MANILA PEST CONTROL, INC., PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ATANACIO A. MARDO, AS CHIEF HEARING OFFICER OF REGIONAL OFFICE 4 OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, CITY S…

This Court, in a resolution of June 21, 1967, was persuaded,
regrettably as it turned out, to give due course to a certiorari and prohibition proceeding with a plea for preliminary
injunction, a restraining order being issued, in view of the rather vehement
and earnest protestations of petitioner Manila Pest Control, Inc. that it was
denied procedural due process.  As will
be more fully explained, such is not the case at all.

More specifically, it was alleged that on February 24, 1967, respondent Workmen’s
Compensation Commission through its referee, considered a complaint filed
against it by the other respondent, Mario Abitria,
for compensation, submitted for decision after he and a physician had
testified, petitioner’s counsel having failed to appear at the hearing of February 24, 1967.^[1]
Then came, according to the petition, a motion for reconsideration dated March 7, 1967, petitioner praying that
he be allowed to present evidence on his behalf.^[2]
It was denied in an order of April 4,
1967, as a decision had already been rendered against petitioner,
as employer, awarding respondent Abitria P6,000.00 as
his disability compensation benefit.  It
was also pointed out in such order that there was no plea in such motion for
reconsideration for such decision being set aside, as it was limited to seeking
an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. 
It could not be granted as the matter was looked upon as “moot and
academic.”^[3]
It was then alleged in the petition that on April 11, 1967, a motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order was filed with the averment that petitioner was not aware of
any decision rendered in the case as no copy of the same had theretofore been
furnished to its counsel.^[4]
After a denial of such motion for reconsideration on April 24, 1967, and a plea for execution on
behalf of respondent Abitria, which was granted on June 14, 1967, the City Sheriff of
Manila, likewise made a respondent, levied on petitioner’s pro­perties on June 14, 1967, by virtue of the above
writ of execution.^[5]

It is petitioner’s contention that in the light of the above
alleged infringement of procedural due process, the actuation of respondent
Commission was either in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.  That was the basis for the
relief sought, seeking a writ of preliminary injunction restraining City
Sheriff of Manila, from proceeding with the sale at public auction of
petitioner’s properties and after hearing, annulling the aforesaid writ of
execution and likewise all the proceedings in RO4-WC Case No. 5503, thereafter
making the injunction perma­nent, and ordering respondent Abitria
to pay petitioner the sum of P500.00 as attorney’s fees.  Thus was imparted more than just a semblance
of plausibility to the petition, deceptive in character, as subsequent
pleadings proved, but nonetheless insufficient to call for its summary
dismissal.

On June 21, 1967, this Court issued a resolution to this
effect:  “‘The respondents in
L-27662 (Manila Pest Control, Inc. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et
al.) are required to file, within 10 days from notice hereof, an answer (not a
motion to dismiss) to the petition for prohibition; let temporary restraining
order issue, effective immediately and until further orders from this
Court.'”

The answer of respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission of July 21, 1967 and the later
pleadings, revealed quite a different story. 
It is now quite clear that instead of being the offended party suffering
from a legitimate grievance, its right to due process having been summarily
disregarded, petitioner was not above resorting to every technicality the law
affords to evade the performance of an obligation, which under the law it must
fulfill, namely, to compensate for the serious and debilitating ailment of
tuberculosis acquired in the course of employment by respondent Abitria. 
Accordingly, the petition for certiorari
and prohibition should be, as it is hereby, denied.

The facts as found by respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
which must be deemed conclusive, can yield no other conclusion but the
undeniable liability for compensation to respondent Abitria
on the part of petitioner.  Thus:  “From the recorded evidence, it appears
that claimant was employed with the respondent since February 4, 1956, working six (6) days a week and
receiving an average monthly wage of P180.00 as laborer for the
respondent.  He was assigned in the
Research Division which conducted research on rat traps and other matters
regard­ing extermination of pests, animals and insects.  It was testified to by the claimant and his
witnesses that in the place of his employment he was made to inhale dangerous
fumes as the atmos­phere was polluted with poisonous chemical dusts.  The working condition of his place of work
was also warm and humid in view of the products being manufactured by the
respondent.  He was not extended any
protective devise and he was also made to lift heavy objects in the painting
and soldering.  In his soldering work muriatic acid and soldering paste [were] used.  Sometime on July, 1966 while the claimant was
soldering, [he] began to experience symptoms of pulmonary tuberculosis.  Because of his spitting of blood or hemoptysis, he went to consult Dr. Felix Tuazon of the Quezon Institute
whose diagnosis was pulmonary tuberculosis, chronic, active, moderately
advanced, right: minimal, left.  He was
confined at the Quezon Institute under the care of
Dr. Felix Tuazon. 
According to the attending physician, he was admitted in the hospital
ward as a hemoptic patient or one who is bleeding
from the lungs.  When he was admitted he
was prescribed Vita K. ampules, bronocal,
ablocid, duestrep
injections and other anti-TB drugs.  His
clinical history showed that the claimant was diagnosed with severe coughing
followed by expectoration of fresh blood amounting to two glassful [when] he
was brought to the Philippine General Hospital and given injection and was
X-rayed.  From that hospital he was trans­ferred
to the Quezon Institute where he was subsequently
admitted.  The attending physician
testified further that the right lung had bronchogenous
lesions in the upper lobe with honeycomb at 2nd and 3rd intercostal
space, while the left lung had fibrotic lesion behind
the anterior rib II.  * * * He was
discharged at the Quezon Institute on September 3, 1966, but the illness was
not yet arrested although there was stopping of the hemoptysis.  The doctor testified on cross examination
that the nature of work of the claimant involving strenuous physical exertion
and other factors of work such as the lowering of his resistance in view of the
enormous inhalation of chemical fumes also brought about the aggravation of the
claimant’s present condition.  According
to the claimant the respondent was duly notified of his illness through the
general manager and in view of the respondent’s refusal to pay him disability
compensation despite repeated demands, claimant filed this instant claim.”^[6]

