IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIE GANIER GARREAU, LIRIO PFANNENSCHMIDT RAMIREZ, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. JOSE MA. RAMIREZ, OPPOSITOR-APPELLEE.

At issue in this appeal is the due execution of the last will and testament of Maria Garnier
Garreau, which was denied probate by the Court of First Instance of
Manila in its order of August
15, 1961 (Special Proceeding No. 39365) on the ground of the testatrix’ lack of
testamentary capacity.

Maria Garnier Garreau,
widow of Ramon Ramirez, was a native of Asnier, Paris,
France, but a Filipino
citizen residing in Madrid, Spain,
where she died child­less at the age of 84 on January 11, 1959. 
The will in question was an “open” one, executed before a
notary public in Madrid on May 24, 1958, and instituting her niece, Lirio
(Lily) Pfannenschmidt, now appellant, as sole and universal heir.  Lirio is one of the four children of Jose
Ramirez, brother of the testatrix’ husband Ramon, the other three being Elsa, Esperanza and Horacio.  Ramon had a half-brother, Jorge P. Ramirez,
whose son, Jose Maria Ramirez, now appellee, opposed the petition for probate
filed by Lirio on February 20, 1959,
al­leging in his opposition, inter alia, that there was a prior
will executed by the testatrix in Manila
in 1949.  The photostat copy of that
will, marked in the record as Exhibit D and Exhibit 2-J, shows that the
testatrix instituted her husband as her universal heir, and in the event that
he should predecease her (which he did), named her niece Lily Ramirez and her
nephews Horacio Ramirez and Jose Ma. Ramirez as substitute heirs to all her pro­perties
in equal shares.  This previous will,
however, is not involved in this case, and has been referred to by the parties
only in relation to the background circums­tances concerning the execution of
the “open” will in 1958.

Ironically enough – and certainly not without some overtones of
poetic justice – the order of the trial court denying probate is based in no
small part on a number of letters written by the petitioner herself, in which
she used quite strong terms to describe the mental infirmity of the
testatrix.  Those letters were written by
her in 1956 and 1957 to her uncle, Jose Eugenio Ramirez de la Cavada, another
brother of the testatrix’ husband, Ramon Ramirez.  Even before then, however, the testatrix’
mental condition was already the object of serious concern among her close
relatives.  The testimony of Jose Eugenio
Ramirez, given in the form of deposition and submitted as Exhibit 3, discloses
the following facts:

He arrived in Madrid
in 1954.  His niece Lily, who was then
residing there, came to him and said that she could not accept the fact that
Jose Maria Ramirez (herein oppositor-appellee) had been named as heir in the
will of her aunt, not being a member of the same family group.  Lily, obviously referring to the 1949 will,
then suggested to her uncle that he do something to correct the same, which
suggestion he turned down, pointing out that the testatrix had the right to
name her nephew Jose as one of her heirs. 
When he arrived in Madrid
he found his sister-in-law “ya una mujer muy incapacitada.” In 1955
he consulted a physician, Dr. Romero de Arcos, and asked him to examine
her.  Dr. de Arcos had been treating the
patient for various ail­ments, and it was he who suggested, after conducting
his examination, that Dr. Jose Germain, a competent specialist, be called to
make his own diagnosis.  The medical
opinions of these two doctors will be discussed later.  But from his own observations, Jose Eugenio
Ramirez declared that his sister-in-law was even then mentally incapacitated, citing by way of example her attitude and
personal reaction when her husband died in 1956.  She was present at his death and saw his body
just before he was buried; but when she went to her room after the funeral and
saw that his bed was no longer there, she came out crying, asking where her
husband was and saying that she was going to look for him.  She had totally forgotten that he had passed
away.  Apart from that, she was easily
susceptible to any suggestion from others, particularly those close to her, and
after doing what she was told would promptly forget all about it.

Another deponent, Julio Escribano Langa, a resident of Madrid who had known
the spouses Ramon Ramirez and Maria Garnier Garreau for about nine years
testified to the same mental condition of the testatrix:  her susceptibility to another person’s
influence; her lack of memory for recent events, her lack of understanding of,
or volition for deciding, certain matters such as the making of a last will.

