G.R. No. L-30871. December 28, 1970
AURORA P. DE LEON, PETITIONER, VS. HON. SERAFIN SALVADOR, AS JUDGE OF BRANCH XIV OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (CALOOCAN CITY), AND EUSEBIO BERNABE, ALBERTO A. VALINO,…
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Joint decision of two special civil actions which were ordered
consolidated since they involve the same properties and the common issue of conflict
of jurisdiction of the two Caloocan
City branches of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal.
Case L-30871 arose from the following facts: A judgment for P35,000.00-actual, moral and
exemplary damages obtained by Enrique de Leon against private respondent Eusebio Bernabe in Civil Case No.
C-189 of Branch XII of the Rizal court of first
instance, Caloocan City branch presided by Judge
Fernando A. Cruz, having become final and executory,
a writ of execution was issued by said court.
Pursuant thereto, the city sheriff, on November 8, 1966 levied on
execution on two parcels of land of 682.5 square meters each registered in the
names of Bernabe under T. C. T. Nos. 94985 and 94986
of Caloocan City.
At the execution sale held on February 14, 1967, the city sheriff sold
the said properties to herein petitioner, Aurora (sister of the judgment creditor)
as the highest bidder for the total sum of P30,194.00, (the property then being
subject to an existing mortgage lien in the amount of P120,000.00). The sheriff executed the corresponding
certificate of sale in her favor, which was duly registered on February 21, 1967 with the Caloocan City
register of deeds.
On February 7, 1968,
just about two weeks before the expiration, of the one-year period to redeem
the properties sold in execution, the judgment debtor Bernabe
filed a separate civil action docketed as Civil Case No. C-1217 against his judgment
creditor Enrique de Leon, herein petitioner Aurora P. de Leon as purchaser and
the sheriff as defendants for the setting aside or annulment of the execution
sale held on February 14, 1967
“for being anomalous and irregular”, and for the ordering of a new auction
sale. This second case, instead of being
referred to Judge Cruz presiding over Branch XII which had issued the writ of
execution, was assigned to Branch XIV, the other Caloocan
City branch of the Rizal Court of First Instance
presided by Judge Serafin Salvador, who issued on
February 19, 1968 a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining therein
defendants, particularly the sheriff to desist “from taking further
proceedings against the properties of the plaintiff [Bernabe]
that were sold at public auction on February 14, 1967, and from issuing a
sheriff’s deed of sale at the expiration of the period of redemption on
February 21, 1968 in favor of defendant Aurora P. de Leon.” Aurora moved
to dissolve the injunction and to dismiss this second case on the grounds of laches and lack of jurisdiction of Judge Salvador’s court
to interfere with the execution proceedings pending in the first case before
Judge Cruz’ court which is of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction, but Judge
Salvador denied the same for not being indubitable and tried the case,
notwithstanding Aurora’s pleas before and after the trial to resolve the issue
of his court’s lack of jurisdiction.
Pending his decision, Judge Salvador issued on May 20, 1969 an
order granting two ex-parte motions, of Bernabe of May 12, and May 15, 1969 and ordering the
sheriff to allow Bernabe to redeem the two properties
sold at public auction more than two years ago on February 14, 1967 under the
writ of execution issued by Judge Cruz’ court in the first case. On the following day, May 21, 1969, Bernabe
deposited with the sheriff the sum of P33,817.28 as the redemption price
(P15,987,00 per lot plus interests), who issued a certificate of
redemption. Bernabe
then “registered on the following day, May 22, 1969, the sheriff’s certificate
of redemption with the register of deeds, who in turn cancelled the entry of
the execution sale in favor of Aurora, as well
as registered on one of the properties covered by T. C. T. No. 94986 a deed of first mortgage executed on May 20, 1969 by Bernabe in favor of one Antonio de Zuzuarregui
to secure a loan of P130,000.00.
Aurora’s motion of May 28, 1969 in the second case to set aside the
order and certificate of redemption and registration of mortgage on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction was denied by Judge Salvador, who ruled in his order of
June 23, 1969 that “there is no question that this Court has jurisdiction
to hear and determine this case which questions the regularity and
legality of the auction sale of properties held on February 14, 1967, hence the
authority granted by the Court to redeem said properties within the redemption
period in order to write finis to the pending case.”[1]
Hence, this action for certiorari filed by Aurora impleading
the sheriff and the register of deeds for the annulment and setting aside for
lack of jurisdiction of the questioned orders of Judge Salvador’s court as
well as of the challenged actuactions of the other
respondent officials pursuant thereto.
