G.R. No. L-26341. November 27, 1968
ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO., PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND IRENEA M. PABLO, FOR HERSELF AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN EDWIN AND EDNA, ALL SURNAME…
CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal by the
Iloilo Dock and Engineering Company (hereinafter referred to as the IDECO) from
the decision dated February 28, 1966 of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission
(hereinafter referred to as the Commission) affirming the decision of the
Regional Office VII in Iloilo City, and ordering the IDECO to pay to the widow
and children of Teodoro G. Pablo (Irenea
M. Pablo and the minors Edwin, Edgar and Edna, all surnamed Pablo) the sum of
P4,000, to pay to the widow P89 as reimbursement for burial expenses and P300
as attorney’s fees, and to pay to the Commission the amount of P46 as fees
pursuant to section 55 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended.
At about 5:02 o’clock in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo,
who was employed as a mechanic of the IDECO, while walking on his way
home, was shot to death in front of, and about 20 meters away from, the main
IDECO gate, on a private road commonly called the IDECO road. The slayer, Martin Cordero, was not heard to
say anything before or after the killing.
The motive for the crime was and still is unknown as Cordero was himself
killed before he could be tried for Pablo’s death. At the time of the killing, Pablo’s companion
was, Rodolfo Galopez, another employee, who, like Pablo, had finished
overtime work at 5:00 p.m.
and was going home. From the main IDECO
gate to the spot where Pablo was killed, there-were four “carinderias” the left side of the road and two “carinderias” and a residential house on the right
side. The entire length of the road is nowhere stated in the record.
According to the IDECO,
the Commission erred (1) in holding
that Pablo’s death occurred in the course of employment and in presuming
that it arose out of the
employment; (2) in applying the “proximity rule;” and (3) in holding
that Pablo’s death was an accident within the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
The principal issue is
whether Pablo’s death comes within the meaning and intendment of that
“deceptively simple and litigiously prolific”[1] phrase “arising out of and in the
course of employment.”[2] The
two component of the coverage formula – “arising out of” and “in
the course of employment” – are said to be separate tests which must be
independently satisfied;[3] however, it should not be forgotten that the
basic concept of compensation coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best
expressed in the word, “work-connection
because an uncompromising insistence on an independent application or each of
the two portions of the test can, in certain cases, exclude clearly
work-connected injuries.[4] The words “arising out of” refer
to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character,
while the words “in the course of” refer to the time, place, and
circumstances under which the accident takes place.[5]
As a matter of general
proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise “in the course of
employment” when it takes place within the period of them
employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he ism
fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.[6]
The general rule in
workmen’s compensation law known as the “going & coming
rule,” simply stated, is that “in the absence of special
circumstances, an employee injured in, going to, or coming from his place of
work is excluded from the benefits of workmen’s compensation acts.”[7]
This rule„ however, admits of four well recognized exceptions, to wit: (1)
where the employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of his
employer; (2) where the employee is about to enter or about to leave the
premises of his employer by way of the exclusive or customary means of ingress
and egress; (3) where the employee is charged, while on his way to or from his
place of employment or at his home, or during his employment, with some duty or
special errand connected with his employment; and (4) where the employer, as an
incident of the employment, provides the means of transportation to and from
the place of employment.[8]
We address ourselves
particularly to an examination and consideration of the second exception, i.e.,
injuries sustained off the premises of the employer, but while using a
customary means of ingress and egress.
This exception, known as the “proximity rule,” was
applied in Philippine Fiber Processing Co., Inc. vs. Ampil.[9]
There, the employee, at about 5:15 a.m., while proceeding to his place of work
and running to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch fronting the main
gate of the employer’s factory, as a result of which he died the next day. The sole question was whether or not the accident
which caused the employee’s death arose out of and in the course of his
employment. This Court ruled in favor of
the claimant, thus:
“The very case of Afable vs. Singer
Sewing Machine Co. invoked by the petitioner intimated that we do not of course
mean to imply that an employee can never recover for injuries suffered while on
his way to or from work. That depends on
the nature of his, employment.’ Considering the facts found by the Commission,
namely, that the deceased Angel was not under any shift routine; that his
assignment covered the entire working hours of the factory; that the first
working hour starts at 6:00 o’clock in the morning; that it takes at least
thirty minutes before the machine operates at full Speed or load; that the spot
where he fell (ditch fronting petitioner’s factory or sidewalk of its
premises), is immediately proximate this place of work, the accident in
question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment and
therefore arose out of and in the course thereof. In Sailing vs. Insular Lumber Co., G.R. No.
28951, September 10, 1928, referred to in the Comments on the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission Act by Morabe and Inton, 1955 edition, compensation was allowed for injury
received by a laborer from an accident in going to his place of work, along a
path or way owned by his employer aril commonly used by the latter’s
laborers.”
In contrast is Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs. Quiroz,[10] which concerned injuries sustained by a
centrifugal operator. He had reported
for work at 9:30 p.m. (March 7,
1958) and was
dismissed at 5:30 the
following morning. Soon “after he
stepped out of the company gate, and while standing about 2 1/2 meters from it
between the shoulder of the highway and a railroad that came from inside the
compound and intersected the highway, waiting for a ride home, he was bumped by a jeepney,
as a result of which he sustained” injuries. In holding that these injuries were “not
produced by an accident ‘arising out of and in the course of employment,'”
this Court reasoned thus:
“The compensability of an injury suffered by an employee
proceeding to or coming from his work depends upon whether or not it is ‘work
connected.’ As Chief Justice Kenison of New
Hampshire has put it, ‘the fact that the employee is
travelling to or from work on a public highway does
not necessarily exclude coverage (Brousseau vs.
Blackstone Mills, 130 A 2d 543, 545).