Dr. Manuel Ramon de Arcos was first called to the Ramirez
household in 1953 to treat Ramon Ramirez, and after that his wife, on a number
of occasions until 1958.  The material
statements in his deposition are as follows:

” … Alla por 1953 debia tener 77 o 78 años de edad, y en esa
señora se notaba cada vez mas falta de memoria, eso mucho, y a veces tenia
cosas extrañas, como imaginarse que habia hecho un viaje que no habia hecho o
de escribir cosas como sobre la case de un cuñado suyo en Palma donde nunca
habia estado, y con el tiempo fue siguiendo
la cosa asi, pero motivos de alarma en cuanto a su vida no.

x        x          x

“Desde hacia tiempo ya que este señora no tenia lucidez
mental, y antes se me pidio que yo certificara de su estado exacto y yo me
encontre spoco competente para ello, y
efectivamente dije que yo queria llevar adelante una exploracion en el sentido
neurologico y yo necesitaba que alguien que se dedique a esa especialidad venga conmigo, y entonces se
llamo al Dr. Germain, y esto fue
en marzo de 1955.

El diagnostico a que llegamos, que despues fue confirmado, era de
una involucion cerebral senil que llamanos a una involucion regresiva debido a
defectos cerebrales de arteriosclerosis, y cuando se tiene eso, cuando las
cocas son asi realmente, la enfermedad no retrocede y la involucion avanza; es
posible que alguna vez yo la saludara y ella me contestara con mas afecto y
pareciese que estaba mejor, pero en realidad la involucion avanzaba como es
normal.”

Dr. Jose Germain, who had been called in con­sultation by Dr. de
Arcos in April 1955, presented an
impressive curriculum vitae, attesting to his qualifica­tions as a psychiatrist.  The conclusions he arrived at after
his examination of the patient are set forth in his deposition as follows:

x      x        x

P.     Quiere usted explicar la naturaleza de los servicios prestados por
usted?

R.    Sencillamente, estudiar a la enferma bajo el
punto de vista psiquiatrico y analizar sus reacciones ante las preguntas
normales de orientacion del
tiempo y del espacio y con­testaciones
a una serie de pruebas o tests, y sobre esto forme un juicio que transmiti al
Dr. Romero.

P.    Que juicio formo usted?

R.    Que esta señora padecia un proceso
arterioesclorotico cerebral con alteracion del
pensamiento y de la conducta que
evidenciaba un estado de demencia pre-senila en evolucion.

P.    Ese estado de demencia pre­senila la
incapacitaba para rea­lizar actos como
un testamento con lucidez?

R.    Indudablemente.

P.    La evolucion de la enfermedad hace suponer
posible que sea curable?

R.    No, señor, es un proceso irre­versible y
progresivo.

P.    Que experiencias hizo usted con la enferma?

R.    No recuerdo, pero eran las usuales.

P.    Tenia memoria?

R.    Si, señor,
pero perturbada.

P.    Gravemente perturbada?

R.    Perturbada para las circumstancias normales
de la vida.

P.    Un
sujeto en eras condiciones, tiene voluntad libre o es facilmente presionable de
ser llevado por personas extrañas a
resoluciones no personales del enfermo?

R.    Todos estos enfermos lo que tienen es una
disminucion del criteria personal
y, par tanto, son susceptibles de ser influenciados.

P.    Normalmente por personas de su intimidad?

R.    Por cualquier persona, el primero que venga.

P.    Ha expedido usted un certificado?

R.    Si, señor.

P.    Podia esta persona tener intervalos lucidos
para que fueran validos?

R.    Repito que es un proceso irreversible y, por tanto, la sintomatologia
tenia que seguir mas o menos en el primer piano de su personalidad.

SR.
GALLARDON:  Nada mas.

x x x          x x x     x x x

P.    Pero usted conoce los requisitos para una
incapacitacion?

R.    Si, señor.

P.    Esta señora incurria en todos los elementos
para ser incapacitada totalmente?

R.    Si, señor.

P.    Al reconocer a ella, tenia usted algun prejuicio?

R.    No, señor.

P.    Usted dijo que era una enfermedad
irreversible, es decir que no tiene curacion?

R.    Exacto.

P.    Pero puede mejorarse?

R.    No, señor, irreversible y progresiva, es un proceso degenerativo cerebral.

In the light of the foregoing expert medical opinions the letters
written by herein appellant to her uncle, Jose Eugenio Ramirez, assume a vital
significance on the issue of testamentary capacity, and of her own credibility
as proponent of the probate of the will. 
In her letter of January 8, 1956
(Exh. 2-A) she wrote:

“I am trying to do all I can for poor Tia Marie who refuses to
be helped.  Poor dear she is getting
worse and worse every day.  Her mind does not, register anything y
es terrible mente dura de
cabeza.”

