G.R. No. L-21894. February 28, 1967
LOPE DESIATA, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND CALIXTO DUQUE, RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
From a decision of the Court of First Instance of Agusan in a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction, this appeal was taken.
On October 28, 1928,
Calixto Duque filed with
the Bureau of Lands a sales application for a parcel of land in Mabolo, Ampayon, Butuan, Agusan. Said application (SA No. 11116-E-2193)
described the land, then not yet surveyed, by stating identifiable natural
boundaries, and approximated its area at 77 hectares. The Bureau of Lands approved the application
on October 8, 1931.
In 1932 Duque appointed Doroteo Lavadia overseer of the
land. In 1942 Lope Desiata
requested and was allowed by Lavadia to stay in a
portion of the land.
In 1947 Lavadia was replaced as overseer by Amparo L. Santos who asked Desiata
to vacate the land occupied by him since 1942.
In March 1947 Desiata, after payment to
him of P100 for his improvements
thereon, vacated the portion of land occupied by him; but he transferred to
another site containing 14 hectares and asserted a claim over the same.
On April 14 and 21, 1947, a provisional survey of the land
applied for by Duque was conducted by a Public Land
Inspector who found that only 10 hectares were under actual cultivation.
Nevertheless, he recommended that sales patent be issued after final
survey.
On May 15,
1947, Duque filed a formal protest, alleging illegal entry of Desiata on the land applied for by him.
On May 21,
1947, Desiata filed with the Bureau of Lands a homestead
application over the 14-hectare area he has occupied.
Said claims resulted in
the docketing of B.L. Conflict No. 52, entitled “H.A. Unnumbered, Desiata, applicant-contestant vs.
SA No. 11116 (E-2193) Duque, applicant-respondent.”
On September
23, 1947, a survey
was made of the land applied for by Duque. The surveyor, using the same natural
boundaries as aforestated, found the area to be
90.9447 hectares, or 14 hectares more than the 77 hectares stated in the application. Said
excess was the portion occupied
by Desiata.
On May 16, 1949, the District
Land Officer rendered a decision giving due course to the sales application of Duque and dismissing the homestead application of Desiata on the
ground that the latter’s application covered land which is part of the
area included in Duque’s application and that his
occupancy thereof was merely tolerated by Duque.
On July 28, 1949, the
Director of Lands issued an order wherein he sustained the findings of the
District Land Officer, but, in addition, held that Duque
failed to protest the encroachment within six months as required by
paragraph 5, Land Administrative
Order No. 6,
Bureau of Lands, thereby losing his right over the disputed area. Thus a survey was ordered to exclude said
area and to limit the sales
application to 77 hectares. The Director
of Lands furthermore noted that per the ocular inspection, 20 or more hectares were still under
forest while the rest were mostly second growth forest, with about 10 hectares
under cultivation by Manobo tenants numbering three
families.
On December
24, 1949, Duque moved for
a reconsideration of the foregoing order. Acting on said motion, the Director of Lands
on August 23, 1951
suspended his order of July 28, 1949 and remanded the case for further investigation
because the records disclosed
that Duque had timely filed in May 1947 a protest against Desiata’s
alleged encroachment.
On November
28, 1953, the
Director of Lands, after reinvestigation and rehearing, rendered a decision
giving due course to Duque’s application and
dismissing that of Desiata. From this decision, Desiata
on May 31, 1954
appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture.
In his decision of November
15, 1954, the Secretary of
Agriculture (through the Undersecretary) found Desiata’s
assigned errors without merit. But based
on the finding of the Director of Lands that 20 hectares of the land applied
for by Duque were still under forest and that the
rest were under second growth forest, except 10 hectares which were actually
cultivated, he ordered the amendment of Duque’s
petition to exclude the area occupied and applied for by Desiata.
On November 26, 1954
Duque’s counsel received a copy of the Secretary’s
decision. Duque
himself received a copy in January, 1955.
On February 24, 1955, Duque, through
another counsel, filed in the Court of First Instance of Agusan
a suit to annul the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture (Civil Case No.
391).
On May 22, 1959, during the pendency of
Civil Case No. 391, Duque addressed a letter-petition
to the President of the Philippines praying for the setting aside of the
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and the reinstatement of the decision
of the Director of Lands of November 28, 1953, based on the alleged grounds
that there was lack of notice to him of the ocular inspection to determine the
prerequisites of cultivation; that the appeal of Desiata
did not raise cultivation requisite as an issue; and that he was denied due
process.
On March 16, 1959, Desiata moved to
dismiss Duque’s appeal to the President.
On July 19, 1960, a decision was rendered by the Executive
Secretary (for the President) revoking the decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and reaffirming that of the Director of Lands of November 28, 1953
which gave due course to Duque’s application and
dismissed Desiata’s homestead application.
On August 31, 1960, Desiata moved for a reconsideration of the Executive
Secretary’s decision. This was denied on
September 30, 1960.
