G.R. No. L-23542. January 02, 1968

JUANA T. VDA. DE RACHO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MUNICIPALITY OF ILAGAN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions January 2, 1968 BENGZON, J.P., J.:
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BENGZON, J.P., J.:


Plaintiff Juana T. Vda.
de Racho and the decedent,
Manuel Racho, were spouses and had five minor
children.  On July 1, 1954 the decedent was appointed as market
clean­er in the Municipality of Ilagan, Isabela,
at the rate of P660.00 per annum (P55.00 monthly) which amount he received up
to June 30, 1958.  On July
1, 1958, decedent’s salary was increased to P720.00 per annum
(P60.00 monthly) by virtue of a promotional appointment extended to him by the
Municipal Mayor.  He received this amount
until Janua­ry 6, 1960 when
he tendered his resignation effective July
7, 1960.  Decedent was then
paid the money value of his accumulated leaves from January 7, 1960 to May 23, 1960 at the rate of P60.00 a month.

On October 5, 1960,
decedent died intestate at Ilagan.  Plaintiff then filed on December 9, 1960 a claim for salary differentials
with the Regional Office of the Department of Labor which dropped the case
later on for lack of jurisdiction.

Based on the foregoing facts, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, in an action brought on December 5, 1961, by
plaintiff, in her own behalf and as guardian ad litem
of her minor children, ruled that defendant Municipality of Ilagan
must pay P1,766.00 to plaintiff representing the wage
differentials and adjusted terminal leave of the decedent from December 9, 1957[1]
to May 23, 1960, based on the monthly wage rate of P120.00 pursuant to the
Minimum Wage Law.

Defendant municipality immediately appealed the case to Us on the sole submission that its shortage and lack of
available funds and expected revenue validly exempted it from complying with
the Minimum Wage Law
.

The appeal must be dismissed. 
We have already ans­wered the question posed in Rivera vs. Colago, L-12323, February 24, 1961, wherein We
ruled that lack of funds of a municipality does not excuse it from paying the
statutory minimum wages to its employees, which, after all, is a mandatory
statutory obligation
of the municipality. 
To uphold such defense of lack of available funds would render the
Minimum Wage Law futile and defeat its purpose. 
This also disposes of the implication appellant is trying to make that
its duty to pay minimum wages is not a statutory obligation which would command
preference in the municipal budget and appropriation ordinance.[2]

Moreover, We cannot sanction appellant’s
proposition that it would eventually and gradually implement the Mini­mum Wage
Law, “if and when its revenues can afford.” The law – insofar as it
affects government employees – took effect in 1952.[3]
It should have been implemented – or at least steps to implement it should have
been taken – right then.  To excuse the
defendant municipality now would be to permit it to benefit from its
nonfeasance.  It would also make the effectivity of the law dependent upon the will and
initiative of said municipality without statutory sanction.  Defendant’s remedy, therefore, is not to seek
an excuse from implementing the law but, as the lower court suggested, to
upgrade and improve its tax collection machinery with a view towards realizing
more revenues.  Or, it could for the
present forego all non-essential expenditures.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is, as it is hereby,
affirmed.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.


[1]
The cause of action for underpayments prior to this date was already barred by
the three-year limitation under the Minimum Wage Law.

[2]
See:  Secs.
2295 & 2296, Revised Administrative Code.

[3]
Sec. 3(c), Republic Act 602.