G.R. No. L-7042. May 28, 1954
CLOTILDE MEJIA VDA. DE ALFAFARA, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. PLACIDO MAPA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, BENITA COMPANA, ET AL., RESPONDEN…
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Instance of Cebu in which petitioner seeks to nullify a decision
rendered by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in
D.A.N.R. Case No. 224 concerning lot No. 741 of the Carcar cadastre on
the ground that he acted in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion.
It appears that petitioner and respondents filed separately with the
Bureau of Lands an application claiming as homestead lot No. 741 of the
Carcar cadastre. After an investigation conducted in accordance with
the rules and regulations of said bureau, a decision was rendered in
favor of petitioner thereby giving course to her application and
overruling the application and protests of respondents. In due course,
respondents appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, who reversed the decision of the Director of Lands. And her
motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner interposed
the present petition for certiorari.
Respondents in their answer allege that, under section 3 of the
Public Land Law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is
the executive officer charged with the duty to carry out the provisions
of said law relative to the administration and disposition of the lands
of the public domain in the Philippines; that the decision which is now
disputed by petitioner was rendered after a formal investigation
conducted in accordance with the rules and regulations of the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and on the basis of the
evidence adduced therein and, therefore, said Secretary has not abused
his discretion in rendering it; and that the decision of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources on the matter is conclusive and
not subject to review by the courts, in the absence of a showing that
it was rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition, or mistake other
than an error of judgment in estimating the value or effect of the
evidence presented, citing in support of this contention the case of
Ortua vs. Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil., 440.
The lower court, after the reception of the evidence, upheld the
contention of respondents, and dismissed the petition, whereupon
petitioner took the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. The case,
however, was certified to this court on the ground that the appeal
involves purely questions of law.
The facts of this case as found by the Director of Lands are: By
virtue of an application filed by Maximo Alfafara, the Bureau of
Forestry granted him a permit on February 1, 1923, by virtue of which
he was authorized to construct and maintain a fishpond within lot No.
741 of the Carcar cadastre. Said permittee constructed fishpond dikes
along the side of the land facing General Luna street and running
parallel to the river. Said dikes were destroyed by the flood which
occurred in the same year. In 1926, the permittee abandoned the idea of
converting the land into a fishpond and, instead, he decided to convert
it into a ricefield. To this effect, the permittee entered into an
agreement with respondents whereby the latter would convert the land
into a ricefield on condition that they would take for themselves the
harvests for the first three years and thereafter the crop would be
divided share and share alike between the permittee and the
respondents. In 1930, the permittee ceded his rights and interests in
the land to his son, Catalino Alfafara, who continued improving the
same by constructing more rice paddies and planting nipa palms along
its border. Having converted the land into a ricefield, Catalino
Alfafara filed a homestead application therefor in his name while at
the same time continuing the same arrangement with respondents as share
croppers. Upon the death of Catalino Alfafara in 1945, the respondents,
after the harvest in 1946, began asserting their own right over the
land and refused to give the share corresponding to Catalino Alfafara
to his widow, the herein petitioner.
The claim of respondents that they improved the land in their own
right and not with permission of petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest,
was not given credence by the Bureau of Lands, for its agents found,
not only from the evidence presented, but also from their ocular
inspection, that the land has been under the rightful possession of
Maximo Alfafara since 1923, and that respondents were only able to work
thereon upon his permission on a share basis. By virtue of these
findings of the Director of Lands, the homestead application of
petitioner was given due course.
On appeal however to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, this official reversed the decision of the Director of Lands
invoking the ruling long observed by his department in connection with
disposition of public lands which are formerly within the forest zone
or under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry. He held that
neither petitioner nor any of her predecessors-in-interest had acquired
any right under the homestead application filed by each inasmuch as the
land covered by them was still within the forest zone when applied for
and that, for that reason, the Director of Lands had no jurisdiction to
dispose of said land under the provisions of the Public Land Law. He
likewise held that, inasmuch as the Alfafaras have not established any
right to the land at the time they entered into the contract with
respondents to work on the land on a share basis, the relation of
landlord and cropper between them did not legally exist and as such did
not produce any legal effect. Consequently,—he held—the Alfafaras
cannot be considered as landlords of respondents, and between an actual
occupant of an agricultural land which is released from the forest zone
and certified as disposable under the Public Land Law, and an applicant
whose application expired prior to its certification, the actual
occupant is given preferential right thereto over the appellant.