In another letter (Exh. 2-B) dated July 15, 1956, she said to her uncle:

“I think it is my duty to look after her (Doña Marie) now that
she is alone especially since the poor dear
is completely in Irene’s hands.”*

“You will remember that Irene was with them when the thousands
of pesos the Tios had for a rainy day were spent in two shakes of a lamb’s tail.”

Appellant’s letter of January
17, 1957 (Exh. 3-C) contained the following postcript:

“P.S. Everyday several times a day she (Doña Marie) tells me
she is going back to Paris.  This morning she asked me where Tio Ramon
(who had died the previous year) was.”

On January 29, 1957
appellant again wrote a letter to her uncle, in which she said:

“Tia Marie has completely forgotten Irene from the second day
she left.

Irene must have told Tia Marie to ask Mr. Collard for the 40,000
telling her that with that money they would go to Paris
and if Mr. Collard would have had the money to send, she would have kept it for
herself, as Tia
Marie would have forgotten about the money no sooner having collected it.  Tia Marie signed for the money I went to
collect and when I came back from the bank she did not ask me for it.  She must have done that with Irene.”

Appellant, having suspected the maid Irene of taking advantage of
Doña Marie’s susceptibility to extraneous influence, succeeded in having her
dismissed from the service; and Doña Maria had “completely forgotten (her)
from the second day after she left.”

Such was the testatrix’ mental condition that as early as 1956
appellant, in her letter of January 8, told her uncle that she was thinking of
having her aunt judicially pronounced incapacitated and asked him to send her
“the papers of the doctors who declared Tios Ramon and Marie ‘incapaces’…
“

Jose M. Cavanna, the Philippine administrator of the family of the
testatrix, had the same idea, and so expressed it in his letter to appellant
(Exh. 3-F) dated May 4, 1957,
making reference to the fact that the testatrix had very little memory or
almost none at all.  He had deposited for
her account in a bank in Madrid
the sum of 100,000 pesetas, so that she could draw regularly therefrom, which she did.  However, when after a year he again went to
Madrid Doña Marie, in the presence of her brother-in-law, Jose Eugenio Ramirez,
denied ever having received any money from Cavanna.  Referring to that incident, Cavanna continued
in his letter to ap­pellant:

“Recordandoles la suma que les habia dejado en mi visita el
año anterior, me lo negaron y aseguraron no haber recibido de mi ninguna
cantidad de dinero.  Estaba entonces
presente D. Pepe Eugenio que habiendo oido sus insistentes protestas de no
haber recibido el año anterior cantidad alguna mia a exepcion de los giros
mensuales, note que llego a dudar de mis afirmaciones y entonces le invite ir
al Banco en donde habia hecho el deposito para cerciorarse de aquellos hechos,
en que trataban de negar mis afirmaciones. 
Al dia siguiente nos
constituimos en el Banco D. Pepe Eugenio y yo y alli se corroboro todas mis afirmaciones y quedo probada la poca o
casi ninguna memoria que existia en Da. Marie, en vista del hecho de que
elle misma habia firmado todos los cheques y no pudo seguir negando el hecho, confeso que se habia olvidado y no
se volvio a hablar de ese asunto.  Pero
este hecho dio lugar que desde entonces los familiares comprendiendo el exceso
de gastos que hacia y la suma tan gruesa que se habia gastado en aquel año,
acordaron designar como en efecto se designo a Dn. Pepe Eugenio para que actuara
en sus
intereses en España y les enviara los fondos que se recibian de
Manila en forma tal que no les hiciera falta nada, para que no se les perdiera
tantos fondos, pues llego a suspecharse de una sirvienta que entonces tenian,
que resultaba mas que sirvienta una ama de compañia.  Tambien entonces habia hecho constar que se
les enviaba trimestralmente las cuentas de sus fondos por duplicado con objeto
de que despues de estudiada, dieran su
conformidad y devolviesen uno de los ejemplares.  No solo no devolvian el duplicado sino que no
acusaban recibo de ella y en muchisimas ocasiones no sabian en donde lo habia
dejado.  En otra ocasion anterior a estos
acontecimientos tambien me aseguraron no haber recibido uno de los giros de
$300.00 enviados y hechas las correspondientes avariguaciones resulto haber
sido cobrado por Da. Marie.

