G.R. Nos. L-48962-63. June 19, 1979
UNITED LUMBER & GENERAL WORKERS OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULGWP), PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE DIRECTOR CARMELO C. NORIEL, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND HIJO PL…
FERNANDO, Actg. C.J.:
The sole issue in this certiorari proceeding, whether or
not foremen could participate in a certification election, arose from an order
of respondent Director Carmelo C. Noriel[1]
of the Bureau of Labor Relations allowing them to do so. The recognition of such a right, so it was
alleged by petitioner union, runs counter to the collective bargaining
provision under the Constitution.[2]
It would be tantamount, in its opinion, to the inclusion of managerial
employees and therefore inconsistent with the protection to labor mandate. The Comment, considered as the Answer,
submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza,[3]
denies the validity of such an assertion as the employees in question
“have no prerogative either to hire or fire subordinates.”[4]
To support its stand, reliance is placed on National
Merchandising Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations.[5]
An excerpt from the opinion of the case, penned by Justice Barrera, was quoted:
“It is to be noted, however, that the power to recommend, in order to
qualify an employee as a supervisor, must not only be effective but the
exercise of such authority should not be merely of a routinary or clerical
nature but should require the use of independent judgement. In the case at bar, it appears in the first
place that, as found by the trial court, there are no clear appointments in
favor of the employees in question including the alleged power to recommend,
and while Alfonso Panganiban, Personnel Manager of the petitioner company,
declared that these employees as section heads could recommend the hiring,
expulsion or dismissal of the workers under their respective shops, the fact
remains that as admitted by him, no such recommendations have ever been made by
them. There is also evidence that other
employees have been appointed, transferred, or discharged and laid-off without
any recommendation of the employees involved in these proceedings. Furthermore, such recommendatory powers are
subject to evaluation, review and final action by the department heads and
other higher executives of the company.
It, therefore, appears that the conclusion of the trial court that the
authority to recommend even if present, is not effective and not an exercise of
independent judgment as required by law, is not incorrect.”[6] A
reply to the comment was submitted by petitioner seeking to distinguish the
National Merchandising decision, although admitting the similarity between a
supervisor as defined in the Industrial Peace Act and a managerial employee as
defined in the present Labor Code. It
sought to support its claim that the order assailed should be set aside by
citing certain provisions of the collective bargaining agreement existing
between petitioner and employer dealing with the functions of foremen.
On the face of the record, petitioner had failed to make out a
case for nullifying the challenged order.
1. It is essential that the integrity of the collective bargaining
process must be maintained. Industrial
democracy requires that the workers, and the workers alone, should choose which
labor organization should be the exclusive bargaining representative in a
certification election conducted according to law. That is of the very essence of industrial
democracy.[7]
There must be no introduction of any alien, not necessarily hostile,
element. It does appear far-fetched to
assert that foremen can no longer be considered as integral units of the labor
force. It is to be admitted that the
powers they exercise are intended to benefit management in the sense of
assuring greater efficiency. It does not
follow, by any means, that in performing the task assigned to them, they have
forfeited their right to be counted on the side of labor and had thereby become
mere minions of management. There may be
instances where such a deplorable situation may exist. It cannot be assumed, though. It must be proved. Such a proof is lacking in this
litigation. It cannot be concluded,
therefore, that the institution of collective bargaining as an instrument of
assuring the protection to labor mandated by the Constitution had thereby become
impaired or weakened by virtue of allowing the foremen to participate in the
certification election ordered by respondent Director Noriel.
2. It must be borne in mind that in thus arriving at such a
conclusion, respondent Director Noriel must have taken into consideration all
relevant factors. It must be assumed
that a labor union would ever be on its guard to avoid management intruding
into a matter which should be the sole and exclusive concern of the
workers. The fear that by allowing
foremen to take part in a certification election, there would be such an
intrusion, is therefore understandable.
It must be assumed, likewise, that respondent Director is equally alert
to such a possibility. The law,
however, does not rely on the degree of possibility, but on the logic of
probabilities. When foremen were
therefore included as voters, the danger of management interference must have
appeared to him as more fanciful than real.
