ELMA M. BAES, FE M. RAYMUNDO, BENIFREDA MANGROBANG, EDNA MANGROBANG, EDUARDO MANGROBANG, ERLE MANGROBANG AND ERNIE MANGROBANG, PETITIONERS, VS. DEPUTY SHERIFF JESUS BAUTISTA, RE…

Baes versus Bautista

The Case

This is an administrative case filed with the Supreme Court against a deputy sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac. The complainants are the prevailing plaintiffs in an ejectment suit, and they charge the sheriff with inefficiency, misconduct, and lack of sincerity in implementing the judgment in their favor. The case matters because it fixes the standard of conduct for sheriffs and deputy sheriffs: a writ of execution is not an invitation to negotiate, and the duty to enforce it promptly and to file a timely return is mandatory, not discretionary.

Procedural History

The complainants filed their administrative complaint directly with the Supreme Court, charging Deputy Sheriff Jesus Bautista with inefficiency, misconduct, and lack of sincerity in the implementation of the decision in the ejectment case. The respondent filed his comment and answer, denying the charges and claiming they were made solely to harass him. The Court referred the matter to Executive Judge Prudencio Ruiz of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac, for investigation, report, and recommendation. After due investigation, Judge Ruiz recommended that the respondent be suspended from the service for two months without pay. The report was indorsed to the Office of the Court Administrator, which concurred with the investigating judge in its memorandum to the Chief Justice. The Court then resolved the administrative case itself, adopting the recommendation.

Facts

The Municipal Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac, decided the ejectment case in favor of the complainants. It ordered the defendants to vacate the lot and the residential house standing on it, and to pay three thousand pesos in attorney's fees plus the costs. Several writs of execution were then issued to enforce that decision, but the complainants say the writs were not properly implemented because of the respondent sheriff's fault.

The investigation showed a pattern of delay. On the first writ of execution, issued in January 1991, the respondent received his copy in February 1991 but filed his return only in June 1992. On the alias writ issued in June 1992, he made his return months later, in April 1993. He received the alias writ issued in August 1992 but filed no return at all. He denied receiving the alias writ issued in September 1992, and no return was made on the alias writ issued in February 1993, which he apparently received that same month. On the alias writ issued in October 1993, he filed his return in December 1993. On the seventh alias writ, issued in January 1995 and received in February 1995, he filed his return in April 1995.

The alias writ issued in September 1995 was finally enforced, but only with the help of a barangay captain and two policemen. Even then, the respondent reported that the defendants later constructed another bungalow on the plaintiffs' premises. In his defense, the respondent said he had been moved by the defendants' pleas for time to look for another place to transfer, and he also claimed that he had been threatened.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent deputy sheriff is guilty of inefficiency and misconduct for failing to enforce the writs of execution promptly and effectively.
• Whether or not the respondent is liable for failing to file his returns on time, and for failing to file any return in two instances.
• Whether or not the respondent's pleas of compassion for the defendants and of having been threatened excuse his delay.

Applicable Provisions

Section 11, Rule 39, of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 11. Return of writ of execution. - The writ of execution may be made returnable, to the clerk or judge of the court issuing it, at any time not less than ten (10) nor more than sixty (60) days after its receipt by the officer who must set forth in writing on its back the whole of his proceedings by virtue thereof, and file it with the clerk or judge to be preserved with the other papers in the case. A certified copy of the record, in the execution book kept by the clerk, of an execution by virtue of which real property has been sold, or of the officer's return thereon, shall be evidenced of the contents of the originals whenever they, or any part thereof, have been lost or destroyed.

This provision fixes the period within which the sheriff must make his return, and the Court holds that this period is mandatory.

Section E, paragraph 4, Chapter VIII, of the Manual for Clerks of Court provides:

4. All sheriffs and deputy sheriffs shall submit a report to the Judge concerned on the action taken on all writs and processes assigned to them within ten (10) days from receipt of said process or writ. Said report shall form part of the records of the case.

This provision imposes a shorter ten-day period for the sheriff's report, reinforcing the duty of promptness in executing process.

Section F, paragraph 2, Chapter VIII, of the same Manual provides:

2. x x x " When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of instructions, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it in accordance with its mandates, x x x. He has no discretion whether to execute it or not."

This provision supplies the core rule of the case: once a writ is placed in the sheriff's hands, execution is a duty, not a choice.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found the respondent guilty of the charge. The procrastination that produced the long delay in executing the judgment was, in the Court's words, truly deplorable. The sheriff is bound to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness, and he has no discretion whether to execute a writ or not.

On the second issue, the Court held that the period prescribed in Section 11, Rule 39, is mandatory. The respondent failed to file his returns on time, and worse, he filed no returns at all for two alias writs of execution. His noncompliance with a mandatory rule was itself a ground for liability.

On the third issue, the Court rejected both excuses. As to compassion, the Court answered that one's act of benevolence is not made at somebody else's expense. Quoting its earlier ruling in Zamora versus Jumamoy, the Court said:

It may be that the respondents were moved by compassion and sympathy, but such personal feelings must never be allowed to compromise the public-trust character of their office which binds them to a continuing accountability to the people. The respondents should not have forgotten the rule that the conduct and behavior of every one connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.

As to the claim of threats, the Court held that if the threats were real and serious, the respondent could have taken appropriate steps to remedy the situation. The claim therefore did not excuse his inaction.

Doctrine

A sheriff or deputy sheriff to whom a writ of execution is entrusted must proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it in accordance with its mandates. He has no discretion whether to execute it or not. The period for making a return under Section 11, Rule 39, of the Revised Rules of Court is mandatory, and the sheriff must also submit his report to the judge within ten days from receipt of the writ under the Manual for Clerks of Court. Compassion for the losing party and unsubstantiated claims of threats do not excuse delay, because personal feelings must never compromise the public-trust character of an office charged with the dispensation of justice.

Disposition

The Court found the respondent sheriff guilty of the charge and suspended him from office for two months without pay, the suspension to take effect upon notice.

Remember This

Memorize the line: when a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness, and he has no discretion whether to execute it or not. Examiners use this case in administrative law and judicial ethics to test the mandatory nature of the return under Section 11, Rule 39, and to show that compassion is never a defense for a sheriff who delays execution.