PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. FABIAN ULITA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. SANTOS ULITA, SERAPIO ULITA, BERNARDINO ULITA, ALFREDO ULITA, AND ISABELO PACAMALAN, APP…

Fabian Ulita, Santos Ulita, Alvaro Ulita, Jose Ulita, Serapio Ulita,
Bernardino Ulita, Alfredo Ulita, Isabelo Pacamalan, Eduardo Malana,
Hipolito Asuncion, Joaquin Gammad, and Fausto Caballes, were charged in
the Court of First Instance of Cagayan, with the crime of murder for
the killing of Guillermo Tagayuna. Eduardo Malana, Hipolito Asuncion,
Joaquin Gammad, and Fausto Caballes were later excluded from the
information, on motion of the Fiscal, for lack of evidence. Fabian
Ulita pleaded guilty upon arraignment. After trial, the court found
Santos Ulita, Serapio Ulita, Bernardino Ulita, Alfredo Ulita, and
Isabelo Pacamalan guilty of the crime charged, but finding one
mitigating and no aggravating circumstance, sentenced each of them in
accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer the penalty
of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, and to pay ¼ of the costs. Jose Ulita and Alvaro Ulita were
acquitted. Fabian Ulita, having pleaded guilty and voluntarily
surrendered, was sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years, 2 months
and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay ¼ of the costs. Fabian did not appeal.

On their part, Santos Ulita, Serapio Ulita, Bernardino Ulita,
Alfredo Ulita, and Isabelo Pacamalan appealed to the Court of Appeals.
However, said court, in its resolution of April 10, 1957, elevated the
case to this Court, in view of its raiding that the murder committed by
appellants was aggravated by evident-premeditation, without any
mitigating circumstance to offset the same and, therefore, the penalty
imposable is at least life imprisonment which, under existing law, it
is not authorized to impose.

Pending appeal with this Court, counsel for appellants submitted a
motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence consisting of
the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses Macario Constantino and
Concepcion Urita, retracting from the testimony they had given in the
lower court, action on which was deferred by resolution of this Court
of January 19, 1959, until the case can be considered on the merits.
These affidavits, we now find, are without merit. In them, the affiants
merely recites that their testimony in open court was not true and that
it was given only because they (the two recanting witnesses) were
included in two previous cases of malicious mischief and less serious
physical injuries filed by the Ulitas against the deceased Guillermo
Tagayuna and more than 25 others. It appears, however, that these two
minor cases were filed, the first on August 18, 1952 and the other on
September 2, 1952 or more than five (5) months before the killing of
Tagayuna, and in the first, the defendants were acquitted on October
17, 1952. Besides, not all the present accused were complainants in
those two cases. The pretense, therefore, that these two witnesses
testified as they did daring the trial of the case only because they
were “mad at the accused” is too flimsy to merit serious consideration.
In the case of People vs. Farol, et al., (G. R. Nos. L-9423 and L-9424 prom. May 30, 1958), we held that—

“* * * resort, to the use of affidavits of
recantation * * * is becoming rather common. Appellate courts must
therefore be wary of accepting such affidavits at their face value,
always bearing in mind that the testimony which they purport to vary or
contradict was taken in an open and free trial in the court of justice
and under conditions calculated to discourage and forestall falsehood,
those conditions being as pointed out in the case of U. S. vs.
Dacir (26 Phil. 507) that such testimony is given under the sanction of
an oath and of the penalties prescribed for perjury; that the witness’
story is told in the presence of an impartial judge in the course of a
solemn trial in an open court; that the witness is subject to
cross-examination, with all the facilities Afforded thereby to test the
truth and accuracy of his statements and to develop his attitude of
mind towards the parties, and his disposition to assist the cause of
truth rather than to further some personal end; that the proceedings
are had under the protection of the court and under such conditions as
to remove, so far as is humanly possible, all likelihood that undue or
unfair influences will be exercised to induce the witness to testify
falsely; and finally that under the watchful eye of a trained judge his
manner, his general bearing and demeanor and even the intonation of his
voice often unconsciously disclose the degree of credit to which he is
entitled as a witness.’ Unless there be special circumstances which,
coupled with the retraction of the witness, really raise a doubt as to
the truth of the testimony given by him at the trial and accepted by
the trial judge, and only if such testimony is essential to the
judgment of conviction so much so that its elimination would lead the
trial judge to a different conclusion, a new trial based on such
retraction would not be justified. Otherwise, there would never be an
end to a criminal litigation and the administration of justice would be
at the mercy of criminals and the unscrupulous. * * *.”

