R. MARINO CORPUS, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. MIGUEL CUADERNO, SR., THE CENTRAL BANK Of THE PHILIPPINES AND THE MONETARY BOARD AND MARIO MARCOS, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES. FILEMON MEN…

While petitioner-appellant was holding the position of Special
Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines—a
position declared by the President of the Philippines as “highly
technical in nature and placed in the exempt class” (Appendix “D”,
Exhibit W)—he was, on or about March 7, 1958, charged in an
administrative case, for alleged dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of
duty and/or abuse of authority, oppression, misconduct, etc., preferred
against him by employees of the Bank, resulting in his suspension by
the Monetary Board of the Bank and the creation of a 3-man committee to
investigate him. The committee was composed of representatives of the
Bank, Bureau of Civil Service and the Office of the City Fiscal of
Manila. After receiving the answer of the respondent therein, the
committee heard the case, receiving testimonies of witnesses on both
sides. On May, 5, 1959, the committee submitted its Final Report, the
pertinent conclusion and recommendation therein reading as follows:

“(1) In view of the foregoing, the Committee finds
that there is no basis upon which to recommend disciplinary action
against respondent and therefore respectfully recommends that he be
immediately reinstated.”

Unable to agree with the committee report, the Monetary Board
adopted Resolution No. 957 on July 20, 1959 which considered “the
respondent, R. Marino Corpus, resigned as of the date of his
suspension.” The pertinent portion of the resolution reads thus:

“After an exhaustive and mature deliberation of the
report of the aforesaid fact finding committee, in conjunction with the
entire records of the case and representations of both complainants and
respondent, through their respective counsel; and, further, after a
thorough review of the service record of the respondent, particularly
the various cases presented against him, object of Monetary Board
Resolution No. 1527 dated August 30, 1955, which all involves fitness,
discipline, etc. of respondent, and moreover, upon formal statement of
the Governor that he has lost confidence in the respondent as Special
Assistant to the Governor and In-Charge of the Export Department (such
position being primarily confidential and highly technical in nature),
the Monetary Board finds that the continuance of the respondent in the
service of the Central Bank would be prejudicial to be best interests
of the Central Bank, and, therefore, in accordance with the provisions
of Section 14 of the Bank Charter, considers the respondent, Mr. K.
Marino Corpus, resigned as of the date of his suspension.”

Three days after, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 995,
dated July 23, 1959, approving the appointment of herein respondent
Mario Marcos to the position involved in place of petitioner R. Marino
Corpus.

On August 18, 1959, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari,
mandamus and quo warranto, with preliminary mandatory injunction and
damages, against the herein respondents. The complaint, as amended,
embodied four causes of action, and the reliefs sought therein read as
follows:

“1. Upon the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION, to reinstate
petitioner immediately to the position of Special Assistant in charge
of the control of exports in conformity with the Final Report of the
Investigating Committee of May 5, 1959 and to declare that the action
of the respondents per Monetary Board Resolution No957 is null and
void, respondents having acted in connection with the same in excess of
their jurisdiction and with grave and gross abuse of discretion and
authority; and for the purposes thereof to order respondent Miguel
Cuaderno, Sr., as Governor of the Central Bank, to prepare an agenda
including therein as part of the business to be taken up by respondent
Monetary Board petitioner’s said reinstatement;

“2. Upon the
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, to remove respondent Mario Marcos from the
Office of Special Assistant in charge of the Export Department of the
Central Bank, the same office to which petitioner in possession of the
same and to declare that the attempted appointment of the said
respondent Mario Marcos to the same is unwarranted and illegal, there
being no vacancy in the same as it has at all times been legally and
physically filled by petitioner were it not for the unlawful acts of
respondents in ousting him therefrom;

“3. Upon the THIRD
CAUSE OF ACTION, to pay petitioner the sums of P500,000.00 as moral
damages, P34,000.00 as salaries accrued and uneollected since March 18,
1958, plus those that may subsequently accrue, p20,000.00 as bonuses,
overtime pay, equity pay and other allowances, which petitioner had
failed to collect by reason of his unwarranted and unjustified
suspension by respondents, P20,000.00 attorney’s fees plus the costs of
this suit;

“4. Upon the UPON THE FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION, to
immediately reinstate petitioner to the position of Special Assistant
in charge of the control of exports and not to remove or molest him
therefrom pending the determination of this case and, to this end,
upon petitioner’s filing of a bond with sufficient sureties in an
amount to be fixed by this Honorable Court, to issue a preliminary
mandatory injunction com manding respondents to do and/or refrain from
doing the acts hereinabove referred to.

