JOAQUIN ROBERTO GOZUN, ROMEO MAURICIO, EDUARDO LAXAMANA, NOEL MORALES, MANUEL CUENCO, QUIRINO DE LEON, NELSON REYES, PEDRO AQUINO, AND JOEY CABUSO, COMPLAINANTS, VS. JUDGE VINCI…
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Gozun versus Judge Gozum
The Case
This is an administrative complaint filed with the Supreme Court against a municipal trial court judge, Judge Vinci Gozum of the Municipal Trial Court of Floridablanca, Pampanga. The complainants are nine individuals who had been named as respondents in a criminal complaint for Destructive Arson pending in the respondent judge's sala. They charge the judge with grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law, arising from the manner in which he conducted the preliminary investigation, issued a warrant of arrest with no bail recommended, and allowed the private prosecutor to examine the complainant's own witnesses. The case matters because it fixes, for the bar candidate, the single and continuous character of preliminary investigation under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, and the two distinct findings a municipal trial judge must make before a warrant of arrest may issue.
Procedural History
The complainants and several others were the respondents in a complaint for Destructive Arson filed before the respondent judge and docketed as six criminal cases. After the judge conducted what he called a preliminary examination and issued a warrant of arrest, the accused were arrested and detained. The accused then sought a re-investigation with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga. The first provincial prosecutor found probable cause only for the lower offense of Arson under Presidential Decree Number 1613 against one complainant and four others, and dismissed the complaints against the rest. The corresponding information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga. The indicted accused appealed to the Secretary of Justice, who set aside the prosecutor's resolution and ordered the withdrawal of the information, which the Regional Trial Court allowed.
The nine complainants then filed this administrative complaint directly with the Supreme Court. The Office of the Court Administrator submitted its report, sustaining the judge on the lack of notice to the respondents and on the sufficiency of his questions, but recommending that he be reprimanded for not strictly observing the rules on preliminary investigation by allowing the private prosecutor to examine two of his clients. The Court, through Justice Carpio, resolved the administrative matter and found the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law.
Facts
Several individuals filed a complaint for Destructive Arson against the nine complainants and others. The complaint landed in the sala of the respondent judge. On the ninth of September 1998, without notifying the accused complainants or their co-accused, the judge conducted a proceeding he characterized as a preliminary examination. The counsel for the arson complainants presented the testimonies of two complainants and several photographs. After questioning those two witnesses, the judge issued a warrant of arrest with no bail recommended. The accused were arrested and detained from the twelfth of September 1998 to the eleventh of November 1998.
The accused then sought a re-investigation with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. The first provincial prosecutor found probable cause to charge one complainant and four others only with the lower offense of Arson under Presidential Decree Number 1613, and dismissed the complaints against the rest. An information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua. On appeal, the Secretary of Justice set aside that resolution and ordered the withdrawal of the information, which the trial court allowed.
In their administrative complaint, the accused complainants alleged that the judge conducted the preliminary investigation ex parte, that they were never given the chance to present evidence negating probable cause, that the arrest caused them suffering and embarrassment, that the participation of the arson complainants' counsel was irregular, and that the questions propounded were insufficient to show prima facie evidence of Destructive Arson. The judge answered that he conducted only a preliminary examination to determine probable cause for the warrant, that he would have conducted the preliminary investigation proper had the accused not opted to waive it and moved that the investigation be conducted by the provincial prosecutor, and that the rules vest ample discretion on judges in examining the complainant and his witnesses.
Issues
- Whether or not the respondent judge may be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for conducting the preliminary investigation without issuing a subpoena to the respondents and without giving them the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits.
- Whether or not the respondent judge erred in issuing a warrant of arrest without a finding of necessity of placing the respondents under immediate custody.
- Whether or not the respondent judge erred in allowing the private prosecutor to examine the complainant's witnesses during the preliminary investigation.
- Whether or not the respondent judge propounded searching questions to the complainant's witnesses in compliance with the requirement for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Applicable Provisions
Section 3 of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 3. Procedure. - xxx (b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss the same if he finds no ground to continue with the inquiry, or issue a subpoena to the respondent, attaching thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents. Within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, the respondent shall submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents. He shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant. (c) Such counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence submitted by the respondent shall also be sworn to and certified as prescribed in paragraph (a) hereof and copies thereof shall be furnished by him to the complainant. (d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant. (e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they may submit questions to the investigating officer which the latter may propound to the parties or witnesses concerned. (f) Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded, and the investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days therefrom. Upon the evidence thus adduced, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.
This provision establishes the single procedure the investigating judge must observe, including the issuance of a subpoena to the respondent and the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits.
Section 6 of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. - (a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Upon the filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. (b) By the Municipal Trial Court. - If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied[,] after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest.
This provision requires two findings before a warrant may issue: probable cause, and the necessity of immediate custody.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent judge erred in following the two-stage procedure of the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court. Under the 1985 Rules, there is only one way of conducting a preliminary investigation, by affidavits and counter-affidavits under Section 3. The Court explained that the investigating judge must issue a subpoena to the respondent even after a warrant of arrest has been issued, and must still observe the procedure in Section 3, which affords the respondent an opportunity to be heard. The judge's reliance on Pangandaman versus Casar was unavailing, because that case merely restated the procedure in Section 3 and held only that the entire procedure need not be completed before a warrant may issue.
On the second issue, the Court held that under Section 6(b), it is not enough that the investigating judge find probable cause. He must also find a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody. The Court found nothing in the records showing such a need, and noted that the circumstances, namely that the accused were residents of Floridablanca, Pampanga, that they were related or known to one another, and that none appeared to have any criminal record, reduced if not negated the risk of flight. The judge also compounded his liability by forwarding the records to the provincial prosecutor before finding probable cause to hold the accused for trial, contrary to Section 5, which requires transmission within ten days after the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
On the third issue, the Court held that nothing in the 1985 Rules authorizes a private prosecutor to examine the parties and their witnesses during the preliminary investigation. Section 3(e) provides that the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine, and Section 6(b) limits the right of examination to the investigating judge. By allowing the private prosecutor to examine two of his clients as if on direct examination, the judge again revealed his lack of familiarity with Rule 112.
On the fourth issue, the Court sustained the finding that the judge's questions satisfied the requirement of searching questions and answers, since they pertained to the alleged participation of the accused, the property damaged, and the personal knowledge of the witnesses.
Doctrine
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, preliminary investigation is a single and continuous proceeding. The two-stage procedure of preliminary examination and preliminary investigation proper under the 1940 and 1964 Rules has been abolished. The investigating judge must observe the procedure in Section 3 of Rule 112, issuing a subpoena to the respondent and giving him the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits, even after a warrant of arrest has been issued.
A warrant of arrest may issue only upon two findings: probable cause, established after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, and the necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. The absence of the second finding renders the issuance of the warrant erroneous.
No private prosecutor may examine the parties or their witnesses during the preliminary investigation. The duty to conduct the examination belongs to the investigating judge alone, and the parties may only submit questions to him.
Disposition
The Court found the respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of the law and imposed on him a fine of 20,000 pesos.
Remember This
The single line worth memorizing is that preliminary investigation under the 1985 Rules is one continuous proceeding, and a warrant of arrest requires both probable cause and a necessity of immediate custody. Examiners like to use this case to test the two requisites under Section 6(b) of Rule 112 and the rule that a private prosecutor may not examine witnesses during preliminary investigation.