And in the case of People vs. Ubiña et al., (97 Phil.,
515), we stated that “it would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject
testimonies solemnly taken before courts of justice simply because the
witnesses who had given them later on change their mind for one reason
or another, for such a rule would make solemn trials a mockery and
place the investigation of truth at the mercy of
unscrupulous-witnesses.” This Court has, likewise, invariably and
consistently refused to entertain and grant motions for new trial based
on affidavits of retraction by witnesses, because of the inherent
improbability of the alleged new versions of the commission of the
crime, as well as the easiness and facility with which such affidavits
are obtained (People vs. Monadi, et al., 97 Phil., 575; People vs. Aguipo, G. P, Nos. L-12123-24, prom. July 31, 1958), and the probability of their being repudiated later (People vs.
Galamiton, G. R. No. L-6302, prom. August 25, 1954). It is not also
improbable that said schemes are conceived and carried out for a
consideration, usually monetary. (People vs. Francisco, 94
Phil., 975.) We find, therefore, no reason for seriously considering,
much less acceding, to the appellant’s motion for new trial.

Coming now to the merits of the case, according to the evidence and
as found by the trial court, at about 9 o’clock in the morning of
January 24, 1953, Guillermo Tagayuna and Macario Constantino went to
the fields at Pallagao, Gattaran, Cagayan. While Tagayuna, followed by
Constantino at a distance of seven (7) meters, was walking along a
narrow trail where there were plenty of tall grasses called tanglares, Santos
Ulita, armed with a bolo, suddenly appeared from behind the grasses and
hacked Tagayuna’s right arm. Then Fabian Ulita, Bernardino Ulita, and
Alvaro Ulita who also were hiding among the tall grasses rushed at him
from behind, on the left side, and hacked his back with their bolos.
Alfredo Ulita then hacked his right leg, causing him to fall to the
ground in kneeling position. While in this position, Serapio Ulita,
Jose Ulita, and Isabelo acamalan rushed at him. Jose then hacked his
left arm and his head, while Serapio and Isabelo hacked his right arm.
The boloes used by the accused were of the kind known as calasiaos.
Tagayuna shouted for help. Constantino did likewise, having been
stunned by the suddenness of the attack, but nobody came to help them.
Constantino then ran away in the direction of the road. Upon seeing
him, Fabian and Alvaro, with boloes in their hands, chased him, but
upon reaching the curve of the road, they gave up. Constantino then
turned around and at this instant, he saw the accused hacking Tagayuna
while they encircled him. The latter died as result of the wounds
inflicted on him by the accused. Thereafter, the accused fled.

After the killing, police corporal Isidro Ventura of Gattaran
repaired to the scene of the crime. He saw the dead body of Tagayuna in
the rice field. He prepared a sketch (Exh. “N”) of the scene, and found
within a radius of 5 meters around said body (“1” in Exh. “N”) ten (10)
fresh footprints.

A bolo (Exh., “I”), which was one of the 3 boloes entrusted by
Santos Ulita and his brothers to Meliton Daniel in San Vicente,
Gattaran shortly after the incident, and surrendered by the latter to
Chief of Police Andres Bucaling, was discovered to have dried blood
stains on its blade.

Appellants were apprehended under a warrant of arrest only a week
later as they fled to, and hid in different places after, the
commission of the crime.

A post-mortem examination of the cadaver of Tagayuna made by Dr.
Antonio Nolasco showed that the victim sustained 21 wounds in various
parts of his body. (Exhs. “O”, “P”, and “P-1”.) Of these wounds 14 were
inflicted on the frontal side and 7 on the dorsal side. Wound No. 3
(Exh. “P”) inflicted frontally on the parietal region, Wound No. 15
(Exh. “P-1”) inflicted dorsally on the neck, cutting the principal
veins and arteries, and Wound No. 16 (Exh. “P-1”) also inflicted on the
neck, were all necessarily mortal. Wound No. 7 (Exh. “P”), completely
severed the middle fingers of the victim, and Wound No. 8 (Exh. “P”)
completely severed his left forearm. All these wounds appear to have
been inflicted from different sides and directions of the body of the
victim and by more than one person. Dr. Nolasco attributed the death of
Tagayuna to severe hemorrhage.

Appellants Serapio, Santos, Alfredo, arid Bernardino are brothers;
while appellant Isabelo Pacamalan is their brother-in-law. (The other
accused who were acquitted, Jose and Alvaro are also their brothers,
while Fabian, who pleaded guilty, is the son of Jose.) There was a
standing controversy between the Ulita family and Tagayuna over the
ownership of a parcel of rice land in Pallagao, Gattaran.

