LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ROMEO F. EDU, IN HIS CAPACITY AS LAND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSIONER; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFE…

The validity of a Letter of Instruction^[1]
providing for an early warning device for motor vehicles is assailed in this
prohibition proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of
due process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its implementation
are concerned, for transgressing the fundamental principle of non-delegation of
legislative power. The Letter of
Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner, who is possessed of the requisite
standing, as being arbitrary and oppressive. A temporary restraining order was issued and respondents Romeo F. Edu,
Land Transportation Commissioner; Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National
Defense; Alfredo L. Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications; and Baltazar Aquino, Minister of Public Highways; were required
to answer. That they did in a pleading
submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza.^[2]
Impressed with a highly persuasive quality, it makes quite clear that the
imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification. The challenged Letter of Instruction is a
valid police power measure. Nor could
the implementing rules and regulations issued by respondent Edu be considered
as amounting to an exercise of legislative power. Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.

The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued
on December 2, 1974, reads in full: “[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal
or serious accidents in land transportation is the presence of disabled,
stalled, or parked motor vehicles along streets or highways without any
appropriate early warning device to signal approaching motorists of their
presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have
been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968
Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization
(U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention, which was ratified by the
Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local
legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; [Now,
therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos], President of the Philippines, in the
interest of safety on all streets and highways, including expressways or
limited access roads, do hereby direct: 1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all
times in their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device
consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow
colors at least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is parked for
thirty (30) minutes or more on any street or highway, including expressways or
limited access roads, the owner, user or driver thereof shall cause the warning
device mentioned herein to be installed at least four meters away to the front
and rear of the motor vehicle stalled, disabled or parked. 3. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized
Triangular Early Warning Devices, as herein described, to be prepared and
issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers,
charging for each piece not more than 15% of the acquisition cost. He shall also promulgate such rules and
regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order. 4. All hereby concerned shall closely coordinate and take such measures as
are necessary or appropriate to carry into effect these instructions.”^[3]
Thereafter, on November 15, 1976, it was amended by Letter of Instruction No.
479 in this wise: “Paragraph 3 of
Letter of Instructions No. 229 is hereby amended to read as follows: ‘3. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall require every motor vehicle
owner to procure from any source and present at the registration of his
vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized triangular early warning device, as
described herein, of any brand or make chosen by said motor vehicle owner. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall
also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate to effectively
implement this order.’”^[4]
There was issued accordingly, by respondent Edu, the implementing rules and
regulations on December 10, 1976.^[5]
They were not enforced as President Marcos, on January 25, 1977, ordered a
six-month period of suspension insofar as the installation of early warning
device as a pre-registration requirement for motor vehicles was concerned.^[6]
Then on June 30, 1978, another Letter of Instruction^[7]
ordered the lifting of such suspension and directed the immediate implementation
of Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended.^[8]
It was not until August 29, 1978 that respondent Edu issued Memorandum Circular
No. 32, worded thus: “In pursuance
of Letter of Instructions No. 716, dated June 30, 1978, directing the
implementation of Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended by Letter of
Instructions No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor
vehicles, the following rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC Adminis­trative Order No. 1, dated December 10, 1976, shall now be
implemented provided that the device may come from whatever source and that it
shall have substantially complied with the EWD specifications contained in
Section 2 of said adminis­trative order; 2. In order to insure that every motor vehicle, except motorcycles, is
equipped with the device, a pair of serially numbered stickers, to be issued
free of charge by this Commission, shall be attached to each EWD. The EWD serial number shall be indicated on
the registration certificate and official receipt of payment of current
registration fees of the motor vehicle concerned. All Orders, Circulars and Memoranda in conflict herewith are
hereby superseded. This Order shall
take effect immediately.”^[9]
It was approved for immediate implementation by respondent Alfredo L. Juinio,
as Minister of Public Works, Transportation, and Communi­cations.^[10]

Petitioner, after setting forth that he “is the owner of a
Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly equipped when it came out
from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very
well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in
Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules
and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the Land Transportation
Commission,”^[11]
alleged that said Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, “clearly
violates the provisions of the New Constitution on due process, equal
protection and delegation of police power, [sic] * * *.” For him, they are
“oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional
and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society.”^[12]
He contended that they are “infected with arbitrariness because it is
harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public;”^[13]
are “one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they]
will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car
owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at
the rate of P56.00 to P72.00 per set,”^[14]
are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a
compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of
the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety
device, or a better substitute to the specified set of EWDs.”^[15]
He therefore prayed for a judgment declaring both the assailed Letters of
Instructions and Memorandum Circular void and unconstitutional and for a
restraining order in the meanwhile.