“Llego a pensarse la conveniencia de promover un expediente de
tutelar, pero no se llevo a cabo para que no sufrieran en vida la vajacion de
ser judicialmente declarados incapacitados por su avanza da edad.”

Lamenting the fact that her aunt was “completely in Irene’s hands,” and that
“Irene has taken complete possession of every penny and gives Tia Marie no
account of anything,”* appellant expressed herself quite strongly in this wise:

“After all if the worst comes to the worst it is better that I
who am a member of the family should cheat Tia Marie rather than an ab­solute
stranger.”

The same fear was reiterated in her letter of February 2, 1957 (Exh. 3-E);

“x x x Que
chasco y disgusto tendriamos si resultase
Irene la heredera de los Tios.  Cosa muy
posible conociendo las cocas que ha hecho y lo engañados que tenia a los pobres Tios.”

A subsequent letter of appellant, dated April 9, 1957
(Exh. 2-K), this time addressed to her brother Horacio, reveals a significant
development.  Apparently the 1949 will,
wherein Jose
Maria Ramirez, appellee herein, was mentioned as one of the heirs, had
been changed with a new one eliminating him. 
Appellant wrote to her brother:

“Enclosed am sending Tia Marie’s letter to you.  As you
will note the date is Feb. 2nd.
I am doing this so that the letter
appears to have been written before her new will.  Keep her letter where it will be clear to see that the reason why Boby
(appellee) does not appear in
her new will is because he intended to take Tio Ramon to the ‘Tribunales,’ so if
Boby by any chance tries to contend it you will have her letter as a farther proof that is what she
had every intention to do.  So Cillo
(Horacio) for goodness sake keep it in a safe or in the bank until you will
have use of it.  Tear this letter no
sooner read in case it falls into wrong hands. 
The less people know of the new will the better in case action should be
taken against it.”

The foregoing letter appears quite conspiratorial, as though the
will referred to in it had been obtained, by appellant in order to cut off Boby
(appellee) from any share in the inheritance, and the enclosed letter of the
testatrix had been antedated to February 2 so that it would appear “to have
been written before her new will.” For some reason not disclosed in the
record, that will never came to light. 
Evidently Horacio was also an heir therein, but then was subsequently
eliminated in the 1958 will which was actually presented for probate by appellant.

The evidence hereinabove discussed, cumulatively considered,
leads to the definite conclusion that Marie Garnier Garreau was indeed mentally
incapacitated to make a will, that is, “to know the nature of the estate
to be disposed of, the proper objects of (her) bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act’ (Art. 799, Civil Code). 
As early as 1955, when she was examined by the family physician, Dr.
Romero de Arcos, and by a quali­fied
psychiatrist, Dr. Jose Germain,
she was already suffering from pre-senile dementia, a degenerative mental infirmity that was described by them as
“a progressive
and irreversible process.” The manifestations of this condition are amply
illustrated in the letters written by appellant herself as well as in the testimony of her
uncle, Jose Eugenio Ramirez.  In fact
these two were convinced that the testatrix should be placed under judicial
guar­dianship, and actually took the initial steps towards that end.  Appellant’s subsequent turn-about in her
opinion of the testatrix’ mental condition is of course understandable,
considering that in the will she is named as sole and universal heir.  But precisely for this reason not much
reliance can be placed upon her testimony to the effect that the testatrix was
possessed of the necessary testamentary capacity.

The
most pertinent evidence in behalf of appellant is the testimony of the notary
public before whom the will in question was executed and the testimony of two
of the three instrumental witnesses.  The
notary public, Braulio Nolasco Carrasquedo, gave the following statements on
the subject of the testatrix’ mental condition:

“17. Sabe usted
cual, era el estado mental de dicha señora
cuando otorgo el testamento anexo 1?

R. A mi juicio estaba bien.

18. Haga usted el favor
de explicar su contestacion a la pregunta anterior.

R. No se lo que quieren decir con esa
pregunta.  Yo juzgo que ella estaba
capacitada y hay una clausula alli de que esta capacitada legalmente.