Petitioner further prays for such other and further relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.”

The respondents filed their answer on September 4, 1959. Filemon
Mendoza, a Central Bank employee, filed a petition for intervention.
The respondents and the intervenor , filed separate motions to dismiss,
against which an opposition was filed by petitioner. On October 8,
1959, an order was issued by the Court below holding in abeyance the
resolution of the motions to dismiss until the trial, stating that the
grounds alleged therein do not appear to be indubitable. Subsequently,
petitioner manifested in open court that he was abandoning his prayer
for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction so that the
case can be speedily terminated. On June 8, 1960, upon representations
of the respondents and intervenor, an order was issued vacating the
order of October 8, 1959 and ordering that “the Motions to Dismiss are
deemed submitted anew for resolution.” On June 14, 1960, after several
hearings, another order was issued granting the motions to dismiss the
amended petition, on the ground that petitioner did not exhaust all
administrative remedies available to him in law. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was denied in an order dated November
16, 1960. From said order of June 14, 1960, dismissing the petition,
and the order of November 16, 1960, denying the motion for
reconsideration, petitioner has brought this appeal, claiming that the
lower court erred:

1. In dismissing his petition for certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto, with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages;
2. In
   not finding that the Monetary Board removed him for a cause not
   provided by law, therefore, in violation of the Constitution; and
3. In
   not finding that the appointment of Mario P. Marcos, the officer
   appointed by the respondent Monetary Board to the position to which he
   was appointed, to have been made to a position that is not yet vacant.

The lower court was of the opinion that petitioner-appellant should
have exhausted all administrative remedies available to him, such as an
appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service, under Republic Act 2260,
or the President of the Philippines who under the Constitution and the
law is the head of all the executive departments of the government
including its agencies and instrumentalities. This is the main issue
disputed in this appeal.

True, the appellant did not elevate his case for review either by
the President or the Civil Service Commission. However, it is our
opinion that a resort to these administrative appeals is voluntary or
permissive, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case.

(1) There is no law requiring an appeal to the President in a case
like the one at bar. The fact that the President had, in two instances
cited in the orders appealed from, acted on appeals from decisions of
the Monetary Board of the Central Bank, should not be regarded as
precedents, but at most may be viewed as acts of condescension on the
part of the Chief Executive. (2) While there are provisions in the
Civil Service Law regarding appeals to the Commissioner of Civil
Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals, We believe the
petitioner is not bound to observe them, considering his status and the
Charter of the Central Bank. In Castillo Bayona, et al., 106 Phil.,
1121, We said that Section 14; Republic Act 265, creating the Central
Bank of the Philippines, particularly paragraph (c) thereof, “is
sufficiently broad to vest the Monetary Board with the power of
investigation and removal of its officials, except the Governor
thereof. In other words, the Civil Service Law is the general legal
provision for the investigation, suspension or removal of civil service
employees, whereas Section 14 is a special provision of law which
must govern the investigation, suspension or removal of employees of
the Central Bank, though they may be subject to the Civil Service Law
and Regulations in other respects” In this case, the respondent
Monetary Board considered petitioner resigned from the office to which
he has been legally appointed as of the date of his suspension, after
he has been duly indicted and tried before a committee created by the
Board for the purpose. An appeal to the Civil Service Commission would
thereby be an act of supererogation, requiring the presentation of
practically the same witnesses and documents produced in the
investigation conducted at the instance of the Monetary Board.
Moreover, Section 16 (i) of the Civil Service Law provides that “except as otherwise provided by law”
the Commissioner of Civil Service shall have “final authority to pass
upon the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officials
and employees in the competetive or classified service and upon
all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such
officials and employees; x x x.” Considering again the fact that the
Charter of the Central Bank provides for its own power, through the
Monetary Board, relative to the investigation, suspension or removal of
its own employees except the Governor, coupled with the fact that
petitioner has admitted that he belongs to the non-competetive or
unclassified service, it is evident that an appeal by petitioner to the
Commissioner of Civil Service is not required or at most is permissive
and voluntary.

