OLEGARIO BRITO, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND DENCIA’S KITCHENETTE WORKERS UNION, RESPONDENTS.

Sometime in November, 1957, the Dencia’s Kitchenette Workers’ Union, in
behalf of its members, filed with the Court of Industrial Relations a
petition for differential pay and overtime compensation against
Olegario Brito, their alleged employer.

Instead of
answering, the respondent Olegario Brito, herein petitioner, moved to
dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction,
prescription and lack of cause of action. The Industrial Court,
however, resolved to defer action on the motion until after reception
of evidence.

On December 18, 1957, the respondent filed his
answer denying the allegations of the complaining union that its
members were paid wages below the prescribed minimum wage and that they
were not paid Overtime compensation. Respondent also reiterated as
affirmative defenses the grounds upon which his motion to dismiss was
based, alleging that petitioner’s claim was simply for a sum of money,
and by way of special defense averred that he became the owner of
Dencia’s Kitchenette at 95 Escolta, Manila, only in 1954.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on January 17, 1958, with due
notice thereof sent to the parties through their respective counsel. As
neither respondent nor his counsel appeared at the hearing, the
Industrial Court allowed petitioner to present its evidence.

It would appear, however, that counsel for respondent was sick and
confined in bed for several days prior to the date of hearing and that
he came to know of said hearing only on January 20, 1958, when he
returned to his office and went to the Court of Industrial Relations to
find out about the status of the case. So, on the following day,
January 21, respondent, through counsel, filed a motion, praying that
he be given a chance to cross-examine the petitioner’s witnesses and to
present his evidence, it being alleged that his failure and that of his
counsel to attend the hearing was due to excusable negligence, the
latter’s clerk, as explained in the affidavit attached to the motion,
having misplaced the notice of hearing and, due to the volume of his
work, failed to notify any of the lawyers in the office about it.
Respondent, likewise, alleged that he has good and valid defenses,
which he could prove if given a chance.

The motion, however,
was denied by the lower court in an order dated July 14, 1958.
Respondent moved to reconsider this order, supporting his motion with a
memorandum together with his affidavit of merits and the sworn
statements of his counsel and that of the latter’s clerk as well as the
certification signed by counsel’s attending physician. The motion for
reconsideration having been denied by the court en banc, with
Judge Emilio C. Tabigne dissenting, respondent is now before this
Court, praying that the order of the Industrial Court and the
resolution en banc denying his motion for reconsideration be
set aside, that the court be directed to allow him to cross-examine the
witnesses for the petitioner and to present evidence in his own behalf;
and that he be granted such other just and equitable remedy under the
premises.

We believe the failure of respondent, herein
petitioner, and that of his counsel to appear on the date set for
hearing has been satisfactorily explained. The notice of hearing, as
stated in a sworn statement by counsel’s clerk-messenger who received
the same, was inadvertently misplaced by him with the papers of one of
the many cases bearing the same title still pending with the court
below, and due to his numerous duties and errands at the time he failed
to note down the date of hearing in the calendar of cases in the office
as well as to inform any of the lawyers therein about it. On the other
hand, for several days prior to the date of the hearing and a few days
thereafter, Atty. Antonio Gaw, who was personally handling the case,
was sick and confined in bed. He was, consequently, not aware of the
date of the hearing. These circumstances, in our opinion, constitute
excusable negligence (see Herrera vs. Far Eastern Air Transportation, Inc., G. R. No. L-2587, Sept. 19, 1950; Miranda vs.
Legaspi. 92 Phil., 290; 48 Off. Gaz., 4819) sufficient to warrant the
grant of herein petitioner’s motion to be given a chance to
cross-examine the witnesses for the complaining union and to submit
evidence in his own behalf. This view, as stated by Judge Emilio C.
Tabigne in his dissenting opinion, is fully in accord with the
provisions of Sections 13 and 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as
amended, “that in the hearing, investigation and determination of any
question or controversy and in exercising any duties and power under
this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or
legal forms and shall not be bound by technical rules of legal evidence
but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable.”

It is significant to note that Atty. Gaw, upon
returning to his office on January 20, 1958 immediately went to the
Court of Industrial Relations to follow up and find out the status of
the present case, and that upon being informed by a court personnel
that said case was heard on January 17, 1958, he immediately filed a
motion for leave to cross-examine the witnesses for the petitioning
union and to present evidence in behalf of his client, herein
petitioner. Since the application was made promptly and before
rendition of judgment, we do not think material prejudice to the
members of the complaining union would result by permitting a defense
on the merit. In the case of Selma vs. Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU) Inc., et al., (G. R. No. L-9884, December 28, 1957), this Court held that—

***** a slight delay in the adjudication of the case occasioned by a
reasonably justified continuance of the hearing of the case, to afford
the herein petitioner the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses of
the herein respondent and to present evidence in his behalf, would not
materially prejudice the members of the respondent union. It is in
consonance with fairplay and justice.”

In
view of the foregoing, the order and resolution complained of are set
aside and the case remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations for
further proceedings to afford the petitioner, respondent in the court
below, the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses of the herein
respondent union and to present evidence in his own behalf. No costs
shall be taxed.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Barrera, JJ., concur.