Conversely, it is not enough to say, that the employee would not have
been on the public highway had it not been for his job, since the same can
usually be said of the general public (Payne & Dolan vs. Industrial
Commission, 46 NE 2d 925). The law, in
effect, insures the employee against losses: arising from the perils of his
work. In other words, the Workmen’s
Compensation Act covers occupational injuries, which, as such, must have a causative
connection with something, not merely in common with the public, but
peculiar to the employment. In order to
warrant recovery for off-the-premises injuries, it must be shown that there has
been a very special danger, some particular risk which the employer could have caused or
allowed to exist. Hence,
‘It is significant that practically all successful
off-the-premises cases have involved normal route of access to the plant,
or an icy sidewalk adjacent to the premises and therefore identified with the premises in the
sense that the employer should have removed the ice.’ (Underscoring ours.)
“It is true that in Philippine Fiber Processing Co. v. Ampil, G.R. No. L-8130 (June 30, 1956), We held the
employer liable for an injury sustained by an employee who, as he was running
to his place of work to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch in
front of the factory’s main gate and near the same. The ditch was, however, in
itself an obvious hazard which, owing to its proximity to the gate, the
employer should have taken measures to remove.
Thus, thru his inaction, he had, contributed, in a special way, to the
occurrence of the accident.
“In the case at bar, no such special circumstance appears to
exist. There is no particular
causative connection between the injury sustained by the employee and either his
work or his employer. Although, as
stated in the decision appealed from, the record does not show that the company
‘had taken measures to make the waiting place safe for the employees, neither
does the record show either that the accident occurred at the usual waiting
place of the employees, or that said place was particularly
unsafe.”
Our Workmen’s
Compensation Act being essentially American in origin and text, it is not amiss
to pay deference to pertinent American jurisprudence. In the precise area of law here involved, we
can draw guidance from an affluence of Federal and State precedents.
From Samuel B. Horovitz‘ Injury and Death under Workmen’s Compensation
Laws (1944), pp. 159 to 165, we glean the following observations:
“Suppose, however, that the injury occurs on the way to
work or on the way home from work.
Injuries going to or from work have caused many judicial upheavals.
“The question here is limited to whether the injuries are ‘in
the course of’ and not ‘out of’ the employment.
How the injury occurred is not in point.
Street risks, whether the employee was walking or driving, and all other
similar questions deal with the risk of injury or ‘out of’ the employment. ‘In the course of’ deals mainly with the
element of time and space, or ‘time, place and circumstances.’
“Thus, if the injury occurred fifteen minutes before working
hours and within one hundred feet of the employer’s premises, on sidewalks or
public roads, the question of ‘in the course of’ the employment is flatly
raised.
“Some of our states refuse to extend this definition of ‘in
the course of to include these ‘injuries.
Most of the states will protect the employee from the, moment his foot
or person reaches the employer’s premises, whether he arrives early or
late. These states find ‘something
sacred about the employment premises and define ‘premises’ very broadly, not
only to include premises owned by the employer, but also premises leased, hired, supplied or used by him,
even private alleyways merely used by the employer. Adjacent private premises are protected many states, and a few protect the employee even on
adjacent public sidewalks and streets. Where a city or any employer owns or controls
an island, all its streets are protected premises.
“There is no reason in principle why states should not protect
employees for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours
and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the
employer’s premises. The Supreme Court
of the United States
has declared that if will not overturn any state decision that so enlarges the
scope of its act. Hence, a deaf worker,
trespassing on rail-road ‘tracks adjacent to his employer’s brick-making
premises (but shown by his superintendent the specific short crossing over the
track), and killed by a train, was held
to be in the course of his employment when hit by an on-corning train fifteen
minutes before his day would have begun.
So long as a causal relation to the employment is discernible, no
federal question arises.
“The narrow rule that a worker is not in the course of his
employment until he crosses the employment threshold is itself subject to many
exceptions. Off-premises injuries
to or from work, in both liberal
and narrow states, are compensable (1) if the employee is on the way to or from
work in a vehicle owned or supplied by the employer, whether in a public (e.g., the employer’s street car) or private conveyance; (2) if
the employee is subject to call at all house or at the moment of injury; (3) if
the employee is traveling for the employer, i.e. traveling workers; (4) if the
employer pays for the employee’s time from the moment he
leaves his home to his return home; (5) if the employee is on his
way to do further work at home, even though on a fixed salary; (6) where the
employee is required to bring his automobile to his place of business for use
there. Other exceptions undoubtedly
are equally justified, dependent on their own peculiar circumstances.“
Schneider (supra,
at p. 117) makes this significant statement:
“The proximity rule exception to the general going and coming
rule is that an employee is generally considered to be in the course of his
employment while coming to or going from his work, when, through off
the actual premises of his employer, he is still in close proximity
thereto, is proceeding diligently at an appropriate time, by
reasonable means, over the natural, practical, customary,
convenient and recognized way of ingress, or egress, either
on land under the control of the employer, or on adjacent property with
the express or implied consent of the employer.”
On pp. 98 to 99 of 85 ALR
we find the following disquisition:
“The compensation acts
have been very generally held not to authorize an award in case of an injury
or death from a peril which is common to all mankind, or to which the public at
large is exposed. 28 R.C.L. 804. And they do not as a general rule cover
injuries received while going to or from so work on public streets, where the
employee has not reached, or has left the employer’s premises. The question whether an injury arises out of
and in the course of the employment, however, is one depending upon the facts
of each case, and in some cases, where an injury occurred while the employee
was going to or from work, but was in the street-in front of the employer’s
premises, it has been held compensable.
“Thus, in the reported case (BARNETT V BRTILING CAFETERIA CO., ante, 85) the injury was held to have arisen out of and in
the course of the employment, where the employee slipped on ice on the sidewalk
immediately in front of the employer’s place of business, while on her way to
report for duty, and just before entering by the only entrance to her place of
employment. The court here recognized the
general rule that, if an employee is injured while going to or from his work
to his house, or to or froth some point not visited for the discharge of a duty
arising out of the employment, or while in the use of a public highway, he does
not come within the protection of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, but stated
that there is an exception to this rule and that the employment is not
limited by the actual time when the workman reaches the scene of his labor and
begins it, or when he ceases, but includes a reasonable time and
opportunity before and after, while he is at or near his place of
employment. The court reasoned that in the case at
bar, although the employee had not
entered the employer’s place of business, and the sidewalk was a public highway so much therefore as was in front
of the employer’s place of business was a necessary adjunct, used in connection with the business,
and that the sidewalk was to a limited degree and purpose a part of the
employer’s premises.
