G.R. No. L-37507. June 07, 1977

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. WILLIAM PAGE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions June 7, 1977 SECOND DIVISION AQUINO, J.:
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AQUINO, J.:


William Page appealed from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal dated July 21, 1973, convicting him
of robbery with homicide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua,
and ordering him to pay the heirs of Veronica Villaverde-Bala­capo
an indemnity of P12,000 plus P20,000 as moral damages (Criminal Case No.
5396).  The judgment of conviction was
based on the following facts:

According to Page’s confession (Exh. C), at around four o’clock in the afternoon of
February 13, 1972 Crisanto Campo­sano,
alias Boy Sankay, a resident of Bagong
Ilog, Baclaran, Parañaque, Rizal, went to the
house of William Page y Ubiña located at 143 Pildira Street, near the Manila International Airport, Pasay City.  They
were friends since boyhood.  Page was an
eighteen-year old third year high school student at the Arellano
University in Pasay City
(Exh. H).

From Page’ s house, the two went to Camposano’s house, where they met the latter’s father who
was drinking with a com­panion.  Camposano‘ father gave Page some liquor to drink.  Page and Camposano
stayed at the latter’s house up to ten o’clock
in the evening (Exh. C).

At past ten o’clock,
Page and Camposano went to the rotonda
or intersection of Taft Avenue
and F. B. Harrison Boulevard,
where they boarded a Manila-bound jeepney.  Page was armed with a balisong
knife.  Camposano
had a revolver.

According to Page’s confession, he seated himself beside a male
passenger who was near the driver on the front seat.  Camposano took a
seat at the back of the jeepney where two female
passengers were seated.  (The male
passenger turned out to be Randolf Scot, a
thirty-year old employee of the Hyatt Regency Hotel who was on his way to
work.  The female passen­gers were the
sisters, Veronica Villaverde-Balacapo and Cesarea Villaverde).

When the jeepney was in front of the
San Antonio Savings Bank on Harrison Boulevard, Page and Camposano
told the driver to turn left on Russel Avenue, going
to M. Roxas Boule­vard, and then to turn left going
to Parañaque. 
There, they held up the driver and the three passengers.  They got the money and pieces of jewelry of
the passengers and the driver.  From the
rear view mirror of the jeepney, Page saw Camposano dumping the two female passengers on Roxas Boulevard in front of
Casa Marcos.  Then, the two directed the
driver to proceed to the airport.  They
left the jeepney at Pildira Street (where Page
resided).  Camposano
gave Page a watch and a woman’s ring as his share of the loot.

Page admitted that he had been charged with theft but the case
was dismissed in the municipal court.  He
knew certain hoodlums named Remy, Manoling, Guerson and Edgar whose specialty was holding up taxicabs (Exh. C).

Scot gave a slightly different version of the holdup.  He testified that when the jeepney reached that portion of Harri­son
Boulevard in front of the San Antonio Savings
Bank, Page pressed a knife at the neck of Scot and shouted:  “This is a holdup.  Don’t move.” Page got Scot’
s
diary book containing a one peso bill. 
Page ordered the driver, Eduardo Dilla, to
shut off the lights of the jeepney, to turn left on Russel Avenue, and to proceed
to Roxas Boulevard.  Page and Camposano
covered their faces with pieces of cloth.

Camposano told the women passengers to
bring out their money and not to shout “or else there will be
shots”.  They rep­lied that they had
already given everything to Camposano.

When the jeepney was in front of Casa
Marcos and El Presidente Hotel, one of the women
jumped out of the jeepney.  (The husband of one of the women was a waiter
at Casa Marcos).  The other woman
shouted.  Camposano
kicked her, thus causing her to fall out of the jeepney.  Camposano noticed
that a car was following the jeepney.  Believing that it was a police car, he
ordered Villa (Dilla) to drive at full speed.

According to Scot, at an isolated place called Baltao Street near the
airport, Page and Camposano told the driver to
stop.  Page robbed Scot of his other one
peso bill and divested the driver of his earnings after boxing him for making
some resistance.  Then, the two
malefactors fled to a dark alley.  Scot
and the driver re­ported the holdup to the police of Parañaque.  It was already eleven o’ clock.

