🎧 Case Brief Lecture

MANOLO P. CERNA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND CONRAD C. LEVISTE, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. L-48359. March 30, 1993 March 30, 1993

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Cerna versus Leviste

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Manolo P. Cerna against the Court of Appeals and Conrad C. Leviste, arising from a collection suit on a promissory note. Cerna was impleaded as a solidary debtor although he never signed the note; he had merely lent his car to the borrower, who mortgaged it as security. The case matters because the Supreme Court, while finding real merit in Cerna's substantive defenses, dismissed the petition on the procedural ground of res judicata. It is therefore a double lesson: a ruling on the solidary liability of a third-party mortgagor, and a warning against using repeated motions to dismiss as a substitute for a lost appeal.

Procedural History

Leviste filed a collection suit for a sum of money before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against Celerino Delgado and Cerna as solidary debtors. Cerna filed his first motion to dismiss, grounded on lack of cause of action and on the death of Delgado. Judge Nicanor S. Sison denied it. Cerna then went to the Court of Appeals on a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition, alleging grave abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals denied the petition, and that decision became final.

Cerna filed a second motion to dismiss on essentially the same grounds. Judge Nelly L. Romero Valdellon denied it, reiterating the earlier resolution. Cerna's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. He then filed a second petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals. That court dismissed the petition insofar as it alleged lack of cause of action against Cerna, but granted it insofar as it sought the dismissal of the complaint against the deceased Delgado. Cerna then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.

Facts

On or about October 16, 1972, Celerino Delgado and Conrad Leviste entered into a loan agreement evidenced by a promissory note. Only Delgado signed the note, promising to pay Leviste 17,500 pesos, with interest at twelve percent per annum, ninety days after date.

On the same date, Delgado executed a chattel mortgage over a Willy's jeep he owned. Acting as attorney-in-fact of Cerna under a special power of attorney, Delgado also mortgaged a Taunus car belonging to Cerna. The chattel mortgage contract, however, was signed only by Delgado as mortgagor.

The period lapsed without Delgado paying the loan. Leviste filed a collection suit against Delgado and Cerna as solidary debtors. Delgado later died, and Leviste pursued a money claim against his estate. Cerna maintained throughout that he never bound himself under the note and that the filing of the collection suit barred the foreclosure of the mortgage.

Issues

  • Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action against Cerna, who did not sign the promissory note and was not a debtor under it.
  • Whether or not a third person who mortgages his own property to secure another's obligation becomes solidarily bound with the principal debtor.
  • Whether or not the filing of a collection suit bars the subsequent foreclosure of the chattel mortgage.
  • Whether or not the petition is barred by res judicata, given the finality of the earlier Court of Appeals decision denying the first petition.

Applicable Provisions

Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides:

Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.

This anchors the ruling that only Delgado, the sole signatory, was bound by the contract of loan.

Article 1207 of the Civil Code provides:

There is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.

This defeats the Court of Appeals' holding that Cerna was a solidary debtor, since nothing in the note made him one.

Article 2085 of the Civil Code provides:

The following requisites are essential to the contracts of pledge and mortgage: (3) That the persons constituting the pledge or mortgage have the free disposal of their property, and in the absence thereof, that they be legally authorized for the purpose.

This explains why the special power of attorney was executed: it authorized Delgado to mortgage Cerna's car, but it did not make Cerna a mortgagor or a debtor.

Section 7 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court provides:

Mortgage debt due from estate. A creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section; or he may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone, and foreclosure the same at any time within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate.

This governs the creditor's remedies against a deceased debtor's secured claim and confirms that the remedies are alternative, not cumulative.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the complaint stated no cause of action against Cerna. Only Delgado signed the promissory note, and nowhere did it appear that Cerna was a co-debtor. Under Article 1311, contracts take effect only between the parties.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the Court of Appeals' reliance on the chattel mortgage to create solidarity. A third-party mortgagor is not solidarily bound with the principal obligor. The chattel mortgage may be an accessory contract to the loan, but the signatory to the principal contract remains primarily bound. It is only upon the principal debtor's default that the creditor may have recourse against the mortgagor by foreclosure, and the third-party mortgagor's liability extends only to the property mortgaged. The special power of attorney did not make Cerna a mortgagor; it merely authorized Delgado to mortgage Cerna's property, in compliance with Article 2085.

On the third issue, the Court agreed that the filing of the collection suit barred foreclosure. A mortgagee who sues for collection abandons the remedy of foreclosure, for he thereby manifests his lack of interest in going after the mortgaged property as security. This is all the more true because Leviste was pursuing a money claim against a deceased person, and under Section 7 of Rule 86 the creditor must elect between abandoning the security and foreclosing it; he may not have both remedies.

On the fourth issue, however, the Court held that the petition must fail on procedural grounds. The second motion to dismiss was a reiteration of the first, and the second petition for certiorari sought to circumvent the finality of the earlier Court of Appeals decision. The action was barred by res judicata. Cerna should have allowed the trial to proceed, where his defenses could still be heard.

Doctrine

A third person who mortgages his own property to secure another's loan does not thereby become solidarily liable with the principal debtor. Solidarity is never presumed; under Article 1207 it exists only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires it. The third-party mortgagor's liability extends only to the mortgaged property, and the creditor's recourse against him is foreclosure, not a personal judgment for the debt.

A mortgagee who files a suit for collection abandons the remedy of foreclosure. He cannot pursue both. Where the debtor has died, Section 7 of Rule 86 requires the creditor to elect: abandon the security and prosecute his claim against the estate, or foreclose the mortgage. If he elects one, he must abandon the other.

Finally, a party may not file repeated motions to dismiss on grounds already resolved and finally denied, nor use a second petition for certiorari to revive a lapsed appeal. Such conduct is barred by res judicata and unduly burdens the courts.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, with costs, so Leviste prevailed on procedural grounds even though the Court sustained Cerna's substantive defenses.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a third-party mortgagor is not solidarily bound with the principal debtor, and that a collection suit abandons the foreclosure remedy. Examiners use this case to test solidarity under Article 1207 and the election of remedies under Section 7 of Rule 86, often pairing it with the procedural trap of res judicata.