MARIANO L. DE LA ROSA, APPLICANT AND APPELLANT, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, THE DIRECTOR OP PUBLIC WORKS AND JOAQUIN PANIMDIM, OPPOSITORS AND APPELLEES.

Mariano L. de la Rosa applied for registration under the Land Registration
Act of six parcels of land situated in the barrio of Caranan, municipality of
Pasacao, Province of Camarines Sur, more particularly described and delimited in
the technical description and plan attached to the application. Later on his
application as to Lot No. 1 was withdrawn because its registration had
previously been decreed in his favor in Land Registration Case No. 295, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 30055. The other lots are Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7. Opposition to the
registration of Lot No. 4 was filed by the Director of Lands and Joaquin
Panimdim, and of Lots Nos. 2, 3, 5 and 7 by the Director of Public Works unless
a public easement of three (3) meters in width along the rivers be recognized by
the applicant. The Director of Public Works prays that the registration of parts
of the lots subject to such easement be denied. Twice the applicant amended his
application, the first on 15 January 1949 to exclude therefrom Lot No. 1
because, as already stated, it had been decreed in the previous registration
case; and second on 8 September 1949 when the applicant prayed that if he should
fail to present sufficient evidence of ownership or title to the lots applied
for, under the provisions of section 37, Act No. 496, he would avail himself of
the statutory provisions of section 38, Com. Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act
No, 107. At the preliminary hearing held on 15 September 1949 the applicant
recognized an easement for navigation covering three (3) meters in width along
the bank of Napalauan River bordering Lots Nos. 2, 4 and 5 and along the bank of
Carangan River bordering Lot No. 7. After hearing the Court, dismissed the
application as to Lot No. 4 on the ground that the same had been previously
determined in another case between the same parties (Land Registration Case No.
295, G.L.R.O. Record No. 30055).

The trial court made the following findings and pronouncements:

The record discloses that the corresponding notice of hearing was published,
posted and served in accordance with law. At the initial hearing held on August
15, 1949, the above-named oppositors thru their respective counsel appeared. The
Provincial Fiscal, in behalf of the Director of Lands, reiterated the latter’s
written opposition which was previously filed on April 12, 1949, while Joaquin
Panimdim and the Director of Public Works filed their formal oppositions on
August 22, 1949, and September 2, 1949, respectively. The written opposition of
the Director of Lands is in substance based on the ground that the lot in
question is a part of the public domain Joaquin Panimdim, as holder of Free
Patent Application No. 30406, raised the defense of res-adjudicata,
alleging that this lot was once the subject-matter of a prior registration
proceeding filed by the same applicant and opposed by the same oppositors, arid
that after due hearing said lot was declared public land by this Court in a
decision which was subsequently confirmed by the Court of Appeals. At the final
hearing the Provincial Fiscal, in behalf of the Director of Lands, joined
Joaquin Panimdim in raising this defense. The Director of Public Works claims an
easement for navigation consisting, of a zone three meters wide along the bank
of the Napalauan River.

The evidence presented by the applicant tends to establish that he acquired
this lot by inheritance from his deceased father, Ignacio de la Rosa, in the
deed of distribution dated January 23, 1924, and marked Exh. B-195. This lot
forms a part of the parcel described under the letters “hh” on page 5 of Exh.
B-195. Ignacio de la Rosa in turn acquired it by purchase from several
individuals, and later on he applied from the then corresponding authorities for
a po ?essory information title (Exh. C-195) wherein this lot is described as
parcel No. 2. Evidence was also presented to prove that except a portion of
about two hectares’ possessed by Joaquin Panimdim, the applicant has been in
possession of this lot since 1924 until the present time; that his father
Ignacio de la Rosa had also possessed it since 1890 until 1924; and that their
combined possession has been public, peaceful, uninterrupted, adverse against
the whole world, and in the concept of owner.