The ruling above adverted to read as follows:
“It is the rule in this jurisdiction which has been
followed consistently in the disposition of forest land which have been
declared agricultural lands that occupation of a forest land prior to
the certification of the Director of Forestry that the same is released
from the forest zone and is disposable under the provisions of the
Public Land Law does not confer upon the occupant thereof the right of
reference thereto under the said law. In the same manner, this office
does not give and does not recognize any right of preference in favor
of homestead applicants whose applications were filed prior to the
certification that the land covered thereby has already been released
from the forest zone and is disposable under the provisions of the
Public Land Law. In other words, prior to the certification by the
Bureau of Forestry that a parcel of forest land is already released
from the forest zone and is disposable under the provisions of the
Public Land Law, this Department does not recognize any right of
preference in favor of either the actual occupant thereof or any
homestead applicant therefor. The reason for this is that any permit or
license issued by the Bureau of Forestry for a parcel of forest land
can not bind the Bureau of Lands to recognize any right in favor of the
permittee under the provisions of the Public Land Law; and any
homestead application filed prior to the certification by the Director
of Forestry is ineffective and subject to rejection. From the time,
however, that a parcel of forest land is released from the forest zone
and certified as disposable under the provisions of the Public Land
Law, the occupation of the actual occupant becomes effective and is
recognized by the Public Land Law under section 95 thereof. Also the
homestead application filed prior to the certification by the Director
of Forestry will become effective from the date of the certification,
if the same had not been rejected prior to such certification. But,
between the actual occupant of a parcel of agricultural land and an
applicant therefor whose application was filed prior to its
certification as such by the Director of Forestry, this office always
recognizes the preferential right thereto of the actual occupant
thereof. In a long line of decisions in appealed cases, this office
always maintains that agricultural lands already and actually occupied
and cultivated cannot be applied for under the homestead law except by
the actual occupant thereof.” (Vicente Ruiz et al., vs. H. A. (New),
Mariano Ba. Mancao, Isabela, City of Zamboanga, decision dated April
13, 1949 and order dated July 22, 1949.)
The question now to be determined is: Has the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources abused his discretion in reversing
the decision of the Director of Lands?
At the outset, it should be stated that the findings of fact made by
the Director of Lands had been substantially upheld by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. They only differ on the conclusions
derived therefrom and on the effect upon them of the law regarding the
disposition of public lands which formerly were within the forest zone
or under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry.
Thus, the first question decided by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources is: Has petitioner or any of her
predecessors-in-interest acquired any right to the land under the
provisions of the Public Land Law? And the Secretary, following the
ruling above stated, answered in the negative. His reasoning follows:
“Neither Clotilde Mejia Vda. de Alfafara nor any of her
predecessors-in-interest could acquire any right under the homestead
application filed by each of them inasmuch as the land covered thereby
was still within the forest zone and that for that reason, the Director
of Lands had no jurisdiction to dispose of said land under the
provisions of the Public Land Law.” To this we agree, for it appears
that the land was released from the forest zone only on August 10,
1949, and the permit granted to Maximo Alfafara to possess the land for
purposes of homestead was in 1923. And with regard to Cataiino
Alfafara, his son, his application was filed only in 1930.
The second question decided by the Secretary is: What is the legal
effect of the contractual relation of landlord and tenant existing
between the Alfafaras and the respondents? The answer of the Secretary
is: “Considering that none of the Alfafaras has established any right
whatsoever to the land in question at the time the contractual relation
began, this office is of the opinion and so holds that the relation of
landlord and cropper could not and did not produce any legal effect
because the supposed landlords, the Alfafaras, have no title or right
to the land in question under the provisions of the Public Land Law. In
other words, this office cannot see how any of the Alfafaras could be
considered landlord of the claimants on the land in question when none
of them has any right over said land under the Public Land Law.”
With this conclusion we disagree. Even in the supposition that the
permit granted to Maximo Alfafara by the Bureau of Forestry to possess
the land and work it out for his benefit be against the law- and as
such can have no legal effect, the fact however is that Maximo Alfafara
has acted thereon in good faith honestly believing that his possession
of the land was legal and was given to him under and by virtue of the
authority of the law. Likewise, it cannot be reasonably disputed that
when Maximo Alfafara entered into a contract with the respondents for
the conversion of the land into a ricefield with the understanding that
the respondents, as a reward for their service, would get for
themselves all the harvest for the first three years, and thereafter
the harvests would be divided between them and Maximo Alfafara share
and share alike both Alfafara and respondents have acted in good faith
in the honest belief that what they were doing was legal and in
pursuance of the permit granted to Alfafara under the authority of the
law. Having entered into that contractual relation in good faith no
other conclusion can be drawn than that such contract has produced as a
necessary consequence the relation of landlord and tenant so much so
that the respondents worked the land only on the basis of such
understanding. And this relation continued not only when Maximo
Alfafara assigned his right under the permit to his son Catalino, but
also when the latter died and his widow, the herein petitioner, took
over and continued possessing the land as successor-in-interest of her
husband. And it was only in 1946, after the death of Catalino Alfafara,
that respondents got wise and taking advantage of the helplessness of
his widow, coveted the land and decided to assert their own right over
it by filing their own application for homestead with the Bureau of
Lands. Such a conduct cannot be regarded as one done in good faith and,
in our opinion, cannot serve as basis for a grant of public land under
the ruling invoked by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
The possession therefore of the land by respondents should be
considered as that of a tenant and in this sense that possession cannot
benefit them but their landlord, the widow, in contemplation of the
rule. As such, the widow should be given the preference to apply for
the land for homestead purposes.
