G.R. NO. L-33027. April 26, 1974
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES BENJAMIN NG, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.
FERNANDO, J.:
In the appeal by the Republic, stress is laid, as in the lower court, on the first ground, the imputation that petitioner had not conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner, more specifically in that the registration of his daughter Jennifer was beyond the period of time required by law. As noted at the outset, if such objection prevails, then there is a bar to the success of the application for naturalization. As will he made apparent, the Republic of the Philippines is justified libel in its insistence that the decision reached is not in accordance with what this Court has consistently held on such a point. We must reverse.
1. In the brief of the Republic, there is a comprehensive discussion of how far the lower court was in error in granting the application for citizenship when admittedly there was a late registration of the daughter, Jennifer, thus resulting in his failure to satisfy the requirement of proper and irreproachable manner in his relation with the government. The principal reliance is on the leading case of Lai vs. Republic,[3] promulgated in 1969, the opinion therein penned by Justice Barredo for a unanimous Court. It made reference to the earlier cases of Co. vs. Republic,[4] a 1960 decision, and Chung Hong vs. Republic.[5] The holding in Co. vs. Republic, the Opinion coming from Justice Bautista Angelo, follows: “Our law also requires that petitioner must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living. It is contended that petitioner has also failed to comply with this legal requirement for he failed to show that he has complied with his obligation to register his wife and child with the Bureau of Immigration as required by the Alien Registration Act. He has, therefore, failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner in his relation with our government.”[6] Chung Hong vs. Republic,[7] decided two years later, reaffirmed Co vs. Republic, with this emphatic characterization of such failure by Justice J. B. L. Reyes as ponente: “This questionable conduct of applicant is fatal to his petition.”[8] After discussing those two earlier cases, Justice Barredo, in Lai vs. Republic,[9] dispelled any doubt as to the validity of distinction between failure to register and tardy registration. These are his words: “Petitioner-appellant would try to distinguish his case from the above-cited precedents in the circumstance that while there, this Court dealt with the failure to register in violation of law. Republic Act 562, otherwise known as the Alien Registration Act of 1950; here, there is merely a case of ‘late registration of a newly born child,’ which, appellant argues, is a minor infraction of an implementing regulation of the Commissioner of Immigration. Overlooked by appellant is the fact that his having registered his daughter tardily on April 26, 1963, or even March 1, 1963, as he contends, involved not only a violation of immigration regulations but of the Alien Registration Act.”[10] Nor did he leave it at that, as is clear from the following excerpt: “That is not all. As he registered his daughter for the first time only on April or March of 1963, the inevitable conclusion is that he did not report for her within the first sixty days of January 1962 and, if in fact, the registration was April again within the same period in 1963. It cannot be validly said then that appellant committed only a minor in fraction of a regulation. In truth, he violated the Alien Registration Act in two ways. It is obvious that such violations constitute improper and irreproachable conduct in his relation with the Government which renders him disqualified to be a naturalized citizen.”[11]
2. That is all that needs be said in connection with the disposition of this case, for again, to quote from the leading Lai vs. Republic decision; “With this view take, this case should write finis to any further move of appellant to be a naturalized citizen of the Philippines, his infirmity above-pointed being incurable. Accordingly, We find it unnecessary to make any express finding as regards the other ground interposed by the Solicitor General in his opposition * * *.”[12] As in Lai vs. Republic, there is no necessity then for discussing the other two grounds of opposition.
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 11, 1970 granting the petition for naturalization is reversed and another entered denying such petition for naturalization of applicant Benjamin Ng. No costs.
Zaldivar, (Chairman), Fernandez, and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., took no part.
Barredo, J., concurs in separate opinion.
[1] Record on Appeal, 20-22.
[2] Ibid. 33.
[3] G.R. No. L-22619, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 754.
[4] 108 Phil. 265.
[5] G.R. No. L-17391, November 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 678.
[6] 108 Phil. 268-269.
[7] 6 SCRA 678.
[8] Ibid, 680.
[9] 27 SCRA 754.
[10] Ibid, 757.
[11] Ibid, 758.
[12] Ibid.
CONCURRING OPINION
BARREDO, J.:
I concur. As in Lai, there is here no explanation whatsoever of the failure of the petitioner to register his child on time. In instances where a good excuse is shown, indicative of good faith, the matter can be viewed differently.