On the other hand, Joaquin Panimdim adduced evidence to prove that the
portion covered by his opposition was applied for by him under Free Patent
Application No. 30406; that the herein applicant filed an opposition against
this free patent application; and that after due hearing the Director of Lands
dismissed the opposition of the applicant and awarded to him (Joaquin Panimdim)
the land covered by his application in a decision dated December 19, 1947, an
official copy of which is Exh. 1-Panimdim. In addition, he presented as part of
his evidence a copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 3772
(Exh. 3-Panimdim), confirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur which declared this lot No. 4 public land. On his part, the
Provincial Fiscal presented in support of the defense of res-adjudicata
the decision of this Court in Land Registration Case No. 295, G.L.R.O. Record
No. 30055 (Exh. 1-Director of Lands) and, the decision of the Court of Appeals
in the aforesaid CA-G. R. No. 3772 (Exh. 2-Director of Lands) confirming the
decision of the Court in the said Land Registration Case No. 295.

There is no dispute that Lot No. 4, jointly with other parcels of land, was
the subject-matter of Land Registration Case. No. 295, in which the herein
applicant was also the applicant, and in which the Director of Lands’ and
Joaquin Panimdim, the oppositors in the instant case, were also the oppositors.
The applicant unhesitatingly admitted this identity of subject-matter and
parties on the witness-stand. It is likewise not disputed that after due hearing
this Court, then presided by Judge Eulalio Garcia, declared Lot No. 4 public
land in its decision dated April 30, 1938 (Exh. 1-Director of Lands). And
lastly, it is undisputed that the applicant in the said case appealed from this
decision to the Court of Appeals, and that this appellate tribunal affirmed the
decision appealed from in a decision promulgated on December 28, 1940 (Exh.
2-Director of Lands).

There is, therefore, a previous question to be decided before passing upon
the evidence of the applicant regarding his alleged ownership and possession.
This question is: Is the defense of res adjudicata interposed by
Joaquin Panimdim and by the Director of Lands well taken?

* * *

Neither the herein applicant, nor any of the oppositors has presented in
evidence a copy of the application for registration of Land Registration No.
295. Happily, the complete record of this case of which this Court can take
judicial notice is still intact in the files of this Court. A perusal thereof
discloses that the applicant, under paragraph 9 of his application, alleged the
following:

“(9) Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case,
I hereby apply for the benefits of Chapter VIII of Act 2874, aa I have been in
possession of the lands since 30 years, applying them to the cultivation of * *
*”

Under this application the applicant presented evidence in support of his,
alleged possession and title. This appears from the aforesaid decision of this
Court (Exh. 1-Director of Lands) in which the following pertinent paragraphs are
found:

‘Al paso que los opositores Fulgencio Minalabag y Joaquin Pannimdim que
reclaman porciones separadas de dicho terreno, situados dentro del Lote No. 4
del referido piano Exhibit ‘A’, y señaladas con las letras (a) y
(b), respectivamente, en el croquis que aparece al respaldo del Exhibit
10-Panimdim-Minalabag, nan probado satisfactoriamente que la porcion
(a) fue anteriormente poseida por Lorenzo Panimdim desde el año 1898 y
la porcion (b) fue adquirida por Minalabag por compra en parte de
Benito Asia y en parte de Petra B. de Tioson (Exhs. 4 y 5-Minalabag), quienes
por si o por medio de sus causantes, la poseyeron desde aproximadamente el
fenecimiento del Gobierno Espanol. Segun las pruebas, ni el solicitante De la
Rosa ni sus supuestos causantes, ni los solicitantes Trivino, han estado jamas
en posesion de los lotes Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 y 7, del piano Exh. ‘A’, no
constituyendo prueba en contrario el haberlos amillarado De la Rosa juntamente
con los Lotes Nos. 1 y 6 del mismo piano, a su nombre, bajo el numero de
impuesto 2987.