“On the other hand, the doctrine does not apply
where, by the terms or implications of the statute authorizing an
administrative remedy, such remedy is permissive only, warranting the
conclusion that the legislature intended to allow the judicial remedy
even though the administrative remedy has not been exhausted.” (42 Am.
Jur 583).

There is another reason. It must be remembered that the amended
petition is for certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto. The allegations
of the second cause of action of the amended petition as abovequoted
sufficiently comply with Section 7, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court on
quo warranto proceedings, which requires that “When the action is
against a person for usurping an office or franchise, the complaint
shall set forth the name of the person who claims to be entitled
thereto, if any, with an averment of his right to the same that the
defendant is unlawfully in possession thereof.” And the complaint was
filed within the period of one year from the date of separation,
pursuant to Section 16 of the same Rule (Madrid vs. Auditor General 108
Phil., 578; 58 Off. Gaz., May, 1960, pp. 41, 42-43).

Section 9 of said Rule 68 provides that the time for pleadings and
proceedings may be shortened and the action may be given precedence
over any and other civil business. Section 16 of the same Rule requires
the filing of the action against an officer for his ouster within one
year after the cause of such ouster. These judicial rules underscore
the need for speed in the determination of controversies to public
offices (Remata vs. Javier, 37 Phil., 699; Tumulak vs. Egay, 82 Phil.,
828). As was stated in Pinullar vs. President of the Senate, 104 Phil.,
131, the rationale is that the Government must be immediately
informed or advised if any person claims to be entitled to an office or
position in the civil service as against another actually holding it,
so that the Government may not be faced with the predicament of having
to pay two salaries, one, for the person actually holding the office,
although illegally, and another, for one not actually rendering service
although entitled to do so (see also Madrid vs. Auditor General, supra).

Giving life and effect to these provisions, we have held in Casin
vs. Caluag, 80 Phil., 758; 45 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 9, p. 379, that a
special civil action for quo warranto may be tried and decided
independently of a pending criminal case. In another case (Abeto vs.
Rodas 82 Phil., 59; 46 Off. Gaz., 930), we denied by resolution a
supplemental motion for reconsideration where the petitioner had
contended that the reglementary period of one year was suspended by the
order of the President exonerating him from certain administrative
charges because the petitioner “was justified in waiting for the
President of the Philippines to reappoint him as the logical and legal
consequence of his exoneration,” and “only after considerable delay,
when his hopes failed, did petitioner institute the present
proceedings.” Finally, in Torres vs. Quintos, 88 Phil., 436, we
recalled the Abeto case, supra, by commenting therein that the
denial of the motion for reconsideration in that case had of course the
effect of rejecting the theory that the pendency of an administrative
remedy suspends the period within which a petition for quo warranto
should be filed, and we gave the reason thus:

“The reason is obvious. While it may be desirable
that administrative remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled
or bound to do so; and as said remedies neither are prerequisite to nor
bar the institution of quo warranto proceedings, it follows that he who
claims the right to hold a public office allegedly usurped by another
and who desires to seek redress in the courts, should file the proper
judicial action within the reglementary period. As emphasized in
Bautista vs. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624, and Tumulak vs. Egay, 82 Phil.,
828; 46 Off. Gaz., 3683, public interest requires that the right to a
public office should be determined as speedily as practicable.”

Upon the foregoing, we have to disagree with the legal opinion of
the trial judge and hold that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is inapplicable and does not bar the present
proceedings.

Considering the two views we have taken in the case, we deem it
unnecessary to pass upon the second and third assignments of error
which partially involve the evaluation of facts. The court below has
started to receive the evidence, and it is better equipped and should
be given the chance to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses who
testified before it (Veraguth vs. Isabela Sugar Co 57 Phil., 266).

WHEREFORE, the orders under consideration are hereby set aside and
the record of the case is hereby ordered remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings and judgment on the merits. No pronouncement as
to costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.