G.R. No. L-14347. April 29, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ROMUALDO LOPEZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for having had carnal
knowledge with Estelita Fajardo Vda. de Caballero by means of
intimidation and violence and after accomplishing his illegal purpose
he feloniously stabbed her with a dagger causing her death.
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded, guilty, but in view of the
gravity of the offense charged, the court placed him on the witness
stand so that he may explain the circumstances surrounding its
commission.
He testified that he is 19 years old, single, and a laborer earning
P1.50 a day; that he is living at Hacienda Arabay, Bacolod City, with
his mother, two brothers, one of whom is married, and a sister; that he
has no love affairs with any other woman except the deceased widow who
is 35 years old, and to whom he expressed his love twice but he was
rejected; that one night he met her alone at a cane field, and thinking
that it was an opportunity to abuse her, he dragged her inside the
field and hit her with his fist blows when she wanted to shout, thus
rendering her unconscious; that after committing sexual intercourse
with her while she was unconscious, he became afraid that his act might
be discovered, and so he killed her and buried her with earth and
debris, but in his hurry to leave, he was unable to cover her feet
which were left protruding out.
Based on his testimony and his plea of guilty, the lower court
rendered decision finding him guilty of the crime of rape with murder
and sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of death, to pay the
heirs of the deceased the sum of P5,000.00, and the costs.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by his counsel de oficio
on the ground that the crime committed was not a complex one but two
distinct offenses of rape and murder and that the trial court erred in
imposing the death penalty. The prosecution filed an opposition to the
motion contending that the crime committed is complex because accused’s
act of rendering the deceased unconscious with his fist blows and in
killing her after committing sexual intercourse while unconscious
constitute just one and single continuous act resulting in the grave
felonies of rape and murder and, therefore, the death penalty was
correctly imposed upon the accused.
In its order of September 22, 1958, the court denied the motion for
reconsideration. The case was elevated to this Court for review
considering the nature of the penalty imposed.
Counsel for the accused does not dispute in this instance the
finding made by the trial court that the crime committed is a complex
one which is that of rape with murder for the reason that they arose
out of a single act, but the government is the one that now contends
that what was committed is not the complex crime of rape with murder
but the crimes of rape and murder separately for the reason that upon
the facts as brought out by the testimony of the accused as well as the
recitals contained in the information, the crimes charged are rape
independently of murder. The government avers that the act of the
accused in delivering fist blows to his victim which caused her
unconsciousness is an essential element in the perpetration of his
desire to have carnal knowledge of her. On the Other hand, accused’s
stabbing of his victim which caused her instantaneous death was
generated by his purpose of concealing what he has done upon the woman
he had expressed his love.
With this contention we disagree. We are inclined to sustain the
theory of the provincial fiscal to the effect that the crime committed
is a complex one because the accused’s act of rendering the deceased
unconscious with his fist blows and in killing her after committing
sexual intercourse while unconscious constitute just one and single continuous
act resulting in the commission of the felonies of rape and murder and
so the two cannot be considered as two independent crimes.
But counsel de oficio contends that the trial court erred
in not appreciating in favor of the accused the mitigating
circumstances of lack of instruction and voluntary surrender, in
addition to lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong and the plea
of guilty because the first two circumstances are borne out by the
evidence of record.
The contention is untenable, for it is well settled that lack of
instruction cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstances in the
crime of rape (Molesa vs. Director of Prisons, 59 Phil., 406; U. S. vs.
Gamilla, 39 Phil., 234). With regard to voluntary surrender, the record
is not clear that the accused surrendered to the authorities
immediately after the commission of the act although there is a
certification of the city warden that he was turned over to the
provincial jail two days before the warrant of arrest was issued
against him. If the claim of counsel were true, there is no reason why
the record will not show it, nor is there any statement to that effect
on the part of the provincial fiscal. This doubt cannot be resolved in
favor of the accused considering that he buried the body of his victim
which would not have been discovered if not because her feet were left
protruding out.
But with regard to the circumstance that the accused did not intend
to commit so grave a wrong as the one committed, we believe that an
error has been committed by the trial court, for this runs counter to
what he manifested that after having satisfied his carnal lust and
fearing that his crime might be discovered, he decided to kill his
victim by stabbing her with a dagger.
Counsel also contends that the trial court erred in appreciating the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of respect to sex considering the
nature of the crime charged. To this we agree. Being a sex crime or one
committed against a woman, the trial court erred in considering it as
aggravating circumstance it being inherent in the crime of rape. The
circumstance, however, of nighttime was properly considered by the
trial court for it cannot be disputed that the accused has taken
advantage of the darkness of the night in ravishing his victim and
satisfying his evil design of possessing her. It would be different if
the only crime committed be murder qualified by treachery because in
that case nighttime would be deemed absorbed by this circumstance.
In resume, we find that in the commission of the crime the
accused can only be given the benefit of plea of guilty while on the
other hand it militates against him the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime, and so the imposable penalty is death. However, for lack of
the requisite number of votes, the Court has resolved to impose upon
him merely the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Wherefore, with the modification that the accused be sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua,
with the corresponding accessory penalties of the law, the decision
appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, with costs against
appellant.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Labrador, Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Montemayor, J., concurs in the result.