VICTORIANA SAGUCIO, PLAINTIFF, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT VS. ADRIANO BULOS, DEFENDANT, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE.

On October 29, 1948, plaintiff Victoriana Sagucio filed with the
Court of First Instance of Isabela, a complaint (Civil Case No. 142),
against defendant Adriano Bulos, for the redemption of a 21 hectare
land covered by a Homestead Patent, originally issued in the name of
Andres Sagucio, deceased father of Victoriana, pursuant to Sec. 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, in view of the repeated refusal of the
defendant to permit her to repurchase the property, without any
justifiable ground therefor.’ The land was sold by Andres Sagucio for
P3,000.00 in Japanese money on April 21, 1944, to Adriano Bulos and TCT
No. 201 was issued in the latter’s name on February 19, 1947. The CFI
of Isabela rendered judgment on July 29, 1954, the dispositive portion
of which reads—

“FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the court hereby enters judgment (a)
ordering the defendant to execute the proper deed of conveyance of the
homestead in question in favor of plaintiff upon payment by the latter
to him of the sum of P3,200.00 it being understood that plaintiff
should assume the obligation in the sum of P3,000.00 in favor of the
Philippine National Bank; (b) ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff the possession of the land; (c)
ordering the Register of Deeds of Isabela to cancel Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 201, and to issue in lieu thereof another
transfer certificate of title in favor of the plaintiff and (d) defendant to pay the costs.”

The above judgment was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which modified the same as follows—

“3. The decision below in reference to the
disposition of the total amount of P6,200.00 due from appellee to
appellant, should be clarified. We declare that the said sum of
P6,200.00 should first be applied to the payment of the mortgage
indebtedness in favor of tile Philippine National Bank. The remainder,
if any, after deducting the costs of the suit, should be turned over to
appellant. In the event that the amount of P6,200.00 be not sufficient
to cover the entire obligation to the bank, the said amount, minus the
costs, should be turned over to the Bank and the deficiency thereof
should be made up by appellant.

Thus modified, the judgment appealed from in all other respect, is hereby affirmed. Costs against appellant.”

The petition for Certiorari, to review the above judgment,
presented by defendant Adriano Bulos, was dismissed by Us in a
resolution dated September 27, 1956, and the judgment was
correspondingly entered on October 26, 1956.

On June 25, 1959, Adriano Bulos filed an action (Civ. Case No.
1298), in the same Court, for Quieting of Title, in accordance with the
provisions of Articles 476 to 480 of the new Civil Code, alleging that
the decision recognizing Sagucio’s right to repurchase had already
become invalid, ineffective and unenforceable, because of her failure
to exercise said right within the period provided for in Section 119 of
Act 141.

On July 10, 1959, Sagucio presented two pleadings, one in Civil
Case No. 142, asking for the execution of the judgment rendered therein
(to exercise her right of redemption) and another in Civil Case No.
1298, which was an Answer to the action for quieting of title. The
quieting of title case was submitted by the parties on the following
stipulation of facts, to wit—

“1. That a complaint was filed in Civil Case No.
142 which is incorporated hereof by way of reference and is found on
page 1 of the records of said case, and the corresponding answer was
filed which is also incorporated hereof by way of reference and is
found on page 6 of the records of said case * * *.

2. That
in the said case a decision was rendered by the court on July 29, 1954
and is found on pages-93 to 101 of the records, which decision was.
appealed to the Court of Appeals by the defendant Adriano Bulos; that
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the decision of this
Court with a slight modification; that said decision of the Court of
Appeals was appealed by certiorari to the Supreme Court and was
affirmed by said court in a decision rendered on September 27, 1956,
which is marked as ‘Annex A’ of this stipulation of facts;

3. That after the filing of Civil Case No. 142 and on April 18, 1949,
plaintiff Victoriana Segucio made a judicial consignation of P370.00 to
this court estimated by her and intended as a repurchase price of the
homestead in question, which amount was withdrawn by her on September
6, 1952 before the rendition of judgment in this Court;

4.
That the plaintiff Victoriana Segucio shall deposit immediately to the
court within five days repurchase price of P6,200.00 from the issuance
of the order of the court to that effect;

5. That with
respect to Civil Case No. 1293, inasmuch as the respondent in his
answer admitted paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the complaint and that
he simply denied paragraphs 3, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 thereof which refer
to question of law, the parties believe that there is no need of
presenting any oral or documentary evidence, and;

6. That
the parties agree that the approximate market value of the land in
question covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 201 is
P20,000.00.”

