BAGTAS, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE LEFT BY THE LATE JOSE V. BAGTAS, …

The Court of Appeals certified this case to this Court because only questions of law are raised.

On 8 May 1948 Jose V. Bagtas borrowed from the Republic of the
Philippines through the Bureau of Animal Industry three bulls: a Red
Sindhi with a book value of P1,176.46, a Bhagnari, of P1,320.56 and a
Sahiniwal, of P744.46, for a period of one year from 8 May 1948 to 7
May 1949 for breeding purposes subject to a government charge of
breeding fee of 10% of the book value of the bulls. Upon the expiration
on 7 May 1949 of the contract, the borrower asked for a renewal for
another period of one year. However, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources approved a renewal thereof of only one bull for
another year from 8 May 1949 to 7 May 1950 and requested the return of
the other two. On 25 March 1950 Jose V. Bagtas wrote to the Director of
Animal Industry that he would pay the value of the three bulls. On 17
October 1950 he reiterated his desire to buy them at a value with a
deduction of yearly depreciation to be approved by the Auditor General.
On 19 October 1950 the Director of Animal Industry advised him that the
book value of the three bulls could not be reduced and that they either
be returned or their book value paid not later than 31 October 1950.
Jose V. Bagtas failed to pay the book value of the three bulls or to
return them. So, on 20 December 1950 in the Court of First Instance of
Manila the Republic of the Philippines commenced an action against him
praying that he be ordered to return the three bulls loaned to him or
to pay their book value in the total sum of P3,241.45 and the unpaid
breeding fee in the sum of P499.62, both with interests, and costs; and
that other just and equitable relief be granted it (civil No. 12818).

On 5 July 1951 Jose V. Bagtas, through counsel Navarro, Rosete and
Manalo, answered that because of the bad peace and order situation in
Cagayan Valley, particularly in the barrio of Baggao, and of the
pending appeal he had taken to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the President of the Philippines from the refusal by the
Director of Animal Industry to deduct from the book value of the bulls
corresponding yearly depreciation of 8% from the date of acquisition,
to which depreciation the Auditor General did not object, he could not
return the animals nor pay their value and prayed for the dismissal of
the complaint.

After hearing, on 30 July 1956 the trial court rendered judgment—

* * * sentencing the latter (defendant) to pay the
sum of P3,625.09 the total value of the three bulls plus the breeding
fees in the amount of P626.17 with interest on both sums of (at) the
legal rate from the filing of this complaint and costs.

On 9 October 1958 the plaintiff moved ex parte for a writ of execution which the court granted on 18 October and issued on 11 November 1958. On 2 December 1958 it granted an ex-parte
motion filed by the plaintiff on 28 November 1958 for the appointment
of a special sheriff to serve the writ outside Manila. Of this order
appointing a special sheriff, on 6 December 1958 Felicidad M. Bagtas,
the surviving spouse of the defendant Jose V. Bagtas who died on 23
October 1951 and as administratrix of his estate, was notified. On 7
January 1959 she filed a motion alleging that on 26 June 1952 the two
bulls, Sindhi and Bhagnari, were returned to the Bureau of Animal
Industry and that sometime in November. 1953 the third bull, the
Sahiniwal, died from gunshot wounds inflicted during a Huks raid on
Hacienda Felicidad Intal, and praying that the writ of execution be
quashed and that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued. On 31
January 1959 the plaintiff objected to her motion. On 6 February 1959
she filed a reply thereto. On the same day, 6 February, the Court
denied her motion. Hence, this appeal certified by the Court of Appeals
to this Court, as stated at the beginning of this opinion.

It is true that on 26 June 1952 Jose M. Bagtas, Jr., son of the
appellant by the late defendant, returned the Sindhi and Bhagnari bulls
to Roman Remorin, Superintendent of the NVB Station, Bureau of Animal
Industry, Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, as evidenced by a memorandum
receipt signed by the latter (Exhibit 2). That is why in its objection
of 31 January 1959 to the appellant’s motion to quash the writ of
execution the appellee prays “that another writ of execution in the sum
of P859.53 be issued against the estate of defendant deceased Jose V.
Bagtas.” She cannot be held liable for the two bulls which already had
been returned to and received by the appellee.

