APOLINARIO KIRIT, SR., ALICE K. MATURAN, ROSELYN K. BIGLETE, APOLINARIO A. KIRIT, JR., WILLIAM A. KIRIT AND LORNA A. KIRIT, PETITIONERS, VS. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM …

Petitioners seek a review of the decision of respondent
Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), dated March 1, 1978, which affirmed the denial by respondent
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) of petitioners’ claim for death
benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.

The findings of respondent commission are as follows:

The late Eugenia A. Kirit was a
classroom teacher of the Department of Education and Culture assigned at the Inalad Elementary School,
Siaton, Negros
Oriental.  Her clinical record reveals
that on March 25, 1976, she
was confined at the Siliman
University Medical
Center on complaints of pain on the
left shoulder for six (6) months prior to admission, with limitation of motion,
accompanied by numbness at the left side of the face, shoulder and arm.  Her ailments were diagnosed as “Osteoarthritis
and Giant Cell Tumor, left humerus.” She died on
July 1, 1976 at the age of
fifty six (56).^[1]

On December 17, 1976,
a claim for employees’ compensation benefits was filed by the decedent’s
husband, Apolinario Kirit,
Sr., with respondent Government Service Insurance System.  Said claim was denied by the GSIS in its
letter-decision dated December 21,
1976,^[2]
stating that the cause of Mrs. Kirit’s death,
osteoarthritis and giant cell tumor, left humerus,
are not occupational diseases, taking into consideration the nature of her particular
work.  The GSIS further stated that the
evidence submitted by petitioners had not shown that said ailment directly
resulted from her occupation or employment as a teacher.

Apolinario Kirit,
Sr. filed a motion for reconsideration on March 17, 1977, which was likewise denied by the GSIS on
the same grounds stated in its decision of December 21, 1976.^[3]

On appeal,
respondent Employees’ Compensation Commission affirmed the decision of the GSIS
holding that:

“Osteoarthritis and Giant Cell Tumor,
are definitely not accepted as occupational diseases.  Both are not included in the list of
occupational diseases.  In the case of Osteoarthrities, medical authorities believe that it is the
result of physiologic process of aging. 
It is characterized by thinning or degeneration of cartilage and
degeneration of bone in some parts of the joint.  Osteoarthritis usually develops slowly and
gradually in the latter half of life.  It
involves degeneration and in one sense is a part of the aging process of the
people afflicted with it.  The same could
be said of Giant Cell Tumor, which is precipitated by extrinsic factors
unrelated to employment.”^[4]

The sole issue presented for resolution in this case is whether or not the death
of Eugenia Kirit caused by osteoarthrities
and/or giant cell tumor is legally compensable.

There is no dispute that the provisions of the Labor Code apply
to the case at bar, as admitted by the petitioners^[5]
and as shown by the evidence on record that the illness and death of the
decedent occurred after January 1, 1975.

Thus, the contentions of petitioners, which are anchored on
presumptions of compensability and aggravation provided under the former
Workmen’s Compensation Act, cannot be upheld. 
The said presumptions have been abandoned under the compensation scheme
in the present Labor Code.^[6]

Article 167(1) of the Labor Code, as amended, defines a
compensable sickness as “illness definitely acceptable as an occupational
disease listed by the Commission or any illness caused by employment subject to
proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions.”

For the sickness or the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the claimant must either show that it is a result of an
occupational disease listed by the Employees’ Compensation Commission or, if
not so listed, he must present proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions.^[7]

In the case at bar, the cause of decedent’s death, osteoarthritis
and/or giant cell tumor, are not listed by the ECC as
occupational diseases.  Consequently, to
be compensable it was incumbent upon petitioners to prove that the decedent’s
working conditions as a teacher increased the risk of her contracting the fatal
illness.

A careful review of the record shows that petitioners did not
present any evidence to prove work connection. 
They relied solely on the theory of aggravation and presumptions of
compensability under the old compensation law which have
no application in this case.  In the
absence of proof, we cannot conclude
that it was the employment of the decedent which increased the risk of her
contracting the disease.^[8] The burden of proof is upon petitioners, as
awards of compensation cannot be made to rest on presumptions.

As ruled in Tanedo vs. Employees’ Compensation
Commission, et al.:^[9]

“Neither may an award in petitioner’s favor be justified upon
any presumption that illness causing death or disability arose out of the
employment or was at least aggravated by such employment.  That presumption was laid down by the old
statute.  It is however now a thing of
the past, abolished on effectivity of the new law on January 1, 1975.  Awards of compensation benefits for death or
disability can now no longer be made to rest on presumption, but on a showing
that the causative disease is among those listed by the ECC, or on substantial
evidence that the risk of contracting said disease is increased by the
employees’ working conditions.”

Petitioners having failed to discharge the burden of proof placed
upon them by the Labor Code, the claim for death benefits was correctly denied
by public respondent.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. 
The decisions of respondents Government Service Insurance System
and Employees’ Compensation Commission denying the claim are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, 24.

^[2]
Ibid., 17.

^[3]
Ibid., 18-21

^[4]
Ibid., 26.

^[5]
Ibid., 11-12.

^[6]
Sulit vs.
ECC, et al., 98 SCRA 483 (1980); Casumpang vs.
ECC, et al., 150 SCRA 21 (1987); Sarmiento vs.
ECC, et al., 161 SCRA 312 (1988).

^[7]
Section 1(b). 
Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation:  Debatian vs.
GSIS, 149 SCRA 123 (1987).

^[8]
Vda.
de Inguillo vs. ECC,
et. al., G.R. No. 51543, June 6, 1989.

^[9]
154 SCRA 288 (1987).