19. Diga usted si
Doña Maria Garnier Garreau se daba cuenta de que estaba otorgando un testamento?

R. Se contesta con la respuesta anterior, pues si estaba capacitada
sabia lo que hacia;

20. Diga usted si la testadora recordaba sus propiedades?

R. Supongo que si,
aunque el en testamento no se permite
a menos que se hagan legados, pero aqui es un testamento en terminos generales.

21. Diga usted si la testadora recordaba sus parientes?

R. No puedo decir eso, pero ella estaba con su sobrina, aunque
supongo que recordara a sus parientes.”

As may be noted, the foregoing statements of the notary public
are far from satisfactory.  They are
vague and evasive, and tend to beg the very issue.  Thus the witness could not say, but merely supposed,
that the testatrix had a recollection of her properties, or of the relatives who would
logically inherit from her; and when asked to explain his answer to the
question concerning her mental state, he simply referred to the certification
in the will on that point.  It would seem
that he was aware that he had no sufficient basis for a categorical opinion on
the subject, and so declined to fully commit himself.

Manuel Gomez Tortajada was one of the instrumental
witnesses.  He affirmed that the
testatrix was in “perfect” mental condition at the time of the
execution of the will; that she knew “perfectly” that she was
executing a will; that on another occasion she had even told him about certain
properties of hers, and about her relatives who were a niece and a sister of that niece. 
The testimony of this
witness on deposition gives the
distinct impression of officiousness, of pretending to be more intimately
familiar with the affairs of the testatrix than their casual ac­quaintance
justified.  In any case his affirmation
of the testatrix’ “perfect” mental condition was so obviously an
exaggeration in the face of the clear and convincing evi­dence to the contrary that it only
serves to weaken his credibility.

The other instrumental
witness was Antonio Fernandez Caballero. 
He likewise affirmed the good condi­tion of the testatrix’ mental
faculties, saying that she had a recollection
of her properties as well as of her relatives. 
The affirmation is rather strange, not to say incredible, considering
that he met the testatrix for the first and only time in the office of the notary public on the occasion of
the execution of the will, and that all that took place then was that the said
will was read by the notary and then signed, by the testatrix, the witnesses
and the notary himself.  And according to
the latter he did not ask her anything about her properties or her rela­tives.  Indeed this instrumental witness admitted
that he did not understand the language spoken by the testatrix on that
occasion:

“R. Yo
quiero decir que esta señora como
hablaba algo diferente de nosotros todo lo que pudiera hablar no me entraba
bien si ella hablaba con la sobrina, pero el lenguaje de ellas no lo entendia y
no se si podian
hablar de propiedades u otras cosas.

P.    But did the testatrix talk about her
relatives on that occasion?

R.    Yo of que ella hablaba con la señorita que
le acompañaba y creo que tenian parentezco pero hablaban en el idioma de
ellas.”

Three additional witnesses, by way of rebuttal, were presented by
appellant.  The first was Dr. Suils Perez, whose deposition
is marked Exhibit Q.  He said that as a neurologist and a psychiatrist he
was called several times in 1957 to treat Marie Garnier Garreau.  His diagnosis was that she had a “brain
lesion” (lesion en el cerebro),
but had a mentality corresponding to her age. “Era una mujer que en interes
o atencion dejaba mucho que desear salvo en las cocas que le interesaban… En un
test que se hubiera hecho con ella hubieramos visto resultados contradictorias segun el
momento de atencion en que se lo hicieramos quo era muy variable.”

The foregoing testimony leaves much to be desired insofar as the issue of testamentary capacity is concerned:  no
reference whatsoever was made therein to the very elements of that issue, such
as capacity to comprehend, the nature of the testamentary act, the recollection
of the properties to be disposed of and of the relatives who might have a claim
upon the testatrix’ generosity.

Salustiano Reyero, a priest, was the second rebuttal witness for appellant, whose testimony
was given in the form of deposition.  The
testatrix, he said, was in possession of her mental faculties, reacted well to
ques­tions directed at her, and even told him that she had a house in Paris.  His impression was that she was not
susceptible to suggestion coming from or influence exerted by other persons.  However, he qualified his assertions as follows: “algunos ratos parecia que estaba
alelada;” “algunes veces note eso cuando fui, y estaba como
si no
tuviera interes.” Asked whether the testatrix remembered things normally, this witness answered: “Algunas veces no, cuando
estaba ya Lily con ella que fue
cuando la vi, porque no iba a ver a la difunta precisamente sino a Lily, y
despues cuando volvia yo ya no se acordaba de que habia estado yo alli.”

