ROBIN FRANCIS RADLEY DUNCAN AND MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (BRANCH X) PRESIDED OVER BY HON. JUDGE HERMINIO C. MARIANO, RESPONDENT.

Duncan versus Court of First Instance of Rizal

The Case

This is the case of Duncan versus the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for review on certiorari brought by the spouses Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen against the decision of the trial court that dismissed their petition to adopt a three-day-old infant. The husband is a British national who had resided in the Philippines for seventeen years, and the wife is an American citizen born in and residing in the Philippines. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's classic statement that adoption is for the benefit of the child, and that the law on parental consent must be read with compassion rather than with rigid severity. It teaches who may give the written consent to adoption when the natural mother has abandoned her child, and whether a stranger who takes in the infant may stand as the person in charge of the child to be adopted.

Procedural History

The spouses filed a petition for adoption in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch Ten, presided over by Judge Herminio C. Mariano. The trial court dismissed the petition. Its principal reason was that the written consent filed with the petition was improper and fell short of the express requirement of the law, because the proper person to consent was, in the order of preference, the mother herself, whose identity the witness knew. The spouses then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari, asking that the findings and conclusions of law in the decision be annulled and revoked, that the petition for adoption be declared meritorious, and that the child be declared their child by adoption and heir.

Facts

Sometime in May 1967, a child only three days old was given to the spouses Duncan for them to adopt by Attorney Corazon de Leon Velasquez. The child was later baptized as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan, with the spouses appearing in the records of baptism as his parents.

Attorney Velasquez had received the infant from the child's unwed mother, who told her never to reveal the mother's identity because the mother wanted to get married and did not want to destroy her future. The mother instructed Attorney Velasquez to look for a suitable couple who would adopt the child. The mother did not provide for the child's maintenance and support, and from the time she turned the child over, she never inquired into his condition.

In the petition for adoption filed in September 1967, Attorney Velasquez gave the written consent required by law, acting as the de facto guardian or person standing in place of the parent. When she testified that the natural mother was still alive, the court pressed her to reveal the mother's identity. She refused, invoking the privileged communication between attorney and client and the instruction of her client. The trial court held that no such relationship existed for purposes of the case, and that the question was not merely revealing the mother's identity but obtaining her consent to the adoption.

Issues

• Whether or not Attorney Corazon de Leon Velasquez, who gave the written consent to the adoption, is the proper person required by law to give such consent.
• Whether or not the natural mother, by her conduct, had abandoned the child, so that her written consent was no longer legally necessary.
• Whether or not Attorney Velasquez may be considered the guardian or the person in charge of the child to be adopted, having actual custody of the abandoned infant.

Applicable Provisions

Article 340 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 340. The written consent of the following to adoption shall be necessary: (1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over; (2) The parents, guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted.

This is the provision the trial court read strictly, and the provision the Supreme Court construed to include the de facto guardian of an abandoned child.

Section 3 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Consent to adoption. There shall be filed with the petition a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years of age or over and not incompetent, and by the child's spouse, if any, and by each of its known living parents who is not an insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child, or if there are no such parents by the general guardian, or guardian ad litem of the child, or if the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home, or benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum, home, or society, or by such person; but if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its father to the adoption shall not be required.

This provision supplies the key qualifier, that the consent required is that of a known living parent who has not abandoned the child, and it also excuses the consent of the father of an illegitimate and unrecognized child.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Attorney Velasquez was the proper person to give the consent. The law names the parents, the guardian, or the person in charge of the person to be adopted. Since no guardian ad litem had been appointed and the child was not in the custody of any orphan asylum, children's home, or benevolent society, there was no one other than Attorney Velasquez who could with reason be called the guardian of the infant. She had actual physical custody and, out of compassion, extended protection over the helpless child. The Court extended to her the recognition that she was a de facto guardian exercising parental authority over the abandoned child.

On the second issue, the Court held that the mother had completely and absolutely abandoned her child. Abandonment, the Court said, imports any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental claims to the child. The mother had not inquired into the child's condition nor contributed to his livelihood, maintenance, and care. She was therefore the very opposite of the known living parent who has not abandoned the child, and there was no more legal need to require her written consent.

On the third issue, the Court resolved the matter in favor of the petitioners, holding that the trial court's strict reading was too harsh. The old maxim that the law is hard but it is the law may generally apply, but in adoption it should be softened and applied with compassion and humane understanding, for adoption is more for the benefit of unfortunate children, particularly those born out of wedlock, than for those born with a silver spoon in their mouths. The law should not be made an instrument to impede a salutary humane policy. The Court also found the spouses qualified to adopt, with no showing of any disqualification and with the means to provide support, care, education, and love, even though they had previously adopted another child.

Doctrine

First, the written consent to adoption under Article 340 of the Civil Code may be given by the parents, the guardian, or the person in charge of the person to be adopted, and a person who has actual physical custody of an abandoned infant, out of compassion and in the absence of any appointed guardian or institution, is a de facto guardian who may give that consent.

Second, the parental consent required in adoption refers only to parents who have not abandoned their child, following Section 3 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. Abandonment imports any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental claims to the child, and once abandonment is established, the consent of the natural parent is no longer legally necessary.

Third, adoption statutes are construed liberally and with compassion, in harmony with the policy of the State to uphold, encourage, and give life and meaning to family relations, because adoption is intended more for the benefit of unfortunate children than for the adopting parents.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulled the decision of the trial court, and declared the minor Colin Berry Christensen Duncan the adopted child and heir of the spouses Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen, without costs.

Remember This

The one line to memorize is that the consent required in adoption is that of a parent who has not abandoned the child, and a de facto guardian in actual custody of an abandoned infant may supply it. Examiners use this case to test the liberal and compassionate construction of adoption laws, the concept of abandonment as a settled purpose to forego all parental claims, and the rule that adoption is for the welfare of the child.