RAFAEL MASCARIÑAS, ETC., PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. CARMELO L. PORRAS, ETC., RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

On January 5, 1960, Rafael Mascariñas, Chief of Police of Davao City,
received a copy of memorandum bearing the same date signed by City Mayor Carmelo
L. Porras which, for ready reference, we quote hereunder:

“MEMORANDUM TO:
Patm. Angel Fuentecilla
Patm. 1st Class Domingo
Larena
Patm. Flaviano Tinapay
Police Department
City of Davao

Effective immediately you are hereby detailed to the Illegal Fishing Unit of
the Police Department. It is directed that you enforce to the limit the laws and
ordinances on illegal fishing and to apprehend violators thereof. In the
performance of your activities, you are entitled to the use of the outboard
motor of the Police Department. It is also desired that periodic reports on the
result of your activities be made to this Office.

(Sgd.) CARMELO L. PORRAS
Mayor, City of
Davao”

In said memorandum the city mayor in effect ordered the detail of three
members of the police force of the city to the Illegal Fishing Unit of the
Police Department which was created to enforce the laws and ordinances on
illegal fishing, requiring them at the same time to submit periodic reports to
the Office of the City Mayor on the results of their activities.

Considering that the above-quoted memorandum in fringed his power as Chief of
Police of the City of Davao and that, if not checked on time, might ultimately
jeopardize his immediate direct control over the organization, government,
discipline and disposition of the police force of Davao City, Rafael Mascariñas,
in his capacity as chief of police, filed before the Court of First Instance of
Davao a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking to annul
the aforesaid memorandum and to prohibit respondent city mayor from enforcing1
it as the same tends to strip him of his power over the affairs of the police
department of the City of Davao.

The court a quo denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
ex parte pending determination of the case, but required respondent to
answer the petition within 10 days from receipt of the order.

Respondent, in his answer, justified the issuance of the disputed memorandum
by intimating that it was issued in accordance with power of control and
supervision given him by the Charter of the City of Davao in line with the
ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Porras vs. Avellana, 105 Phil., 1147.
He also set up the defense that the aforesaid memorandum is but “the direct
consequence of previous acts of petitioner which necessitated and justified its
issuance.”

On January 28, 1960, petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars
asking that respondent be required to specify the alleged “previous acts of
petitioner which necessitated and justified” the issuance of the memorandum in
question so that petitioner could prepare a responsive reply, but relying on the
assurance made by respondent that would present evidence on the alleged previous
acts when the case is tried on the merits, petitioner desisted from pressing his
bill of particulars and instead filed a reply denying knowledge of the alleged
previous acts above adverted to. But, as the record discloses, no trial on the
merits was had, and instead the case was Submitted for judgment on the
pleadings, the issue involved being one of law. And on July 6, 1960, the court
a quo rendered decision denying the petition based on our ruling in the
case of Porras vs. Avellana, supra. In effect, the court a quo
held that the respondent mayor has the power, under the charter of the city,
to do directly what he is empowered to do thru his chief of police. It upheld
the validity of the memorandum issued by respondent.

Petitioner has appealed.

It should be recalled that respondent mayor issued the memorandum in dispute
detailing three members of the police force of the City of Davao to the Illegal
Fishing Unit of the Police Department in order that they may exert efforts to
enforce the laws and ordinances on illegal, fishing within the city, and
requiring them to Submit periodic reports to his office on the results of their
activities. It should also be noted that the memorandum was addressed directly
to the patrolmen concerned and only a copy there of was furnished the chief of
police. This action was resented by the chief of police who considered it as an
invasion of his power, control and supervision over the police and detective
force of the City of Davao. He contends that if such action is tolerated and not
checked on time respondent mayor might ultimately strip him of his power and
control over his organization.

The question that now arises is: Can the issuance of the memorandum in
question be justified as a valid exercise of the power of control and
supervision that the Charter of the City of Davao grants to the city mayor?

The answer to this question requires an analysis of the pertinent provisions
of the City Charter of Davao which, or purposes of our discussion, merely refer
to Sections 9, 16 and 33 of Commonwealth Act No. 51, as amended. Said sections
provide:

“SEC. 9. General powers and duties of the Mayor.—As chief exeutive of
the city government, the Mayor shall have immediate control over the
executive and administrative functions of the different department, subject
to the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior, and shall be held
accountable for the proper administration of all affairs of the city.” (Italics
supplied)

“SEC. 16. City departments—Municipal Court.—There shall be a
department of engineering and public works headed by the city engineer; a law
department headed by the city attorney; a finance department headed by the city
treasurer; a police department headed by the chief of police; and a fire
department headed by the chief of the fire department and such other departments
as may fom time to time be established by law or ordinance approved by the
proper Head of Department. * * *”

SEC. 33. Powers and duties of heads of department.—Each of the
department of the city government shall be in control of such department,
under the supervision and control of the Mayor and shall possess such
power as may be prescribed therein or by ordinance. * * * (Italics
supplied)

Note that, under Section 9, the city mayor is given immediate control
over the executive and administrative functions of the different departments,
one of which being the police department headed by the chief of police (Section
16), Note also that, under Section 33, each head of the department is given
control of his department, subject to “the supervision and control of the
mayor.” It, therefore, becomes important to define the extent and scope of the
terms “supervision” and “control” employed in the charter under
consideration.

In Mondano vs. Silvosa 97 Phil., 143; 51 Off. Gaz. 2884; we said that “In
administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.
If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or
step as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties. Control on
the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” (Italics
supplied)

It is clear that respondent mayor not only can exercise supervision over the
chief of police who comes under him in connection with the performance of his
official duties in order that they may be properly fulfilled, but also immediate
control in the sense that he can alter, modify nullify, or set aside what the
latter may have done to the extent of substituting his own judgment for that of
his subordinate officer in connection with the activities of the latter’s
office. This power of supervision and control is so broad that it may justify
interference with the functions of a subordinate officer when such is necessary
in the interest of the service. Because of such control and supervision, it is
evident that respondent was justified in issuing the memorandum in question it
appearing that its purpose is to fill the positions in the Illegal Fishing Unit
of the Police Department in order that the same may carry out its function of
enforcing the laws and ordinances concerning illegal fishing within the
jurisdiction of Davao City. The fact that the action taken by respondent mayor
was direct is of no moment. It is enough that petitioner was notified of the
action taken so that he may act accordingly.

The court a quo was justified in invoking our ruling in the case of
Porras vs. Avellana, (supra), promulgated July 24, 1959, for the same
concerns an interpretation of the extent and scope of the power of control
vested in the mayor of Davao City by its charter. In that case we justified the
action taken by the mayor in ordering the transfer of the finance and supply
officer of the chief of police to the field in view of the power of supervision
and control of the mayor under the city charter. The facts obtaining in both
cases are parallel.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
petitioner.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.