ATTY. MELENCIO A. CEA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE ORLANDO C. PAGUIO, MTC-BR. 1, MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, RESPONDENT.

Cea versus Paguio

The Case

This is an administrative case filed with the Supreme Court by Atty. Melencio A. Cea against Judge Orlando C. Paguio, then presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Meycauayan, Bulacan. The complainant charged the respondent judge with violation of the Code of Legal Ethics and of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, alleging that the judge solicited one hundred thousand pesos in exchange for a favorable decision in the criminal cases against the complainant's daughter. The case matters for two reasons. First, it is a leading statement on the quantum of proof required in administrative charges against judges, especially accusations of bribery and extortion, which the Court describes as easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Second, it shows that even when the corruption charge fails, a judge may still be disciplined for an entirely separate and proven offense, here the inexcusable delay in promulgating a decision.

Procedural History

Atty. Cea filed an affidavit-complaint dated 23 January 2001 with the Supreme Court. The Office of the Court Administrator endorsed it for appropriate action and directed the respondent judge to file his comment, which he did on 6 April 2001, denying the charges. In its initial report dated 22 November 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that the case be referred to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, for investigation, report, and recommendation. By a resolution dated 21 January 2002, the Supreme Court directed the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, to conduct the investigation and to submit his report and recommendation within ninety days. Executive Judge Oscar C. Herrera, Jr., of Branch 20 of that court, complied and submitted a report dated 8 October 2002 finding the respondent guilty of gross misconduct and recommending an appropriate sanction. The case then returned to the Supreme Court, which decided it in February 2003.

Facts

Atty. Cea was the counsel of his daughter, Alicia Cea Tecson, who was the accused in three criminal cases for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, all entitled People versus Alicia Cea Tecson. On 3 July 2000, Judge Paguio rendered a consolidated decision convicting the accused on all counts. The decision, however, was promulgated only on 4 December 2000.

According to the complainant, the judge himself asked him to meet at the Ark's Restaurant in Marilao, Bulacan, to discuss the status of the criminal cases. During one of those meetings, the judge intimated that he would lose the cases and solicited one hundred thousand pesos in exchange for a favorable decision. Feeling insulted, Atty. Cea replied that he need not give grease money because his daughter had a meritorious case, and he dared the judge to proceed with the promulgation. The judgment was rendered and promulgated, finding his daughter guilty as charged.

In his comment, the judge categorically denied meeting the complainant on several occasions regarding the criminal cases. He said he did not even know the complainant's residence or law office address, and he denied making any suggestion or proposal to extort money. He argued that if the defense were truly meritorious, it would be futile for him to squeeze any consideration from the complainant, since a meritorious case is always a winning case. He attributed the delayed promulgation to the continuous failure of the accused to appear in court. At the investigation, the complainant testified in a straightforward and categorical manner, and the investigating judge found him credible, noting that the respondent himself testified that he knew the complainant to be a man of principle.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of serious misconduct for soliciting one hundred thousand pesos in exchange for a favorable decision, warranting dismissal and disbarment.
• Whether or not the respondent judge may be held administratively liable for the delay in the promulgation of the consolidated decision in the criminal cases.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court. If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon request of the court that rendered the judgment. The court, however, may promulgate the judgment in absentia, upon motion of the prosecution and notice to the accused and his counsel, if the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice.

This provision bears on the case because the Court held that the respondent could have avoided the delay by promulgating the decision in absentia, and his failure to do so was inexcusable.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. It stressed that an administrative complaint against a judge must be examined with a discriminating eye, because the consequences are highly penal and the respondent stands to face dismissal and disbarment. In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the complainant. The Court found that the complainant failed to discharge that burden. Apart from the oral testimony of the complainant and his daughter, there was no proof that the meetings actually took place. The restaurant receipt could not be given evidentiary weight because it did not identify who ordered or paid for the food. Since the restaurant was a public place, the complainant could easily have presented waiters, employees, or other disinterested witnesses. The daughter merely testified that she faintly heard the figure one hundred thousand pesos mentioned, without saying who uttered it or whether it was preceded by a demand. The Court also noted that if the corrupt overtures had truly been made, the complainant's good sense would have dictated that he report the matter to the authorities and set up an entrapment operation. Citing Co versus Calimag and Castaños versus Escaño, the Court held that an accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove, so the complainant must present a panoply of evidence, and the quantum of proof required should be more than substantial. The Court likewise rejected the claim of bias and partiality, holding that bias cannot be presumed and that when the opinion of counsel is at variance with that of the judge, the former cannot use it as an excuse to hurl imputations of unfairness in the absence of clear and convincing proof.

On the second issue, the Court ruled against the respondent. Although it took exception to the complainant's speculative imputations, it held that the respondent had not shown enough justification to stay the Court's hand in exercising its disciplinary powers. The delay in promulgation could have been avoided had the respondent resorted to the remedy provided in Section 6 of Rule 120, which is to promulgate the decision in absentia. For his inexcusable delay, the respondent deserved to be sanctioned, as his action was contrary to the constitutional mandate enshrining the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of their cases. The Court also observed that this was not the first time the respondent had been subject of an administrative proceeding; in a prior case he had been found guilty of delay in deciding criminal cases and was accordingly fined.

Doctrine

An accusation of bribery or extortion against a judge is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The complainant must therefore present a panoply of evidence, and the quantum of proof required is more than substantial. In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondent committed the act complained of rests on the complainant. Failing in this, the complaint must be dismissed. Bias and impartiality cannot be presumed; when the opinion of counsel is at variance with that of the judge, the former cannot use it as an excuse to hurl imputations of unfairness and partiality in the absence of clear and convincing proof. Finally, a judge who fails to promulgate a decision despite the availability of the remedy of promulgation in absentia under Section 6 of Rule 120 is guilty of inexcusable delay and may be sanctioned, for such delay violates the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of their cases.

Disposition

The complaint against Judge Orlando C. Paguio for violation of the Code of Legal Ethics and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, but he was meted a fine of three thousand pesos for the delay in the promulgation of the consolidated decision, the amount to be deducted from whatever retirement benefits may be due him.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that an accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove, so the complainant must present a panoply of evidence, and the quantum of proof required is more than substantial. Examiners like to use this case to test the quantum of proof in administrative charges against judges and the rule that a judge may still be disciplined for a proven offense even when the main corruption charge is dismissed.