As prayed for, the Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining said respondents from doing or taking any other act in connection
with the said properties.
On May 30, 1969, Aurora also filed in the first case before Judge
Cruz’ court a motion with proper notice for consolidation of title and for the
court to order the sheriff to issue in her favor a final deed of sale over the
subject parcels of land. Judge Cruz
order of September 5, 1969, granting Aurora’s motion over Bernabe’s
opposition that he had redeemed on May 21, 1969 the said properties by virtue
of Judge Salvador’s order of May 20, 1969 in the second case and ordering Bernabe to surrender his owner’s duplicates of title for
transfer to Aurora, in turn gave rise to Case L-31603 filed by Bernabe. After Bernabe’s motion for reconsideration urging Judge Cruz to
hold in abeyance Aurora’s motion for consolidation of title until this Court’s
decision in Case L-30871 “which
will end once and for all the legal controversy” over the conflict of
jurisdiction between the two courts, was denied by Judge Cruz’ order of January
8, 1970, he filed this action for certiorari, impleading
the sheriff, for the annulment and revocation of the questioned orders of Judge
Cruz, on the ground of the latter’s lack of jurisdiction to issue the
same. As prayed for, the Court
also issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the enforcement of Judge
Cruz’ orders, until the conflict between the parties could be finally
resolved.
The decisive issue at bar is a simple one of jurisdiction: which court, Branch XII presided by Judge
Cruz or Branch XIV presided by Judge Salvador has exclusive jurisdiction to set
aside for alleged irregularities the execution sale held on February 14, 1967
by virtue of the writ for the execution of the final judgment in the first case
(No. C-189) issued by Judge Cruz court and to order a new auction sale – which
was the relief sought by the judgment
debtor in the second case (No. C-1217) in Judge Salvador’s court?
It is patent that such exclusive jurisdiction was vested in Judge
Cruz’ court. Having acquired
jurisdiction over Case No. C-189 and rendered judgment that had become final
and executory, it retained jurisdiction over its
judgment, to the exclusion of all other co-ordinate courts for its execution and
all incidents thereof, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct
of its ministerial officers in connection therewith.[2]
Execution of its judgment having been carried out by the sheriff with the levy
and sale of the judgment debtor’s properties, Eusebio
Bernabe as judgment debtor could not in the guise of
a new and separate second action (Case No. 1217) ask another court of
co-ordinate jurisdiction, Judge Salvador’s court, to interfere by injunction
with the execution proceedings, to set them aside and to order the holding of a
new execution sale – instead of seeking such relief by proper motion and
application from Judge Cruz’ court which had exclusive jurisdiction over the
execution proceedings and the properties sold at the execution sale.
As early as 1922, in Cabigao
vs. del Rosario,[3]
this Court laid down the doctrine that “no court has power to interfere
by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction having power to grant the relief sought by
injunction”, pointing out that “(T)he various branches of the Court of
First Instance of Manila are in a sense coordinate courts and to allow them to
interfere with each other’s judgments or decrees by injunctions would obviously
lead to confusion and might seriously
hinder the administration of justice.”
The Court similarly ruled in Hubahib
vs. Insular Drug Co., Inc.,[4]
with reference to Branch II of the Cebu court of
first instance having taken cognizance of an independent action for the
annulment of a writ of execution issued by Branch III of the same court which
has rendered the judgment, that “the institution of said action was not
only improper but also absolutely unjustified, on the ground that the appellant
had the remedy of applying to the same Branch III of the lower court, which
issued the orders in question, for reconsideration thereof, x x x or of appealing from said
orders or from that denying his motion in case such order has been issued. The various branches of a Court of First
Instance of a province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority
and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not,
cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much
less with their orders or judgments, by means of injunction.”
In National Power Corporation vs. de Veyra,[5]
the Court, through former Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon,
thus explained that the garnishment or levy of property on execution brings the
property into custodia legis
of the court issuing the writ of execution, beyond the interference of all
other co-ordinate courts, thereby avoiding conflicts of power between such
courts: “(T)he garnishment of
property to satisfy a writ of execution ‘operates as an attachment and fastens
upon the property a lien by which the property is brought under the
jurisdiction of the court issuing the writ.’