We are not unmindful of the doctrine laid down in the case of Ortua
vs. Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil., 440, to the effect that “a decision
rendered by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon a question of fact is
conclusive and not subject to be reviewed by the courts, in the absence
of a showing that such decision was rendered in consequence of fraud,
imposition or mistake, other than error of judgment in estimating the
value or effect of evidence.” But we hold that this doctrine does not
apply here because we are not concerned with a decision of the Director
of Lands which was approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, but one which has been revoked. The philosophy behind this
ruling is that if the decision of the Director of Lands on a question
of fact is concurred in by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, it becomes conclusive upon the courts upon the theory that
the subject has been thoroughly weighed and discussed and it must be
given faith and credit, but not so when there is a disagreement.[1]
And even if there is unanimity in the decision, still we believe that
the doctrine would not apply if the conclusions drawn by the Secretary
from the facts found are erroneous or not warranted by law. These
conclusions can still be the subject of judicial review. These are
questions of law that are reserved to the courts to determine, as can
be inferred from the following ruling laid down in the same case of
Ortua:
There is, however, another side to the case. It certainly was not
intended by the legislative body to remove from the jurisdiction of
courts all right to review decisions of the Bureau of Lands, for to do
so would be to attempt something which could not be done legally.
Giving force to all possible intendments regarding the facts as found
by the Director of Lands, yet so much of the decision of the Director
of Lands as relates to a question of law is in no sense conclusive upon
the courts, but is subject to review. In other words, any action of the
Director of Lands which is based upon a misconstruction of the law can
be corrected by the courts.” (Shirley vs. Cowan [1876], 91 U. S., 330;
Moore vs. Robins [1878], 96 U. S., 530; Marquez vs. Frisbie [1879], 101
U. S., 473; Black vs. Jackson [1900], 177 U. S., 349; Johnson vs.
Riddle, supra.)
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. The court sets
aside the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources dated September 15, 1949 as well as his order dated January
3, 1950, reaffirming said decision. The court revives the decision of
the Director of Lands dated March 18, 1948 and orders that it be given
due course. No pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
[1] This doctrine is based on section 4 of the Public
Land Law. It provides that the decisions of the Director of Lands “as
to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary
of Agriculture and (Natural Resources).”
DISSENTING
PARAS, C. J.:
It is true that Maximo Alfafara was granted on February 1, 1923, a
permit to construct and maintain a fishpond within lot No. 741 of the
Carcar cadastre, but it never- theless appears that said permit was
cancelled in 1926 after said fishpond was destroyed by a typhoon. In
said year, Maximo Alfafara induced the respondents Benita Compana et
al., to convert the former fishpond into a riceland, the agreement
being that the crops for the first three years would be for said
respondents and that thereafter the crops would be divided equally
between the former and the latter. According to the findings of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, not contradicted in any
way by those of the Director of Lands, Maximo Alfafara and his
successors-in-interest never worked on the land or spent anything for
the improvements thereon. The question that arises is, after the land
was declared available for homestead purposes by certification of the
Director of Forestry in 1949, or long after the permit of Alfafara had
been cancelled, whether the Alfafaras should be preferred to those who
actually worked on the land. After the cancellation of his permit,
Maximo Alfafara ceased to have any right or authority to continue
holding the land. Yet, he was given for several years one half of the
crops harvested by the respondents who took over the land in good faith
and could already occupy it in their own right. It may fairly be
considered that the original holder had impliedly parted with his
rights, if any, for valuable consideration. It is plainly unjust, under
the circumstances, to deprive the respondents of their priority to the
portions of the land actually held by them as homesteads. It appears,
however, that there were occupants of the portions of the lot who did
not apply for homesteads with the result that said portions may be
awarded to the Alfafaras if they are still entitled under the law.
I vote for the affirmance of the appealed decision.
Pablo, J., concurs.