GUARDIANSHIP OF THE INCOMPETENT LEONORA NAVARRO AND THE MINORS ADOLFO YUSON AND OTHERS, ELDEGARDES YUSON DE PUA, JUDICIAL GUARDIAN-APPELLANT, VS. JUSTINIANO SAN AGUSTIN, MOVANT-…

Appeal from the order dated November
12, 1966 approving the “Motion for Confirmation of Deed of Transfer of
Right on Lots Nos. 632 and 633, Cadastre No. 102 in favor of Justiniano San Agustin” of the Court of First Instance
of Davao, Branch I, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr. presiding, in Special Proceedings (Case) No. 282,
entitled “Guardianship of the Incompetent Leonora Navarro and the Minors
Adolfo Yuson and Others”.

The records disclose the following
antecedents of this appeal:

The spouses Enrique Navarro and Maximina Bonleon died intestate
in 1945 — on March 18 and February 15,
1945, respectively — leaving as heirs the following:

a)   Benita Navarro, legitimate daughter, of legal
age, and residing at Lasang, Davao City.

b)   Leonora Navarro, legitimate daughter, of
legal age, and residing in Lasang, Davao City, under the judicial guardianship of Atty. Eriberto A. Unson – later Eldegardes Yuson de Pua – Davao
City.

c)   Ramon Navarro and Delia Navarro, legitimate
grandchildren (children of predeceased child Antonio Navarro), eight and seven
years of age respectively,
represented by their mother Filipinas Catalan.

In
the course of the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses in Special
Proceeding No. 64-R, entitled “Intestate Estate of the Deceased Spouses
Enrique Navarro and Maximina Bonleon”
of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I,
Hon. Wenceslao L. Fernan then presiding, a Project of Partition dated June 11, 1956, executed
by all the above-named heirs with the assistance of their respective guardian
and counsel, was presented to the court for approval, which the court approved
in its order dated August 31, 1956. 
Among the properties awarded to Leonora Navarro in said Project of
Partition were:

x            x       
x

“b)    The parcel of land situated at Lasang,
Davao City,
designated as Lot 634-A, with an area of 89,430 square
meters, more or less …

“c)    All
rights and interests under the portion of Lot No. (632 and 633) situated
at Panabo, Davao
with an area of 1.5 hectares, more or less adjacent to the parcel of land
described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1297.”

On
October 13, 1958, Eldegardes Yuson
de Pua, eldest legitimate daughter and judicial
guardian of the incompetent Leonora Navarro Yuson,
filed a verified petition with the court below, praying for authority to sell
Lot No. 634-A.  On October
25, 1958, the court
issued an order granting the judicial guardian authority to sell Lot No. 634-A on the ground that “the sale
of the aforesaid property will be beneficial to the ward and her minor children
because the proceeds thereof could be expended for their maintenance.”
Accordingly, Lot No. 634-A was sold to herein appellee, Justiniano San Agustin,
for P13,750.00 as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated January 19, 1959.  This sale was approved by the
court on January 23, 1959, and Eldegardes Yuson de Pua was directed in the
same order “to deposit with the Philippine National Bank, Davao Branch, the amount of Thirteen Thousand Seven Hundred
Fifty Pesos (P13,750.00), consideration of the
aforesaid sale, in the name of the above-entitled guardianship, to be withdrawn
only upon previous approval of the court.”

Subsequently, or on January 20, 1959, the same guardian
Mrs. de Pua filed a second petition in the court a
quo, praying for authority to sell Lots Nos. 632 and 633 on the
following ground, to wit:

“That in view of the standing account of the estate of the
insane, Leonora Yuson and the expenses for
maintenance of her children, the herein petitioner deems it wise that the
above-mentioned property, which the estate cannot maintain or improve, be
sold.” (Record on Appeal, p. 2.)

However, the true area
of the two lots — i.e., eleven (11) instead of only one and one-half (1-1/2)
hectares — was disclosed in this petition, thus:

“That among the properties of the insane, Leonora Navarro, as inheritance from the deceased
spouses, Enrique Navarro and Maximina Bonleon, are two (2) parcels of land known as Lots Nos. 632 and 633 Cad. 102, consisting of 11
hectares, more or
less, and situated at Lasang, Davao. “(emphasis supplied) (Id., p. 2)

On the same day that this second
petition was filed, Mrs. de Pua also filed a
“Motion to Approve Sale of Property” because Lots Nos. 632 and 633
had in the meantime been already sold by her to Dr. Justiniano
San Agustin the day before, i.e., on January 19, 1959, as evidenced by
an instrument ‘titled “Transfer of Rights”, that is to say,
simultaneously with the other deed which was duly authorized and approved by
the court.