It is brought into custodia legis, under the sole control of such court. Property is in the custody of the court when
it has been seized by an officer either under a writ of attachment on mesne process or under a writ of execution. A court which has control of such property,
exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the same.
No court, except one having a supervisory control or superior
jurisdiction in the premises, has a right to interfere with and change that possession.”
The Court in striking down the Baguio
court’s issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the Baguio city sheriff’s garnishment of cash funds of Baguio City deposited in the Baguio
branch of the Philippine National Bank pursuant to a writ of execution issued
by the Manila court of first instance for the satisfaction of a final judgment
rendered in favor of the National Power Corporation, and its assuming
cognizance of the separate complaint filed with it, duly indicated the proper
procedure in such cases and the fundamental reason therefor: “(T)he reason advanced by the respondent
court of Baguio City that it should grant relief when
‘there is apparently an illegal service of the writ’ (the property garnished
being allegedly exempt from execution) may not be upheld, there being a better
procedure to follow, i. e., a resort to the Manila
court, wherein the remedy may be obtained, it being the court under whose
authority the illegal levy had been made.
Needless to say, an effective ordering of legal relationships in
civil society is possible only when each court is granted exclusive
jurisdiction over the property brought to it.”[6]
The Court time and again has applied this long-established
doctrine admonishing court and litigant alike last year in Luciano
vs. Provincial Governor[7]
“that a judge of a branch of a court may not interfere with the
proceedings before a judge of another branch of the same court.”
The properties in question were brought into custodia
legis of Judge Cruz’ court and came under its
exclusive jurisdiction when they were levied upon by the sheriff pursuant to
the writ for execution of the judgment rendered by said court. The levy is the essential act by which the
judgment debtor’s property is set apart for the satisfaction of the judgment
and taken into custody of the law, and from such time the court issuing the
execution acquires exclusive jurisdiction over the property and all subsequent
claims of other parties are subordinated thereto, irrespective of the time
when the property is actually sold.[8]
The execution sale having been carried out upon order of Judge Cruz’ court, any
and all questions concerning the validity and regularity of the sale
necessarily had to be addressed to: his court which had exclusive jurisdiction
over the properties and were beyond interference by Judge Salvador’s
court. Judge Cruz’ court alone had
jurisdiction – subject only to the supervisory control or appellate
jurisdiction of superior courts – to rule upon the regularity and validity of
the sale conducted by its ministerial officers from the sheriff’s office, and
his affirmative ruling thereon could not be interfered with by injunction of,
nor sought to be foreclosed by, the challenged orders of Judge Salvador’s
court.
Bernabe’s contention that “he does
not attempt to annul or nullify the judgment or order issued by (Judge Cruz’
court) … If (Judge Salvador’s court)
finds the allegations of the complaint to be true, then it has the,
jurisdiction to order a new auction sale, which has nothing to do with the
judgments or decrees issued by Judge Cruz’ court)”[9]
is untenable. As above stated, the properties
upon being levied on and sold by virtue of Judge Cruz’ order of execution were
brought into the exclusive custodia legis of Judge Cruz’ court. This is but in accordance with the
established principle that” A case in which an execution has been issued is
regarded as still pending, so that all proceedings on the execution are
proceedings in the suit”[10]
and that “(A)n execution is the fruit and end of the suit, and is very
aptly called the life the law. The suit
does not terminate with the judgment; and all proceedings on the execution, are
proceedings in the suit, and which are expressly, by the act of Congress, put
under the regulation and control of the Court out of which it issues. It is a power incident to every Court from
which process issues, when delivered to the proper officer, to enforce upon
such officer a compliance with his duty.”[11]
Any and all questions involving the execution sale concerned the proceedings in
Judge Cruz’ court and had to be raised and determined in that court, subject to
review by the higher courts. They could
not be improperly passed upon by another co-ordinate court – behind the back,
as it were of Judge Cruz’ court.