Gonzalo Conejos Fernandez
was the third rebuttal witness,
also by deposition.  A lawyer by
profession, he said he was consulted by the testatrix, after he came to know
her in 1956, about certain personal
matters, among them the revocation of a power-of-attorney given to Jose M. Cavanna and the designation of another
in his place as well as the proceedings for the adoption of appellant by the said testatrix.  She
consulted him also about what kinds of wills were permitted under the Spanish
law, and told him that she had previously made a will in Manila where she was leaving her properties
to her niece Lily, to a brother
or a sister of the latter and to a “señor Ramirez,” (evidently
referring to appellee), but that because of certain actuations of appellee
which did not please her she did not consider him deserving of being her heir. 
The witness was present at the execution
of the will in question on May 24, 1958, and he
noted, he said, that she was aware of the nature of the act in which she
was engaged and that she had a recollection of her relatives and
properties.  From the tenor of his testi­mony the testatrix was a completely normal
person during the period of their acquaintance; she was never absent­minded
(alelada); and he did not know that she
was suffer­ing from cerebral arteriosclerosis or from pre-senile dementia.

The testimony of this witness was not given weight by the trial
court.  It does suffer from the viewpoint of credibility.  He was presented as a rebuttal witness, who had been present during
the taking of the depositions of the previous witnesses
for appellant.  He was therefore in a
position to cure, as he apparently tried
to do, the weaknesses in their statements.  Although he was present when the will was
executed, he actually remained in another room, the “antesala”, which
was separated by a glass parti­tion from the room where the testatrix, the notary public and the instrumental
witnesses transacted the business at hand.

The witness was quite elaborate about the motive behind the execution of the new will making appellant the sole heir.  He said:

“. . .esta Señora (testatrix) me dijo que tenia otorgado un
testamento en Manila distribuyendo la herencia entre Lily, una hermana hermano,
y un Señor Ramirez (appel­lee), y que el motivo de decidir que toda su herencia
fuera de Lily, rectificando su anterior testamento, era debido, aparte de las
consideraciones de tipo afectivo a que me he referido, al hecho de que ella
estuvo casada con un Señor Ramirez, hijo natural de su padre, y que este Señor
tenia un hijo legitimo, y a pesar de llevarce en buenes
relaciones, cuando murio, el hijo (evidently referring to appellee) de este
hijo legitimo quiso anular las disposiciones de su padre que no distinguio
entre la condicion natural or legitimo, y por esta razon, a quien habia
procedido de esa forma, que era sobrino
de la difunta no le consideraba acreedora ser heredero de ella.”

If the foregoing were true, and had
indeed been confided to the witness by the testatrix, it is strange that she
should cut off from her new will not only the appellee but also the other
nephew, Horacio Ramirez, appellant’s full brother who was one of the heirs
mentioned in the previous will executed in Manila and against whom the
testatrix entertained no grievance.

The issue here is essentially one of fact, and involves an
appraisal of the conflicting evidence presented by the parties.  That issue was addressed in the first
instance to the trial Judge, and we cannot say that his conclusion as to the testamentary
incapacity of the testatrix is erroneous. 
It is based mainly on expert medical testimony to the effect that her
mental infirmity was observed by the family physician as far back as 1953 and
confirmed in 1955 by a competent psychiatrist, who described the process of the
mental degeneration as progressive and irreversible; on the written admissions
and declarations of appellant herself, who could have no motive then to falsify
the facts; and on the testimony of the testatrix’ brother-in-law, Jose Eugenio
Ramirez.  On the question of credibility,
we find no ground to disregard such evidence in favor of the vague,
inconclusive statements of the notary public who authenticated the will and of
the two instrumental witnesses, nor even of the testimony of the rebuttal
witnesses, the more categorical character of whose affirmations only serve to
weaken their credibility, conflicting as they do not only with the evidence for
appellee but also with that given by the other witnesses for appellant.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the order
appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Zaldivar, Fernando, Barredo,
Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Ruiz Castro and
Teehankee, JJ., concur.

* Irene was the maid of the
testatrix.

* Exh. 2-B, letter of July 15, 1956, addressed to Jose
Eugenio Ramirez.