THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. ABRAHAM JARAMILLA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

Abraham JaramiUa was discharged before the Justice of the Peace Court of Sta.
Cruz, Ilocos Sur with less serious physical injuries in an information filed by
the provincial fiscal. After trial, the accused was convicted and sentenced to
10 days of arresto mayor and to pay the costs. He appealed in due time
to the court of first instance.

After the papers had been forwarded to the latter court, the provincial
fiscal filed a petition stating that he found sufficient reason to prosecute the
case and asked that it be included in the court calendar. The case was set for
hearing on September 26, 1951. On the same date, the accused asked for
postponement on the ground that he had not yet secured the services of a lawyer
to defend him. The postponement was granted and the case was again set for
hearing on November 15, 1951. The accused again asked for postponement and again
it was granted, the hearing having been set on February 24, 1953. On this date,
when the case was called for hearing, neither the provincial fiscal, nor any of
his assistants, appeared, whereupon the trial court issued an order dismissing
the case for lack of interest on the part of the prosecution, with costs de
oficio.

On the same day, counsel for the offended party filed a motion for
reconsideration. The motion was denied. On March 5, 1953, the provincial fiscal
in turn filed a motion for reconsideration wherein he explained his failure to
appear, ratifying at the same time the motion for reconsideration filed by the
private prosecutor. On March 14, 1953, the accused entered a special appearance
with the only purpose of opposing said motion for reconsideration. On the same
date, the trial court denied the motion for lack of merit, and from this order
the provincial fiscal has appealed. The case is now before us for the reason
that, as certified by the Court of Appeals, the appeal involves a question of
jurisdiction.

The only ground on which the order of dismissal was predicated is the alleged
“lack of interest on the part of the prosecution” in view of the failure of the
provincial fiscal, or any of his assistants, to appear when the case was last
set for trial at the instance of the accused. And, as we have stated, the trial
court denied the motion for reconsideration filed both by the provincial fiscal
and the private prosecutor. Considering that the explanations given by the
provincial fiscal in his motion are reasonable, it is now contended by the
Solicitor General that the lower court abused its discretion in not reopening
the case to give the government an opportunity to prove the offense charged
against the accused.

We find merit in this claim. The explanation offered by the provincial fiscal
of his failure to appear and of his assistants on the date of the trial was that
on that date he was in Manila because of an official business he had taken up
with the Department of Justice; that, on the other hand, his assistant Laya had
gone to Zambales, upon previous permission, to see a close relative who was
seriously ill, while special counsel Valdez was sick, as evidenced by a telegram
he sent to the clerk of court. It does not appear that this explanation was
untrue or was merely advanced as an excuse to justify the absence of the
government prosecutors. Nor can such failure be considered as an indication of
their lack of interest in prosecuting the case it appearing that they were
present in the previous hearings. When we consider that the trial judge readily
granted the two-motions for postponement put in by the defense it would seem to
be unusually harsh to dismiss the case outright for the single failure of the
prosecutors to appear at the last hearing without giving them an opportunity to
explain their failure. It is for this reason that we believe that the court has
been unfair to the prosecution and, therefore, such an act should be corrected
to prevent miscarriage of justice.

It is however contended that the case can no longer be reopened for that
would amount to placing the accused in double jeopardy. We are not of this
opinion it appearing that the case was dismissed before the accused had pleaded
to the information (section 9, Rule 113). It should be noted that this case
originated in the justice of the peace court and was merely brought on appeal
after conviction of the accused to the court of first instance. In such a case
the rule provides that the judgment is vacated and “the case shall be tried in
all respects anew in the court of first instance as if it were a case originally
instituted in that court.” (Section 8, Rule 119.) There is no need of filing a
new information, as the casa stand3 for “trial de novo” which means “a new trial
in the same manner, with the same effect, and upon the same issues as the case
was tried in the lower court.” (Crisostomo vs. Director of Prisons, 41 Phil.,
368.) This means that a new arraignment is necessary because the case stands “as
if it were a case originally instituted in that court” (section 8, Rule 119),
and as this was not done, the reopening of the case cannot place the accused in
double jeopardy.

The order appealed from is hereby set aside. The case shall be remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings, without pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Labrador,
Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.