Upon the basis of the above stipulation of facts, on October 14, 1959, the Court said—

“For all the foregoing consideration, the Court hereby enters judgment (a) denying, as it hereby denies the petition for a writ of execution; (b)
declaring that the right of plaintiff-respondent Victoriana Segucio to
repurchase the homestead under the Public Land Law has prescribed; and (c)
declaring petitioner-defendant Adriano Bulbs the absolute and
registered owner in fee simple of the land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 201. Without special pronouncement as to
costs.”

After the motion for reconsideration, invoking the spirit of the
law and the avowed policy of the State to the effect that the heirs of
the homesteader must be given all the chance to redeem the property was
denied, Sagucio elevated the matter to this Court on two assignments of
errors, both of which converge on the issue as to whether or not she
can still repurchase the property, under the facts obtaining in the
present case.

There is no question that Victoriana Sagucio has the right to
repurchase the property in question. This is the clear import of the
decision in Civil Case No. 142, ordering the defendant Bulos to execute
the proper deed of conveyance in her favor. The Court of Appeals and
this Court affirmed the decision, with slight modification only as to
the disposition or application of the money to be paid.

Section 119 of Act No. 141, relied upon by appellee provides—

“Every conveyance of land acquired under the free
patent homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to
repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period
of five years from the date of the conveyance.”

Following strictly the letter of the provision and taking as basis
for computation of the period of redemption the date of conveyance,
which was April 21, 1944, it would seem that when the appellant tried
to redeem the property by asking the execution of the judgment in Civil
Case No. 142, the five (5) year period had already elapsed. But the
period prescribed for repurchasing the property had been interrupted by
judicial demand, by the bringing of the action for redemption (Civil
Case No. 142), which amounted to a tender to redeem, as in fact, the
complainant consigned with the Court the sum of P370.00 which was
withdrawn on September 6, 1952 (stipulation of facts). The filing of
the action to redeem was well within the 5-year period which preserved
her right to repurchase (Lustado vs. Pinol, et al. 102 Phil. 1164). It is held that when prescription is by judicial demand, the full time for the prescription must be reckoned from the cessation of the interruption (Florendo vs. Organo, 90 Phil., 483; Pamposa de Nator vs. CIR, 114 Phil.,—; see also Spring vs.
Barr 120 Southern Reporter, 256, 9 La. App. 732; 54 C. J. S., 293).
Considering that the decision in the action for redemption (Case No.
142), became final on October 26, 1956, on which date the interruption
had ceased to exist, and the motion for a writ of execution was
presented on July 10, 1959, it follows that the period to redeem has
not elapsed.

Moreover, as things now stand, what is before Us is a petition for
the issuance of a writ of final judgment in case No. 142, which was
filed on July 10, 1959. By virtue of the provisions of Rule 39, section
6, therefore, the judgment in said case No. 142 could be executed on
motion within 5 years from the date of its finality, which was October
26, 1956. The motion for execution of said judgment was within such
period. But the lower court and the appellee countered with the
argument that said provision (Sec. 6, Rule 39), governs cases of
execution in general and not the period to repurchase under section
that to permit the execution of the decision, as sought for by the
appellant, would amount to extending the period of repurchase from 5 to
10 years, thereby offending the express mandate and spirit of said
section. The rule of execution of judgment under the rules should
govern all kinds of execution of judgment, unless it is otherwise
provided in other laws. As the Public Land Act does not provide the
procedure for the execution of judgments arising from its provisions,
“By express provision of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the rules
contained therein apply to land registration cases in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient (Dulay vs. The Director of Lands, 53 Off. Gaz. p. 161)” (Duran vs. Oliva, 113 Phil.,—; 58 Off. Gaz., [39] 6637; also Marcelo vs. Mencias, 107 Phil., 1071; 58 Off. Gaz., [16] 3349).

And considering finally the avowed policy of the Public Land Act,
to give the homesteader an opportunity to preserve as much as possible,
the ownership of the land acquired by him through hard labor and toil,
it would seem just to permit the appellant daughter of the homesteader
to repurchase the land. Appellee would not lose anything. The amount he
paid as original price, in Japanese money, would have been aptly
compensated by the enjoyment of the fruits of the property for several
years.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
another entered, ordering the appellee to execute the corresponding
deed of reconveyance in favor of appellant Victoriana Sagucio, in
accordance with the terms and conditions specified in the decision of
the Court of Appeals heretofore recited. No pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Barrera, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.