THEA C. MANGABAT, REPRESENTED BY ERLINDA M. CRUZ, APPLICANT-APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT.
DIMAAMPAO, J.:
This doctrinal principium finds application in the case at bench.
At the vortex of this Appeal is the Order[3] dated 28 December 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 266, in LRC No. 11585-TG re: Application for Registration of Original Title. The court a quo disposed, as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the application of Thea C. Mangabat (represented by Erlinda Cruz), Filipino, of legal age, and residing at 602 Rebecca Avenue SE Auburn, MA 98092, United States, over the Lot in question containing an area of One Thousand Seventy Six Square Meters (1,076 sq.m.) as shown by plan Csd-00-001607… and its corresponding Technical Descriptions, situated in Barangay Wawa, City of Taguig, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon, is hereby GRANTED.
Upon the finality of the judgment, let the proper Decree of Registration and Certificate of Title be issued to the applicant pursuant to Section 39 of P.D. 1529
Let two (2) copies of this Order be furnished the Land Registration Authority Administrator Eulalio C. Diaz III, thru the Chief of the Docket Division of said Office, East Avenue, Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.”[4]
The factual milieux material to the disposition of the controversy unfurl as follows:
Applicant-appellee Thea Mangabat[5] (appellee), repre-sented by Erlinda Cruz, lodged an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land described as Lot 575-C with an area of 1,076 square meters located in Brgy. Wawa, Taguig City, and covered by Tax Declaration No. FL 009-01639.[6] The realty in dispute is a portion of the land originally owned by Rufino Mamonong (Rufino) who had four children, namely: Leodivina, Florencio, Tomas and Pascual, all surnamed Mamonong.[7] After the death of Rufino, his heirs subdivided his property and accordingly Lot 575-C was adjudicated to Leodivina who had two children, herein appellee and Sulficio Concepcion (Sulficio). Thereafter, the heirs of Sulficio waived their rights and interests over Lot 575-C in favor of appellee.[8] Ensuingly, appellee adjudicated to herself the whole Lot 575-C pursuant to an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the Estate of the Late Leodivina Mamonong.[9] In her application, appellee averred, inter alia, that she and her predecessors-in-interest had declared the subject lot for taxation purposes. They have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of an owner since 12 July 1945. There was neither a mortgage nor encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting the said parcel of land nor did any other person have an interest therein, legal or equitable, or was in possession thereof. The subject land is alienable and disposable land.[10]
On the scheduled initial hearing, appellee adduced pieces of documentary evidence apropos the jurisdictional require-ments of notices, posting and publication.[11] In the same vein, appellee offered in evidence tax declarations, the technical description, affidavits of self-adjudication and waiver of hereditary rights, and certifications from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Laguna Lake Development Authority. Witness Erlinda Cruz (Cruz) attested to these documentary evidence and testified on appellee’s alleged continuous, open, and exclusive possession of the factious property.
In due course, the court a quo rendered the impugned Decision finding appellee to have the registrable title over the subject property.
Oppositor-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (appellant), moved for reconsideration thereof, but the court a quo paid no heed to its Motion in the Order dated 21 September 2011.[12]
Unflustered, appellant interposed the present Appeal postulating—
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE OF THE SUBJECT LOT DESPITE THE FAILURE OF APPLICANT-APPELLEE TO PROVE SPECIFIC FACTS SHOWING THE NATURE AND DURATION OF HER POSSESSION AND THAT OF HER PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST.
II
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF TITLE UNDER THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE, IN RELATION TO THE PUBLIC LAND ACT, WERE NOT COMPLIED WITH.
The Appeal lacks merit.
Appellant asseverates that appellee failed to comply with the requirements set forth by law.
Appellant’s asseveration does not hold sway.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529[13] ordains:
“Sec. 14. Who may apply.-The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
- Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious posses-sion and occupation of alienable and dispo-sable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (Emphasis supplied)
Corollarily, Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141,[14] amended by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073,[15] reads:
“Section 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945. (Emphasis supplied)
As plain as a pikestaff, the aforecited laws both require that the continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of a parcel of land by the applicants, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, must commence on 12 June 1945 or earlier.