“In Industrial Commission v Barber (1927) 117 Ohio St 373, 159
NE 363, the injury was held to have arisen in the course of the employment
where an employee, about five minutes before the hour when he was to go on
duty, was struck by an automobile owned and driven by another employee, within
a short distance from the employer’s plant, which was located at the dead end
of a street maintained by the
employer from its plant the intersection with another street, and, although the street was a
public one, it led nowhere except player’s plant, and
all of its employees were obliged to use it in going to and from their work. The court stated that where the conditions
under the control of an industrial plant are such that the employee has no
option but to pursue a given course with reference to such conditions and
environments, the pursuance of such course is an implied obligation of the
employer in his contract with such employee, and that when he, for the purpose
of entering his employment, has entered into the sphere or zone controlled by
his employer and is pursuing a course with reference to which he has no option, he is then not only within the conditions
and environments of the plant of his employer, but is then in the course of his employment; and that, when he
receives an injury attributable to such conditions and environments, there is a
direct causal connection between his employment and his injury, and the injury
falls within the class of industrial injuries for which compensation has been
provided by the Workmen’s Compensation Law.”
99 C. J. S. at pp. 807-814, has this to
say:
“It is laid down as a general rule, known as the ‘going and
coming rule, that, in the absence of special circumstances, and except in
certain unusual circumstances, and where nothing else appears, harm or injury
sustained by an employee while going to or from his work is not compensable. Such injury, or accident, is regarded by the
weight of authority of many courts as not arising out of his employment, and as
not being, or not occurring, in
the course thereof.
“However, this rule is not inflexible, is not of inevitable
application, and is subject to qualifications, and to exceptions which depend
on the nature, circumstances, and conditions of the particular employment, the
circumstances of the particular case, and the cause of the injury.”
Jaynes vs. Potlatch Forests[11] expresses with enlightening clarity the
rationale for extending the scope of “course of employment” to
certain “off-premises” injuries:
“We are urged here to again recognize and apply the distinction
between off-premises injuries which occur on private property and those which
occur on public streets and highways.
The extension of the course of employment to off-premises injuries is
not based upon the principle which would justify a distinction upon the narrow
ground of private and public property; it is not sound to say that while an employee is on a public highway he
is always there as a member of the public and in nowise in the exercise of any
right conferred by his contract of employment; nor is it a complete answer to
say that while he is on his employer’s premises his presence there is by
contract right, otherwise he would be a trespasser. The question of whether or not one is a
covered employee should not be resolved by the application of the law relating to rights to enter upon lands, or by the law of
trespass, licensee, invitee or otherwise.
“A substantial and fair ground to justify the extension of the
course of employment beyond the premises of the employer is to extend its scope
to the necessary risks and hazards associated with the employment. These risks may or may not be on the premises
of the employer and for this reason there is no justification to distinguish
between extended risks on public highways and private pathways. In fact it is at most a distinction without a
difference. Under the better reasoned
cases the technical status as public or private is obviously of no moment or in
any event in and of itself is not conclusive.”
Likewise enlightening is
the following explanation of the premises rule exceptions:
“We have, then a workable explanation of the
exception to the premises rule: it
is not nearness, or even reasonable distance, or even the
identifying or surrounding areas with the premises; it is simply that,
when a court has satisfied itself that there is a distinct ‘arising out of’
or causal connection between the conditions under which claimant must approach
and leave the premises and the occurrence of the injury, it may hold
that the course of employment extends as far as those conditions extend.”
(Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, 1965 ed, vol. 1, pp.
210-211)
We now direct our
attention to the cause of the employee’s death: assault.
An “assault,” although resulting from a deliberate act of
the slayer, is considered an “accident” within the meaning of sec. 2
of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, since the word “accident”, is
intended to indicate that “the act causing the injury shall be casual or
unforeseen, an act for which the
injured party is not legally responsible.”[12]
In the cases where the assault was proven to have been
work-connected, compensation was awarded.
In Nava, supra, the
helmsman of a boat was engaged in hauling the ship’s cable and in
coiling it on the deck of the boat preparatory to passing it down a
hatchway. He found the space necessary
for coiling the cable partly occupied by a folding bed of one of the
passengers. This passenger, upon being
asked, declared his ownership of the bed.
Nava expressed his intention of pushing it out of the way and proceeded to do so. Angered
by this,
the passenger exchanged hot words with Nava, and then, with a piece of wood,
jabbed Nava at the pit of the stomach.
At this point, the passenger’s ‘brother ran up to Nava and stabbed him to death. The death was adjudged compensable.
In Bohol
Land Transportation Co. vs. Vda. de Mandaguit,[13] the truck which Mandaguit
was driving collided with a cyclist going in the opposite
direction. The latter fumed around and
immediately pursued the bus. He overtook
it a few minutes later when it stopped to take on passengers.
The driver then disembarked from the bus to wash his hands at a
drugstore nearby. The cyclist followed
him there and knifed him to death. We
affirmed the grant of compensation upon
the finding that the death arose out of and in the course of employment.
In Galicia vs. Dy Pac,[14] the employee, Pablo Carla, was asked to work
in lieu of another employee who had been suspended from work upon request of
his labor union; while Carla was working, the suspended employee asked him to
intercede for him, but Carla refused; an altercation resulted; shortly
thereafter the suspended employee stabbed Carla to death. The death was held compensable because
“the injury sustained by the deceased was caused by an accident arising
out of his employment since the evidence is clear that the fight which resulted
in the killing of the deceased had its origin or cause in the fact that he was
placed in the job previously occupied by the assailant.”
