G.R. No. L-27773. December 28, 1970
EMILIA DE VERA VDA. DE HALILI, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND HALILI BUS DRIVERS & CONDUCTORS UNION?PTGWO, RESPONDENTS.
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for review on appeal by certiorari of the order, dated
April 27, 1967, entered by the Court of Industrial Relations it its Case No.
1099-V, and of said court’s en banc resolution, dated May 25,
1967, denying reconsideration of the order aforesaid.
This is not the first time that an incident in the
above-mentioned Case No. 1099-V of the CIR has reached this Court. G.R. No. L-24864, entitled “Fortunato F. Halili etc.,
petitioner, vs. Court of Industrial Relations & Halili
Bus Drivers & Conductors Union (PTGWO), Respondents”, was also an
appeal by certiorari from a 1955 resolution of the court a quo in
the same case. In fact, the initial
background of the present petition constitutes also that of the previous
one. It is set forth in the decision
which this Court rendered therein on February
26, 1968 (22 SCRA 785) as follows:
“On November 30, 1957, Fortunato F. Halili, doing business under the name and style of ‘Halili Transit’, and the Halili
Bus Drivers and Conductors Union (PTGWO) entered into a three-year Collective
Bargaining Agreement (Annex A to the petition for certiorari; Rollo, p. 30) by virtue of which the former recognized the
latter as exclusive bargaining agent of the drivers and conductors employed by
Halili, and according to which they both agreed to
abide by the schedule of the hourly regular and overtime rates of drivers
and conductors set forth in Annex ‘B’ of the Agreement.
“On August 20, 1958, the union filed with the Court of
Industrial Relations a petition docketed as Case No. 1099-V, which it
subsequently amended on December 9, 1958, charging violation by Halili of Commonwealth Act No. 444 (the Eight-Hour Labor
Law) in that he deducted from, and did not include in, the hours of work of the
drivers and conductors the time consumed for filling gas or for taking the bus
from the ‘carbarn‘ and vice-versa, the time for trip
intervals when the bus is waiting for passengers, and the time consumed on
minor repairs of the engine and other parts of the bus. It therefore prayed the court to fix the
compensable hours of work of the drivers and conductors, members of said
union, according to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 444, and to order Halili to pay the drivers and conductors the compensable
hours of work-previously rendered by them from October 1, 1956 up to the
filing of the petition.
“Halili filed his amended answer on December 22, 1958.
“After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations on August 7, 1961 rendered a decision (Rollo, p. 51) finding Halili
guilty of having violated Commonwealth Act No. 444. It thereupon required the Examining Division
of the Court of Industrial Relations to compute the compensable hours of work
rendered by the drivers and conductors who were members of the union, from
October 1, 1956 (This, instead of November 30, 1957 which was the date of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, is the starting date of computation because in
his answer to the complaint against him by the union before the Public Service
Commission in Case No. 48603-C, Halili averred ‘that
effective last Monday, October 1, 1956, all drivers and conductors of the
respondent are on fixed salary basis, that is to say, conductors are paid at
the rate of P0.50 an hour and drivers are paid at the rate of P0.60 an hour,
thereby making their wages in comformity with the
order of this Honorable Commission and with Republic Act 602, known as the
Minimum Wage Law.’ [Rollo, pp. 53-54; italics
supplied] until the date of the decision, at the rate of P0.60 for drivers and
P0.50 for conductors per hour, and the management of Halili
Transit to facilitate the examination by giving access to the Court examiner of
all trip reports, time records, time books, payrolls, vouchers, ledgers,
journals and all other pertinent records for the speedy computation of the
compensable hours of work.
“On August 14, 1961, Halili filed a
motion for clarification and for reception of additional evidence, wherein he
questioned the decision for not defining the compensable hours therein which
may be credited to the drivers and conductors, claiming that in said order the
court did not direct the Examining Division to determine the amount of
compensation actually received by the particular employees on any particular
day, and contending further that the decision was not a judgment, because it
did not determine any right or duty.
“The Court of Industrial Relations, on August 17, 1961, issued an order wherein it
clarified compensable hours as referring to work rendered over eight hours and
the computation based on the trip report per hourly rate at P0.60 for drivers
and P0.50 for conductors from October
1, 1956 until the date of the order. It further stated that the complainants were
working more than eight hours since they start from 5:30 A.M. and stop at
night, and declared that the judgment as to the liability of Halili was categorically concluded in the decision but the
amount of said liability could not be determined until after the Court Examiner
renders his report.
