ALEJANDRA V. MABITAZAN, AVELINO V. BERNARDO AND FLORENCIO A. BERNARDO (SUBSTITUTED BY ALICIA B. JULOYA, NELLY B. RUBINA AND AVELINO BERNARDO), PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. SPS. RO…
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Mabitazan versus Villanueva
The Case
This is a case about malicious prosecution. Alejandra Mabitazan, Avelino Bernardo, and Florencio Bernardo sued spouses Roberto and Consuelo Villanueva and their lawyer, Lazaro Gayo, for damages. The plaintiffs claimed that the Villanuevas, acting on their lawyer's advice, filed a baseless criminal complaint for perjury against them, purely to vex and harass them for having earlier won a road right of way case against the spouses. The case matters because it gathers into one decision the full rule on malicious prosecution: the four elements, the requirement that want of probable cause and malice must exist together, and the settled principle that merely submitting a case for prosecution does not make a complainant liable.
Procedural History
The plaintiffs filed their complaint for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union. After pre-trial and trial on the merits, the trial court, through its presiding judge, rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning as errors the trial court's failure to find the elements of malicious prosecution and its refusal to hold the defendants jointly and severally liable for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed the trial court's judgment in full. The case reached the Supreme Court by that appeal, and the High Court likewise found the appeal bereft of merit.
Facts
On February 24, 2004, the plaintiffs filed a complaint for easement of road right of way against the Villanueva spouses. They alleged that they had long used a portion of the spouses' land under an agreed right of way, but that the spouses had built a fence around the land, cutting off their ingress and egress.
On March 11, 2004, the spouses, with the advice of their counsel, Attorney Gayo, filed a criminal complaint for perjury against the plaintiffs before the Municipal Trial Court of Agoo. The spouses claimed the plaintiffs committed perjury by falsely alleging in their civil complaint that a fence had been constructed, when in truth there was none. The municipal trial court found probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest. The plaintiffs moved to quash; the motion was denied. The plaintiffs then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the Regional Trial Court, which granted the petition and ordered the perjury case dismissed.
Meanwhile, the road right of way case was decided in favor of the plaintiffs, and that decision became final all the way up to the Supreme Court. Armed with these victories, the plaintiffs sued for malicious prosecution, insisting the perjury charge was baseless, frivolous, and impelled by malice. The spouses answered that they acted in good faith, noting that the municipal trial court itself had found probable cause and issued a warrant. Attorney Gayo answered that he was not behind the filing of the criminal case and that an ocular inspection had been conducted before it was filed. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
- Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that the elements of malicious prosecution had not been proven.
- Whether or not the defendants should be held jointly and severally liable for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Applicable Provisions
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides:
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This is the anchor of the claim: the plaintiffs say the defendants abused their right to litigate, and the Court requires proof that the suit was patently malicious to warrant damages under this provision.
Article 20 of the Civil Code provides:
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
The Court ties the award of damages to proof of legal malice, which this provision demands.
Article 21 of the Civil Code provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The Court cites Articles 19 to 21 together as the basis for damages in malicious prosecution, requiring that the suit be so patently malicious as to fall under them.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court did not err. It laid down the elements of malicious prosecution: the aggrieved party must prove that he or she had been denounced or charged falsely of an offense; that the defendant knew the charge was false or lacked probable cause; that the defendant acted with malice; and that the aggrieved party suffered damages. The Court stressed that want of probable cause and malice must simultaneously exist; the presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice.
The plaintiffs argued that because the perjury case was ultimately dismissed and the dismissal was affirmed, a case for malicious prosecution already existed. The Court rejected this. It quoted its earlier ruling in the Limanch-o Hotel case:
But the burden in suits for malicious prosecution is being able to prove the complainant's deliberate initiation of a criminal action knowing the charge to be false and groundless.
The Court also quoted the test of probable cause from that same ruling:
The test should be whether sufficient facts exist which show that, in bringing the criminal action, complainant acted without probable cause, defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind that the person charged and prosecuted in a criminal case is probably guilty of the crime or wrongdoing.
Here, the spouses did not conjure the charge out of thin air. Attorney Gayo conducted an ocular inspection before the complaint was filed, and the municipal trial court itself found probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest. The dismissal of the perjury case did not imply a lack of probable cause, because it rested on the outcome of the civil case, not on a finding that the plaintiffs' allegations were true. The plaintiffs therefore failed to prove the second and third elements, want of probable cause and malice.
On the second issue, the Court held that no damages could be awarded, since the action for damages itself failed. It reiterated that the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. Where the action is filed in good faith, no penalty should be imposed.
Doctrine
For a Bar answer, state the rule this way. Malicious prosecution requires four elements: first, the aggrieved party was falsely charged with an offense; second, the defendant knew the charge was false or lacked probable cause; third, the defendant acted with malice; and fourth, the aggrieved party suffered damages. Want of probable cause and malice must concur; if probable cause exists, malice is legally absent. The mere filing of a criminal complaint, especially after a reasonable investigation and where a court found probable cause, does not give rise to liability. Damages under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code require proof that the suit was patently malicious, filed in wanton and gross bad faith, and deliberately knowing the charge was false.
Disposition
The Court denied the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the trial court's judgment dismissing the complaint for damages.
Remember This
Memorize this line: want of probable cause and malice must simultaneously exist, and the presence of probable cause signifies the absence of malice. Examiners use this case to test the elements of malicious prosecution and the rule that the mere act of submitting a case for prosecution does not make one liable, especially where the complainant acted in good faith after an investigation.