Acting on this second motion, on February 7, 1959, the Court denied the
petition to sell Lots Nos. 632 and 633, thus:

“Inasmuch as the judicial guardian sold just recently Lot No.
634-A, TCT No. 1296, belonging to the ward, in the amount of Thirteen Thousand Seven
Hundred Fifty Pesos (P13,750.00), the sale of the
property mentioned in her petition filed on January 20, 1959, is not necessary or would not be beneficial
to the ward; hence, the petition
to sell is hereby denied.” (Id.,
pp, 26-27)

Meanwhile, because the co-heirs of the
ward, Leonora Navarro — namely, Benita Navarro, Delia Navarro and Ramon Navarro, in
aforementioned Special Case No. 64-R learned thru the sale by appellant
guardian Mrs. de Pua to Dr. San Agustin that Lots Nos. 632 and 633 consisted not merely of
1.5 hectares but 11, steps were taken towards the return of the said properties
and they were correspondingly returned to the estate for proper disposition,
and as a result, a Supplemental Project of Partition dated June 9, 1960 was arrived at, submitted to the court
but subsequently amended on July 29, 1960. 
The amended Supplemental Project of Partition was also approved by the
court in Case No. 64-R on August 29, 1960. 
Under the terms of the Supplemental Project of Partition and the amendment
thereto, the heirs agreed that —

“ . . . th(e) Estate shall
recognize and confirm the conveyance of the rights over said Lots Nos. 632-633,
Cad. 102, with an area of 11 hectares, in favor of JUSTINIANO SAN AGUSTIN, for
the stipulated price of P8,250.00; and

” . . . the heirs Benita Navarro and
the minors Ramon and Delia, both surnamed Navarro, hereby cede and assign in
favor of the heir Leonora Navarro, all of their rights, interests in the aforecited lots nos. 632-633, Cad. No. 102 and all its
improvements under the consideration that said Leonora Navarro shall pay to the
aforenamed co-heirs, namely, Benita Navarro and the
minors Ramon and Delia, all surnamed Navarro, the sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) and in addition, shall
release and rescind the respective mortgage obligations of the said co-heirs in
favor of said Leonora Navarro, and with
the corresponding cancellation of the annotation of mortgage encumbrance
appearing in TCT No. T-8363 of Benita Navarro and the titles in the name of the
minors Ramon and Delia, all surnamed Navarro, which properties were assigned to
said co-heirs under the project of partition dated June 11, 1956, approved by this
Honorable Court in its Order of August
31, 1956.” (Id., pp. 47-48)

On
August 21, 1962,
Mrs. de Pua filed an “Ex-Parte
Motion” manifesting her desire to return to Dr. San Agustin the amount of
P7,375.00 advanced by him, so that the possession of
Lots Nos. 632 and 633 may be returned to the guardianship.  This motion was granted in an order dated September
1, 1962, pertinent
portion of which provides:

x            x       
x

” . . . conformably
with her ex-parte motion filed on August 31, 1962,
P7,375.00 of said amount shall be paid to Justiniano
San Agustin so that he could return possession of Lots Nos. 632 and 633, Cad. 102,
belonging to the incompetent, to the judicial guardian.  x x
x.” (Id., pp. 29-30)

On
September 4, 1962, she followed this with an “Amended Ex-Parte
Motion” with the following relevant allegations:

x            x       
x

“2.  – That since January 19, 1959, said Dr. San
Agustin has been in continuous possession of the said lots and has been
enjoying the fruits thereof, which fact was not alleged as it should be, in the
aforestated ex-parte motion
of August 31st.  (should
be 21st)

x            x       
x

“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the undersigned
guardian be allowed to return the sum of P7,375.00 to
Dr. Justiniano San Agustin, less the total value of
the fruits he realized from his possession of the land in question from January
19, 1959 until he returns the possession thereof to the undersigned-movant, the amount of which may be ascertained from the
doctor’s record of production and sales of the coconuts thereon.” (Id., p.
31)

