G.R. No. L-26556. January 24, 1969
MARIA REYES DE TOLENTINO, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND LUCIO TOLENTINO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. GODOFREDO ESCALONA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH I, COURT OF FIRST INSTANC…
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Original petition for certiorari to annul several orders of Hon. Godofredo Escalona, as Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch I, and a
writ of execution issued in pursuance thereof, as well as the
sheriff’s notice of sale issued and the sale made in accordance with said
orders and writ.
Herein petitioners, Maria Reyes de Tolentino
and her husband, Lucio Tolentino,
were plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2799 of said court, against the spouses Gaspar Llamas and Encarnacion
Enriquez de Llamas. In their complaint
therein, the Tolentinos sought the reformation of a
deed purporting to be a pacto de retro
sale of a land of Mrs. Tolentino, with an area of 720
square meters, to the Llamases, upon the ground that
the true agreement between the parties was merely to constitute an equitable
mortgage to guarantee the payment of the sum of P2,000.00
lent by the Llamases to the Tolentinos.
Atty. Sinforoso B. Anota
represented the Tolentinos in said court, which, on August 2, 1962, rendered a decision
substantially as prayed for by the Tolentinos.
The Llamases appealed to the Court of
Appeals, where Atty. Jovenal R. Fernandez an Atty. Anota appeared on behalf of the Tolentinos. On March
12, 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive part of which reads:
“IN VIEW WHEREOF, judgment modified; the
deed Exh. A is declared to be pacto de retro; but pursuant to Art.
1606 of the New Civil Code, plaintiff is given 30 days from finality of this
judgment to pay unto defendant the sum of P2,000.00
as redemption of the property; should she fail to do so, she shall be held to
have lost all privilege of redemption; as a consequence of this decision, all
other claim of the parties against each other are dismissed; no more
pronouncement as to costs.”
Sometime before June 3, 1964, Mrs. Tolentino
redeemed the lot in question, within the period fixed in this decision, which
had meanwhile become final. Soon
thereafter, or on October 5, 1964, Anota filed, in
said Civil Case No. 2799 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
a petition for the payment of his attorney’s fees, in the sum of P6,480.00, representing 30% of the market value of said lot,
or, in the alternative, for the Tolentinos to deed to
him one-third (1/3) thereof, that is to say, a portion of said lot of about 220
square meters. The Tolentinos
objected thereto, on October 22, 1964, and prayed that the amount of the
attorney’s fees be fixed by the court.
Acting upon said petition of Atty. Anota and
the opposition thereto, the court, presided over by respondent herein, Judge Escalona, issued an order, dated October 31, 1964, fixing
the sum of P4,000.00 as the amount of Anota’s fees
and making the same a lien upon the lot adverted to above.
The Tolentinos sought a
reconsideration, on December 8, 1964, and prayed that the award be reduced to P2,000.00. Anota countered, on January
22, 1964, with a motion to strike out the motion for
reconsideration, upon the ground that the order of October 31, 1964 was already final and that a
writ for the execution thereof should, therefore, be issued. By an order, dated February 27, 1965, Judge Escalona amended his order of October 31, 1964, in the
sense that the attorney’s fees would be deemed reduced to P2,000.00
if this sum were judicially consigned by the Tolentinos
not later than March 20, 1964, but that, otherwise, said order of October 31,
1964, in its original form, would “stand as it is.”
Instead of making said judicial consignation, the Tolentinos filed, on March 16, 1965, a motion praying that
the sum of P1,420 be deducted from Anota’s attorney’s
fees, as his share in the redemption price and other litigation expenses. Before the last motion could be acted upon, or on April 5, 1965, the Tolentinos filed another motion praying that the amount of
attorney’s fees be reduced to P500.00 only.
Upon the other hand, Anota moved, on April 12,
1965, that the order of October 31, 1964 be executed,
and on May 6, 1965, that the motion for reconsideration of the Tolentinos, dated December 8, 1964, be stricken out. This motion to strike out was denied by Judge
Escalona, in an order, dated May 8, 1965, in which
he, also, directed the issuance of a writ for the execution of his order of
October 31, 1964.
Two (2) days later, or on May
10, 1965, the Tolentinos moved for the
reconsideration of said order of May 8,
1965, which was denied by Judge Escalona
on May 15, of the same year. Meanwhile,
or on May 8, 1965, the corresponding writ of execution had been issued and
respondent Virgilio C. Lentejas,
as ex–officio sheriff of Leyte, caused
to be published, on August 26, 1965, a notice of sale, at public auction, of
the land aforementioned, for the payment of Anota’s
fees, in the sum of P4,000.00, plus the sheriff’s fees
and other expenses incidental to the enforcement of said writ. Subsequently, or on October 11, 1965,
sheriff Lentejas sold the land, at public auction, to
Attorney Anota, in full satisfaction of his
attorney’s fees, plus the Sheriff’s fees and incidental expenses.
Over eleven (11) months later, or on September 16, 1966, the Tolentinos commenced the present action, against Judge Escalona, Sheriff Lentejas and Atty.
Anota, to annul the aforementioned orders of October
31, 1964, February 27, and May 8 and 15, 1965, as well as the sheriff’s notice
of sale dated August 26, 1965, and the sale made on October 11, 1965, upon the
ground that Judge Escalona had abused his discretion
and exceeded his jurisdiction in entertaining the claim for attorney’s fees in
Civil Case No. 2799, not only because said claim is allegedly “foreign to
the matter litigated” therein but, also, because the amount involved is
below the minimum original jurisdiction of Court of First Instance, and that
they (the Tolentinos) have “no appeal, nor
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law” against
the acts complained of.