In the three cases
above-cited, there was evidence as to the motive of the assailant.
In A.P. Santos, Inc. vs. Dabacol,[15] the death of an employee-driver who, while
driving a cab, was killed by an unidentified passenger, was held compensable by
the Commission. However, the question of
whether the assault arose out of the employment, was not raised on appeal to
this Court.
In Batangas
Transportation Company vs. Vda. de Rivera,[16] that question was raised. While the employee-driver was driving the
bus, a passenger boarded it and sat directly behind the driver. After about thirty minutes, during
which the passenger and the driver never so much as exchanged a word, the
passenger shot the driver to death and then fled. There was no competent proof as to the cause
of the assault, although there were intimations that the incident arose from a
personal grudge. The majority decision[17]
ruled the death compensable. The bases:
(1) Once it is proved that the employee died in the course of the
employment, the legal presumption, in the absence of substantial evidence to
the contrary, is that the
claim “comes within the provisions of the compensation law” (sec. 43), in other words, that the incident arose out of
the workman’s employment. (2) Doubts as
to rights to compensation are resolved in favor of the employee and his
dependents. (3) The Commissioner’s
declaration on the work-connection might be binding on the Court. (4) There are employments which increase the
risk of assault on the person of the employee and it is in that sense that an injury or harm, sustained by
the assaulted worker arises out of the employment, because the increased risk
to assault supplies the link or connection between the injury and the
employment. Among the jobs enumerated as
increasing the risk of assault are (a) jobs having to do with keeping
the peace or guarding property; (b) jobs having to do with keeping or carrying
of money which subject the employee to the risk of assault because of the
increased temptation to robbery; (c) jobs which expose the employee to direct
contact with lawless and irresponsible members of the community, like that of a
bartender; and (d) work as bus driver, taxi driver or street car conductor.
It has been said that an employment may either increase risk of assault
because of its nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the
assault. The first kind of employment,
the so-called “increased risk” jobs comprehend (1) jobs involving
dangerous duties, such as that of guarding the employer’s property, that of
carrying or keeping money, that where the employee is exposed to lawless or
irresponsible members of the public, or that which subjects him to increased or
indiscriminate contact with the public, such as the job of a street car
conductor or taxi-driver;”[18] (2) jobs where the employee is placed in a
dangerous environment;[19] and (3) jobs of employees whose work takes
them on the highway. On the other hand,
the employment itself may be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the
assault as where a supervisor is assaulted by a workmen he has fired, or where
the argument was over the performance of work or possession of tools or the
like, or where the violence was due to labor disputes.[20]
In Rivera, supra,
the unexplained assault on the employee was considered to have arisen
out of the employment because it occurred in the course of
employment. This Court relied on the
presumption of law that in any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the
claim is presumed to come within the provisions of the Act.[21]
According to this Court, “this statutory presumption was copied from New
York.” Concerning the corresponding New
York provision of law, Larson has this to say:
“In a few jurisdictions, notably New
York and Massachusetts,
a statutory presumption in coverage has
figured in unexplained accident cases. The Massachusetts statute provides:
‘In any claim for compensation, where the employee has been killed,
or is physically or mentally unable to testify, it shall be presumed, in the
absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim comes within
the provisions of this chapter, that sufficient notice of the injury has been
given, and that the injury or death was not occasioned by the wilful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself
or another.’
“This provision was largely copied from the New
York section on presumptions, except that the New
York act creates the presumption in all cases, not
merely those involving an employee’s death or inability to testify.
“The sweeping inclusiveness of this language might seem at
first glance to mean that the mere making of a claim is also the making of a
prima facie case, as long as death or injury is shown to have occurred. The New York
and Massachusetts courts have not so interpreted these statutes,
however. It seems to be necessary to establish some kind of preliminary link with the
employment before the presumption can attach.
Otherwise the claimant widow would have merely to say, ‘My husband, who
was one of your employee, has died, and I therefore claim death benefits,’
whereupon the affirmative burden would devolve upon the employer to prove that
there was no connection between the death and the environment.
“It is not yet entirely clear what initial demonstration of
employment-connection will give the presumption a foothold. Apparently, the idea is to rule out cases in
which claimant can show neither, that the injury occurred in the course of
employment nor that it arose out of it, as where he contracted a disease but
has no evidence to show where he got it.
If there is evidence that the
injury occurred in the course of employment, the presumption will usually
supply the arising out-of-employment factor.” Larson’s Workmen’s
Compensation Law (1965) vol. 1, pp. 123-124
We also quote from the
decision of the Court of Appeals of New York in Daus vs. Gunderman & Sons:[22]
“The statute is not intended to relieve completely an
employee from the burden of showing that accidental injuries suffered by him
actually, were sustained in the course of his employment. ‘It is not the law that mere proof of an
accident, without other evidence, creates the presumption under section 21 of
the Workmen’s Compensation Law (Consol Laws, c. 67) that the accident arose out
of and in the course of the employment.
On the contrary, it has been frequently held, directly and indirectly,
that there must be some evidence from which the conclusion can be drawn that
the injuries did arise out of and in
the course of the employment. Proof of
the accident will give rise to the statutory presumption only where some connection
appears between the accident and the employment.'”
Likewise of relevance is
the following treatise:
“The discussion of the coverage formula, “arising out of and
in the course of employment,’ was opened with the suggestion that, while
‘course’ and ‘arising’ were put under separate headings for convenience, some
interplay between the two factors should be
observed in the various categories discussed.
“A few examples
may now be reviewed to show that the two tests, in practice, have not been kept
in air-tight compartments, but
have to some extent merged into a single concept of work-connection. One is almost tempted to formulate a sort of quantum theory of work-connection
must be shown, and if the ‘course’ quantity is very small, but the ‘arising’ quantity is large,
the quantum will add up to the necessary minimum, as it will also when the
‘arising’ quantity is very small
but the, ‘course’ quantity is relatively large.