“El solicitante De la Rosa, en su informs hace mencion de un documento
marcado como Exhibit ‘D’ que dice ser titulo obtenido de la Junta Provincial de
Composicion de Terrenos, a nombre de su causante, Ignacio de la Rosa,
acreditativo del derecho de propiedad de esta sobre los referidos lotes Nos. 2,
3, 4, 5 y 7, del piano Exhibit ‘A’. El Juzgado ha examinado todos los documentos
exhibidos en esta causa y hace constar que no aparece el supuesto titulo Exhibit
‘D’ “.

Reviewed on appeal, the appellate Court, passing on this point made the
following findings:

“La apelacion interpuesta por el solicitante Mariano de la Rosa en el
expediente No. 3772 de este Tribunal no puede prosperar pot varias razones:

“(a) Contra la pretension del apelante De la Rosa de que los lotes a
que se contrae su apelacion son parte integrante de la segunda parcela descrita
en el Exhibit O’ en su folio l.o vuelto, limita la descripcion del terreno
integrado por la contiguidad de dichos lotes, segun aparece en el piano Exhibit
A. Dicho tereno linda por el Este con el rio Caranan, por el Sur con el golfo de
Ragay y por el Oeste con el rio Napalauan, siendo su limite por el Norte otra
portion del Lote No. 1 de dicho piano. Pero el Exhibit O describe un predio que
linda por el Norte con el de Don Vicente Castillo, por el Este con seno de Ragay
por el Sur con monte del Estado y por el Oeste con propiedad de Simon Miranda.
Basta una confrontation de estas parcelas para llegar a la conclusion de que las
mismas son diferentes.

“(b) Los linderos que aparecen en el piano Exhibit A son naturales y
no se concibe como en los documentos presentados por el solicitante-apelante
tales limites que por su naturaleza son notorioa e inconfundibles no hayan sido
expresamente mencionados;

“(c) Para que una solicitud de registro pudiera ser eonsiderada
favorablemente es necesario que el peticionario identifique la finca y acredite
debidamente su propiedad sobre ella. Este no es el caso en lo que a la parte
afectada por la apelacion se refiere;

“(d) ‘Cuando el padre y causante del apelante, D. Ignacio de la
Rosa, dispuso que sus terrenos fueran medidos el 1.o de junio de 1891, segun
aparece en el piano topografico en tela que obra en autos marcado Exh. P
preparado por el perito practico Juan Casanovas, no incluyo ni hizo que se
incluyera el terreno objeto de apelacion, lo cual indica que el mismo no se
hallaba en posesion de el cuando presento la solicitud para la obtenci6n del
titulo de. composicion con el Estado a que mas arriba se alude;

“(e) No texisten en autos pruebas positivas de posesion por parte
del apelante o de su causante sobre los lotes arriba aludidos, no giendo
bastante para ello la exhibicion del documento Ex. 0.”

It is clear from the above-quoted portions of both decisions that the
applicant adduced in the present case the same nature and kind of evidence that
he presented in the former case. Exhibit “0” mentioned in both decisions
(erroneously marked as Exhibit D in the aforesaid decision of this Court) which
was the basis of the applicant’s alleged title in the former case is Exhibit
C-195 in the present case. ‘It is also apparent that the applicant’s evidence
regarding his alleged possession in the present case is the same evidence that
he adduced in the former case. This matter had, therefore, been already adjudged
in th& former judgment and accordingly as far as the same is concerned,
there is already con- clusiveness of the former judgment.

The first application under Land Registration Case No. 295 having been filed
under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act 2874, now Chapter VII of
Commonwealth Act 141, it is apparent that the defense of res-adjudicata
and conclusiveness of judgment is well-taken. There is identity of parties in
that case and in the present, because the applicant and the principal oppositors
in both cases are the same * * *. There is identity of things, because Lot No. A
which is the subject-matter in Land Registration Case No. 295 is also the
subject-matter in the present application for registration. And there is
identity of questions involved, because the issue in both cases is the same,
namely: (That the land (Lot No. 4) belongs to the public domain. There is,
therefore, a perfect identity of parties, of things and of questions involved;
and as the decision in the first case is now final and conclusive, arid there
having been a trial on the merits in the said case, and there being furthermore
no question as to the jurisdiction of the Court that tried it, the defence of
res-adjudicata is indeed well taken (Aquino vs. Director of
Lands, 39 Phil. 850).