This pretense is obviously devoid of merit, for surely, the Tolentinos could have appealed from the contested orders of
Judge Escalona, and no plausible reason has been
adduced – in fact, no effort has been made – to show that an appeal would not
have been a plain, speedy and adequate remedy for the Tolentinos. Having failed to appeal from said orders,
they may not avail of the writ of certiorari to offset the adverse effects of
their omission.[1]
Then, again, the question whether or not a particular issue may
be taken up in a given case, is generally one addressed to the sound discretion
of the Court, to be exercised in the interest of justice, and does not affect
the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide said question, unless there
are factors entailing a denial of due process, which do not exist in the case
at bar. As regards the advisability of
passing upon Anota’s claim for attorney’s fees, it
should be noted that the Tolentinos have not merely
failed to object to the exercises of the lower court’s jurisdiction over said
claim. They even asked the court to fix
the amount collectible by Anota, and later to reduce
said amount, as well as to grant some other affirmative relief in connection
therewith. In short, they are now in estoppel to assail the propriety of the action taken by
Judge Escalona thereon.[2]
Then again, it is well-settled that a claim for attorney’s fees
may be asserted either in the very action in which the services in question
have been rendered, or in a separate action.
If the first alternative is chosen, the Court may pass upon said claim,
even if its amount were less than the minimum prescribed by law for the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject-matter of the case, so long as the
main action is within the jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory that the
right to recover attorney’s fees is but an incident of the case in which the
services of counsel have been rendered.
Thus, in Palanca v. Pecson,[3]
it was held:
“x x x that the application to fix the attorney’s fees is
usually made before the court which renders the judgment or may be enforced in
an independent and separate action.
We see no valid reason why a probate court cannot pass upon a proper
petition to determine attorney’s fees, if the rule against multiplicity of
suits is to be activated and if we are to concede that, as in the case before
us, said court is to a certain degree already familiar with the nature and
extent of the lawyer’s services.”
In Dahlke v. Viña,[4]
this Court quoted, with approval, from Corpus Juris,[5]
the following:
“x x x. Thus in
some jurisdictions the attorney’s lien upon a judgment may be established and
enforced upon an application to the court in the case wherein the judgment was
rendered, and, although it is sometimes held that this lien may be enforced in
an independent action by the attorney, yet ordinarily a motion in the cause is
the proper remedy. The attorney need not
become a party to the cause in order
to enforce his lien upon the judgment, but in a proper case he may be permitted
to intervene. In such a proceeding it
would be proper practice for the attorney, on being admitted as a party, to
file a petition in his own name against both plaintiff and defendant, setting
forth the particulars of his claim and lien, so that if disputed by them
answers could be filed, and the issue made up, as in other cases. x x
x.”
To the same effect, substantially, are Talisay-Silay
v. Court of Industrial Relations[6],
Philippine Products Co. v. Court of Appeals[7]
and Republic v. Central Surety[8].
In Missouri, K & T RY. Co. of Texas
v. Bacon[9],
the language used was:
“The amount claimed by the intervener being a sum less than
$500, it is the contention of appellant that the district court had no
jurisdiction to try the cause. The
district court having obtained jurisdiction of the original cause, it had the
authority to dispose of all matters arising out of it. In a similar case, where less than $1,000 was
involved in the suit after the compromise, the Supreme Court entertained
jurisdiction, and granted a writ, thereby indicating that the court concluded that
the amount originally sued for was the sum that fixed their jurisdiction: Railway v. Ginther,
96 Tex. 295, 72 S. W. 166. It has always
been the rule in Texas that when a court once obtains jurisdiction over the
subject-matter it has the power to adjust all rights growing out of it, even as
to the demands that are not, when standing alone, sufficient to give the court
jurisdiction. x x
x .”
WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is hereby dismissed
and the writ prayed for denied, accordingly, with costs against petitioners
herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.
[1]
Gov’t.
of U.S. v. Judge, CFI, Pamp., 49 Phil. 495; 50
Phil. 975; Silvestre V. Torres, 57 Phil. 885, 890; Profeta
v. Gutierrez David, 71 Phil. 582; Santos v. Pecson,
79 Phil. 261; Bimeda v. Perez, 93 Phil. 636; Grospe
v. CA, 106 Phil. 1144; Phil. Surety v. Jacala,
L-12766, May 25, 1960; Pachoco v. Tumangday, L-14500, May 25, 1960; Jose v. Zulueta, L-16598, May 31, 1961; Lopez v. Alvendia, L-20697, Dec. 24, 1964; Republic v. Maglanoc, L-20397, April 29, 1966.
[2]
Tijam v.
Manila
Surety, L-21450, April 15, 1968; Young Men Labor Union v. CIR, L-20307,
Feb. 26, 1965; People v. Acierto, 92 Phil. 534.
[3]
94 Phil. 419.
[4]
51 Phil. 707.
[5]
Vol. 6, p. 794.
[6]
L-21582, November 29, 1966.
[7]
L-20308, November 15, 1967.
[8]
L-27802, October 26, 1968.
[9]
80 S. W. 572.