“Acting on Halili’s motion for
reconsideration, the Court of Industrial Relations on April 6, 1962 entered a
resolution (Rollo, p. 58) en banc
affirming the decision of August 7, 1961, but remanding the case to the Court
of Industrial Relations trial Judge for determination as to union membership of
the claimants referred to in the decision because: ‘The determination of who are members of the
petitioner union, especially that the decision would cover a period, from
October 1, 1956, is a judicial determination which entails the use of
discretion and can not be left to the determination by the Court Examiner,
upon the expediency of the examination of the books, records, payrolls, etc.’
“No judicial determination of the membership of the union was
however made. Neither did Halili appeal from the decision nor from the clarificatory resolution of the same dated August 17, 1961. The resolution en banc on
motion for reconsideration dated April
6, 1962 was not appealed by Halili.
“On April 7, 1965,
the Court of Industrial Relations issued an order (Rollo,
p. 70.) directing the Court Examiner, assisted by a union representative, to
investigate and examine all trip reports, time records, time books, payrolls,
vouchers, ledgers, journals, and all other pertinent records of Halili Transit, and compute the compensable hours of work
rendered by the drivers and conductors pursuant to the decision, dated August
7, 1961, for the period from January 1, 1961 up to the date of the order.
“On April 14, 1965,
Halili moved for a reconsideration of the
aforementioned order, and op April 24,
1965, filed his memorandum in support thereof – on the ground that
the same is contrary to law, the facts and evidence. This motion was denied by the Court of
Industrial Relations in its resolution en banc (Rollo, p. 83.) dated July 12, 1965.”
It was from said order of April
7, 1965 and en banc resolution of July 12, 1965 that Halili brought the first appeal by certiorari in G. R. No.
L-24864, putting in issue: (1) Whether
or not the trial court erred in holding him liable for the payment under
Commonwealth Act No. 444 of the compensable hours of work rendered by the
drivers and conductors who are members of respondent union; (2) Whether or not
the decision dated August 7, 1961 is incomplete and interlocutory and
therefore the respondent court erred in enforcing it by entering its order
dated April 7, 1965 and promulgating its resolution en banc dated
July 12, 1965; and (3) Whether or not the respondent court erred in directing
its Examiner to examine and investigate the records of petitioner Halili from January 1, 1961 up to the present. Upon the facts set out above, this Court
rendered the following judgment:
“WHEREFORE, the appealed order and resolution en banc
are hereby affirmed and the Court of Industrial Relations is hereby enjoined to
make a judicial determination of the union membership of the claimants, while
the Examining Division of said court shall proceed with its computation of the
compensable hours of work rendered by, and the corresponding compensation
payable to, the drivers and conductors admitted by both parties to be union
members since October 1, 1956 and those contended by the union to be
such-members but disputed by the employer.
No costs. So ordered.”
It appears that while this appeal in G.R. No. L-24864 was still
pending resolution in this Court, and while, on the other hand, proceedings
were being had in Case No. 1099-V before the Court of Industrial Relations for
the purpose of determining the membership of the herein respondent union as of
October 1, 1956 – pursuant to the order of the CIR dated January 3, 1966 –
because this Court had denied herein petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a
restraining order, Fortunato F. Halili
died on December 29, 1966. Accordingly,
notice of such death was given to herein private respondents who, on January
13, 1967, filed a motion in the CIR praying that the legal representative of
the deceased Fortunato F. Halili
be ordered to appear to be substituted for him, or the appointment of a legal
representative be procured should none appear, or, the heirs of the deceased be
substituted for him. That motion was
opposed by herein petitioner who, thru counsel, alleged that after the death of
Halili a petition for letters of administration had
been filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
in its Spec. Proc. No. Q-10852; that herein petitioner was duly appointed as
special administration in said proceeding; and, that Case No. 1099-V of the
respondent CIR, being a money claim against the deceased Fortunato
F. Halili, should be dismissed and thereafter
prosecuted in the manner especially provided in the Rules of Court. The CIR resolved that incident on March 8, 1967, by ordering herein
petitioner to appear before it within 30 days from receipt of the corresponding
order and to be substituted for the deceased.