Lieutenant Casiano Eugenio,
the precinct commander, showed them a photograph of Camposano.  Dilla and Scot
identified him as one of the two hoodlums. 
Eugenio and the two robbery victims repaired
to the residence of Camposano at Bagong
Ilog, Baclaran.  They saw Camposano,
whom Dilla fingered, but Camposano
fired shots at them and was able to elude pursuit due to the darkness of the
night.  He was later killed by the Pasay City
policemen while he was committing another crime.

The next day policemen went to Page’s residence near the airport
to apprehend him.  He was not there.  His father, in the presence of his aunt,
promised to surrender him.

Page was arrested in the morning of February 24, 1972 at the Jose
Abad Santos
High School of the Arellano
University in Pasay City.  In the afternoon of that day, his statement
was taken down by Patrolman C. Prepeña and sworn to
before the municipal judge (Exh. C).

The woman, who jumped from the jeepney (according to Scot’s story), was Veronica Balacapo.  She
was brought to the Philippine General Hospital by a good
Samaritan, Manolo Daval
Santos.  She was already dead when she
reached the hospital.

The other woman, Cesarea Villaverde (the sister of Veronica), who was pushed by Camposano out of the jeepney, was
brought to the Ospital ng Maynila.  The record
is not clear as to whether she survived.

The postmortem examination of the body of Veronica Balacapo, a forty-two year old married woman, revealed that
she suffered (1) abrasions on the left eyebrow, left shoulder, left elbow and sacral
region; (2) bilateral severe hematoma on the
occipital region of the scalp; (3) fractures on the base of the cranial fossa and the fourth and fifth ribs along the mid-clavicular line, and (4) hemorrhage in the posterior
cranial fossa. 
Death was caused by the severe and traumatic meningeal
he­morrhage (Exh. A and F).

On February 15, 1972
or before Page was arrested, the chief of police filed a complaint for robbery
with murder in the municipal court of Parañaque
against Camposano and John Doe (Criminal Case No.
30039).  The complaint was based on the
investigation of Dilla and Scot.  Page did not present any evi­dence at the
preliminary investigation.  The case was
remanded to the Court of First Instance where the fiscal filed an informa­tion for robbery with homicide against Page and Camposano.

After trial, the trial court rendered the judgment of conviction
already mentioned.

In this appeal, appellant Page contends that the trial court
erred (1) in relying on his repudiated confession, (2) in convicting him
although he was not identified by Randolf Scot, the
prosecution’s eyewitness, and (3) in convicting him on the basis of weak
circumstantial evidence.

1.  Patrolman Prepeña, who took Page’s confession, testified on its voluntariness. 
Lieutenant Eugenio, the precinct commander,
and Patrolmen Manolito Miranda and Jose Elquiero, the arresting officer, denied that Page was
maltreated while he was in the custody of the police.

Page admitted that when he was brought before the muni­cipal
judge for the administration of the oath on his confession, he could have
complained to the latter about the alleged mal­treatment.  He did not complain.

His aunt, Prudencia Alupit,
and his own lawyer visited him in jail. 
He allegedly confided to them that he was maltreated.  He requested them to take action against the
policemen.  They did not complain to the
proper authorities about the alleged mal­treatment.

The learned trial court made a searching and conscientious
analysis of appellant’s evidence on the alleged duress employed by the police
in extracting his confession.  It
concluded that the con­fession was voluntary.

We find no error in that conclusion.  Page’s confession, having been taken before
the new Constitution took effect, is ad­missible although the requisites in
section 20 of article IV were not observed (Magtoto
vs. Manguera, L-37201-2, March 3, 1975, 63 SCRA 4).

Certain details found in the confession are strong indicia of its
authenticity.  Page specified therein
that his residence was at 143 Pildira Street, an
address which jibes with the address in his school record (Exh.
I); that his maternal surname is Ubiña; that he met Camposano at four o’clock in the afternoon of February 13,
1972; that they went to Camposano’s residence, where
he (Page) was given liquor by Camposano’s father;
that he directed the driver to follow a certain route; that Camposano
was from Sorsogon; that Page was acquainted with some
hoodlums, and that he (Page) was charged with theft.  These details would not have been embodied in
the confession had not Page freely disclosed them to the police.

