REMEDIOS M. VDA. DE MIRANDA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. URBANO LEGASPI, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

On May 3, 1949, plaintiff filed an action against defendants,
forty-nine (49) in number, seeking to recover from them the possession of two
parcels of land situated in the district of Paco, City of Manila, and the sum of
P1,200 as monthly rental from January 1946, until the land is returned.

On May 21, 1949, defendants filed a motion for bill of
particulars, suspension or dismissal of the complaint. This motion was denied,
the court stating that the complaint contains sufficient allegation that the
defendants are occupying approximately 4,000 square meters of the land described
in the complaint, and that the proceedings of this case cannot be suspended
because Commonwealth Act No. 538, invoked by the defendants, only applies to
cases of ejectment and not to an ordinary action for recovery of possession.

On July 8, 1949, defendants filed their answer wherein they set
up several special defenses which are practically a reiteration of those they
had set up in their motion to dismiss. In addition, they alleged that they are
possessors in good faith in that they took possession of the land with the
knowledge and consent of the plaintiff who allowed them to erect their houses
thereon and fixed the rentals to be paid by them and that they continued
occupying the land unmolested until only recently when a Chinese who had a
lumber yard in the adjoining lot signified his intention to occupy the premises
in question. Defendants also set up a counterclaim for the value of the
improvements they had made on the land which amounted to a total of P56,500.

When the case was called for hearing on August 23, 1949,
plaintiff appeared assisted by her counsel. Neither the defendants, nor their
counsel, appeared, whereupon the court allowed the plaintiff to present her
evidence. On September 9, 1949, the court rendered its decision granting the
relief prayed for in the complaint with the exception of the claim for damages.
The counterclaim of the defendants was dismissed.

On September 14, 1949, defendants filed a motion in which they
prayed that the decision be set aside and a new trial ordered alleging therein
that their failure to appear at the trial was due to inadvertence or mistake of
one Dominador Villafuerte, the stenographer and filing clerk of their counsel, as
fully explained by him in an affidavit which was attached to the motion as
appendix “A”. Defendants likewise alleged that they have a good and valid
defense which they could prove if given a chance as shown in the answer they had
filed in the case. To this motion plaintiff filed an opposition wherein it was
stressed that even if the case be reopened the defenses set up by the defendants
could not have the effect of altering the decision of the court.

On October 6, 1949, the court denied the motion for a new
trial, and on October 11, 1949, the defendants brought the case to the Court of
Appeals. The case was later certified to this Court on the ground that the
appeal involves only questions of law.

In this instance, appellants make the following assignment of
errors:

“I

“The lower court erred in denying defendants’ motion for bill
of particulars or dismissal.

“II

“The lower court erred in denying defendants’ motion for
suspension of the proceedings as provided in Commonwealth Act No. 538.

“III

“The lower court erred and abused its discretion when it
proceeded with the trial of the case ex-parte in the absence of all the 49
defendants and their attorneys thereby depriving them of their substantial
rights to present their respective evidence and to be represented by
attorney.

“IV

“The lower court erred in denying defendants’ motion to set
aside its decision and for new trial on the merits of the
case”.

The first assignment of error is not well taken. This is but a
reiteration of the motion filed in the lower court wherein defendants asked for
a specification of the allegation of the complaint as regards the portion of
land allegedly occupied by them, and the lower court resolved the question
holding that such specification was not necessary because it is already clearly
alleged in the complaint that the defendants were occupying approximately 4,000
square meters of the land in controversy. The complaint alleges that the
defendants occupied a portion of the land without the knowledge and consent of
the plaintiff and such allegation sufficiently apprises the defendants of the
nature of the complaint to enable them to prepare their defense. This is a
substantial compliance with the rule.

With regard to the second assignment of error, defendants
invoke in their favor Commonwealth Act No. 538 which provides for the automatic
suspension of an action for ejectment against tenants occupying lands which the
Government desires to acquire through purchase or expropriation proceedings. But
this Act cannot properly be invoked by the defendants for the reason that it
only applies to an action for ejectment Said Act cannot apply to the present
action which is in the nature of “accion publiciana”, or a plenary action in an
ordinary civil proceeding, different from the summary action of forcible entry
and detainer (II Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 290, 1952 ed.).

With regard to the third assignment of error, we notice that
the appellants based their motion for new trial on section 1(a), of rule 37
which provides that a party may ask for a new trial on the ground of fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against by reason of which such party has probably been impaired in his
rights. They have not predicated their motion on rule 38 which gives to an
aggrieved party the right to obtain relief when for similar reasons he has been
unjustly deprived of a hearing. In any event, we consider immaterial the remedy
pursued by the defendants for in our opinion both remedies have the same
purpose. The important question is whether the reasons advanced to obtain relief
are such that would justify the reopening of the case with a view to giving them
an opportunity to present their evidence. We are of the opinion that those
reasons are valid and justifiable and are enough to warrant a reopening of the
case, specially so when the failure of the defendants to appear took place on
the first day of the case was called for trial. But it should be noted that the
granting or denial of a motion for new trial is, as a general rule,
discretionary with the courts, whose judgment should not be disturbed unless
there is a clear showing abuse of discretion. In the instant case, we find that
the lower court did not abuse its discretion. While it is true “that the failure
of the defendants to appear is due to inadvertence or mistake on the part of an
employee which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against, we should not
lose sight of the fact that the lower court deemed it wise to deny the motion
because it considered futile and unsubstantial the defenses set up by the
defendants which, even if proven, could not have the effect of altering the
nature of the decision. In this respect we agree with the trial court. It should
be noted that the defendants do not claim any title over the land other than
that of mere tenants who claim to have been allowed by the plaintiff to occupy
it at certain rental a month, which defense cannot be seriously taken because
even if true it would not justify their indefinite continuance in the property.
The plaintiff is the owner of the land and as such has the right to reoccupy it
if she so chooses, her only duty being to give to defendants the notice required
by law. With this the plaintiff has complied. The defendants failed to heed her
bidding upon the claim that the Government would expropriate the land. But we
have already said that this pretense is untenable.

Considering the surrounding circumstances, we are of the
opinion that the lower court did not err in denying the motion for new trial
subject of the present appeal.

The order appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as
to costs.

Paras C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, and
Labrador, JJ., concur.