“But if both the ‘course’ and ‘arising’ quantities are small,
the minimum quantum will not be met.
“As an example of the first, a strong ‘arising’ factor but weak
‘course’ factor, one may cite the cases
in which recoveries have been allowed off the employment premises,
outside business hours, when an employee going to or coming from work is injured by a hazard distinctly
traceable to the employment, such as a traffic jam overflowing from the
employment premises, or a rock flying through the air from a blast on the
premises. Here, by normal course of
employment standards, there would be no award, since the employee was not on
the ‘premises while coming or going. Yet
the unmistakable character of the causal relation of the injury to the
employment has been sufficient to make up for the weakness of the ‘course’
factor. Another example of the same kind
of balancing-out is seen in the line of cases dealing with injury to traveling
men or loggers while sleeping in hotels or bunk-houses. It was shown in the analysis of these cases
that, although the ‘course’ factor is on the borderline when the employee is
sound asleep at the time of injury, a
strong causal relation of the injury to the conditions of employment –
as where a fellow-logger runs amok, or a straw falls into the bunk-
house-inmate’s throat from the mattress above, or the employee is trapped in a
burning hotel – will boost the case over the line to success; while a weak
causal connection, as where the salesman merely slips in a hotel bath, coupled
with a weak ‘course’ factor due to the absence of any direct service performed
for the employer at the time, will under present decisions add up to a quantum
of work-connection too small to support an award. It was also shown that when the ‘course’ element
is strengthened by the fact that the employee is at all times on call, the
range of compensable sources of injury is broader than when the employee, although
living on the premises is not on call.
“A somewhat similar balancing-out process is seen in the
holding that a borderline course-of-employment activity like seeking personal
comfort or going to and from work falls short of compensability if the method
adopted is unusual, unreasonable and dangerous, while no such restriction applies
to the direct performance of the work.
“As an example of the reverse situation, a strong ‘course’
element and a weak ‘arising’ element, one may recall the ‘positional’ cases
discussed in section 10, as well as the unexplained-fall and other
‘neutral-cause’ cases. Here the course
of employment test is satisfied beyond the slightest doubt: the employee is in
the midst of performing the active duties of his job. But the causal connection is very weak, since
the source of the injury – whether a stray bullet, a wandering lunatic, an
unexplained fall or death, or a mistaken assault by a stranger is not
distinctly associated with employment conditions
as such, and is tied to the employment only by the argument that the injury
would not have occurred to this employee but for the obligation of the
employment which placed him in the position to be hurt. Yet, since the ‘course’ element is so strong,
awards are becoming increasingly common on these facts.
“Incidentally, it may be observed that this ‘quantum’ idea
forms a useful yardstick for measuring just how generous a court has become in
expanding compensation coverage; for if a court makes an award when a case, by
the above standards, is weak both on course of employment and on causal
connection, one can conclude that the court is capable of giving the act a
broad construction. Thus, an award was
made in Puffin v. General Electric, where the course element was weak (rest
period) and the causal element was weak (setting fire to own sweater while
smoking). Both factors were likewise
very weak in O’Leary v, Brown Pacific-Maxon Inc.,
where the course of employment consisted of a recreation period interrupted by
a rescue of a stranger, and the arising factor consisted of drowning in a
channel where decedent was prohibited from going. And, in Martin v. Plaut,
the course of employment factor was weak (a cook dressing in the morning) and the causal factor
was also weak (an unexplained fall); yet an award was made in New
York.
“But another New York
case shows that the simultaneous weakness of course and arising factors may
reach the point where the requisite quantum is not found. In Shultz v. Nation Associates, compensation
was denied to an employee who while combing
her hair preparatory to going to lunch negligently struck her eye with the
comb. Here we see thinness on all
fronts: as to course of employment time factor, we have a lunch period; as to
the course of employment activity factor, we have care of personal appearance;
and as to the causal factor, we have negligence of the employee. Each weakness standing alone — lunch period,
care of appearance, negligence — would not be fatal; there are many awards in
which one or another of these is present.
But when all are present, while an award is not impossible and could be
defended on a point by point basis, it can not be relied upon in
most jurisdictions by the prudent lawyer.” Larson’s Workmen’s
Compensation Law, 1965 ed. Vol. 1,
pp. 452.97 to 452.100.
In resume:
1. Workmen’s compensation is
granted if the injuries result from an accident which arise out of and in the
course of employment.
2. Both the
“arising” factor and the “course” factor must be
present. If one factor is weak and the
other is strong, the injury is compensable, but not where both factors are
weak. Ultimately, the question is
whether the accident is work-connected.
3. In a proceeding for the
enforcement of a claim, the same
is presumed to come within the provisions of
the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
But a preliminary link must first
be shown to exist between the injury and the employment. Thus if the injury occurred in the course
of employment, it is presumed to have arisen out of the employment.
4. The “course”
factor applies to time, place and circumstances. This factor is present if the injury takes place within the period of
employment, at a place where the employee may be, and while he is fulfilling
his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.
5. The rule is that an
injury sustained while the employee goes to or comes from his place of work, is not of the employment.
6. The exception to the rule
is an injury sustained off the employee’s premises, but while in close proximity
thereto and while using a customary means of ingress and egress. The reason for extending the scope of
“course of employment” to off-premises injuries is that there is a
causal connection between the work and the hazard.
7. An “assault”
may be considered an “accident” within the meaning of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act. The employment may
either increase risk of assault because of its nature or be the subject-matter
of a dispute leading to the assault.
From these milestones, we
now proceed to take our bearings in the
case at bar, having in mind always that no cover-all formula can be spelled out
with specificity, that the particular facts and circumstances of each case must
be inquired into, and that in
any perceptive inquiry, the question as
to where the line should be drawn beyond which the liability of the employer
cannot continue has been held to be usually one of fact.