A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on
October 19, 1978: “L-49112
(Leovillo C. Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F. Edu, etc., et al.) – Considering the
allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the
petition for prohibition with writ of preliminary prohibitory and/or mandatory
injunction, the Court Resolved to [require] the respondents to file an answer
thereto within ten (10) days from notice and not to move to dismiss the
petition. The Court further Resolved to
[issue] a [temporary restraining order] effective as of this date and
continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court.”^[16]

Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General and granted. Then on
November 15, 1978, the Answer for respondents was submitted. After admitting the factual allegations and
stating that they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle car,^[17]
they “specifically deny the allegations in paragraphs X and XI (including
its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the effect that Letter of
Instruction No. 229 as amended by Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as
well as Land Transportation Commission Administrative Order No. 1 and its
Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the consti­tutional provisions on due
process of law, equal protection of law and undue delegation of police power,
and that the same are likewise oppresive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided,
onerous, immoral, unreasonable and illegal, the truth being that said
allegations are without legal and factual basis and for the reasons alleged in
the Special and Affirmative Defenses of this Answer.”^[18]
Unlike petitioner who contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his litany
of grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of constitutional
litigation, the Answer, in demonstrating that the assailed Letter of
Instruction was a valid exercise of the police power and implementing rules and
regulations of respondent Edu not susceptible to the charge that there was
unlawful delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion captioned
Special and Affirmative Defenses, a citation of what respondents believed to be
the authoritative decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They are Calalang v. Williams,^[19]
Morfe v. Mutuc,^[20]
and Edu v. Ericta.^[21]
Reference was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna Conventions of the United
Nations on road traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was
a signatory and which was duly ratified.^[22]
Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute in detail, in language calm and
dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accu­sation of petitioner
that the assailed Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and
regulations cannot survive the test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its highly-persuasive quality
cannot be denied.

This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision,
the issues being clearly joined. As
noted at the outset, it is far from meritorious and must be dismissed.

1.     
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the
exercise of the police power. That is
conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however,
that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process
and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point
was mentioned only in passing. The
broad and expansive scope of the police power, which was originally identified
by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as
“nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty”^[23]
was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: “Justice Laurel, in the first leading
decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams,
identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare. Persons and property could
thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure
the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.’ Shortly after
independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a
competence being referred to as ‘the power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare
of the people.’ The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm
in a pre-Commonwealth decision as ‘that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and
welfare of society.’ In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted
by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and
most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, ‘the most essential, insistent,
and at least illimitable powers,’ extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out
‘to all the great public needs.’ Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be
interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the
time.’ The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state
and imposing upon its govern­ment limitations to safeguard constitutional
rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures
calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.”^[24]

2.     
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner,
compounded by the fact that the particular police power measure challenged was
clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a
legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being
non-existent. The latest decision in
point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law,^[25]
an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute,
the purpose of which was: “To
promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets
designated as national roads * * *.”^[26]
As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity
of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act,^[27]
with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative
demands of public safety.

3.     
The futility of petitioner’s effort to nullify both the Letter
of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations becomes even more
apparent considering his failure to lay the necessary factual foundation to
rebut the presumption of validity. So
it was held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v.
City Mayor of Manila.^[28]
The rationale was clearly set forth in an excerpt from a decision of Justice
Brandeis of the American Supreme Court, quoted in the opinion: “The statute here questioned deals with
a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the
ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and
hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the consti­tutionality
of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must
prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record in overthrowing the
statute.”^[29]