2.  It is true that Scot
during the trial did not point to Page as the person who sat beside him on the
front seat of the jeepney and who pressed an open
knife at his neck.  Testifying nine
months the after the occurrence, Scot could not remember the face of Page.  He recalled only that Page’
s
hair was thick.

Patrolman Ruben Cruz Santiago, one of those who investigated
Page, testified that the latter was sporting long hair and looked like a hippie
at the time of the investigation (2 tsn November 21,
1972).  The photographs of Page taken in
July, 1971, or about seven months before the holdup, when Page was booked for
theft, show that he had long hair (Exh. G).

Scot’s failure to identify Page during the trial is of no moment
because the crucial fact is that Page in his own confes­sion admitted his
participation in the holdup.  Page stated
in his confession:

“Iyong jeep na
pampasahero na aming sinakyan sa may Rotonda ng Baclaran patungong
Maynila, biaheng Harrison,
ay may sakay na dalawang babae sa hulihan at isang
lalaki sa unahan sa tabi
ng driver at ako ay naupo sa harapan
katabi ko iyong lalaki at si Boy Sangkay (Camposano) ay sa gawing hulihan.

“Pagdating namin
sa may tapat ng San Antonio Bank ay hinoldap namin iyong jeep pati ng mga
pasahero at pinaliko namin sa
Russel Avenue patungong M. Roxas Blvd.  Pagdating namin sa M. Roxas Blvd., ay pinakaliwa namin patungong Parañaque at noong kami’y nasa
M. Roxas Blvd. na, ay kinuha namin ang
mga pera at alahas noong mga
pasahero at tsuper ng jeep at matapos noon ay nakita ko na
lang sa salamin
na inihulog ni Boy Sangkay iyong dalawang babae sa may tapat
ng Casa Marcos sa M. Roxas Blvd.

“At pagkatapos ay nagpahatid kami patungong MIA at bumaba kami sa Pildira
sa Pasay
City.” (No. 13, Exh.
C).

Scot’ s testimony and the necropsy
report (Exh. A) prove the corpus
delicti
or the fact that robbery with homicide
was committed.  Page’s extrajudicial
confession was corroborated by the evidence on the corpus delicti (Sec. 3, Rule 133, Rules
of Court).

3.  Appellant’
s
third contention that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt, because the prosecution’ s evi­dence is mainly circumstantial, is not
meritorious.

Once it is conceded, that his confession is voluntary, then there
cannot be any doubt as to his guilt.  We
have already shown that his confession was not vitiated by compul­sion or
constraint.

The alibi, which Page interposed during the trial and which his
counsel did not bother to discuss in his brief, appears to be a complete
fabrication.  Page testified that at the
time of the commission of the holdup, he was residing with his aunt at 26 Simbo Street, Fort Bonifacio, Makati, Rizal
and that he was sick.

That testimony was squarely belied by Page’s school record (Exh. I) which shows that, when the
holdup was per­petrated, he was residing with his father at 143 Pildira Street, Pasay City near
the airport (or at 101 Interior Rivera Village near the airport, Exh. H) and that on February 11,
1972, or two days before the holdup was committed, he was not sick because on
that date he was not absent from school.

In any event, even if he was a Makati
resident at the time of the holdup, that would not have precluded his partici­pation
in the commission of that offense at Baclaran, Paraña­que, which is not very far from Fort Bonifacio.

To establish an alibi, the accused must show that he was in
another place for such a period of time that it was impossible for him to have been
at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission
(People vs. Resa­yaga, L-23234, December 26, 1973, 54
SCRA 350, 354).  Page’s alibi does not
satisfy that requirement.

The more important point to consider is whether the trial court
correctly ruled that Page, as a fellow conspirator of Camposano,
could be held liable for robbery with homicide or for robbery only.  In his letters to this Court, Page, not being
a lawyer and not knowing the rules on conspiracy, insisted that he had nothing
to do with the death of Veronica Villaverde-Balacapo.