The
record does not disclose the lower court’s action on this “Amended Ex-Parte Motion”. 
Neither does it appear there that appellee
ever took any step to enforce the sale to him of the two lots in question
evidently because, as he very well knew, the Court had disapproved the
same.  According to appellant on page 11
of her brief, it was only after she filed a civil action, docketed as Civil
Case No. 5160, seeking the reconveyance
of the said lots that appellee began to move by
filing on September 28, 1966 a “Motion for Confirmation of Deed of
Transfer of Rights Over Lots 632 and 633, Cad. 102″ in
his favor.  He prayed that “.
. . in the interest of justice and equity . . . the Transfer of Rights over
Lots 632 and 633 in favor of Justiniano San Agustin
be approved and confirmed by the Honorable Court.” He based his alleged
right over the two lots on the “Supplemental Project of Partition” of
June 9, 1960 and the “Amendment to the Supplemental Project of
Partition” of July 29, 1960, which were executed by the Judicial
Administrator and by the heirs, respectively, and approved by the probate court
in the intestate proceeding, to modify, as already stated earlier, the original
Project of Partition because of the discovery of the true area of Lots Nos. 632
and 633, which is eleven (11) hectares and not one and one-half (1.5) hectares
only, and that all the heirs agreed in said “Supplemental Project of
Partition” and the amendment thereto, among other things, to recognize and
confirm the sale of Lots Nos. 632 and 633 in his favor, instead of
partitioning the same in some other manner.

On November 12, 1966, Mrs. de Pua
filed an “Opposition to the Motion for Confirmation, contending that:

“1.  The transfer of rights over Lots Nos. 632 and 633, Cad. 102
had been passed upon and disapproved by an order of this Honorable Court which
has become final.  (Referring
to order of February 7, 1959 disapproving the sale of the same lots.)

“2.  The petition (motion for confirmation) is self-serving and states
no ground to warrant approval of the transfer of rights.”

Over said opposition, the court issued
the following order, granting Dr. San Agustin’s motion for confirmation:

“Finding the Motion for Confirmation of Deed
of Transfer of Right over Lots Nos. 632 and 633, Cad. 102 in favor of Justiniano San Agustin filed by his counsel on September
28, 1966, meritorious, the Order of this Court of February 7, 1959, based on
erroneous facts, is hereby set aside and the aforesaid transfer of rights
signed by Justiniano San Agustin and Leonora Navarro
represented by Eldegardes Yuson
de Pua, her judicial guardian … is hereby
approved.” (Emphasis supplied)

Her motion for reconsideration having
been denied “for lack of merit, “the judicial guardian, Mrs. de Pua, is now before Us and urges
the following assignment of errors:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE ORDER OF THE LOWER COURT
APPROVING THE TRANSFER OF RIGHTS IN FAVOR OF JUSTINIANO SAN AGUSTIN IS CONTRARY
TO LAW ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:

I.    THE TRANSFER OF RIGHTS IS VOID AB INITIO;
HENCE, COULD NOT BE APPROVED NOR CONFIRMED.

II.   THE TRANSFER OF RIGHTS IS NOT
NECESSARY NOR BENEFICIAL TO THE WARD.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE ORDER OF THE LOWER COURT
IN SETTING ASIDE ITS ORDER DATED FEBRUARY
7, 1959 IS CONTRARY TO LAW ON THE GROUND THAT IT SETS ASIDE AN
ORDER WHICH HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

In support of the first assigned
error, judicial guardian-appellant Mrs. de Pua argues
through counsel that the transfer of rights is void ab
initio and cannot be approved nor confirmed,
because under Rule 95, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, property under guardianship
can be sold only by prior authority granted by the guardianship court; that in
the instant case “not only was the transfer of rights executed by the
judicial guardian without any authority, but the petition seeking authority to
sell, which was filed a day after the actual execution of the transfer of
rights, was expressly denied by the lower court”; and, therefore, the
transfer of rights is void because “a sale of the ward’s realty by the
guardian without authority from the court is void”, citing Inton v. Quintana, (81 Phil. 97).  Furthermore, she adds that the transfer of
rights is not necessary nor beneficial to the
ward.  In fact, there is no allegation at
all to such effect in appellee’s motion for
confirmation.

Relative to the second assigned error,
judicial guardian-appellant argues that the Order of the lower court of
February 7, 1959, which denied her petition to sell Lots 632 and 633 completely
disposed of her petition and, therefore, the challenged Order of November 12,
1966, which summarily set aside the said previous order is contrary to law.

The
foregoing assignment of errors/arguments raise only one decisive issue, which
is:  Whether or not, under the circumstances
related above, the lower court acted correctly in issuing the order of November
12, 1966, approving the Motion for Confirmation of Sale of Lots 632 and 633
filed by the appellee Dr. San Agustin and setting
aside its previous order of February 7, 1959, which earlier disapproved the
sale of the same lots.

We agree with appellant that the
impugned order cannot stand legal scrutiny.