4.     
Nor did the Solicitor General, as he very well could, rely
solely on such rebutted presumption of validity. As was pointed out in his Answer: “The President certainly had in his possession the necessary
statistical information and data at the time he issued said letter of
instructions, and such factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner’s
naked assertion that early warning devices ‘are not too vital to the prevention
of nighttime vehicular accidents’ because allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of
the supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that occurred in 1976 involved
rear-end collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioner’s statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data on record. As aptly stated by this Honora­ble Court: ‘Further: “It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of
validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the
statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here” ’ *
* *. But even assuming the verity of
petitioner’s statistics, is that not reason enough to require the installation
of early warning devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that could
mean the death of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths that could likewise result
from head-on or frontal collisions with stalled vehicles?”^[30]
It is quite manifest then that the issuance of such Letter of Instruction is
encased in the armor of prior, careful study by the Executive Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to the
due process clause is to give sanction to conjectural claims that exceeded even
the broadest permissible limits of a pleader’s well-known penchant for
exaggeration.

5.     
The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of
oppressiveness of this Letter of Instruction was exposed in the Answer of the
Solicitor General thus: “Such
early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor
oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) ‘blinking
lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-powered
blinking lights inside motor vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in reflectorized tapes on
front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted two (2)
petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * * because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968
Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of
at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the
world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on
the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that
somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway,
there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which
obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other
built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get
adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light
is all about. Is it an emergency
vehicle? Is it a law enforcement
car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of
the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of
collision.”^[31]

6.     
Nor did the other extravagant assertions of consti­tutional
deficiency go unrefuted in the Answer of the Solicitor General: “There is nothing in the questioned
Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in Administrative Order No. 1,
which requires or compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the early warning
device prescribed thereby. All that is
required is for motor vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their
motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning device in question, procuring
or obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of industry and practical ingenuity, motor
vehicle owners can even personally make or produce this early warning device so
long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid down in
said letter of instruction and administrative order. Accordingly, the early warning device requirement can neither be
oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make
manufacturers and dealers of said devices ‘instant millionaires at the expense
of car owners’ as petitioner so sweepingly concludes * * *. Petitioner’s fear that with the early
warning device requirement ‘a more subtle racket’ may be committed by those
called upon to enforce it * * * is an unfounded speculation. Besides, that unscrupulous officials may try
to enforce said requirement in an un­reasonable manner or to an unreasonable
degree, does not render the same illegal or immoral where, as in the instant
case, the challenged Letter of Instruction No. 229 and implementing order
disclose none of the constitutional defects alleged against it.”^[32]

7.     
It does appear clearly that petitioner’s objection to this
Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of power, the justification for a
finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say negative,
view he entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, to put it at its mildest, is distinguished, if that is
the appropriate word, by its un­orthodoxy. It bears repeating “that this Court, in the language of Justice
Laurel, ‘does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation.’ As expressed by Justice Tuason: ‘It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep
it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.’ There
can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice
Montemayor: ‘As long as laws do not
violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply
them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary.’ For they,
according to Justice Labrador, ‘are not supposed to override legitimate policy
and * * * never inquire into the wisdom of the law.’ It is thus settled, to
paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,
that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action
taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in
the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and
confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on
a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would
substitute its own. If there be
adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be
courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy
precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and
prescriptions. The attack on the
validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be
objections, even if valid and cogent, on its wisdom cannot be sustained.”^[33]

8.     
The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of
non-delegation of legislative power is equally without any support in
well-settled legal doctrines. Had
petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint himself with authoritative
pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to make such
an assertion. An excerpt from the
aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the matter: “To avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental
policy. Otherwise, the charge of
complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out
its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which
the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried
out. Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be
implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly, the
legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is ‘safe
transit upon the roads.’ This is to adhere to the recognition given expression
by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the Constitution
came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation ‘has been made
to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the
adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of “subordinate
legislation” not only in the United States and England but in practically
all modern governments.’ He continued: ‘Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased
difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency
toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the
approval of the practice by the courts.’ Consistency with the conceptual
approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative
in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of
Congress being assumed.”^[34]

9.     
The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must
be dismissed is reinforced by this consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the
assailed Letter of Instruction: “[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have
been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968
Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization
(U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention, which was ratified by the
Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local
legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; * * *.”^[35]
It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the
Constitution possesses relevance: “The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, * * *.”^[36]
The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a
character. It is not for this country
to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda
stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the
principle of international morality.