Judge Salvador’s order of May 20, 1969 granting two ex-parte motions of the judgment debtor Bernabe
and directing the sheriff to allow the redemption of the properties notwithstanding
that the one-year redemption period had already lapsed more than one year ago
on February 21, 1968 (one year after registration on May 21, 1967 of the
sheriff’s sale of May 14, 1967) was equally untenable. It must be noted that Bernabe’s
action in Judge Salvador’s court filed on February 7, 1968 two weeks before
the expiration of the redemption period sought to set aside the execution sale
and to have a new auction sale ordered, on the grounds that the sheriff had
allegedly sold the two parcels of land jointly instead of separately, and that
the total sales price of P30,194.00 was shocking to the conscience, alleging
that the two parcels, if sold separately, could easily be sold at P235,000.00
and P150,000.00. Pending decision and
without ruling squarely on his court’s lack of jurisdiction over the
properties, Judge Salvador preremptorily issued his
redemption order on Bernabe’s bare manifestation that
”(he) has but barely two days left of the one (1) year period granted by law
to redeem” and that “(he) is now ready and willing to redeem”
the properties.
Aside from the basic lack of jurisdiction of Judge Salvador’s
court to issue the redemption order, the order per se suffered
from other grave flaws. Bernabe’s motions in effect amounted to an abandonment of
his position on the alleged irregularity of the execution sale, and the logical
consequence thereof would have been the dismissal of his suit. (Thus, soon after Aurora’s filing of her
action for certiorari in this Court, Bernabe filed
his so-called “Urgent Motion to Dismiss” of August 27, 1969 with
Judge Salvador’s court praying for the dismissal of the very case filed by him
on the ground that having redeemed the properties, “the case can therefore
be considered closed and terminated considering that defendants [Aurora, et
al.] did not interpose any appeal” from the redemption order. ) But Bernabe’s motions were presented on May 12 and May 15,
1969 and it was self-evident from the record that the one-year period for
redemption had long expired more than a year ago on February 21, 1968 as above
stated and that Bernabe’s allegations that he had two
days left – of the redemption period was a gratuitous one. Nothing in the record indicates that Bernabe had ever timely made a valid offer of redemption
so as to safeguard his right thereto prior to his filing his separate action
questioning the validity of the execution sale.
It was therefore void and illogical for Judge Salvador to rule, in
denying Aurora’s motion for reconsideration that “there is no question
that this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this case which
questions the regularity and legality of the auction sale of properties held on
February 14, 1967, hence the authority granted by the Court to redeem said
properties within the redemption period in order to write finis to the pending
case.” For Judge Salvador thereby begged the basic prejudicial questions
of his court’s lack of jurisdiction and the expiration over a year ago of Bernabe’s alleged right of redemption, not to mention that
any grant of such right to redeem could not be decreed in a summary unreasoned
order but would have to be adjudged in a formal decision reciting the facts and
the law on which it is based, and which
may not be immediately executed, without a special order therefor. Under Judge Salvador’s void orders, all that
a judgment debtor whose properties have been sold at execution sale but who does not have the funds to effect
redemption has to do to unilaterally extend the one-year redemption period would
be to file a separate action before another court of coordinate jurisdiction
questioning the regularity of the execution sale and upon his getting the
funds, notwithstanding the expiration of the redemption period, get an order of
redemption and ask the court “to write finis to the pending case” –
which should have been dismissed in the first instance for lack of jurisdiction.
The doctrine cited that a court or a branch thereof may not interfere
with the proceedings before a judge of another court or branch of the same
court since they are all courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction is an
elementary doctrine that has been established with the very system of courts. Understandable as Bernabe’s
plight and financial predicament may be, still it is incomprehensible why he
should futilely resort, as he did, to filing his separate action with Judge
Salvador’s court which patently lacked jurisdiction over the properties sold in
execution instead of questioning the regularity of the execution sale before
Judge Cruz’ court as the court of competent and exclusive jurisdiction, and
properly applying, if he had just grounds, for extension of the redemption
period.
As to the alleged gross inadequacy of the price of P30,194.00
paid by Aurora when according to Bernabe the properties could have been easily sold for a
total price of P385,000.00, Bernabe has admitted that
there was an existing mortgage lien on the properties in the amount of P120,000.00
which necessarily affected their value.