To start with, it must be emphasized
that what appellee asked the court to confirm was a
sale in 1959, or seven years before the
filing of said motion, and what is more, it was a sale which the court refused
to authorize in its order of February 7, 1959, for the simple reason that in
its opinion, considering that a previous sale of Lot 634-A for P13,750.00 had
just been approved, it could not see why it would again be
“necessary”, after just a few days, “or beneficial to the
ward” that the two lots, Lots 632 and 633 should still be sold.

Reiteratedly,
this Court has ruled that under Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 96 (now Rule 95) that
the properties of Leonora, the ward of appellant Mrs. de Pua
could be sold only under authority of the guardianship court in Special
Proceedings No. 282.  Without such
authority, any sale would necessarily be illegal.  Indeed, even on the assumption posited by appellee that the lack of authority from the guardianship
court resulted only in a voidable sale which could be
ratified, there is no showing in the record that there
was any such ratification.  We cannot go
along with the proposition that the approval by the probate court in Case No.
64-R of the amended “Supplemental Project of Partition” may be deemed
in law as tantamount to the required ratification.

It is quite true that
appellant-guardian Mrs. de Pua, did sign, assisted by
her lawyer, Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, the motion to approve said
“Supplemental Project of Partition” of July 29, 1960, and that said
motion was approved by the probate court on August 29, 1960.  It is further true that in the first
“Supplemental Project of Partition” it was specifically stipulated in
paragraph 7(a) “that this Estate shall recognize and confirm the
conveyance of the rights over said Lots Nos. 632 and 633, Cad. 102, with an
area of 11 hectares, in favor of Justiniano San
Agustin, for the stipulated price of P8,250.00.”
But legally speaking, the approval by the probate court of such project of
partition (the stipulation just quoted was specifically reiterated in the
amended project dated July 29, 1960), did not in any degree confer upon Mrs. de
Pua the power to dispose of the lots in question
without prior permission of the guardianship court.  Indeed, the motion to approve referred to was
signed only by Flor A. Unson,
the Judicial Administrator in the probate court in Case No. 64-R.  We hold that that court had no jurisdiction
to authorize the sale of any property belonging to an heir who is under
guardianship without first requiring the guardian to secure the corresponding
authority from the guardianship court. 
Worse, much less could the probate court have any power to effectively
approve a sale of an heir-ward which had, as in this case, been actually
disapproved by the guardianship court.

In
arriving at this conclusion, We are not overlooking the fact that the same
judge, the Honorable Vicente N. Cusi, Jr. who had
issued the order denying authority to sell Lots 632 and 633 was the very
one who in his order of November 12, 1966, here being assailed, approved the
motion for confirmation on the lame excuse, as We see it, that his previous order of February 7, 1959 was
“based on erroneous facts”. 
What “erroneous facts”, he did not state, which circumstance readily
places the order in question subject to the omission to comply with the
constitutional requirement that final orders or decisions of courts of record
should state the facts on which it is based, which means, of course, that at
least the main elemental facts must be stated in a manner such as to enable the
parties to comprehend intelligently what they are.

Another equally important
consideration lies in the way to Our giving Our
sanction to the questioned order.  In the
order of February 7, 1959,
Judge Cusi held the sale was neither necessary nor
beneficial to the ward.  The motion for
confirmation of appellee of September 28, 1966 had no allegation at all that
could induce anyone to alter the conclusion in the February 7, 1959 order. 
If indeed there was already need on the part of the ward Leonora for
additional funds in 1966, the court could not just assume that such was the
case, absent any allegation, much less any proof to such effect before it.

Besides, We cannot but wonder how Lot
634-A with an area of a little less than nine (9) hectares was sold for
P13,750.00 and yet two lots, numbered 632 and 633, indicating they must be
either contiguous to Lot 634-A or within its immediate vicinity could be sold
on the same day for only P8,250.00.  A
guardianship court is designed purposely to see to it that the interests of
wards under its jurisdiction are taken care of by the court’s appointed
guardian with the diligence and prudence of a bonus pater
familiae. 
We are not convinced that such standard of care was observed in the
impugned order of November 12, 1966.

We
hold that appellant had every right to require the reconveyance by deed of said lots, without prejudice to
her returning to appellee the P7,375.00
he appears to have paid, but not before appellee San
Agustin has accounted for the fruits of the lots in question which have
remained in his possession since 1959 and a proper set-off of the amount of any
possible additional payment has been determined.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered setting aside the impugned order of November 12, 1966, and ordering the guardianship court in
Case No. 282 of the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Branch I, to proceed with the accounting pursuant to the above opinion.

Abad Santos, and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Fernandez, J., concurred.  Member of the first Division and was
designated to sit in the Second Division.

Aquino, J., see
concurring opinion.

Concepcion, Jr., J., no part.