FAUSTINO LUCAS; EULALIO ROSENDO, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE, MERCEDES DE GUZMAN; MAMERTA DIZON, ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND ESTEBAN FULGENCIO; PACITA DIZON, ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBA…

Lucas versus Iboleon

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, with a prayer for preliminary injunction, brought by Faustino Lucas and his co-petitioners against Rafael Iboleon, Junior, Nilda Iboleon, Chua Beng Seh, Pacifico Garcia and others. The petitioners were the plaintiffs in a complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of land in Malabon, Rizal, which they claim was fraudulently included in a Torrens title. The case matters because it fixes the rule on when the period to appeal begins to run after a dismissal order is set aside and later reissued, and because it shows how the Supreme Court treats a trial court's own correction of its erroneous reckoning of reglementary periods.

Procedural History

The complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. On September 16, 1965, then Judge Samuel Reyes dismissed the complaint on the ground that a Torrens title cannot be defeated by long adverse possession and that the decree of registration could no longer be impugned after one year. The petitioners' first motion for reconsideration was denied on November 23, 1965. They filed a second motion for reconsideration, and on September 6, 1966 the respondent judge set aside the order of dismissal and set the case for pre-trial. On motion of the defendants, however, the respondent judge issued an order on December 1, 1966 again dismissing the case, this time on the ground that the action for reconveyance based on fraud had prescribed. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied on April 17, 1967, and they filed their notice of appeal on May 18, 1967. The trial court initially gave due course to the appeal on September 22, 1967, but on May 30, 1968 it reconsidered that order, declared the dismissal final and executory, and ordered execution. The petitioners then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.

Facts

The petitioners claimed to be the true owners of Lot 6-B-2 of the Malabon land, which they alleged had been inadvertently or fraudulently included in the original survey of the Hacienda de Maysilo and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 994 issued in 1917 by virtue of a decree of 1912. They alleged continuous possession in the concept of owner since time immemorial and asked for reconveyance and cancellation of the transfer certificates of title.

At pre-trial, the trial court first understood the petitioners to have admitted that the land was registered under the Torrens system and that they were neither registered owners nor successors in interest of the registered owners. On that basis, Judge Reyes dismissed the complaint. Later, upon a reading of the transcript, the respondent judge found that the petitioners had not made such an admission and that they insisted on fraud and on their possession since time immemorial, so he set aside the dismissal and set the case for pre-trial.

Reconsidering once more, the respondent judge dismissed the case on December 1, 1966, holding that an action for reconveyance based on fraud prescribes in four years from discovery, that the fraud was discovered as early as 1930, and that the complaint filed in 1964 was barred. The petitioners appealed, and the trial court at first gave due course, then withdrew that ruling and ordered execution, prompting this petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the petitioners' appeal was taken within the reglementary period, counting from the dismissal order of December 1, 1966.
• Whether or not the order of December 1, 1966 was a mere reinstatement of the earlier dismissal order of September 16, 1965, such that no new period to appeal arose.
• Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the dismissal final and executory and ordering execution.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6 of Rule 41, on the contents of the record on appeal, provides:

Such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time.

This provision bears on the case because the Court noted that had counsel observed it, the confusion over the dates of filing would not have arisen.

Section 1 of Rule 50, on the dismissal of appeals, provides:

Failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that the appeal was perfected within the period fixed by these rules.

This is the ground on which an appeal may be dismissed, and it frames the Court's discussion of the record on appeal.

Section 1 of Rule 13, on filing by registered mail, provides that the date of mailing, as shown by the post office stamp, is considered the date of filing. The Court applied this rule to hold that the petitioners' motions were filed on the dates of mailing, not on the dates of receipt by the clerk of court.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petitioners' appeal was taken within the reglementary period. Counting from December 13, 1966, when the December 1, 1966 order was served, and deducting the time the motion for reconsideration was pending, the notice of appeal filed on May 18, 1967 was well within thirty days. The Court also applied Section 1 of Rule 13 and found that the motions for reconsideration were filed by registered mail on November 6, 1965 and January 26, 1966, so the trial court's finding that the second motion was ten days late was erroneous.

On the second issue, the Court held that the order of December 1, 1966 was not a mere reinstatement of the September 16, 1965 order. The earlier dismissal had been completely wiped away by the order of September 6, 1966, and the later dismissal rested on a different ground, prescription of the action based on fraud. The Court said:

It is obvious, therefore, that the reconsideration of the order of September 6, 1966 could not have resulted automatically in the reinstatement of the status of dismissal in consequence of the order of September 16, 1965, and if after a restudy, the judge deemed it proper to order again a dismissal, this later dismissal must be considered as a newly appealable order and the period for its appeal must be correspondingly computed from the date of its service as prescribed by the rules.

On the third issue, however, the Court agreed with the private respondents that the dismissal of September 16, 1965 had already become final and executory, and it was unwilling to let the litigation protract further, considering the public interest in the settlement of property rights.

Doctrine

A dismissal order that has been set aside is wiped away completely, and a later order dismissing the case again, even on the same subject, is a newly appealable order from whose service the period to appeal runs anew. The mere modification of a judgment in an immaterial matter does not restart the period to appeal; only a substantial change does. Under Section 1 of Rule 13, the date of mailing shown by the post office stamp is the date of filing, and this governs motions sent by registered mail. Finally, the record on appeal must show on its face that the appeal was perfected on time, as required by Section 6 of Rule 41.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the order of the trial court declaring the dismissal final and executory and directing execution was upheld.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a dismissal order that has been set aside is completely wiped away, so a later dismissal is a new order and a new period to appeal runs from its service. Examiners use this case to test the reckoning of the period to appeal after a reinstated dismissal and the rule that the date of mailing is the date of filing under Rule 13.