Of course, it was Camposano alone who
directly brought about Veronica’s death. 
Whether Veronica jumped whether from the jeepney,
as testified by Scot, or whether Camposano kicked and
pushed her and her sister, Cesarea, out of the jeepney, as stated by Page in his confession, Camposano’s culpability for that flagitious deed cannot be
disputed.

If Veronica jumped out of the jeepney,
it must have been because she was in mortal dread that Camposano
would shoot her.  As fear gripped
Veronica, she, in desperation, thought of scampering out of the moving jeepney.  Her head
struck the pavement.  It was broken.  A hemorrhage ensued.  She died before medical assistance could be
extended to her.

The rule is that if a man creates in another person’s mind an
immediate sense of danger, which causes such person to try to escape, and, in
so doing, the latter injures himself, the man who creates such a state of mind
is responsible for the resulting injuries (People vs. Toling,
L-27097, January 17, 1975, 62 SCRA 17, 33).

We find that the trial court’s conclusion as to conspi­racy is
borne out by the evidence.  Page and Camposano were boyhood friends.  About six hours before the crime was
committed, they were already together. 
They were in the Baclaran rotonda
at around ten o’clock in the evening
or shortly before the holdup was committed.  They boarded the jeepney
in that place.  Inside the jeepney, they coordinated their actions.  They directed the jeepney
driver to go near the airport or in the vicinity of Page’ s
residence, a place which was well-known to the two malefactors.  They left the jeep­ney
together and fled in the same direction.

There is not a scintilla of doubt that a conspiracy to commit
robbery existed between Page and Camposano.  The fact that the two armed themselves with
deadly weapons, a knife and a revolver, signified that they were determined to
kill their victims in order to consummate their nefarious objective.

The conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of Page and Camposano.  Those
acts reveal that they had agreed to commit robbery inside a passenger jeepney (Art. 8, Revised Penal Code).  This Court may take judicial notice that that
kind of robbery has been frequently committed since the liberation when the jeepney came into existence as a public con­veyance.

Page and Camposano implemented their
agreement when they waited for a passenger jeepney at
the Baclaran rotonda and
boarded it at the same time.  If they had
no evil intention, they could have sat together at the back.  But, they did not do so.  Obviously, as previously planned by them,
Page took the front seat so that he could control the driver and at the same
time extort money from him and the other passenger in the front seat.  Camposano took a
seat at the back of the jeepney so that he could rob
the two female passengers.

The behavior of Page and Camposano
inside the jeep­ney disclosed a synchronization of
their actions, evincing a prior concert and plan to commit robbery with
violence against and intimidation of persons. 
Page should answer for all the consequences of the conspiracy, including
the homi­cide which was intertwined with the robbery committed by his
co-conspirator.  The homicide was
committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery.

The rule is that where the conspiracy to commit robbery was
conclusively shown by the concurrent and coor­dinate acts of the accused, and
homicide was committed as a consequence, or on the occasion, of the robbery,
all of the accused are guilty of robo con homicidio whether or not they actually participated in
the killing (People vs. Lingad, 98 Phil. 5; People
vs. Puno, L-31594, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 659, 663).

Generally, when robo con homicidio has been proven, all those who had taken part
in the robbery are guilty of the special complex crime unless it appears that
they endeavored to prevent the homicide (U.S.
vs. Macalalad, 9 Phil. 1).  The same rule is followed in Spanish
jurisprudence:

“Son responsables de este delito (robo
con homicidio) en concepto
de autor
no solo todos los que cooperen
a la muerte, siquiera sea
con su presencia, sino tambien todos
los que intervienen
en la ejecucion del robo aun cuando no tomen
parte en el homi­cidio”
(2 Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, 1975 Edition, p. 876).

“Cuestion II.  Cometido un robo con violencia e intimidacion en las personas por dos sujetos, uno de los cuales
dispara un trabuco, dejando muerto en el acto a un tercero que acude en auxillio
de los robados, el que no disparo sera solo responsable del robo, o al igual que su
consorte, incurrira en la pena del robo con homicidio, previsto en el numero 10 del art. 516 que comentamos?