That was his decision. It must be
respected in the absence of a showing of abuse of authority. To repeat, there is lacking such proof. While it was not a determination of fact to
which full credence must be accorded,[8]
the question partaking more of a legal character, respondent Director, as the
enforcement agency of the Labor Code, must be given a wide latitude of
discretion. There was a recognition of
such autonomy where the Court of Industrial Relations was concerned.[9]
The following excerpt from National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority v. NWSA
Consolidated Union[10]
possesses relevance: “The controlling doctrine recognizes the wide
discretion enjoyed by respondent Court in ascertaining what actually did occur
in labor disputes of whatever sort. Its
conclusion once reached is invariably accorded the seal of our acceptance. Its disposition of a case before it usually
elicits assent from us. It could happen,
of course, that we may fail to view matters similarly. We have that power; it must be made use of
when warranted. It does not occur often,
though. That is not merely so as to the
facts found. The acceptance of its legal
conclusion reached is not a rare event either.
This is merely to recognize that on labor matters, its recognized
expertise has well-nigh earned for its decrees the title-deed to recognition,
unless there be a rank failure to observe the constitutional and statutory
limitations which it must observe.”[11]
The discretion vested in respondent Director under the present Labor Code
should not be less in degree.
3. An aspect that should not be ignored in the consideration of
the basic issue raised is the consequence flowing from a holding that foremen
should be classified as managerial employees.
A recent decision, Reyes v. Zamora,[12]
promulgated barely a month ago, is indicative of the untoward effects of such a
holding. In the exhaustive opinion of
Justice Guillermo Santos, it was pointed out that petitioner Reyes “is a
managerial employee, one in whom respondent company has given its complete
trust and confidence.”[13]
As a result: “Loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an
employee, and proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee’s misconduct —
apparently demanded by the Minister of Labor — is not required to dismiss him
on this charge.”[14]
The situation would be different if there were not that degree of
“complete trust and confidence.” Nonetheless, to ban foremen from
participating in a certification election, on the ground that they are
managerial employees, could be a step fraught with peril for the cause of labor
as the highly prized safeguard of security of tenure would be emasculated.
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is
dismissed. This decision is immediately
executory. No costs.
Barredo, (Acting Chairman), Antonio, Santos, and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., in the result.
Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.
[1]
The other respondents are the Hijo Plantation, Inc., Progressive Federation of
Labor, Associated Labor Union, Davao Workers Union and Trade Unions of the
Philippines and Allied Services.
[2]
According to Article II, Section 9 of the Constitution: “The State shall
afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate
the relations between workers and employees.
The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of
work. The State may provide for
compulsory arbitration.”
[3]
He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and Trial
Attorney Felix B. Lerio.
[4]
Comment, 5, and Annex B of Petition.
[5]
117 Phil. 608 (1963).
[6] Ibid,
613.
[7]
Cf. United Employees Union of Gelmart Industries v. Noriel, L-40810,
October 3, 1975, 67 SCRA 267 citing eight decisions starting from PLDT
Employees Union v. PLDT Co. Free Telephone Workers Union, 97 Phil. 424
(1955) to Philippine Communications Workers Federation v. Court of
Industrial Relations, L-34531, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 480.
[8]
Cf. Antipolo Highway Lines v. Inciong, L-38532, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA
441; Jacqueline Industries v. National Labor Relations Commission,
L-37034, Aug. 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 397; Federacion Obrera v. Noriel,
L-41937, July 6, 1976, 72 SCRA 24; Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v.
Noriel, L-45475, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA 414; Monark International, Inc. v.
Noriel, L-47570-71, May 11, 1978, 83 SCRA 114.
[9]
Cf. Security Bank Employees Union NATU v. Security Bank and Trust Co.,
L-28536, April 30, 1968, 23 SCRA 503; Sanchez v. Court of Industrial
Relations, L-26932, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 490.
[10] L-26894-96,
February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 227.
[11] Ibid,
237.
[12]
L-46732, May 5, 1979.
[13] Ibid,
27.
[14] Ibid,
26.