Petitioner herein did not comply with the said order; but counsel for
the decease Fortunato F. Halili,
on April 24, 1967, filed a
manifestation informing the CIR that herein petitioner Emilia
de Vera Vda. de Halili had
been appointed regular administratrix of the
intestate estate of Fortunato F. Halili
in Special Proceedings No. Q-10852 of the CFI of Rizal,
whereupon the CIR, taking such manifestation ad a substantial compliance with
its order of March 8, 1967,
entered an order dated April 27, 1967,
appointing herein petitioner Vda. de Halili as the legal representative of, and ordering her
substituted for, the deceased Fortunato F. Halili. In the same
order, the court a quo directed a CIR commissioner to continue
the reception of the evidence of the parties on the question of the herein
respondent union’s membership as of October
1, 1956.
On May 8, 1967,
certain attorneys entered a special appearance for herein petitioner Emilia de Vera Vda. de Halili, in her capacity both as administratrix
of the intestate estate, and as heir, of Fortunato
F. Halili “for the purpose only of the matter of
her being required to substitute for her deceased husband.” At the same time, she filed a motion seeking
reconsideration of the above-mentioned order of April 27, 1967, which motion, however, was denied by the
CIR in its en banc resolution dated May 25, 1967.
Hence, the present petition for review on appeal by certiorari from the
last mentioned order and en banc resolution.
In her brief, petitioner makes the following assignment of
errors:
“I
“THAT RESPONDENT COURT ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION (1) IN APPOINTING PETITIONER, IN
HER CAPACITY AS THE ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE IN TESTATE ESTATE OF DECEASED
FORTUNATO F. HALILI, THE LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OF SAID DECEASED IN CASE NO.
1099-V; (2) IN ORDERING HER, IN THE SAME CAPACITY, SUBSTITUTED FOR THE SAME
DECEASED IN THE SAME CASE; AND (3) IN DIRECTING ITS HEARING EXAMINER TO
CONTINUE RECEIVING THE EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES IN CASE NO. 1099-V AND TO
SUBMIT HIS REPORT IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER, INSTEAD OF HOLDING’THAT THE ACTION
OF RESPONDENT UNION AGAINST DECEASED FORTUNATO F. HALILI INVOLVES ONE 0THICH
DOES NOT SURVIVE AND THEREFORE OUGHT TO BE DISMISSED AND PROSECUTED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 21, RULE 3 IN RELATION TO RULES 86 OF THE REVISED RULES
OF COURT.
“II.
“THAT RESPONDENT COURT
ERRED IN ACTING FURTHER IN CASE NO. 1199-V FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE-CASE AND THE NULLITY OF ALL PROCEEDINGS HAD IN THE
CASE.”
It is obvious that it is the second assignment of error
concerning the jurisdiction of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations
that raises the more substantial issue, even if We find, as will be explained
later, that petitioner may not be very serious in raising the same. Petitioner takes the position that cases
involving claims for overtime compensation should in all its aspects be within
the jurisdiction of regular courts, to the exclusion of the CIR. She contends that respondent CIR had no, as
it never could have acquired jurisdiction over the subject-matter of Case No.
1099-V; consequently, all the proceedings had in said case, including the
judgment, the order of April 27, 1967, and the en banc resolution
of May 25, 1967, are entire, nullities which cannot be the source of any right
or obligation.
Petitioner’s position is untenable. In Casino Español
de Manila vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-18159, December 17, 1966, this Court already said
definitely), “it is already a settled matter which need not be further
discussed x x x that the
Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction, among others, over cases
involving hours of employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law and claims arising
thereunder by an employee or an ex-employee seeking
reinstatement.” We emphasized this again in Rheem
of the Phil., Inc., et al vs. Ferrer, et al., G.R.
No. L-22979, January 27, 1967,
19 SCRA 130, 134 wherein We said, “[A]fter the
passage of Republic Act 875, this Court has (always) x x
x upheld the industrial court’s assumption of
jurisdiction over cases for salary differentials and overtime pay.”
