EDGAR R. ERICE, COMPLAINANT, V. PRESIDING JUDGE DIONISIO C. SISON, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 125, CALOOCAN CITY, RESPONDENT.

Erice versus Sison

The Case

This is an administrative matter filed by Edgar Erice, then Vice Mayor of Caloocan City, against Judge Dionisio Sison of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 125. Erice charged the judge with gross misconduct, knowingly rendering an unjust order, and gross ignorance of the law, all arising from the judge's handling of a petition for declaratory relief that sought to stop the Ombudsman's preventive suspension of the city mayor and other officials. The case matters because it fixes the boundary between a trial court's power to issue injunctive relief and the authority of the Ombudsman, and because it teaches that a judge's ignorance of a basic jurisdictional rule is itself a serious administrative offense.

Procedural History

The complaint was filed with the Supreme Court and referred to the Office of the Court Administrator, which investigated and submitted a report recommending that the judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and fined an amount equivalent to one month's salary. The Court noted this recommendation in a resolution and later resolved the judge's request for terminal leave by releasing his benefits while retaining an amount equivalent to two months' salary to answer for any penalty in his pending administrative cases. The Court then decided the administrative matter on the merits, modifying the recommended penalty.

Facts

Erice, then Vice Mayor of Caloocan City, filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against then Mayor Enrico Echiverri and several city officials for alleged violation of the Government Service Insurance System Act. On July 18, 2011, the Ombudsman issued an order of preventive suspension against them, to last until the administrative adjudication was completed but not to exceed six months. The officials went to the Court of Appeals, obtained a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, but in a decision dated January 2, 2012, the Court of Appeals affirmed the suspension order and lifted the injunction.

A week later, the officials filed a petition for declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, naming Erice and the Department of the Interior and Local Government as respondents, and praying for a judicial declaration on the implementation of their suspension. A 72-hour ex parte order was issued to enjoin implementation. The case was raffled to Judge Bordios, who inhibited herself, and it was re-raffled to Judge Sison. On January 11, 2012, over the objection that the Solicitor General had not been informed of the hearing, Judge Sison proceeded and allowed the officials to present evidence. The next morning he denied the government's claim of a right to cross-examine the witnesses already presented, and at 9:15 a.m. he extended the temporary restraining order to 20 days.

On January 17, 2012, the day set for the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Judge Sison instead heard evidence on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. Erice filed an urgent motion to inhibit, but without ruling on it, Judge Sison issued the order granting the writ of preliminary injunction. In his defense, the judge claimed there was no basis for bias, that the extension was meant to accord due process, and that the haste was dictated by the limited time under the Rules of Court.

Issues

• Whether or not Judge Sison is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law in issuing a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Ombudsman's order of preventive suspension.
• Whether or not the subsequent declaration in Carpio Morales that the restrictions in Section 14 of the Ombudsman Act are unconstitutional or ineffective exonerates the judge from administrative liability.
• Whether or not a petition for declaratory relief may properly be used to challenge a court decision or an order of a quasi-judicial body.
• Whether or not the penalty of a fine of 40,000 pesos is proper given that the judge had already retired and that this was his second offense.

Applicable Provisions

Section 14 of the Ombudsman Act, Republic Act Number 6770, provides:

SEC. 14. Restrictions. — No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

This is the very restriction the Office of the Court Administrator found violated when the judge enjoined the enforcement of the suspension order.

Section 14 of the same Act further provides:

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

This provision, later declared unconstitutional in Carpio Morales, nonetheless frames the jurisdictional question the Court examines.

Rule 63, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, on petitions for declaratory relief, provides:

Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

The Court uses the phrase "other written instrument" to hold that court judgments and quasi-judicial orders fall outside the scope of declaratory relief.

Rule 140, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, as amended, on sanctions for serious charges, provides:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed: 1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; 2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or 3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

This fixes the range of penalties for gross ignorance of the law, which the Court applies in the disposition.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court agrees with the Office of the Court Administrator that the judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. A judge becomes liable for this serious charge when there is a patent disregard for well-known rules, producing an inference of bad faith, dishonesty, and corruption. The judge failed his basic duty to be acquainted with the fundamentals of the law he was sworn to uphold.

On the second issue, the Court holds that the supervening Carpio Morales decision does not exonerate him. Even setting aside Section 14, the judge ignored the basic principle of judicial stability or non-interference: where decisions of administrative bodies are appealable to the Court of Appeals, those bodies are co-equal with the trial courts, and their actions are beyond the trial court's control. The Ombudsman's disciplinary decisions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, so the trial court had no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of the suspension order, more so because the Court of Appeals had already affirmed that very order.

On the third issue, the Court holds that court orders and decisions cannot be the subject of a petition for declaratory relief. They are not included in the words "other written instrument" in Rule 63, and the same principle applies to orders of quasi-judicial bodies, anchored on res judicata. The losing party cannot escape the effects of a judgment under the guise of an action for declaratory relief.

On the fourth issue, the Court holds that the penalty for gross ignorance of the law ranges from a fine of more than 20,000 pesos but not exceeding 40,000 pesos to dismissal. Since the judge had already retired, suspension was no longer feasible, and a fine in lieu of suspension may be imposed. Considering that this was not his first offense, a fine of 40,000 pesos is justified.

Doctrine

A judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law when there is a patent disregard for well-known rules, producing an inference of bad faith, dishonesty, and corruption. Under the principle of judicial stability or non-interference, administrative bodies whose decisions are appealable to the Court of Appeals are co-equal with trial courts, and their actions are beyond the trial court's control. A petition for declaratory relief cannot be used to challenge a court judgment or a quasi-judicial order, because these are not "other written instruments" under Rule 63, and res judicata makes such judgments conclusive subject only to appellate authority. A supervening declaration that a statutory restriction is unconstitutional or ineffective does not excuse a judge who violated a more basic jurisdictional principle.

Disposition

The Court found retired Judge Sison guilty of gross ignorance of the law and ordered him to pay a fine of 40,000 pesos, to be deducted from his retained terminal leave benefits, with the remaining amount released to him immediately.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a trial court cannot enjoin the Ombudsman, because the Ombudsman's decisions go to the Court of Appeals, making the two bodies co-equal. Examiners use this case to test gross ignorance of the law, the principle of judicial stability, and the rule that judgments and quasi-judicial orders cannot be attacked through declaratory relief.