The sole issue then, as accurately set forth in the above
decision, was “to determine in this case * * *whether * * * there is
sufficient or substantial evidence in support of the claim for disability
compensation benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Law.  The evidence on record is crystal clear that
the claimant had already substantially proven his case and all indications
point that the illness of moderately advanced, pulmonary tuberculosis was
service connected in view of his work as laborer involving strenuous physical
exertion which brought about the lowering of his resistance due to the massive
inhalation of injurious chemical fumes to the extent that he was made an easy
prey to the contraction of TB bacilli. 
The fact that there was no evidence on record that claimant was sick upon
entrance to his employment, it is presumed that he was normal in every respect
during the first period of his employment and the disease of pulmonary
tuberculosis showed only during the later part of his employment when he was
assigned in the research division of the respondent.  The attending physician himself stated that
claimant’s exposure to his work aggravated the illness and we believe that the
respondent had failed to dispute the work connection as there is no showing
that claimant’s ailment was due to the lowering of his resis­tance by causes
other than the nature of his work as laborer of the respondent.”^[7]

It must be a realization that no valid defenses could be inter­posed
that prompted petitioner to rely on the alleged deprivation of due process, a
contention, which as will now be shown, is with­out basis.

The petition was so worded that the employer’s right to be heard
appeared to have been disregarded.  No
further attention should be accorded such an alleged grievance.  If it did not introduce any evidence, it had
itself solely to blame.  No fault could
be attributed to respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission.  There must be such a realization on the part
of petitioner for its four-page memorandum submitted in lieu of oral argument
did not bother to discuss such a matter at all. 
Accordingly, such a con­tention need not detain us further as it ought
never to have been raised in the first place.

Petitioner would make much however of the allegation that, as
shown in the answer of respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission,^[8]
the decision was sent to a certain Attorney Manuel Camacho but care of
petitioner’s counsel, Attorney Manuel Corpuz.  Petitioner would emphasize that the one
“officially furnished” with a copy of such decision was not its
counsel, who was without any connection with the aforesaid Attorney
Camacho.  It would conclude, therefore,
that it had not received a copy of a decision which could not thereafter reach
the stage of finality calling for a writ of execution.

This contention was squarely met in the reply-memorandum of November 6, 1967 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission.  Why it happened
thus was explained in an affidavit of one of its employees, a certain Gerardo
Guzman, included therein.^[9]
As set forth in such reply-memorandum: 
“As stated in the affidavit of Mr. Guzman, he went to the office of
Atty. Corpuz, on March 10, 1967 to deliver a copy of
the decision, * * *, but Atty. Corpuz refused to
receive the said decision alleging that he was no longer handling the
case.  Atty. Corpuz,
instead instructed Mr. Guzman to deliver the said decision to Atty. Camacho
since it was already Atty. Camacho who was handling the case, and Atty.
Camacho, according to Atty. Corpuz, even had the
records of the case.”^[10]
In view of such instruction, it was further noted, Guzman “went to the
office of Atty. Camacho, but since Atty. Camacho was not around he handed the
copy of the decision to the receiving clerk therein, who received it as
evidenced by the stamp pad bearing the name of the Law Office of Camacho, Zapa, Andaya & Associ­ates on
the attached true copy of the Notice of Decision, * * *.”^[11]