There can be no disagreement here that what the members of the
respondent union claim is the payment of overtime wages for work rendered by
them during the hours deducted by the predecessor of herein
petitioner from their daily compensable working time in the company’s payrolls,
in violation of the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
As a matter of fact, this Court stressed the nature of the basic issue
between the parties herein in that earlier case, G. R. No. L-24864, thus:
“The matter in issue in the main case below (Case No. 1099-V)
is whether or not petitioner Halili is guilty of
violating the Eight-Hour Labor Law (C.A. No. 444) in that he deducted from the
working hours of the drivers and conductors, members of respondent union, the
time spent for taking the buses from the carbarn and
filling it with gas, oil or, water; the interval for waiting for passengers;
and the repair of the engine and other parts of the bus in case of
breakdown. The trial court found him
guilty of the charge and held him ‘liable categorically‘ for the
compensable hours and overtime pay from October 1, 1956 up to the present at
the rate of P0.60 for drivers and P0.50 for conductors per hour. This finding of the trial court in its
decision of August 7, 1961, as clarified in its order of August 17, 1961 and
affirmed in all respects – except the ‘x x x determination
as to the union membership of the claimants referred to in the decision x x x’ – by the court en banc in its resolution
of April 6, 1962, is a finding of fact which is final and conclusive and not
subject to review, no appeal having been interposed therein.”
Petitioner’s reliance on Our decision in the earlier unreported
case of Mindanao Bus Employees Labor Union (PLUM) vs. The Mindanao Bus Co.
and the CIR,[1]
is unavailing. As already pointed out
above, this Court has consistently held otherwise in all subsequent cases
involving the same issue, hence Mindanao Bus should be deemed to have been
abandoned even as early as in Red V Coconut Products, Ltd. vs. CIR, et al., G.
R. No. L-21348 decided June 30, 1966,
if not earlier, at least impliedly, in the cases decided previous thereto by
this Court.[2]
Withal, why petitioner did not raise this issue in G. R. No. L-24864 wherein
it was an appropriate one would seem incomprehensible, if there were
seriousness in bringing it up here now.
When We decided G. R. No. L-24864 in 1968 or even when it came up here
in 1965-1966, Mindanao Bus was no longer the rule and it can be presumed
petitioner’s counsel then was acquainted with such development in labor law.
Petitioner’s first assignment of error, on the other hand,
revolves around the applicability or inapplicability to the situation here
presented of the following provisions of the Rules of Court:
“Sec. 17 (Rule 3). Death
of party. – After a party
dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon
proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be
substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within
such time as may be granted. If the
legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the
opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased
within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to
be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.”
“Sec. 21 (Rule 3). Where
claim does not survive. – When the action is for recovery of money,
debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the
Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner
especially provided in these rules.”
It is her contention that Case No. 1099-V in the CIR is one for
the recovery of overtime compensation allegedly due and owing to the members
of the respondent union for their services to the deceased Fortunato
F. Halili; and since the same is a money claim
which does not survive within the contemplation of the above-quoted provisions
of Section 21 of Rule 3, by clear mandate of the same provisions, the said
action should be dismissed and thereafter prosecuted in the manner especially
provided in the Rules, i. e., the money claim
referred to must be dismissed in the CIR and then filed instead, if not yet
barred, in the intestate estate of the late Fortunato
F. Halili in Special Proceedings No. Q-10852 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal in the manner
provided under Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
It is therefore maintained by her that the procedure provided in Section
17 of Rule 3 requiring the substitution of a deceased party by his legal
representative – is not applicable to the present case, and, consequently, the
respondent CIR erred and committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction when, in its impugned order of April 27, 1967, it appointed
herein petitioner as legal representative of, and substituted for, the
deceased Fortunato F. Halili,
and directed the Hearing Examiner of said court to continue receiving the
evidence of the parties, instead of declaring that the action against said
deceased did not survive and should be dismissed and prosecuted in the CFI of Rizal.
For the sake of clarity, it must be stated that the basic theory
of petitioner’s first assignment of error is that if the respondent or
defendant, who is a natural person, in a case before the CIR for payment of
overtime pay dies during the pendency of the same,
the CIR loses jurisdiction to continue with the same and, instead, the corresponding
claim should be re-filed with the appropriate regular court of first instance
having jurisdiction of the testate or intestate estate of the deceased
respondent or defendant. While the point
is undoubtedly important, We do not deem it necessary to pace upon the same in
this case. For even if the injunction in
Section 21, Rule 3, in relation to Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, were to be
followed in this case, the questioned orders of respondent CIR must stand. We find that the court a quo
acted precisely in accordance with the provisions invoked by petitioner when
it appointed her as legal representative of her deceased husband and
substituted her for him in the case.
