FLORDELIZA ORPIA-TIONG, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BAGUIO CITY,…

Orpia-Tiong versus People of the Philippines

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, brought by Flordeliza Orpia-Tiong against the People of the Philippines and Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3. The petitioner was charged with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law for allegedly selling a carnapped vehicle. After the City Prosecutor's Review Committee recommended that the information be withdrawn, the trial court refused. The case matters because it draws the boundary between executive and judicial power over a criminal case already filed in court, and because it tells every judge what a written order resolving a motion to withdraw an information must contain.

Procedural History

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, through Prosecutor Raymond Tabangin, issued a resolution finding probable cause against the petitioner for violation of Presidential Decree Number 1612, the Anti-Fencing Law, and an information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3. The petitioner moved for reconsideration before the Office of the City Prosecutor. The Review Committee of that office, through Prosecutor Elmer Manuel Sagsago, issued a resolution finding that there is no crime of fencing insofar as it involves cars which were the subject of carnapping, and recommended that the information be withdrawn. The City Prosecutor then filed a motion to withdraw the information before the trial court.

Judge Pamintuan denied the motion to withdraw in an order dated July 4, 2006, and denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an order dated October 10, 2006. The petitioner went directly to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari, asking for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and praying that the two orders be set aside and that the motion to withdraw be granted. The Supreme Court partly granted the petition.

Facts

A carnapped vehicle owned by Rionel Lumanog was allegedly sold by the petitioner to Spouses Ernesto and Junette Akia. On April 3, 2006, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through Prosecutor Tabangin, issued a resolution finding probable cause against the petitioner for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, and an information was filed the same day before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3.

On April 20, 2006, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the Office of the City Prosecutor. On May 18, 2006, the Review Committee of that office, through Prosecutor Sagsago, issued a resolution finding that there is no crime of fencing insofar as it involves cars which were the subject of carnapping, and recommended that the information be withdrawn. On May 29, 2006, the City Prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the information before the trial court.

On July 4, 2006, Judge Pamintuan denied the motion, stating that he found the April 3, 2006 resolution of Prosecutor Tabangin more persuasive than the May 18, 2006 resolution of the Review Committee, and setting the arraignment. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on October 10, 2006, the court stating that it had found probable cause resulting in the issuance of the warrant of arrest, and again setting the arraignment.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court, in denying the motion to withdraw the information, encroached on the prosecutor's prerogative to determine probable cause and whether a crime was committed.
• Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion to withdraw the information by relying solely on a comparison of the two resolutions of the Office of the City Prosecutor.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote a statutory text; it applies the settled rule on the court's control of a case once filed, as stated in the decision:

Once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the court.

This rule is the premise of the Court's holding that the trial court may grant or deny a motion to withdraw an information.

The decision also states the judge's duty in resolving such a motion, as quoted from Carolina B. Jose versus Purita Suarez:

The court is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. Thus, the court may deny or grant a motion to withdraw an information, not out of subservience to the (Special) Prosecutor, but in faithful exercise of judicial discretion and prerogative.

This is the standard against which the trial court's orders were measured.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court did not encroach on the prosecutor's determination of probable cause. Once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the court. It is therefore within the judicial discretion and prerogative of the trial court to deny or grant the City Prosecutor's motion to withdraw the information, not out of subservience to the prosecutor, but in faithful exercise of judicial discretion and prerogative.

On the second issue, the Court held that the trial court gravely abused its discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. Even with that discretion, the trial court had a bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion. Instead, the trial court relied solely on its comparison of the resolution of Prosecutor Tabangin and the resolution of the Review Committee, without conducting its own determination of whether there was probable cause to hold the petitioner for trial. The Court quoted its earlier ruling in Joseph C. Cerezo versus People of the Philippines:

By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The said Orders were thus stained with grave abuse of discretion and violated the complainant's right to due process.

Because the assailed orders traced their roots from an act committed in excess of jurisdiction, they lose their standing and produce no effect. Following Summerville General Merchandising and Company, Incorporated versus Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Junior, the Court remanded the case to the trial court to rule on the merits and resolve the motion to withdraw the information anew.

Doctrine

First, once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the court. The court may deny or grant a motion to withdraw an information, not out of subservience to the prosecutor, but in faithful exercise of judicial discretion and prerogative.

Second, that discretion is not unbridled. The court has a bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion. A judge who merely compares the conflicting resolutions of the prosecutor's office, or blindly relies on the prosecutor's manifestation, abdicates judicial power and commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

Third, all acts which trace their roots from an act committed in excess of jurisdiction lose their standing and produce no effect, so the case must be remanded for a proper independent assessment.

Disposition

The petition for certiorari was partly granted; the orders of July 4, 2006 and October 10, 2006 were set aside and annulled, and the case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, to resolve the motion to withdraw the information based on its independent assessment of the evidence.

Remember This

Memorize the line: the court may deny or grant a motion to withdraw an information, not out of subservience to the prosecutor, but in faithful exercise of judicial discretion and prerogative, and that assessment must be embodied in a written order. Examiners use this case on the separation of powers between prosecutor and court, and on grave abuse of discretion for a judge who merely compares conflicting prosecutor resolutions instead of making an independent evaluation.