From which it could make the apt observation.  “It is indeed sad to note that after the
Counsel for Petitioner refused to receive the copy of said decision, he is now
impugning the delivery of said decision to Atty. Camacho and is denying
knowledge of it when in fact and in truth the delivery of said decision to
Atty. Camacho was made per his instruction to Mr. Guzman, as evidenced by the
attached affidavit of Mr. Guzman.”^[12]

In view of the rather persuasive character of such an affidavit
and the understandable reflection on the actuation of counsel for petitioner,
there was, as could be expected submitted by petitioner’s counsel a rejoinder,
dated November 26, 1967.  He would have
this Court believe that the reply-memorandum is contradicted by what appeared
in respondents’ answer, where it was stated that a copy of the decision was
received, not by him but by the law office of a certain Attorney Camacho.  He would then ask why Guzman did not serve a
copy of the decision to him.  He would
even assume, for argument sake, that there was a refusal on his part to accept
a copy of his decision, but he would argue why did not Guzman, who could be
expected to know the duties of a service officer, fail “to state said
refusal in his official return.”

Which of the above conflicting versions is entitled to
credence?  That of respondent Workmen’s
Compensation Commission would appear to be more in accordance with the
realities of the situation.  It is entitled
to belief.

This would not be the first time, in the first place, where out
of excess of zeal and out of a desire to rely on every conceivable defense that
could delay if not defeat the satisfaction of an obligation incumbent on one’s
client, counsel would attempt to put the most favorable light on a course of
conduct which certainly cannot be given the stamp of approval.  Not that it would clear counsel of any
further responsibility.  His conduct
leaves much to be desired.  His responsi­bility
aside, it made evident why, to repeat the effort to evade liability by
petitioner by invoking the due process guaranty must not be re­warded with
success.

Under the above circumstances, no due process question
arose.  What was done satisfied such a
constitutional requirement.  An effort
was made to serve petitioner with a copy of the decision; that such effort
failed was attributable to the conduct of its own counsel.  True, there was a denial; it is far from
persuasive, as already noted.  It does
not have the ring of truth.  There is no
reason why the decision would have been served on some other counsel if there
were no such misinformation, if there were no such attempt to mislead.

No benefit would have accrued to respondent Workmen’s
Compensation Commission.  It was merely
performing its official function. 
Certainly, it could be expected to see to it that the law’s
beneficiaries were not inconvenienced, much less frustrated, by its failure to
follow the regular procedure prescribed. 
It was un­likely that the employee entrusted with serving a copy of the
decision, in this particular case, and in this particular case alone, would
depart so radically from what the law requires, if there were no such
intervening cause that resulted in his going astray.  How could petitioner escape responsibility?

Petitioner, and petitioner alone, could be expected to furnish
such a cause.  Who would benefit
thereby?  The answer cannot be in
doubt.  Through such a circumstance,
whether intended or otherwise, a basis was laid for at least a delay of the
fulfillment of a just claim.  For it is
to be noted that there is no, as there could not be any, valid ground for
denying compensation to re­spondent Abitria on the
facts as found.  Considering how great
and pressing the laborer’s need for the compensation due him was and the
consequent temptation to settle for less if in the meanwhile, the money he had
the right to expect, was not forthcoming, petitioner, as the employer liable,
had everything to gain and nothing to lose by such a turn of events.  Even if it were an honest mistake, the
consequences were still deplorable.

It is quite revealing that in not one of the pleadings filed by
peti­tioner did it ever indicate how it could validly avoid its liability under
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission which disclosed that the ailment suffered
by respondent Abitria while in its employment was
indeed compensable.  Neither in its
memorandum submitted on October 19, 1967 and rejoinder of November 21, 1967,
did it ever occur to petitioner to allege that if given the opportunity for
hearing it could interpose a plausible, not to say a valid defense?  It did not do so because it could not do
so.  Our decisions as to the undeniable
liability of an employer similarly situated are impressive for their number and
unanimity.^[13]

It would thus be grimly ironic if the due process concept, in
itself an assurance and a guaranty of justice and fairness, would be the very
vehicle to visit on a hapless and impoverished litigant injustice and
unfairness.  The law itself would stand
in disrepute, if such a gross perversion of its dictates were allowed.  Any other view is unthinkable.  Otherwise, there would be a stultification of
all our efforts to promote social justice^[14]
and a mockery of the constitutional ideal of protection to labor.^[15]

Considering the above, it is not enough that petitioner be
required to pay forthwith the sum due respondent Abitria.  The unseemly conduct, under the above
circumstances disclosed, of petitioner’s counsel, Attorney Manuel A. Corpuz, calls for words of reproof.

It is one thing to exert to the utmost one’s ability to protect
the interest of one’s client.  It is
quite another thing, and this is to put it at its mildest, to take advantage of
any unforeseen turn of events, if not to create one, to delay if not to defeat
the recovery of what is justly due and demandable, especially so, when as in
this case, the obligee is a necessitous and
poverty-stricken man suffering from a dreaded disease, that unfortunately
afflicts so many of our countrymen and even more unfortunately requires an
outlay far beyond the means of our poverty-stricken masses.