An applicant in a land registration case cannot just harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the application but must impress thereto the facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership and possession of the land.[16] Along this grain, it is settled that a person who seeks confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title to a piece of land on the basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest shoulders the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence compliance with the requirements of Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended.[17]
Case law teaches us that the determination of whether claimants were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 1945 as required by law, is a question of fact.[18] Here, We find no cogent reason to deviate from the conclusion of the court a quo that appellee has the registrable right owing to her and her predecessors-in-interest’s continuous possession of the subject parcel of land. The foundation of such conclusion is primarily factual. Findings of fact of the trial court are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence on record.[19]
Contrary to appellant’s thesis, appellee was able to prove by convincing evidence the required number of years of continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession over the realty. Appellee’s predecessor-in-interest, Rufino Mamonong, occupied and cultivated the subject land as early as 1916. Subsequently, he declared the lot for taxation purposes in 1917.20 On this score, witness Cruz avowed:
| “Q | Since when was Rufino Mamonong the owner of the property? |
| A | As early as March 27, 1916 or earlier he had (sic) been the owner. |
| Q | Do you have any proof to show that he was indeed the owner? |
| A | The tax declaration, sir. |
| Q | I have here the authentic document coming from the Provincial Assessor Officer of Rizal then, Tax Declaration No. 9667 issued in the name of Rufino Mamonong and dated March 27, 1916, showing to you this document, is this the document that you are referring? |
| A | Yes, sir. |
|
x x x
|
x x x
|
| Q | Of what use is the property? |
| A | It was planted with rice and vegetables, sir. |
| Q | Agricultural? |
| A | Yes, sir.”[21] |
While indeed tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership[22]
Appellant asserts that the disputed land was not yet alienable and disposable and that appellee failed to overcome the presumption that all lands form part of the public domain.
Appellant’s assertion carries no weight and conviction.
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.[23]
There is no quibbling that appellee was able to establish that the disputed realty was alienable and disposable public land. She adduced a document confirming that this was no longer part of the public domain. For one, the private character thereof was verified by Corazon Calamno, Senior Forest Management Specialist, Office of the Technical Director for Forest Management Services, National Capital Judicial Region, DENR, Quezon City.[24] For another, this was affirmed and confirmed by the DENR’s Chief of the Forest and Utilization and Law Enforcement Division and the Officer-In-Charge, Regional Technical Director of the Forest Management Services. Jurisprudence dictates that the DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary.[25] Therewithal, the Laguna Lake Development Authority certified that the disputed property is not part of the bed of the Laguna de Bay.[26] It bears emphasis that no opposition was filed by the Land Registration Authority or the DENR to controvert appelle’s application on the ground that the subject lot is inalienable. There being no substantive rights which stand to be prejudiced, the benefit of the Certification may thus be equitably extended in favor of appellee.[27] Appositely, in the case of Victoria v. Republic, the Supreme Court gave probative weight to the DENR certification issued by Corazon Calamno involving a similar property, the latter being the duly authorized official to issue certifications on the status of public lands as alienable and disposable.
In epitome, We discern no reversible error committed by the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 28 December 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 266, in LRC No. 11585-TG, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
Ybañez and Manaham, JJ., concur.
[1] Republic v. Alconaba, 427 SCRA 611, 613 (14 April 2004). (Italics Ours)
[2] See Republic v. Iglesia Ni Cristo, 591 SCRA 438, 450 (30 June 2009). (Italics supplied)
[3] Original Records, pp. 144-150.
[4] Original Records, pp. 149-150.
[5] Previously known and registered as Teofila Mamonong Concepcion.
[6] Original Records, pp. 9-10.
[7] TSN, 9 July 2009, pp. 4-5.
[8] Original Records, p. 13.
[9] Original Records, p. 7.
[10] Id., p. 5
[11] Id., pp. 35-40, 42-46, 53.
[12] Id., pp. 168-169.
[13] Amending and Codifying the Law Relative to Registration of Property and For Other Purposes.
[14] Public Land Act.
[15] Extending the Period of Filing Applications for Administrative Legalization Free Patent and Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect and Incomplete Titles to Alienable and Disposable Lands in the Public Domain Under Chapter VII and Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, for Eleven (11) Years Commencing January 1, 1977.
[16] See Republic v. Manimtim, 645 SCRA 520, 535 (16 March 2011).
[17] See Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation, 555 SCRA 314, 322 (25 June 2008).
[18] See Republic v. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 451, 460 (18 January 2001).
[19] See Republic v. Alconaba, 427 SCRA 611, 616 (14 April 2004).
[20] Original Records, p. 70.
[21] TSN, 9 July 2009, pp. 107, 109.
[22] See Republic v. Court of Appeals, 448 SCRA 442, 454 (17 January 2005); Republic v. Candy Maker, 22 June 2006; See also Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), 651 SCRA 352, 387 (8 June 2011).
[23] See Republic v. Medida, 678 SCRA 317, 325-326 (13 August 2012).
[24] Original Records, p. 59 dorsal portion.
[25] Republic v. Serrano, 613 SCRA 537, 547 (24 February 2010).
[26] Original Records, pp. 58, 83-85.
[27] See Republic v. Serrano, 613 SCRA 537, 547 (24 February 2010).