The version of the defense regarding the incident is as follows:

On January 24, 1953, at about 7 o’clock in the morning, Fabian Ulita
went to harvest palay on the land leased to him by one Servillano. He
was followed later by 6 women, relatives of his. He was harvesting on
the northern part of the ricefield near a path, 30 meters away from the
women when he saw Tagayuna approaching. Upon seeing him, Fabian
unsheathed his bolo and stuck the same to the ground. Tagayuna went
near him saying: “What, are you harvesting here also loco?” to which
Fabian answered: “I am harvesting my little ripe palay, Tata. I have to
harvest a little because you have harvested the one I planted on the
controverted land.” Tagayuna then retorted: “You did not plant anything
there, loco,” and Fabian replied: “Why not? You had it harvested.”
Infuriated by Fabian’s reply, Tagayuna rushed at him with a club he was
holding at the time. Instantly, Fabian picked up his bolo and hit
Tagayuna’s right arm below the right wrist, causing the latter to drop
his club. Then he delivered blows which Tagayuna tried to parry with
his hands; then he hacked him several times on his left arm until it
was severed and gave him a “backhand stroke” which hit Tagayuna on the
head, neck, and back. Then he hit him twice on the knee, severing the
same on the second blow and causing the minor wounds described in
Exhibit “O”, all done in the heat of anger. When Margarita Natividad
(wife of Alfredo Ulita) and her companions saw Fabian hacking the
deceased, they ran away, and while running, they saw 4 PC soldiers on
the road. When asked why she was running, Margarita answered: “Fabian
and Guillermo are fighting.”

After hacking Tagayuna to death, Fabian saw Constantino and
thereupon chased him. After chasing him, Fabian walked through the rice
fields. Thereafter, he saw 4 PC soldiers. He then surrendered to them
saying: “I am coming to surrender. I killed Imong,” at the same time
delivering his bolo (Exh. “G”) to Corporal Malana. While Fabian was
being guarded by Caballes, Malana saw more than 30 followers of
Tagayuna, armed with boloes, walking toward them. He then collected 5
boloes from them. Not long thereafter, Benita Mamuad, wife of Tagayuna,
arrived and went directly to Fabian saying. “Vulva of your mother
Fabian, you killed my husband, I will kill you also.” Then she picked
up some hardened earth and threw it at Fabian, angrily shouting: “Vulva
of your mothers, the Ulitas. Even women, children and men, I will send
all of you to jail.” She also uttered bad words to the PC soldiers.

Appellants’ defense is alibi, as follows:

Isabelo Pacamalan testified that when Fabian Ulita killed
Tagayuna, he was at home lulling his baby to sleep; that it was his
wife who informed him about the killing; that in the afternoon of the
same day, Serapio Ulita dropped at his house and asked him to go with
him to town (Gattaran), to advise Atty. Mandac regarding the incident;
and that the latter told him not to return to Pallagao for several
days, to give the followers of Tagayuna time to cool off.

Serapio Ulita, alleged that he was at home convalescing
from an illness (“pasma”); that he learned about the incident from his
wife, who got the information from Margarita Natividad; and that as he
was afraid to remain in his house, he went to town (Gattaran) with his
brother-in-law, Isabelo Pacamalan, and saw Atty. Mandac, who advised
them to stay away for a while, which they did, until their arrest a
week later.

Santos Ulita declared that he was cooking when Margarita
Natividad informed him about the incident and warned him not to go down
their house; that his wife, Juanita Baraquio, was then in bed, as she
had delivered 5 days prior to the incident; and that at 2 o’clock in
the afternoon of the same day, his brothers Jose, Bernardino, and
Alfredo fetched him, and they went to Tuguegarao for the purpose of
informing Atty. Singson that Fabian had killed Tagayuna, returning
therefrom at lunch time the following Monday.

Bernardino Ulita averred, that he was then at home cooking
when Margarita Natividad informed him about the killing; that his wife
had just delivered and was then in bed at the time; and that in the
afternoon of the same day, he went with his brothers Jose Santos, and
Alfredo to Tuguegarao in order to inform Atty. Singson about the
incident.

Alfredo Ulita stated that he was plowing near his house
when his wife, Margarita Natividad, informed him about the incident;
and that in the afternoon of the same day, he went with his brothers
Jose, Santos, and Bernardino to Tuguegarao to advise Atty. Singson
about the killing.

Appellants have assigned 11 errors allegedly committed by the trial
court, all of which we believe converge en one main issue, namely,
whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution warrants the conviction
of appellants of the crime charged. It is a question of credibility of
the state witnesses. Where the issues is one of the credibility of
witnesses, the rule is that appellate courts will not generally disturb
the findings of the court a quo considering that it is in
better position to decide the question, having seen and heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the hearing, unless it is shown that it has
overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered,
might affect the result of the case. (People vs. Binsol, et al., 100 Phil., 713; 53 Off. Gaz., 3045; People vs. Villaroya, et al., 101 Phil., 1061.)