This question was not raised at all before Judge Cruz’ court nor did
Judge Salvador rule thereupon, since he merely issued his void order of
redemption. Suffice it to state on the
basis of the record, however, that the failure of Bernabe
to timely sell the properties for their fair value through negotiated sales
with third persons either before or after the execution sale in order to be
able to discharge his judgment debt or redeem the properties within the redemption
period, or to raise the necessary amount therefrom
to so effect redemption notwithstanding that they have been collecting the
substantial monthly rentals thereof of P2,500.00 monthly even up to now[12]
can be attributed only to his own failings and gross improvidence. They cannot
be cited in law or in equity to defeat the lawful claim of Aurora nor to give validity to the void orders of
Judge Salvador’s court. The applicable
rule on forced sales where the law gives the owner the right of redemption was
thus stated by the Court in Velasquez vs. Coronel:[13] “However, while in ordinary sales for reasons of equity a transaction may be
invalidated on the ground of inadequacy of price, or when such inadequacy
shocks one’s conscience as to justify the courts to interefere,
such does not follow when the law
gives to the owner the right to redeem, as when a sale is made at public
auction, upon the theory that the lesser the price the easier it is for the
owner to effect the redemption. And
so it was aptly said: ‘When there is the
right to redeem, inadequacy of price should not be material, because the
judgment debtor may reacquire the property or also sell his right to redeem’
and thus recover the loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price
obtained at the auction sale.”
Bernabe’s petition challenging the
jurisdiction, of Judge Cruz’ court to issue its orders of September 5, 1969 and
January 5, 1970, confirming Aurora’s acquisition of title to the properties by
virtue of the execution sale and ordering Bernabe to
transfer possession thereof to her, because of the separate civil action filed
by him in Judge Salvador’s court, must necessarily fail — since said orders
were within the exclusive competence and jurisdiction of Judge Cruz’ court.
ACCORDINGLY, in Case L-30871, the writ of certiorari
prayed for is granted; respondent Judge Salvador’s court is declared without
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. C-1217 other than to dismiss the same and the
writ of preliminary injunction of February 19, 1968 therein issued and the
orders of May 20, 1969 and June 23, 1969 therein issued, as well as respondent
sheriff’s certificate of redemption issued on May 21, 1969 are set aside and
declared null and void; and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court
on September 2, 1969 is made permanent.
In Case L-31603, the petition for certiorari is dismissed and the writ
of preliminary injunction issued by this
Court on February 11, 1970
is dissolved. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Concepcion, C.J., in the result.
Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Fernando, Barredo,
Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., no part.
[1]
Annex P, Petition in G.R. No. L-30871.
[2]
Rule 35, section 5(d), Rules of Court; see
Manila Railroad Co. vs. Yatco, 23 SCRA 735
(1968).
[3]
44 Phil., 182; see also Nuñez vs. Low, 19 Phil. 244 (1911) and Orais vs. Escaño, 14 Phil.
208 (1909).
[4]
64 Phil., 119 (1937); emphasis supplied.
[5]
3 SCRA 646 (1961).
[6]
Citing Lacuna, et al. v. Ofilada, G.R. No. L-13548,
September 30, 1959; Manuel Araneta & Jose L. Yu vs. Common. Ins. Co., G.R.
No. L-11584, April 28, 1958, citing the
early cases of Cabigao & Izquierdo
vs. Del Rosario and Lim, 44 Phil. 182; Agustin P. Montesa,
et al. vs. Manila Cordage Co., G.R. No. L-4559, September
19, 1952; Taciana Ongsingco, Guardian of
Francisco de Borja vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., G.R. No. L-7635, July 25,
1955.
[7]
28 SCRA 517 (1969); see also Sterling Investment Corp. vs. Ruiz,
30 SCRA 318 (1969); Mas vs. Dumara-og, 12 SCRA 34 (1964); Tuason
v. Torres, 21 SCRA 1169 (1967); Hacbang vs.
Leyte Autobus Co. 8 SCRA 103, (1963).
[8]
Rule 39, section 35, see 2
Moran’s Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., pp. 347-348, citing Govt. of P. I. vs.
Echaus, 71 Phil. 318 (1941).
[9]
Petition, L-31603, p. 11.
[10]
Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. vs. CIA, 8
SCRA 59 (1960), Citing 21 Am. Jur. 18.
[11]
Idem, at p. 64.
[12]
G.R. No. L-31603, Rollo,
p. 127.
[13]
5 SCRA 985 (1962), citing Tolentino vs. Agcaoili, 91 Phil. 917 (unrep.)
and Barrozo vs. Macaraeg,
83 Phil. 378. In the cited Velasquez case, the issuance of a final deed of
sale, by virtue of the tax sale to Velasquez for P520.19 and P311.58 of
properties of 245.329 sq. m. and 383.099 sq. m. with assessed values of
P7,500.00 and P4,730.00, respectively, both situated in Las Piñas,
Rizal, upon the owners’ failure to redeem, was
upheld.