ILUMINADA T. TORREDA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ALEJANDRO R. BONCAROS, JUDGE CFI NEGROS ORIENTAL, BRANCH V; VISAYAN SAWMILL, INC., ANG TAY, AND SERAPION TIONSON, RESPONDENTS.

Torreda versus Boncaros

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by Iluminada Torreda, the widow of Pascasio Torreda, against Judge Alejandro Boncaros of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, Branch Five, and against the private respondents Visayan Sawmill, Incorporated, Ang Tay, and Serapion Tionson. The widow had filed a civil action for damages arising from the death of her husband, who was killed when lumber protruding from a cargo truck struck him as he sat inside another truck on the national highway. The trial court dismissed her complaint on the ground of prescription, and she asked the Supreme Court to set aside that dismissal and to order the case tried on the merits. The case matters because it teaches when the defense of prescription is deemed waived, and how the civil action for quasi-delict relates to the civil liability deemed joined with a criminal prosecution.

Procedural History

The widow first filed her civil action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental. The private respondents moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint stated no cause of action, and later filed a supplemental motion to dismiss alleging that the action had prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code. The trial court granted the supplemental motion and dismissed the case on January 17, 1974, ruling that the action had prescribed because it was filed more than nine years after the incident. The widow moved for reconsideration, and the trial court denied her motion. She then came to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari and mandamus, asking that the orders of dismissal be set aside and that the case be reinstated for trial on the merits.

Facts

Visayan Sawmill, Incorporated, and Ang Tay operated a lumber business and owned a cargo truck used to haul sawed lumber. They employed Serapion Tionson as driver. On July 25, 1963, at around ten o'clock in the evening, Tionson drove the truck from the lumber yard at Cawitan, Santa Catalina, Negros Oriental, carrying a full load of sawed lumber for delivery to Dumaguete City and other towns.

The lumber was untied and carelessly arranged. After traveling over eighty kilometers, the movement of the truck caused the pieces to shift, and some protruded frontwise and sidewise beyond the body of the truck. Near the boundary of Dumaguete City, in the barrio of Banilad in the municipality of Bacong, another cargo truck was coming from the opposite direction. Pascasio Torreda was a passenger on that other truck, seated on the front seat on the left side of the driver. As the two trucks came level with each other, the protruding lumber struck Pascasio Torreda and pierced him against the back of his seat, killing him almost instantly.

A criminal complaint for homicide through reckless imprudence was filed against the drivers of both trucks. Tionson jumped his bail and left the country, and the criminal case remained pending for about nine years without trial. On August 19, 1972, the widow filed a notice in the criminal case reserving her right to file a separate civil action. She filed the civil action for damages on December 15, 1972.

Issues

• Whether or not the widow's civil action for quasi-delict had already prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code when it was filed on December 15, 1972.
• Whether or not the defense of prescription, raised for the first time in a supplemental motion to dismiss filed more than six months after the original motion, was deemed waived under Section 2 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.

Applicable Provisions

Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:

Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

This provision is the basis for the Court's observation that the action on quasi-delict is independent of the criminal responsibility of the offender, and could have been filed separately.

Section 2 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides:

Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.

This is the rule the Court applied to hold that the belated defense of prescription was waived.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court acknowledged that, from a very technical viewpoint, there could be merit in the position that the action, considered as one for quasi-delict, had already prescribed. The Court noted that regardless of the criminal case and the civil action deemed joined with it, the case for quasi-delict could have been filed separately, because that kind of action is entirely independent of the criminal responsibility of the offender. The civil action joined with the criminal case is predicated on civil liability arising from the offense, and is distinct and different from the action on quasi-delict arising from the same act.

On the second issue, however, the Court held that the defense of prescription was waived. The original motion to dismiss filed on February 16, 1973, did not allege prescription. It was only in the supplemental motion to dismiss filed more than six months later, on September 8, 1973, that the defense was interposed for the first time. Under the peculiar circumstances of the case, where the widow would be left without a remedy if the respondents were excused for belatedly invoking prescription, equity and substantial justice made it preferable to apply the rule that defenses not pleaded are deemed waived. The Court noted that the respondents gave no reason at all why the defense was not invoked earlier, when its basis was already existing and evident even before the original motion was filed.

Doctrine

A candidate must retain two rules. First, the action for quasi-delict under Article 2177 of the Civil Code is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code, and may be filed independently of the criminal case. Second, under Section 2 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived; a defense of prescription raised for the first time in a supplemental motion to dismiss, without any explanation for the delay, is barred, especially where the plaintiff would otherwise be left without a remedy.

Disposition

The petition was granted. The orders of the trial court dismissing the case were set aside, and the trial court was ordered to proceed with the trial of the civil case on the merits, with costs against the private respondents.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the defense of prescription, not pleaded in the original motion to dismiss, is deemed waived when raised belatedly in a supplemental motion without explanation. Examiners use this case to test the waiver rule under Section 2 of Rule 9 and the independence of the quasi-delict action under Article 2177 of the Civil Code.