After a careful appraisal of the evidence, we agree with the trial
court that the guilt of the appellants has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt We believe that Fabian Ulita pleaded guilty as the
sole author of the crime charged, in order to save his close relatives
from imprisonment. His story cannot be believed at all. As the trial
court observed:

“Fabian Ulita claims that Guillermo Tagayuna rushed
at him when he was harvesting palay and hacked him (Tagayuna) right
then and there. But Tagayuna’s cadaver was found where there was no
palay and his legs were stuck into the deep mud up to the thighs. This,
fact explodes the theory of self-defense, complete or incomplete. * * *”

We believe that the killing of Tagayuna actually took place as
narrated by the prosecution witness Macario Constantino who testified
in direct, positive straightforward and credible manner. His testimony
has corroborated in many respects. Concepcion Ulita testified that on
the morning in question, when he was on his way to the rice fields; he
saw the 8 accused, armed with boloes, fleeing from the scene of the
crime towards their houses, shouting: “We have killed him” (referring
to Tagayuna). Policeman Isidro Ventura, who drew a sketch of the place
where the dead body of Tagayuna was found, saw at least 10 fresh
footprints near said body, which, was stuck in a muddy spot, with tall
grasses (tanglares) all around. The number and location of the wounds
(21 in all and in various parts of the victim’s body) show convincingly
that Tagayuna’s assailants were many and that the wounds could not have
been inflicted by only one person. The bolo (Exh. “I”) one of the 3
boloes which were entrusted by Santos Ulita and his brothers (Serapio,
Bernardino, and Alfredo) to Meliton Daniel at the latter’s house in San
Vicente, Gattaran, was found by chief of police Andres Bucaling to have
on its blade dried blood stains. It was not Fabian alone but the entire
Ulita family that had bad blood with the deceased due to the ownership
of certain rice lands. As a matter of fact, the Ulitas had vowed to
kill Tagayuna. During the planting season, prior to the incident, they
were overheard by Constantino to have told the deceased: “We will bury
you in one of the rice paddies” (Itambac da ca ditoy). As to the
immediate motive of the killing, it will be noted that on January 23,
1953, or the day before the incident, there arose the question of
whether the Ulitas or the Tagayuna group should harvest the palay on
the disputed land between Jose Ulita and Tagayuna, and the PC soldiers
had ordered the deposit of the harvest with the barrio lieutenant,
until the settlement of the dispute. The Ulitas must have deeply
resented this, as they had been thereby deprived of the fruits of their
labor in planting the palay. They are, therefore, the ones to have
reason to likely start hostilities and not the deceased. The fact that
the accused fled a few hours after the commission of the offense,
clearly indicates their guilty minds, (U. S. vs. Alegado, 25 Phil., 510; U. S. vs. Sarikala, 37 Phil., 486; U. S. vs. Virrey, 37 Phil., 618; People vs. Manalo & Atienza, 46 Phil., 572; People vs. Wilson et al, 52 Phil., 907; People vs. Gucor, 86 Phil., 157; 47 Off. Gaz. 1621.) We quote with approval the trial court’s finding on this point, to wit:

“That the said accused fled a few hours after the
commission of the crime, is ah eloquent proof of their guilt—especially
when six, of them went directly to their respective attorneys for
advice, and two of them went to the friendly P.C. soldiers for
protection. What need was there for four of them to go to Atty. Singson
in Tuguegarao to advise him of the killing of Tagayuna by Fabian? What
need was there for two of them to go to Atty. Mandac to tell him the
same thing? To ask both attorneys to defend Fabian only? If they were
afraid of retaliation: from the followers of Tagayuna, like Alvaro
Ulita, they would just have sought the protection of the P.C. soldiers
in Pallagao, thus avoiding expense and trouble.”

Coming to their defense of alibi, it should be noted that the
respective residences of the accused “where they claim they were at the
time of the killing are in the immediate vicinity of the scene of the
crime. Besides, it has been stated that alibi is at best a weak defense
and cannot prevail over the testimony of truthful witnesses. The reason
is that alibi is easy of fabrication (People vs. Badilla, 48
Phil., 718) especially between parents and children, between relatives,
as in the present case, and friends, and even between those not so
related (People vs. De Asis, 61 Phil., 384; People vs.
Japitana, 77 Phil., 175). Indeed, even in those cases where proof of
the alibi is well-supported by the testimony of witnesses, the alibi
would not be credited when the identity of the accused as the persons
who committed the crime is fully established by clear, explicit, and
positive testimony, (U.S. vs. Pascua, 1 Phil., 631; U. S. vs. Hudieres, 27 Phil., 45), as in this case.