Section 21 of Rule 3 provides very clearly that actions for recovery of
money, debt or interest thereon, as the one here involved, “shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in the(se)
rules” only when “the defendant dies before final judgment”. There is no gainsaying that such is not the
case of petitioner – where the decision in the court below has already long
ago, become final and executory. Petitioner should recall that in her deceased
husband’s first appeal to this Court in G.R. No. L-24864, it was already argued
that the respondent CIR erred “in holding him liable for payment under
Commonwealth Act No. 444 of the compensable hours of work rendered by, the
drivers and conductors who are members of respondent union”, and this
Court therein disposed of said-argument by declaring that the “issue is
not properly raised x x x
because the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations dated August 7, 1961
and its clarificatory resolution of August 17, 1961
already became final and executory, the petitioner
not having appealed therefrom“. Such being the situation in this case, it is
obvious that it does not come within the purview of Section 21 of Rule 3
invoked by petitioner; and the lower court was right in appointing her as legal
representative of, and ordering her substituted for, the deceased Fortunato F. Halili, in
accordance with the procedure indicated in Section 17 of the same Rule.
Likewise, in that decision in G. R. No. L-24864, this Court held:
“The decision, therefore, is a final adjudication on the main
issue submitted to the court, and cannot be considered as interlocutory. The main case is now at its execution stage
and what only remains to be threshed out is the precise compensable hours of
work rendered by, and the amount of compensation owing to, the drivers and
conductors who are members of the respondent union from October 1, 1956 to date.”
Under the circumstances, the respondent
CIR cannot be held to have abused-its discretion in directing the Hearing
Examiner of said court to proceed with the reception of the evidence of the
parties in this case after herein petitioner was appointed legal representative
of, and was substituted for, her deceased husband.
It is well to emphasize, perhaps, that the rationale of the
procedure here involved is that after an action for money has been tried and
decided by a competent court, it would be a useless repetition of proceedings
to have it again tried and decided by a probate court. Enlightening on this point are the following
words in Testate Estate of Jose Laserna Paro y Tupaz,[3]
to wit:
x x x [u]pon the facts and circumstances of the present case, the
claim of Jose Altavas, although it did not survive
the deceased, need not have to be presented before the committee on claims and
appraisal principally because that claim is already an adjudicated claim by
final pronouncement by this Court in G. R. No. L-40038. To countenance appellant’s theory would be
to convert a claim duly passed upon and determined not only by the Court of
First Instance but by this Court into a contested claim, once again, in the
language of the trial court, ‘giving the committee on claims more power than
the courts of justice’ and ‘obliging a creditor whose claim had already been
passed upon by the Court to submit himself to the committee on claims and to
pass over again through the endless process of presenting his evidence which he
had already done.’ x x x“[4]
WHEREFORE, the order and en banc resolution
assailed in this proceeding are affirmed, with costs against petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., did not take part.
[1] G.R.
No. L-9795, Dec. 28, 1957,
192 Phil. 1179 (Unreported).
[2] See Annotations 19 SCRA 141. See also Phil. Asso.
of Free Labor Union (PAFLU), et al. vs. Tan & Rema,
Inc., 99 Phil. 854, 861-862; Oriental Tin Cans Workers’ Union vs. CIR, G.R.
No. L-17695, Feb. 26, 1965; Edward J. Nell Co. vs. Cubacub,
G.R. No. L-20842, June 23, 1965; Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co. vs. Olivar, G.R. No. L-19526, Sept. 20, 1965; Centro Escolar University vs. Wandaga, et al.,
G.R. No. L-25826, April 3, 1968, 23 SCRA 11, 14.
[3]
68 Phil. 703. This case was decided on a
different issue, i. e., whether or not the claim was
barred because Jose Altavas failed to present it
before the probate court, but it is cited because the same procedure is
involved.
[4]
Cf. Intestate Estate of Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando (Ignacio
vs. Pampanga Bus Co.,
Inc.), G.R. No. L-18936, May 23, 1967,
20 SCRA 126; To Guioc-Co vs. Del Rosario, 7
Phil. 126; Azarraga vs. Cortes, et al., 9
Phil. 698.