From the quoted parts of the decision under review it appears that the
provincial fiscal joined opponent Joaquin Panimdim’ in pleading or setting up
the defense of res judicata. It is not an error for the trial court to
take judicial notice of its own record (Land Registration Case No. 295, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 30055) because, aside from the fact that the applicant made reference
to it in the first amendment to his application, he mentioned it in his
testimony at the hearing of this case (pp. 8, 11, 16, t.s.n.). The applicant
testifies that the evidence presented by him in the previous application is
“practically the same” as that presented in this case; that he applied for the
benefits of the Public Land Act in a printed form application; that the land
registration court declared Lot No. 4 to be part of the public domain (pp. 17,
18, t.s.n.) ; and that the decision of the trial court (Exhibit 1-Director of
Lands) was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (Exhibit 2-Director of Lands) (pp.
18, 19, t.s.n.).

The appellant advances the proposition, as intimated in the second amendment
to his application dated 8 September 1949, that in the first application (Land
Registration Case No. 295, G.L.R.O. Record No. 30055), he applied only for
confirmation of his imperfect title, meaning his alleged possessory information
title, but in paragraph 9 of the application in the previous land registration
case the applicant invoked the benefits of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, the
Public Land Law then in force, and as the decision of the court discloses, the
applicant presented evidence of his possession of the land and that of his
predecessor-in-interest, the latter’s possession from 1896 to 1924-and the
former’s from 1924 to the date of the application. Notwithstanding that
testimony on possession, the court declared Lot No. 4 as part of the public
domain. In the previous case the applicant made mention of a title to the lands
sought to be registered claimed to have been secured by his late father Ignacio
de la Rosa, his predecessor-in-interest, from the Junta Provincial de
Composition de Terrenos, but the court found that there was no such
document presented. In this connection it should be noted that if the applicant
meant a composition con el Estado title which was issued by the chief of the
province in his capacity as deputy of the Director General de Administration
Civil in accordance with the provisions of the Royal Decree of 31 August
1888, published in the Gaceta de Manila on 1 November 1888, the issuance of such
title has no foundation in law and in fact, because all public lands in the
Philippines (crown lands or baldios y realengos) which were subject to
adjustment with the Government pursuant to the provisions of the rules of 25
June 1880 were divided into two groups: the first, to include all those lands
which were bounded at any other public lands and those which although bounded on
all sides by privately owned lands contained an area in excess of 30 hectares;
and the second, to include all lands containing not more than 30 hectares and
bounded on all sides by privately owned lands.^[1] The adjustment or composition of
public lands under the first group was to continue as provided for in the rules
of 25 June 1880, or with the intervention of the Inspector General de
Montes under the supervision of the Director General de Administration
Civil.^[2] That adjustment of public
lands under the second group was delegated to a provincial board and the
issuance of the title to the applicant after complying with the procedure
outline in the said royal decree and approval thereof, was made by the chief of
the province in his capacity as deputy of the Director General de
Administration Civil.^[3] Going over
the technical description of lots Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the application, we
find that they are adjoining one another and the total area is very much in
excess of 30 hectares.

The parcel of land (Lot No. 4) sought to be registered being the same lot
already declared public land in Land Registration Case No. 295, G. L. R. O. No.
30055 where the herein appellant and the Director of Lands were parties and the
applicant therein failed to establish title secured from the Spanish Government
or possession of the land in accordance with the Public Land Act then in force,
the decision in the former case declaring lot No. 4 as part of the public domain
must be deemed res judicata.

The judgment appealed from being in accordance with law is affirmed, with
costs against the appellant.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and
Labrador, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed.

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^[1] Article 1, Royal Decree of 31
August 1888.

^[2] Article 2, same royal decree.

^[3] Article 10, same royal
decree.