10. 
That is about all that needs be said. The rather curt reference to equal
protection did not even elicit any attempt on the part of petitioner to
substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and categorical, why such a casual
obser­vation should be taken seriously. In no case is there a more appropriate occasion for insistence on what
was referred to as “the general rule” in Santiago v. Far Eastern
Broadcasing Co.,^[37]
namely, “that the constitutionality of a law will not be considered unless
the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued.”^[38]
“Equal protection” is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation
of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect that success will crown his
efforts. The law is anything but that.

WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

Ruiz Castro, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Santos, Fernandez,
Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Malencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., dissents in a
separate opinion.

Makasiar, J., reserves the
right to file a separate opinion.

Aquino, J., did not take part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave,
concur in this decision.

^[1]
Letter of Instruction No. 229 (1974) as amended by Letter of Instruction No.
479 (1976).

^[2]
He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor
Amado D. Aquino.

^[3]
Petition, par. III.

^[4]
Ibid, par. IV.

^[5]
Ibid, par. V.

^[6]
Ibid, par. VIII.

^[7]
No. 716.

^[8]
Petition, par. VII.

^[9]
Ibid, par. VIII.

^[10]
Ibid.

^[11]
Ibid, par. IX.

^[12]
Ibid, par. X.

^[13]
Ibid, par. XI.

^[14]
Ibid, par. X.

^[15]
Ibid, par. XI.

^[16]
Resolution of the Court dated October 19, 1978.

^[17]
Answer, pars. 1-6.

^[18]
Ibid, par. 8.

^[19]
70 Phil. 726 (1940). The opinion was
penned by Justice Laurel.

^[20]
L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424. The writer of this opinion is the ponente.

^[21]
L-32096, October 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481. The writer of this opinion was likewise the ponente.

^[22]
Answer, par. 18 (a) and (b).

^[23]
License Cases, 5 How. 504, 583.

^[24]
35 SCRA 481, 487-488. There is no need
to repeat where Calalang and Morfe are reported. Primicias v. Fugoso is reported in 80 Phil. 71; Rubi v.
Provin­cial Board, where the first quotation from Justice Malcolm came, in 39
Phil. 660, 708 (1919); and Smith Bell and Co. v. Natividad, his other
decision cited, in 40 Phil. 136 (1919); Helvering v. Davis, with Justice
Cardozo writing the opinion, in 301 US 619 (1937).

^[25]
Republic Act No. 5715 (1969).

^[26]
Commonwealth Act No. 548 (1940).

^[27]
Cf. People v. Lagman, 66 Phil. 13 (1938). Even earlier in United States v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245
(1915), this Court, by virtue of the police power, held valid a provision of
the then Municipal Code requi­ring “able-bodied males in the vicinity
between certain ages to perform patrol duty not exceeding one day each
week.”

^[28]
L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849.

^[29]
Ibid, 857. The excerpt came from
O’Gorman and Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 282 US 251, 328
(1931).

^[30]
Answer, par. 18 (a). The excerpt came
from Samson v. Mayor of Bacolod City, L-28745, October 23, 1974, 60 SCRA
267, 270.

^[31]
Ibid, par. 18 (c).

^[32]
Ibid, par. 18 (d) and (e).

^[33]
Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424, 450-451. The citation from Justice Laurel may be traced to Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 160 (1936); from Justice Tuason to People v.
Carlos, 78 Phil. 535, 548 (1947); from Justice Montemayor to Quintos v.
Lacson, 97 Phil. 290, 293 (1955); and from Justice Labrador to Ichong v.
Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1166 (1957). Chief Justice Concepcion’s reiteration of the doctrine,
paraphrased in the quoted opinion, was made by him in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, L-28196, November 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774. Cf. Province of Pangasinan v.
Secretary of Public Works, L-27861, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 134.

^[34]
35 SCRA 481, 497-498. The following
cases were also cited: People v.
Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125 (1957), and People v. Jolliffe, 105 Phil. 677
(1959).

^[35]
Petition, par. III.

^[36]
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution reads in full: “The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
inter­national law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all
nations.”

^[37]
73 Phil. 408 (1941).

^[38]
Ibid, 412.

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