We shall first dwell on
the question of ownership of the private road where Pablo was killed. In granting compensation, the Commission said
that “the road where the deceased was shot was of private ownership, was
called the IDECO road, and led straight to the main IDECO gate, thus raising the reasonable assumption that it belonged” to the
IDECO. The Commission reasoned out that
“even if the ownership of the road were open to question, there was no
doubt that its private character was obviously exploited by the respondent for
the purpose of its own business to such an extent as to make it to all intents
and purposes an extension of its premises,” so that “the shooting a the deceased may be considered to have taken place on the premises, and
therefore within the employment;” and that “while respondent allowed
its name to be used in connection, with the private road for the ingress and
egress a the employees it did not apparently take the
necessary precaution to make it safe for its employees by employing security
guard.”
But the IDECO denies
ownership of the road. In its memorandum
filed with the Regional Office, IDECO averred that Pablo’s death did not
originate from his work as to time, place and circumstances. This, in effect, is a denial of ownership of
the road. The decision of the Regional
Office does not state that the road belongs to the IDECO. All that it says is that Pablo was shot
“barely two minutes after he was dismissed from work and while walking
along the IDECO road about twenty (20) meters from the gate.” In its
“motion for reconsideration and/or review,” the IDECO emphasized that
“the place where the incident happened was a public road, not less than
(20) meters away from the main gate of the compound, and therefore not
proximate to or in the immediate vicinity of the place of work.” Again,
the ownership of the road was implicitly denied. And in its “motion for reconsideration
and/ or appeal to the Commission en banc,” the IDECO alleged outright that
the “road where the incident took place, although of private ownership,
does not belong to IDECO. There is
absolutely no evidence on record that shows IDECO owns the road.” If the
road were owned by the IDECO, there would have been no question that the
assault arose “in the course of employment.”[23] But if it did indeed own the road, then the
IDECO would have fenced it, and placed its main gate at the other end of the
road where it meets the public highway.
But while the IDECO does
not own the private road, it cannot be denied that it was using the same as
the principal means of ingress and egress.
The private road leads directly to its main gate.[24] Its right to use the road must then perforce
proceed from either an easement of right of way or a lease. Its right, therefore, is either a legal one
or a contractual one. In either case the
IDECO should logically and properly be charged with security control of the
road. The IDECO owed its employees a
safe passage to its premises. In
compliance with such duty, the IDECO should have seen it not only that
the road was properly paved and did not have holes or ditches, but should also
have instituted measures for the proper policing of the immediate area. The point where Pablo was shot was barely twenty meters away from the
main IDECO gate, certainly nearer than a stone’s throw therefrom. The spot is immediately proximate to the IDECO’s premises.
Considering this fact, and the further facts that Pablo had just
finished overtime work at the time, and was killed barely two minutes after
dismissal from work, the Ampil case is
squarely applicable here. We may say, as
we did in Ampil, that the place where the
employee was injured being “immediately proximate to his place of work,
the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his
employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof.” Our
principal question is whether the injury was sustained in the course of employment. We find that it was and so conclude that the
assault arose out of the employment, even though the said assault is
unexplained.
American jurisprudence
supports this view.
In Bountiful Brick
Company vs. Giles,[25] the U.S. Supreme Court ruled:
“Employment includes not only the actual doing of the work,
but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to
and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing,
with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a
way over the employer’s premises, or
over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in
practical effect a part of the employers premises, the injury is one
arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had
happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its
performance. In other words, the
employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and in
point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached. Probably, as a general rule, employment may
be said to begin when the employee reaches the entrance to the employer’s
premises where the work is to be done; but it is clear that in some cases
the rule extends to include adjacent premises used by the employee as a means
of ingress and egress with the express or implied consent of the employer.”
The above ruling is on
all fours with our facts. Two minutes
from dismissal and twenty meters from the main IDECO gate are “a
reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from”
the IDECO’s premises.
The IDECO employees used the private road with its consent, express or
implied. Twenty meters on that road from
the main gate is in close proximity to the IDECO’s premises. It
follows that Pablo’s death was in the course of employment.
In Carter vs. Lanzetta,[26] it was held that “such statutes envision extension a coverage to employees from the time they reach the employer’s premises
until, they depart therefrom and that hours of
service include a period when this might be accomplished within a reasonable
interval;” and that “under exceptional circumstances, a continuance of the
course of employment may be extended by allowing the employee a reasonable time
not only to enter or leave the premises but also to surmount certain hazards
adjacent thereto.”
The private road led
directly to the main IDECO gate. From
this description, it would appear that the road is a dead-end street. In Singer vs. Rich Marine Sales,[27] it was held that, where the employee, while
returning to work at the end of the lunch period, fell at the curb of the
sidewalk immediately adjacent to the employer’s premises and one other located
thereon, and the general public used the street only in connection with those
premises, and the employer actually stored boats on the sidewalk, the sidewalk
was within the precincts of employment.
In that case there were even two business establishments on the dead-end
street. Here, it is exclusively the
IDECO premises which appear to be at the end of the private road.
We find in Jean vs.
Chrysler Corporation[28] a meaningful statement of the obligation of
the employer to its employees: “That the employer owes, so to speak, a duty of ‘safe passage’ to an employee to the point where he can reach
the proper arrival or departure from his work seems without question.”
We next quote extensively
from Kelty vs. Travellers
Insurance Company.[29]
“The rule has been repeatedly announced in Texas that an
injury received by an employee while using the public streets and highways in going
to or returning from the place of employment is not compensable, the rationale
of the rule being that in most instances such an injury is suffered as a
consequence of risk and hazards to which all members of the travelling
public are subject rather than risk and hazards having to do with and
originating in the work or business of the employer. x x x
“Another exception, however, which is applicable is found in
the so-called ‘access’ cases. In these
cases a workman who has been injured a
place intended by the employer for use as a means of ingress and
egress to and from the actual place of the employee’s work has been held to be
in the course of his employment. The
courts have said that these access areas are so closely related to the employer’s
premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer’s
premises. We shall discuss the principal authorities
dealing with this exception to the general rule.
