SULTAN RASUMAN DIPATUAN AND HADJI ALL MAMADRA ALAWI, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF BACOLOD GRANDE, MACABOROD BALINDONG AND HADJI…
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Dipatuan versus Commission on Elections
The Case
This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition brought by Sultan Rasuman Dipatuan and Hadji Ali Mamadra Alawi, candidates for Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Bacolod Grande, Lanao del Sur, against the Commission on Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bacolod Grande, and the rival candidates Macaborod Balindong and Hadji Hasan Ali Dino Api. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to annul a resolution of the Commission on Elections which excluded the returns of certain precincts from the canvass and set aside their proclamation. The case matters because it draws the outer boundary of the Commission's constitutional power: the Commission is not a roving commission free to correct every electoral evil, and it cannot entertain, for the first time on appeal, an objection that the law requires to be raised before the board of canvassers.
Procedural History
The election for municipal officials was held on November eighth, nineteen hundred seventy-one. The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bacolod Grande proclaimed the petitioners as the winning candidates for Mayor and Vice-Mayor on November ninth. The private respondents, having lost, filed a petition with the Commission on Elections on November fifteenth, later amended on December thirteenth. On December second, the Commission suspended the effect of the proclamation. On March tenth, nineteen hundred seventy-two, the Commission issued the challenged resolution declaring the returns from the disputed precincts spurious and excluding them, annulling the proclamation, and directing the board of canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winners on the remaining returns. The petitioners came to the Supreme Court on March twenty-third, and the next day the Court issued a temporary restraining order. After comments, answers, and memoranda, the case was submitted for decision on October first, nineteen hundred seventy-two.
Facts
The petitioners were duly registered and qualified candidates for Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Bacolod Grande, Lanao del Sur, in the election of November eighth, nineteen hundred seventy-one. The private respondents were their rivals, Balindong for Mayor and Dino Api for Vice-Mayor. The petitioners alleged that Balindong had been previously convicted of multiple murder and was disqualified, but the Commission had disallowed that objection in an earlier resolution. The petitioners also alleged shooting, force, and violence in several precincts, and that the election returns were prepared at the Philippine Constabulary headquarters in Marawi City rather than at the polling places.
After the results became publicly known, the private respondents filed their petition with the Commission on November fifteenth, and a belated amended petition on December thirteenth. Critically, at no time did the private respondents object to the inclusion of the returns of the disputed precincts at the canvassing stage before the Municipal Board of Canvassers. The Commission never denied this failure; it did not even take issue with the petitioners' account of when and how the private respondents raised their objections.
The Commission nonetheless entertained the petition, declared the returns from the disputed precincts spurious or manufactured, annulled the proclamation of November ninth, and ordered the board of canvassers to reconvene, exclude those returns, and proclaim the winning candidates. The petitioners stood to lose their proclaimed victory if the disputed returns were excluded.
Issues
- Whether or not the Commission on Elections may entertain, on petition of the private respondents, an objection to the inclusion of election returns in certain precincts which was never raised before the Municipal Board of Canvassers at the canvassing stage.
- Whether or not the Commission on Elections may, in the name of insuring free, orderly, and honest elections, act beyond the limits fixed by the Election Code and the Constitution.
Applicable Provisions
Article Ten, Section Two of the Constitution provides:
The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of its enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions, affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials. All law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government when so required by the Commission, shall act as its deputies for the purpose of insuring free, orderly, and honest elections. The decisions, orders, and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court. No pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence for the violation of any election law may be granted without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.
This provision fixes the Commission's competence as enforcement and administration of election laws, not a general power to inquire into all electoral evils.
Section Two Hundred Sixteen of the Revised Election Code of 1971 provides:
The municipal or municipal district board of canvassers shall meet not later than six o'clock in the evening on election day for the purpose of canvassing the votes cast in the municipality for candidates for municipal or municipal district offices, as the case may be. The municipal or municipal district treasurer shall produce before it the election returns from the different election precincts already received by him. The board shall canvass continuously until the last statement of election has been read, but may suspend the canvassing only for the purpose of waiting the other election returns, and shall immediately resume canvassing upon receipt of said election returns. Each time the board suspends its canvassing, it shall prepare the total of votes cast for each candidate for national, provincial, city, municipal or municipal district offices and send copies thereof by the fastest means of communication to the Commission on Elections in Manila and to the provincial treasurer, making available the data contained therein to mass media and other interested parties. After counting all the votes cast for candidates for municipal or municipal district offices, as the case may be, the board shall proclaim as elected for said offices those who have polled the largest number of votes for the different offices, in the same manner as hereinabove provided for the provincial board.
This statutory scheme places the initial canvass and the objections to returns before the municipal board of canvassers, and the Commission's appellate review presupposes that the question was first raised there.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The statutory scheme on canvassing is explicit, and the public interest in procedural regularity is best served by strict compliance. The Court held that the issue of whether returns should be accepted or excluded must first be brought before the appropriate board of canvassers. It relied on its consistent rulings, including Lucman versus Dimaporo, where it held that a petitioner could not legally raise before the Commission, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, any question not originally set up before the board. The rationale, expressed in Anni versus Rasul, is that allowing belated questions would mean undue and endless delays in pre-proclamation proceedings, contrary to the settled doctrine that pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided. The Court distinguished Antonio versus Commission on Elections, where there was a total failure of election and the provincial board could not have held a valid session, and held it was no justification for allowing the Commission to pass upon an issue that must be threshed out with the board of canvassers. The Commission therefore lacked legal competence to issue the challenged order.
On the second issue, the Court also ruled for the petitioners. While sympathetic to the constitutional objective of insuring free, orderly, and honest elections, the Court stressed that the Commission's power is limited to enforcement and administration of election laws. It has no competence to act outside the statutes and administrative orders in pursuance thereof; its scope is circumscribed by the Election Code. It is not vested with direct constitutional authority like the executive, legislative, and judicial departments. As the Court put it, the Commission is not vested with a roving commission to inquire into all electoral evils and correct them. Quoting Chief Justice Moran in Cortez versus Commission on Elections:
The functions and powers of the Commission on Elections are limited by law. It has no legislative power to change or modify the law, nor may such power be delegated to the Commission.
And quoting Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Lawsin versus Escalona:
The Commission on Elections may not increase its scope, nor alter or amend the Election Code enacted by the Legislature.
Since the Commission failed to justify its action, the challenge to the validity of what it did must succeed.
Doctrine
First, an objection to the inclusion or exclusion of election returns must be raised before the municipal board of canvassers at the canvassing stage; it cannot be raised for the first time before the Commission on Elections on appeal. Second, the Commission on Elections is not a roving commission. Its power under Article Ten, Section Two of the Constitution is confined to the enforcement and administration of election laws, and it may not enlarge, alter, or amend the Election Code. Third, pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided, and belated questions that cause endless delays are disallowed.
Disposition
The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari annulling the Commission's resolution of March tenth, nineteen hundred seventy-two, granted the writ of prohibition restraining its enforcement, and prohibited the convening of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bacolod Grande to give effect to that resolution, without pronouncement as to costs.
Remember This
The single line to memorize: the Commission on Elections is not a roving commission, and an objection to returns not raised before the board of canvassers cannot be entertained by it on appeal. Examiners use this case to test the limits of the Commission's constitutional power and the rule that pre-proclamation objections must first be lodged with the board of canvassers.