SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF QUEZON, SPECIAL PROSECUTOR VICENTE ORENDAIN, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. JUDGE ENRIQUE MAGLANOC, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH II OF…

This original action in certiorari is directed against certain
orders of respondent Judge in Special Civil Action No. 6461 pending in his
court.

The pertinent events are as follows:

On July 26, 1961
respondent Judge promulgated a decision in Cadastral Case No. 90, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 1516, adjudicating Lot No. 7719 (with an area of 15,505.6854), together with the
improvements thereon, to the claimant Leon Faraon.  The decision was subsequently amended on September 6, 1961, whereby six hundred
(600) hectares of Lot No. 7719 were adjudicated to Frances Alice and Leonor Burgess, leaving to Faraon
14,905.6854 hectares.

On October 4, 1961 Leon Faraon, a
Catholic priest, executed a sworn statement before Notary Public Leonardo L. Guce in an investigation conducted by the Office of the Provincial Governor of Quezon denying that he was the petitioner and claimant of
Lot No. 7719 in Cadastral Case No. 90, or that he appeared, let alone gave his
testimony, in that proceeding.

In view of the peculiar
circumstances thus dis­closed in connection with the decision in said case,
then Secretary of Justice Alejo Mabanag,
acting pursuant to Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued on
December 6, 1961 Administrative Order No. 300, designating Attorneys Fernando
de Leon and Vicente Orendain, Jr. of the Department
of Justice as special prosecutors “to assist the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon and City Attorney of Lucena
City in the prosecution of the Personnel of the Court of First Instance
involved and particularly Jesus Orozco, File­mon Juntereal, Elino Joyas, Fidel Faraon and others
for the alleged falsification of public documents, false testimony, and other
offenses related to the promulgation of decisions of the Court of First
Instance in Cadastral cases of Quezon covering more
than 15,000 hectares of land in that province.”

Accordingly, on January
3, 1962 Attorney Orendain, Jr. started the investigation pursuant to the
Administrative Order.  On the same day
the persons named therein (respondents here) filed a petition for prohibition
before respondent Judge (Special Civil Action No. 6461), alleging that:

“a. [Orendain] trataba
de comenzar con la investigacion
contra los aqui compare­cientes en ausencia del
recurrido Fiscal Provincial, a los
comienzos de la cual ellos impugnaron tanto la facultad del
investigador como
la legalidad y validez del
procedimiento;

“b. La susodicha investigacion
es improcedente, ilegal y nula, puesto que los
hechos que constituyen los delitos supuestos, sobre los cuales
versa la misma se encuentran
sub-judice y forman cuestiones prejudiciales;

“c. Los recurridos al ordenar
y practicer la precitada investigacion han obrado sin jurisdiccion, o en exceso, con grave abuso de su competencia, y en la tramitacion ordinaria del caso no existe el recurso de apelacion expedito y adecuado, mas que la presente
Accion Civil Especial por avocacion y prohibicion.”

On January
4, 1962 respondent
Judge issued a writ of preliminary injunction against herein petitioners,
restraining them from conducting the preliminary investigation pursuant to the
directive of the Secretary of Justice, and another order for them to answer the
petition.

Orendain moved to set aside the orders aforesaid and
upon denial of the motion came to this Court on cer­tiorari.

The two principal grounds relied upon by herein respondents in
their petition below are manifestly un­meritorious and the orders complained
of, particularly the injunctive writ, constitute a grave abuse of
discretion.  The first of said grounds is
that petitioning special prosecutors could not legally conduct the
investigation in the absence of the Provincial Fiscal.  No authority for this novel proposition was
or has been cited.  The mere fact that
the special prosecutors were designated to “as­sist” the Provincial
Fiscal does not mean that the latter must always be present at every stage of
the investigation.  It was held by this
Court in another case:  “A lawyer ap­pointed by the
Secretary of Justice, pursuant to section 1686 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended, to assist the City Fiscal, is authorized to sign informations, make investigations and conduct
prosecutions.  This lawyer does not need
to secure the consent of the corresponding Fiscal to start a prosecution.  In fact, it is not a secret that the power in
said section has often been exercised by the Department of Justice, whenever it
did not see eye to eye with the Fiscal on certain matters involving offenses
and/or prosecutions.” (People vs. Henderson, G. R. No.
L-10829-30, May 29, 1959.)
If consent of the Fiscal is not required so that a prosecutor designated in the
man­ner above described may discharge his duties, it stands to reason that the
physical presence of the Fiscal is likewise not indispensable.  Otherwise the purpose for which the special
prosecutor has been designated can be easily defeated by an indifferent or
uncooperative Fiscal.

Respondents’ second point is
that since a peti­tion for reopening of the Cadastral case has been
filed by the Director of Forestry and is now pending in court, the investigation to be conducted by the
Fiscal would treat of matters that are sub-judice.  Consequently, it is contended, a prejudicial
question exists which should be resolved in the said petition before any
criminal proceed­ings are started.

The contention is without merit.  The possible
criminal responsibility of respondents, as may be established upon
investigation pursuant to Administrative Order No. 300, is not in issue in the
petition for reopen­ing filed by the Director of Forestry.  What is
alleged there is that fraud, deceit and misrepresentation had been
committed by claimant-movant Leon Faraon in connection with his cadastral application.  No reference whatsoever is made to the
participation of respondents, who are the per­sons specifically fingered for
investigation in the Administrative Order. 
The judgment that may be rendered in the cadastral case will not be
conclusive as to the guilt or innocence of said respondents.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted:  the order of respondent
Judge for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction as well as the writ
itself are here­by set aside. 
Costs against respondents except the Judge.

Reyes, JBL, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, CJ., took no part.

Dizon, J., did not take part.