“El Tribunal Supremo ha declarado que siendo
ambos procesados autores
del robo, lo son igualmente
del homicidio que ocurrio en el mismo acto, al tempo de ser perseguidos
por el interfecto; porque este ultimo delito esta de tal manera enla­zado
con el de robo, que a no haber mediado este,
ni los robados
hubieran pedido auxilio, ni al prestarselo el tercero hubiese sido muerto
como lo fue; y que por consiguiente,
habiendo tornado parte directa en la ejecucion del robo ambos rocesados, son autores uno y otro,
segun el art. 13 del Codigo penal, y por lo mismo responsables los dos de todas las consecuencias de su accion.” (Sentencia de 30 de Abril
de 1872; 3 Viada, Codigo
Penal 347).

“El propio Tribunal Supremo ha resulto:  ‘que si resulta probado
la delincuencia del procesado
en el hecho generador, que es el robo,
con ocasion del
que se cometio un homicidio, basta esto, en conformidad a lo dispuesto en, el num. 1. del art. 516, para
considerarle tambien responsable del
homicidio; resolucion cuya justicia evidencia
aun mas el parrafo se­gundo del
art. 518, en el que se declara
que los malhechores
presentes a la ejecucion de
un robo en despoblado y en cuadrilla son autores de cualquiera de los atentados que
está cometa, si no constare que procuraron impedirlos‘”.  (Sentencia de 23 de Febrero
de 1872; 3 Viada, Codigo
Penal, Cuarta Edicion, p.
347).

It may be added that the presence of Page in the front seat,
armed with a balisong, must have emboldened Camposano to threaten Veronica Balacapo
and to cause her death with impunity.

The lower court failed to order the accused to pay the sum of P95
as the value of the things taken by Camposano from
the deceased victim.

The case of Page, a former high school student, now twenty-four
years old, the child of estranged parents (he lived with his father), who at
the age of eighteen years, was implica­ted in robbery with homicide,
undoubtedly by reason of poverty, should ordinarily excite some sympathy and
might evoke compas­sionate justice.

Pressed by his lawyer to examine his conscience and to state
truthfully whether he was implicated in the holdup, Page cried and said:  “Before the eyes of God, I really do not
have anything to do with it.  That is why
I am very sad, sir.  I am being charged
for a crime which I have not done.  I
have been in jail.  I
have nothing to do with it” (19 tsn
December 19, 1972).

Of course, he did not kill the victim.  But, under the rules of conspiracy, he is
deemed to be a co-principal in the robbery with homicide.

He testified that he was single. 
However, Rosita Lareza, claiming to be his
wife, and Teresita Cordero, posing as his girl
friend, filed written requests for the early dispo­sition of his case (pp. 125
and 140, Rollo).

We have already mentioned that he was charged with theft in the
municipal court but the case was dismissed. 
At the time the instant case was filed in 1972, he was charged also in
the municipal court with simple robbery and two cases of robbery with murder
(Criminal Cases. Nos. 30000, 30001 and 30038) (p. 12, Expediente of
Criminal Case No. 5396).
  He was
also charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 5395 and 9765 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. 
(See I. S. No. 73-5054 for robbery filed in the fiscal’s office at Pasig, Rizal, pp. 63, 70 and 78 of Rollo).  What happened to those cases is not shown in
the record.

His behavior in prison has not been exemplary.  On October
7, 1975 Page and five other prisoners commandeered the truck, which
was delivering foodstuffs at the prison com­pound, held as hostages the driver
and the kitchen supervisor, and tried to escape.  Page and four others were recaptured (p. 119,
Rollo).

Page in his letter to the Chief Justice dated April 14, 1977
manifested that, inasmuch as he could not endure the dis­comforts of prolonged
confinement, he was amenable to be electrocuted (he was only sentenced to reclusion
perpetua
by the trial court).

This is a case where considerations of leniency are out of
place.  The full force of retributive
justice should be brought to bear upon the accused.  Many persons have been victimized in
extortions or holdups committed in buses, taxicabs and jeepneys.  The courts should cooperate with the agents
of the law in making these public conveyances a safe means of travel.

WHEREFORE, the lower court’s judgment is affirmed with the
slight modification that appellant should further pay the heirs of the victim
the sum of P95 representing the value of the watch, earrings and necklace taken
from her.  Costs
against the defendant-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., (Chairman), in
the result.

Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.