On November 23, 1960, Desiata filed in
the court a quo the present suit for certiorari, prohibition and
preliminary injunction against the Executive Secretary.
After hearing, the lower court on June 29, 1963 rendered judgment
holding that the Executive Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture
which had already long become final, and that therefore his decision was null
and void.
Respondents appealed to Us to raise
questions of law having to do with the finality or non-finality and the
validity or invalidity of the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture dated
November 15, 1954.
As to the point of finality, Section 12 of Administrative Order
No. 6 (Bureau of Lands) provides:
“Sec. 12. Finality of decisions promulgated by Secretary. – The
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now Natural Resources)
or the Undersecretary of an appealed case shall become final, unless otherwise
specifically stated therein, after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the date
of its receipt by the interested parties.”
Duque’s counsel
received a copy of the questioned decision on November 26, 1954.
Therefore, based on the afore-quoted Section 12 of Administrative Order
No. 6, said decision became final on December
26, 1954. That Duque allegedly received said decision in the
middle of January 1955 is of no moment because it is settled principle in this
jurisdiction that receipt of processes by counsel is receipt by the party
himself.[1]
In fact, counsel’s failure to inform his client of an adverse judgment is not
even a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face;[2]
neither is it necessarily a ground for granting relief against the result of
neglect.[3]
The decision having become final, the Executive Secretary had no
more power to review it when Duque filed his
letter-petition on May 22, 1959. Neither can it be seriously contended that
the President has power to alter Administrative Order No. 6 retroactively by setting it aside to be able to
review a decision already final and to revoke rights already vested
therein.
Appellant Duque, however, argues that
Administrative Order No. 6 itself recognizes certain exceptions wherein
decisions of the Secretary of Agriculture do not become final even after 30 days, particularly citing Section 14
thereof. But this proviso is unavailing
to him because he does not contend that in his case there obtains any of the
recognized exceptions to finality listed thereunder,
to wit: mistake, inadvertence, default or excusable negligence.
Appellant, under the issue of validity, raises the question of
due process in order to impugn the decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture. It is alleged that he did
not receive any notice of the ocular inspection that resulted in the report,
basis of the decision, that he had cultivated only 10 hectares of the land
applied for by him.
Section 30 of Act No. 2874, as amended, which was the law in force when
the application of Duque was approved in 1931,
provides:
“Sec. 30. – Before
any patent is issued, the purchaser must show actual occupancy, cultivation,
and improvement of at least one-fourth of the land applied for until the date
on which final payment is made. (As amended by Sec. 5 of Act No. 3517).”
It is clear that the afore-quoted law required applicant for
sales patent to show actual occupancy and cultivation of at least 1/4 of the
land. Duque
failed to prove that he had complied with this requirement. So even disregarding the adverse report of
the ocular inspector, the absence of evidence upon this point operates against
sales patent applicant Duque. And, besides, the allegation of alleged lack
of notice to Duque is supported by his self-serving
statement merely, which is insufficient to rebut the presumption of regularity
of the official report and action.
Appellant further claims that if at all the notice was sent, the
purpose of the inspection was to determine the exact boundaries of the property
– not to find the extent of his actual cultivation. The reason for the inspection of the land is
obviously to ascertain compliance with all requisites of the law,
including cultivation. This is-the import of Section 25 of Land
Circular No. 16 which provides:
“Sec. 35. Purpose. – The
final investigation is for the purpose of ascertaining whether the applicant
has complied with the requirements of the law and regulations promulgated thereunder, preparatory to the issuance of patent. This is necessary in homestead, sales and
free patent applications.”
The Director of Lands, having determined that the land Duque applied for has an area of 90.9447 hectares, rightly
ordered the exclusion of the excess so as to conform substantially to the
requisite that one-fourth of the land be under actual
cultivation. For as the court a quo aptly said, the rationale of the award is beneficial
use, and since Duque apparently could not cultivate a
larger area, he was properly awarded a lesser one.
Summarizing, therefore, the foregoing, We
find that the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture dated November 15, 1954 had become final
and beyond review by respondent Executive Secretary at the time the same was referred
to him; and that said decision is in accord with law and is not defective for
lack of due process.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with costs against appellant Duque.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Castro, JJ., concur.
[1]
Perez v. Isip, 81 Phil. 218; Chainani
v. Judge Tancinco, 90 Phil. 862; Perez v.
Araneta, G.R. No. L-11788, May 16, 1958; Ballesteros,
et al. v. Caoile, et al., G.R. No. L-16056, May 31, 1961; Cabili v. Badelles, G.R. No.
L-17786, Sept. 29, 1962.
[2]
Duran v. Agarigan, G.R. No.
L-12573, Nov. 29, 1960.
[3]
Vivero v.
Santos, G.R. No. L-8105, Feb.
28, 1956.