G.R. No. L-15714. April 23, 1962
LORENZA FABIAN, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. EULOGIO MENCIAS, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
DIZON, J.:
suit (Civil Case No. 2009) against Lorenza and Albano Fabian to collect the sum
of P925.51, with 12% thereon from October 24, 1954 until full payment, plus
P200.00 as attorney’s tees, the first amount being the alleged unpaid balance of
the purchase price of gasoline and other articles taken on credit by said
defendants from the plaintiff. Judgment for the latter haying been rendered
after due trial, the defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Civil Case No. 4054), where they filed their answer with a counterclaim.
After several postponements, the case was called for trial on March 10, 1958,
on which date the plaintiff rested his case. Thereafter, upon motion of
defendants’ counsel, the continuation of the trial was set for June 17. On that
date defendants again moved for postponement, but the motion was denied in view
of plaintiff’s opposition. The case was therefore considered submitted for
decision.
On September 6, 1958 the court rendered judgment finding that, according to
plaintiff’s evidence, the total value of the gasoline and other articles taken
on credit by the defendants amounted to P1,087.41, while the receipts showing
payments made by them gave the total sum of P1,858.47. For this reason the court
dismissed the case, with costs against the plaintiff.
The plaintiff received notice of the judgment on October 7, 1958. Eleven days
thereafter (October 18) he filed a pleading entitled “PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT” which, for all legal purposes—as admitted by said plaintiff himself in
his motion for reconsideration (Annex G to the petition for certiorari)—was a
motion for new trial because the grounds relied upon therein were: that the
decision was contrary to the evidence because it failed to consider and give due
weight to a portion of plaintiff’s evidence; that plaintiff’s counsel, in not
presenting certain material evidence, committed excusable negligence resulting
in prejudice to plaintiff’s case. As a matter of fact, the principal relief
prayed for in the petition was for the court to give plaintiff a chance “to
amplify his evidence” (Annex A attached to the Petition for Certiorari). On
December 8, 1958 the court denied said petition, notice of the denial having
been served on the plaintiff on December 15 of the same year.
On December 27, 1958 the plaintiff filed another pleading entitled “URGENT
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL” (Annex D, Petition for Certiorari) based on the same
allegations or grounds relied upon in his previous petition for relief from
judgment. On January 6, 1959 the court denied said motion on the ground that the
decision had already become final and executory. Notice of the order of denial
was received by the plaintiff on January 22, 1959.
On January 26, 1959 the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration claiming
that his petition for relief from judgment was, in law and in fact, a motion for
new trial and, as such, suspended the running of the period of appeal; that,
consequently, when the “urgent motion for new trial” was filed, the decision had
not yet become final and executory. Over the opposition of the defendants, the
court, in its order of May 4, 1959, granted the motion for reconsideration, set
aside the decision, and set the case for new trial on July 31, 1959. Thereupon
the present petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction, was filed upon
the theory that the court had acted either without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the last order, because the decision of September
5, 1958 had already become final.
In accordance with Rule 17, section 4, a second motion for new trial may be
allowed only if based on a ground not existing when the first motion was made,
and may be filed within the period of appeal excluding therefrom the time during
which the first motion had been pending. This provision implements or emphasizes
those of Rule 26, section 8, of the Rules of Court concerning Omnibus
motions.
In the light of this provision, and considering Interior’s own contention
that the petition for relief from judgment filed on October 18, 1958 was really
a motion for new trial, it seems clear that his second motion for new trial was
out of order because it was based on exactly the same grounds relied upon in the
previous petition and was a mere reiteration of the latter. Its filing,
therefore, did not suspend the running of the period of appeal. (Rili, et al.
vs. Chunaco et al. 48 O. G., p. 614; Sawit vs. Rodas, et al., 73, Phil., 310).
As a result, when Interior filed his motion for reconsideration on January 26,
1958, the decision had already become final, as shown by the following:
As notice of judgment was received by Interior on October 7, 1958, it
is clear that he had already consumed or used up eleven days of the period of
appeal when he filed his petition for relief (new trial) on October 18,
1958. The period was suspended from that date until notice of the order of
denial was received by Interior on December 15, 1958. The period of
appeal, therefore, started running again on December 16, 1958 and expired
nineteen days thereafter, that is, on January 3, 1959. Consequently, the motion
for reconsideration that was granted by the respondent judge was filed (January
26, 1959) out of time.
WHEREFORE, the writ is granted, with the result that the order of May 4, 1959
mentioned heretofore is annulled. With costs against respondent Pedro
Interior.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., and Paredes, JJ., concur.