The ancient and learned profession of the law stresses fair­ness
and honor; that must ever be kept in mind by everyone who is enrolled in its
ranks and who expects to remain a member in good standing.  This Tribunal is rightfully entrusted with
the serious responsibility of seeing to it that no deviation from such a norm
should be countenanced.  If what occurred
here would not be characterized for the shocking thing it was, then it could be
said that the law is less than fair and far from honorable.  What happens then to the ideal that only he
is fit to belong to such a profession who remains a faithful votary at the altar
of justice?  Such an ideal may be difficult
to approximate.  That is true, but let it
not be said that when such a notorious breach of its lofty standard took place,
as unfortunately it did in this case, this Court exhibited magnificent
unconcern.

WHEREFORE,
this petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction is denied.  With treble costs against petitioner to be
paid by his counsel, Attorney Manuel A. Corpuz.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez,
Castro, Angeles, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., on official leave.

^[1]
Petition, pars. 3 to 5.

^[2] Ibid,
par. 6.

^[3] Ibid,
Annex D.

^[4] Ibid,
par. 8.

^[5] Ibid,
pars. 9 to 11.

^[6]
Answer of Respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission, Decision, Annex C.

^[7] Ibid.

^[8] Ibid,
Annex C.

^[9]
Reply Memorandum of Respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission, Annex A.

^[10] Ibid.

^[11] Ibid.

^[12] Ibid.

^[13]
Cf. Blue Bar Coconut Co. v. Boo, 95 Phil. 867 (1954); Quezon Institute v. Velasco, 97 Phil. 905 (1955);
NASSCO v. Asuncion, 103 Phil. 67 (1958); Gutierrez v. Bachrach Motor Co., 105 Phil. 9 (1959); Blue Bar Coconut
Co. v. Lugod, 105 Phil. 513 (1959); Central Azucarrera Don Pedro v. de Leon, 105 Phil. 1141
(1959); Sereno v. PLDT, L-11184, May 29, 1959;
International Oil Factory v. Martinez vda. de Doria, L-13426, Sept. 30, 1960; MRR v. Ferrer, L-15454, Sept. 30, 1960; Plywood Industries Inc. v.
WCC, L-18165, May 30, 1962; Rebodos v. WCC,
L-18737, Nov. 29, 1962; Lambino v. Baens del Rosario, L-18434, Dec. 29, 1962; MRR v.
WCC, L-18388, June 28, 1963; Pantranco v. WCC,
L-16490, June 29, 1963; Itogon-Suyoc Mines Inc. v.
Dulay, L-18974, Sept. 30, 1963; NDC v. WCC,
L-19854, Dec. 27, 1963; Pantranco v. WCC,
L-16490, Jan. 30, 1964; Cepoc v. WCC, L-19164,
Feb. 29, 1964; Phil. Engr. Corp. v. Florentino, L-16569, May 30, 1964; MRR v. WCC,
L-19773, May 30, 1964; Peter Paul (Phil) Corp. v. WCC, L-19612, July 30,
1964; BT Co. v. Perez, L-19522, Aug. 31, 1964; Agustin v. WCC,
L-19957, Sept. 29, 1964; MRR v. Chavez, L-20103, Sept. 30, 1964; Vda. de Acosta v. WCC, L-19772, Oct. 21, 1964;
Central Azucarrera Don Pedro v. Agno, L-20424, Oct. 22, 1964; Koppel (Phil) Inc. v. Javellana, L-19926, April 30, 1965; Hernandez v.
WCC, L-20202, May 31, 1965; MRR v. Perez, L-21071, June 29, 1965; Caltex (Phil) Inc. v. Derpo,
L-19698, Jan. 31, 1966; NDC v. WCC, L-21724, April 27, 1967; NDC v.
Ayson, L-23450, May 24, 1967; MRR v. WCC,
L-21902, Aug. 10, 1967; NDC v. WCC, L-21963, Aug. 30, 1967; MRR v.
WCC, L-21504, Sept. 15, 1967; Victorias Milling Co. v.
WCC, L-25640, March 21, 1968; Rebar Buildings Inc. v. WCC, L-27486,
April 30, 1968; MRR v. WCC, L-23021, May 29, 1968; Central Azucarrera Don Pedro v. WCC, L-24987, July 31, 1968;
Juan Isberto v. Republic, L-22769, Aug. 30,
1968; C.A. Chiong Shipping Co. v. WCC,
L-24202, September 23, 1968.

^[14]
Section 5, Art. II, Constitution.

^[15]
Section 6, Art. XIV, Constitution.