“The leading cases in Texas dealing with the ‘access’
exception, and one which we think controlling of this appeal, is Lumberman’s
Reciprocal Ass’n v. Behnken,
112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72, 23 A.L.R. 1402.
In that case the employee was employed
by Hartburg Lumber Company, which company operated
and owned a sawmill in Hartburg, Texas, which was a lumber town, consisting solely of the employer’s
facilities. A railroad track ran through
the town and a part of the lumber company’s facilities was situated on either
side of the right-of-way. A public road
ran parallel to the railroad tracks which led to the various buildings on the
property of the lumber company. This
crossing was used by any member of the public desiring to go to any part of the
lumber company facilities. On the day in
question the decedent quit work at noon, went home for lunch and while returning to
the lumber company plant for the purpose of resuming his employment, was struck
and killed by a train at the crossing in question. The insurance company contended (as it does
here) that the decedent’s death did not originate in the work or business of
his employer and that at the time of his fatal injuries he was not in or about
the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer. The Supreme Court, in an extensive opinion,
reviewed the authorities from other states and especially Latter’s Case 238
Mass. 326, 130 N.E. 637, 638, and arrived at the conclusion that
the injury and death under such circumstances were compensable under the Texas
Act. The court held that the railroad
crossing bore so intimate a relation to the lumber company’s premises that it could hardly be treated otherwise than as a part of the premises. The court pointed out that the lumber company had rights in and to the crossing which was
used in connection with the lumber company’s business, whether by employees or
by members of the public. In announcing
the ‘access’ doctrine Justice Greenwood said:
‘Was Behnken engaged in or about the
furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer when he received the injury causing his death? He was upon
the crossing provided as the means of access to his work solely because he was
an employee. He encountered, the dangers
incident to use of the crossing in order that he might perform the duties
imposed by his, contract of service. Without subjecting himself to such dangers he could not do what was
required of him in the conduct of the lumber company’s business. He had reached a place provided and used only
as an adjunct to that business, and was injured from a risk created by the
conditions under which the business was carried on, To hold that he was not
acting in furtherance of the affairs or business of the lumber company would be
to give a strict interpretation to this remedial statute, which should be
liberally construed with a view to accomplish its purpose and to promote
justice.’
x x x
“In Texas Employer’s Ins. Ass’n v. Anderon, Tex. Civ. App., 125 S.W.
2d 674, wr. ref., this court followed the rule
announced in Behnken, supra. In that case the employee was killed while
crossing the railroad track near his place of employment. In discussing the question of the situs of the injury Justice Looney said:
‘Its use as a means of ingress to and exit from his place of
work not only conduced to his safety and convenience, but contributed to the
promises and efficiency with which he was enabled to discharge the duties owing
his employer; hence the reason and necessity for his presence upon the
railroad track (that portion of the pathway leading over the railroad right of
way) when injured, in our opinion, had to do with, originated in and grew out
of the work of the employer; and that, the injury received at the time, place,
and under the circumstances, necessarily was in furtherance of the affairs or
business of the employer.’
“Again, in Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n
v. Boecker, Tex. Civ. App.,
53 S.W. 2d 327, err. ref., this court had occasion to follow the ‘access’
doctrine. In that case Chief Justice
Jones quoted from the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Bountiful Brick Company et al v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 48 S.Ct.
221, 72 L.Ed. 507, 66 A.L.R. 1402, as follows:
‘An employment includes not only the actual doing of the work,
but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to
and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of
the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer’s premises, or
over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical
effect a part of the employer’s premises, the injury is one arising out of and
in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the
employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other words, the employment may begin
in point of time before the work is entered
upon and in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is
reached.'”
The ruling enunciated
above is applicable in the case at bar.
That part of the road where Pablo was killed is in very close proximity to the
employer’s premises. It is an
“access area” “so clearly related to the employees premises as
to be fairly treated as a part of the employer’ s premises.” That portion of
the road bears “so intimate a relation” to the company’s
premises. It is the chief means of entering the IDECO premises, either for
the public or for its employees. The
IDECO uses it extensively in pursuit of its business. It has rights of passage over the road,
either legal, if by virtue of easement, or contractual, if by reason of
lease. Pablo was using the road as a
means of access to his work solely because he was an employee. For this reason, the IDECO was under
obligation to keep the place safe for its employees. Safe, that is, against dangers that the
employees might encounter therein, one of these dangers being assault by third
persons. Having failed to take the
proper security measures over the said area which it controls, the IDECO is
liable for the injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his death.
As heretofore stated, the
assault on Pablo is unexplained. The
murderer was himself killed before he could be brought to trial. It is true there is authority for the
statement that before the “proximity” rule may be applied it must
first be shown that there is a causal connection between the employment and the
hazard which resulted in the injury.[30] The following more modern view was expressed
in Lewis Wood Preserving
Company vs. Jones:[31]
“While some earlier cases seem to indicate that the causative
danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood for the
injuries to arise out of and in the course of the employment (see Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Peek, 36 Ga. App. 557 [137 S.E. 121], Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Co. V. Cox, 61 Ga. App. 420, 6 S.E. 2d 189), later cases have been
somewhat more liberal, saying that, ‘to be compensable, injuries do not have to
arise from something peculiar to the employment.’ Fidelity & Casualty Co.
of N. Y. v. Bardon, 79 Ga.
App. 260, 262, 54 S.E. 2d 443, 444. ‘Where the duties of an employee entail his
presence (at a place and a time) the claim for an injury there occurring is not
to be barred because it results from a risk common to all others x x x unless it is also common to
the general public without regard to such conditions, and independently of
place, employment, or pursuit.’ New Amsterdam
Casualty Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 118
S. E. 786, cited in Globe Indemnity Co. v. MacKendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 46, 47. McKiney v.
Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co., 79 Ga. App. 826, 829, 54 S.E. 2d 471, 473.”