The appellant contends that the Sahiniwal bull was accidentally
killed during a raid by the Huks in November 1953 upon the surrounding
barrios of Hacienda Felicidad intal, Baggao, Cagayan, where the animal
was kept, and that as such death was due to force majeure she is relieved from the duty of the returning the bull or paying its value to the appellee. The contention is without merit.

The loan by the appellee to the late defendant Jose V. Bagtas of the
three bulls for breeding purposes for a period of one year from 8 May
1948 to 7 May 1949, later on renewed for another year as regards one
bull, was subject to the payment by the borrower of breeding fee of 10%
of the book value of the bulls. The appellant contends that the
contract was commodatum and that, for that reason, as the appellee retained ownership or title to the bull it should suffer its loss due to force majeure. A contract of commodatum is essentially gratuitous.^[1]
If the breeding fee be considered a compensation, then the contract
would be a lease of the bull. Under article 1671 of the Civil Code the
lessee would be subject to the responsibilities of a possessor in bad
faith, because she had continued possession of the bull after the
expiry of the contract. And even if the contract be commodatum, still the appellant is liable, because article 1942 of the Civil Code provides that a bailee in a contract of commodatum—

* * * is liable for loss of the thing, even if it should be through a fortuitous event:

(2) If he keeps it longer than the period stipulated. * * *

(3)
If the thing loaned has been delivered with appraisal of its value,
unless there is a stipulation exempting the bailee from responsibility
in case of a fortuitous event:

The original period of the loan was from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949.
The loan of one bull was renewed for another period of one year to end
on 8 May 1950. But the appellant kept and used the bull until November
1953 when during a Huk raid it was killed by stray bullets.
Furthermore, when lent and delivered to the deceased husband of the
appellant the bulls had each an appraised book value, to wit: the
Sindhi, at P1,176.46; the Bhagnari, at P1,320.56 and the Sahiniwal; at
P744.46. It was not stipulated that in case of lass of the bull due to
fortuitous event the late husband of the appellant would be exempt from
liability.

The appellant’s contention that the demand or prayer by the appellee
for the return of the bull or the payment of its value being a money
claim should be presented or filed in the intestate proceedings of the
defendant who died on 23 October 1951, is not altogether without merit.
However, the claim that his civil personality having ceased to exist
the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case against him, is
untenable, because section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides
that—

After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the
deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as
may be granted,

and after the defendant’s death on 23 October 1951 his counsel failed to comply with section 16 of Rule 3 which provides that—

Whenever a party to a pending case dies * * * it
shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such
death * * * and to give the name and residence of the executor or
administrator, guardian, or other legal representative of the deceased
* * *.

The notice by the probate court and its publication in the Voz de Manila that
Felicidad M. Bagtas had been issued letters of administration of the
estate of the late Jose V. Bagtas and that “all persons having claims
for money against the deceased Jose V. Bagtas, arising from contract,
express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent,
for funeral expenses and expenses of the last sickness of the said
decedent, and judgment for money against him, to file said claims with
the Clerk of this Court at the City Hall Bldg., Highway 54, Quezon
City, within six (6) months from the date of the first Publication of
this order, serving a copy thereof upon the aforementioned Felicidad M.
Bagtas, the appointed administratrix of the estate of the said
deceased,” is not a notice to the court and the appellee who were to be
notified of the defendant’s death in accordance with the above-quoted
rule, and there was no reason for such failure to notify, because the
attorney who appeared for the defendant was the same who represented
the administratrix in the special proceedings instituted for the
administration and settlement of his estate. The appellee or its
attorney or representative could not be expected to know of the death
of the defendant or of the administration proceedings of his estate
instituted in another court, if the attorney for the deceased defendant
did not notify the plaintiff or its attorney of such death as required
by the rule.

As the appellant already had returned the two bulls to the appellee,
the estate of the late defendant is only liable for the sum of P859.63,
the value of the bull which has not been returned to the appellee,
because it was killed while in the custody of the administratrix of his
estate. This is the amount prayed for by the appellee in its objection
on 31 January 1959 to the motion filed on 7 January 1959 by the
appellant for the quashing of the writ of execution.

Special proceedings for the administration and settlement of the
estate of the deceased Jose V. Bagtas having been instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Q-200), the money judgment rendered
in favor of the appellee cannot be enforced by means of a writ of
execution but must be presented to the probate court for payment by the
appellant, the administratrix appointed by the court.

Accordingly, the writ of execution appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., concurs in the result.