There is reason to believe that the accused had conspired to kill
Tagayuna. The form and manner in which the attack was accomplished
(People vs. Tiam, et al., G. R. No. L-36, prom. August 29,
1946) and the gravity and seriousness of the wounds inflicted on the
deceased (People vs. Reyes, 47 Phil., 635), showed unity of
action and purpose. And it is understandable that a community of
interest should exist among the accused, as they were all closely
related to each other by blood (People vs. Monadi, et al., supra.)
It is not, therefore; difficult to see that they had strong reasons to
hate him and adopt measures, even radical, to liquidate him.

There can also be no doubt that treachery was present in the
commission of the crime, which qualifies the killing of Tagayuna to
murder. It was conclusively shown that the latter was suddenly
intercepted and assaulted by the accused who were then hiding in the
surrounding tall grasses (tanglares), thereby employing means, methods,
or forms in the execution of the crime which tended directly and
specially to insure its execution without risk to themselves arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. (Art. 14-16,
Revised Penal Code.) When an assault is made with a deadly weapon upon
an unarmed and unsuspecting victim who has given no immediate
provocation for the attack, and under conditions which make it
impossible for him to evade the attack, flee, or make defense, the act
is properly qualified as treacherous; and the homicide resulting
therefrom is murder. (People vs. Pengzon, 44 Phil., 224; People vs.
Sombilon, 83 Phil., 630; 46 Off. Gaz. [Sup. 11] 83.) It is to be noted
that there is here present the circumstance of abuse of superior
strength. However, under the circunistances of the case, we deem it
absorbed by the element of treachery.

The trial court found that the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation was not attendant in the commission of the crime, for the
reason that the incident of January 23, 1953, one day before the
killing, was not an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to
their determination to kill the deceased. According to the court, it
was a mere altercation regarding which of the parties (the Ulitas and
Tagayuna) should get the palay harvested on the land in question. We
disagree with the trial court in this regard. According to its own
findings, “the way the ambuscade was made, showed a well-predetermined
and premeditated plan.” Tagayuna was hacked on the arms in order that
he could not defend himself. Then they cut his legs so that he could
not escape. And when he was already disabled, they surrounded him and
hacked him to death. The intention of the accused to eliminate Tagayuna
began during the last planting season, before the incident, when the
accused told him: “We will bury you in one of the rice paddies.” They
decided to carry it out on January 23 1953, when the question arose as
to who should get the harvest. The best solution to their problem was
to eliminate Tagayuna. They therefore planned to ambush him the
following morning, knowing that he would return to the land in
question. These circumstances satisfy the requisite of evident
premeditation, to wit, “a period sufficient in a judicial sense to
afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection and sufficient to
allow the conscience of the actor to overcome the resolution of his
will if he desires to harken to its warnings. (U. S. vs. Gil, 13 Phil., 530; People vs.
Bangug, 52 Phil., 87.) The fitness of the place selected by the accused
and the manner in which they inflicted the wounds on the deceased, all
are evidences of such premeditation as to satisfy the requirement of
the statute that it be evident. (U. S. vs. Ricafor, 1 Phil., 173.)

The trial court appreciated the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation in favor of appellants, because it believed that when
the harvest of the land which had been cultivated by appellants was
ordered deposited with the barrio lieutenant by the PC soldiers, they
were deprived of the fruits of their labor and, were, therefore,
naturally infuriated and obfuscated. But, in order to consider this
mitigating circumstance, it is necessary that there be clear proof of
the existence of an act both unlawful and sufficient, to produce such
condition of the mind. (U.S. vs. Pilares, 18 Phil., 87; U.S. vs. Sarikala, 37 Phil., 486; People vs.
Alanguilang, 52 Phil., 663.) It will be noted that Jose Ulita, the
eldest of the Ulita brothers, has consented to the making of such a
deposit on January 23, 1953. We believe that the order for the deposit
of the harvest cannot be considered unlawful or sufficient to cause
obfuscation on appellants. (See People vs. Noynay, et al., 68 Phil., 893.)

In view of the foregoing we find the appellants guilty of the crime
of murder aggravated by evident premeditation, without any mitigating
circumstance. However, for lack of the required number of votes for the
imposition of the supreme penalty of death, the appellants are hereby
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased Guillermo Tagayuna in the sum of P6,000.00.

Thus modified, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.