But even without the
foregoing pronouncement, the employer should still be held liable in view of
our conclusion that that portion of the road where Pablo was killed, because of
its proximity, should be considered part of the IDECO’s
premises. Hence, the injury was in the course
of employment, and there automatically
arises the presumption – invoked in Rivera – that the injury by assault arose
out of the employment, i.e., there is a causal
relation between the assault and the employment.
We do say here that the circumstances of time, two minutes after dismissal from overtime work, and
space, twenty meters from the employer’s main gate, bring Pablo’s death within
the scope of the course factor.
But it may logically be asked: Suppose it were three minutes after and
thirty meters from, or five minutes
after and fifty meters from, would the “proximity” rule still apply?
In answer, we need but quote that portion of the decision in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation, supra, which answered a question arising from an
ingenious hypothetical situation put forth by the defendant therein:
“We could, of course,
say ‘this is not the case before us’ and utilize the old saw, ‘that which
is not before us we do not decide.’ Instead, we prefer to utilize the
considerably older law: ‘Sufficient
unto the day is the evil thereof’ (Matthew 1:34), appending, however, this admonition: no statute is static; it must
remain constantly viable to meet new challenges placed to it. Recovery in a proper case should not be
suppressed because of a conjectural posture which may never arise and which if
it does, will be decided in the light of then-existing law.”
Since the Workmen’s
Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief
to workmen, it must be liberally construed to attain the purpose
for which it was enacted.[32] Liberally construed, sec. 2 of the Act comprehends Pablo’s death. The Commission did not err in granting compensation.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed, at
petitioner’s cost.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Fernando, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., reserves his vote.
[1]
Description used by Justice Frank Murphy in Cardillo vs.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 330 US 469 (1947), 91 Led 1028.
[2]
Sec. 2, Workmen’s Compensation Act.
[3]
Arthur Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law (1952 ed. with 1959 supplement),
vol. 1, p. 41; see also 1965
ed., vol. 1, p. 42.
[4]
See note 3, at pp. 42-& 43.
[5]
Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine Co., 58 Phil.
42, citing Fitzgerald vs. Clarke & Sons, 1 LWCC 197, Dretzen Co. vs. Industrial Board, 279 III, 11, 116 NE 684.
[6]
PHHC vs. WCC & Alba Titong, L-18246, Oct.
30, 1964, citing Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689, & Larson’s
Workmen’s, Compensation Law, 1952 ed., p. 153.
[7]
Vol. 8, William R. Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Text, Permanent Edition
(1951), p. 3.
[8]
See note 7, at pp. 7 and 8.
[9]
L-8130, June 30, 1956, 99
Phil. 1050.
[10]
L-22117, April 29, 1966.
[11]
50 ALR 2d. 356, Idaho Supreme Court, June 15, 1954.
[12]
Taller vda. de Nava vs. Ynchausti
Steamship Co., 57 Phil. 751.
[13] 70 Phil. 685.
[14]
G.R. No. 7402, March
25, 1941, 40 OG No. 1, p. 83 (Court of Appeals case,
decision of a special division
of five Justices, Justice Alex Reyes, ponente).
[15]
L-19051, Nov. 23, 1966.
[16]
L-7658, May 8, 1956.
[17]
Five Justices dissented.
[18]
The jobs of the employees in the Nava, Rivera, Madanguit and Dabacol
cases are within this class.
[19]
The injuries resulting from assault on the manager of a building used as a
rooming house by unsavory characters, was adjudged compensable in Israel vs.
Ramble Properties, Inc., 58 NYS 2d 388.
[20]
The Galicia
case probably comes under this category.
For a discussion of assaults as a work hazard, see Larson’s Workmen’s
Compensation Law (1965 ed.), vol. 1, pp. 132-144.
[21]
Sec. 43(1), Workmen’s Compensation Act.
[22]
28 NE 2d 914.
[23]
The presumption that the injury arises out of and in the course of employment
prevails where the injury occurs on the employer’s premises. The injuries were sustained by the employee
when she was struck by an automobile while walking from the processing plant
where she worked to her automobile which was parked in the adjoining parking
area maintained for employees. Forest
v. Birds Eye Division of General Foods Corporation, 422 P2d 616, Supreme Court
of Idaho, Jan. 17, 1967.
Where a state vehicle being driven with consent of the state and under
its direction and upon its business struck a state hospital employee on
the premises of the state hospital after she had completed her shift, the
injuries sustained were declared covered by workmen’s compensation law in
Nichols v. Godfrey, 411 P2d 763, March 4, 1966.
[24]
“Main” means principal, chief, first in size, rank,
importance. 26 Words & Phrases 60,
citing Evers v. Flanagan, 61 NYS 2d 496, 499, 186 Misc. 101. It may be
reasonably assumed to then that the main gate, although the natural tendency of
employees and customers is to pass through the main gate.
[25]
72 L. ed. 507, Feb. 20, 1928.
[26]
193 SO 2d 259, Supreme Court of Louisiana,
December 12, 1966. Here, the Court held that the accident when
the employee, fell on the step adjoining the employer’s front door, as the
employee was leaving, occurred during the course of employment although the
employee had been engaged for one day and had already been paid, and although
the employee had lingered for from 20 to 30 minutes talking to the employer.
[27]
271 NYS 2d 514, New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third
Department, April 29, 1966.
[28]
140 NW 2d 756, Court of Appeals of Michigan,
March 22, 1966.
[29]
391 SW 2d 558, Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas, May 21, 1965.
[30]
Jaynes vs. Potlatch Forests, supra.
[31]
140 SE 2d 113, Court of Appeals of Georgia,
Nov. 24, 1964.
[32]
Abana vs. Quisumbing, L-23439, March 27, 1963, 22
SCRA 1278, 1968A PHILD 997; Manila Railroad Co. vs. WCC, L-21504,
Sept.
15, 1967, 21
SCRA 98, 1967 PHILD 676; ITEMCOP vs. Reyes-Florzo,
L-21969, August 31,1966 17
SCRA 1104.