THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DOMINGO ELEFAÑO, JR., ET AL., DEFENDANTS, ALFREDO ELEFAÑO ALIAS “BOBBY”, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal by Alfredo Elefaño from a conviction for the crime of murder
for the death of Adolfo Brandes y Jurado. In the information filed by the
Fiscal, his brother, Domingo
Elefaño, Jr. was included. Both were
convicted, the lower court Judge, now Associate Justice, Pacifico P. de Castro,
finding both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
sentencing each of them to life imprisonment with indemnification to the heirs
of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00 and the additional sum of P6,000.00
by way of moral damages. Only Alfredo
Elefaño appealed from the above decision. A study of the evidence of record reveals that the killing could
be characterized as murder but the participation of appellant Elefaño was that solely of an accomplice. The finding of guilt must
be sustained but the penalty as to him must be reduced.

After setting forth the
information against the brothers Elefaño, the facts were set forth thus in the
appealed decision: “The evidence
for the prosecution shows that about 9:00 o’clock in the
evening of June 1, 1965, while the late Adolfo Brandes and some members of his
family were listening to the radio, a mouth whistle was heard from outside
their house at 11-A Legaspi, Project 4, Quezon City, Respon­ding to the
whistle, Adolfo’s younger brother, Mendel Brandes, peeped from a window and saw
accused Domingo Elefaño near the fence. He went outside and meeting Domingo along the pathway, he asked the
latter what he wanted. Domingo answered
he wanted to talk to Adolfo. Whereupon,
Mendel went back to the house and called for his brother, Adolfo, who then went
to see
Domingo whom he greeted
cordially, asking him when he returned from the province. Domingo invited Adolfo for a walk, and
acceding to the invitation, Adolfo returned to the house to dress up. He then left with Domingo, proceed­ing along
Camerino Street towards Jose Rizal Street. Sensing that they were being followed by Adolfo’s brother, Mendel, who
became apprehensive that something amiss might take place because of a quarrel two weeks ago his brother Adolfo had with Domingo’s brother, Alfredo,
Domingo waited for Mendel. He requested
the latter to buy for him some Philip Morris cigarettes. Mendel obliged and bought the cigarettes
from a nearby store in the opposite direction to where Adolfo and Domingo were
proceeding. Mendel thus had to catch up
with the two whom he overtook along Antonio Luna
St., giving the cigarettes to Domingo. Mendel, however, continued to follow them, staying behind about 15
meters away. The two were walking side
by side, Domingo on the left, with his right hand on the shoulder of
Adolfo. When they were about to turn
from Jose Rizal Street to Magat Salamat Street, where the corner was well
lighted, Domingo, still with his right hand on the shoulder of Adolfo, suddenly
pushed the latter. Almost
simultaneously, Alfredo Elefaño appeared from a corner store and immediately
tapped Adolfo’s shoulder and then held Adolfo’s hands from
behind. At that very instant, Domingo
drew a knife from his waist and thrust it
into Adolfo’s stomach. Even as Adolfo
had already been stabbed, Alfredo pushed him, causing him to fall to the
ground. As the two brothers ran away,
and seeing his brother fall, Mendel ran towards Adolfo who now was writhing in
pain, struggling to get home. With the
help of one Bino and Alano, Mendel brought his brother in a taxi to the Quirino
Memorial Hospital. It was not then
about 10:20 that Adolfo was admitted into the emergency room. He was still conscious, able to talk and answer questions. At the
emergency room, Adolfo told his mother, who was called for by Mendel, that the
person who stabbed him was Domingo with the help of his brother Bobby, the
other accused. Before the victim was
operated on at about 11:30 that same even­ing, Pat. Cesar Bermejo of the Quezon City Police took
his ante mortem statement
(Exh. F) at the emer­gency room herein he named as his assailants the here­in two accused (Exh. F-1). After the operation Adolfo’s condition
worsened, and about 8:30 in the morning of the next day, he gradually
lost consciousness until he finally died in the early hours on June 3,
1965.”^[1]

In the decision of the
court a quo, there was a narration of the defense submitted by both Domingo
Elefaño, Jr. and Alfredo Elefaño. There
is no need, however, for the purpose of this appeal, to pass on the merits of
the claim of self-defense of the former as he did not join in the appeal. What follows is that portion of the decision
dealing with the arrest of Domingo as well as his admission of his responsi­bility
for the killing in a signed statement,^[2]
given of his own free will, and his defense of alibi: “On June 3, 1965, when the case of the death of Adolfo
Brandes was transferred to the Detective
Bureau for investigation, Pat. Dalanon and Pat. Garcia started to
question possible witnesses as to the slaying
and the whereabouts of the suspects, the
herein accused who, they were informed were in hiding. About August, 1965, Pat. Dalanon came
to know that Domingo was in Tacloban, Leyte, for which reason, he went to Leyte
and armed with a warrant of arrest issued by this Court and with the help of
the agents of the NBI in Leyte, he arrested said accused in the house of his
uncle, one Mr. Asardon. After his
arrest, said accused was brought to the Tacloban Police Department where he was
investigated. There he admitted that he
was the actual assailant of Adolfo Brandes. He then gave a statement to that effect (Exh. A), which he voluntarily
signed after reading it. For accused Alfredo Elefaño, the defense is
alibi. The evidence presented in his
behalf shows that in the morning of June 1, 1965, said accused attended a baptismal party where he took much of
intoxicating drinks. When he went home from
the party at about 6:00 in the evening, he found his brother Domingo and
friends drinking in their garden. He
again took about two bottles of beer although he was already feeling dizzy. He then told his wife to prepare supper
after taking which he retired to bed about 8:00. He fell asleep almost immediately to awaken only the next
morning.”^[3] The main reliance of the brief for appellant
is the failure of the prosecution to overcome the consti­tutional presumption
of innocence.^[4] More speci­fically, it was contended that
the defense of alibi was credible and that, on the other hand, the version of
the witnesses of the prosecution was not. Hence the claim that the lower court failed to heed the constitutional
mandate as to the standard that must be satisfied, namely, proof beyond
reasonable doubt before such constitutional presumption can be over­come.

To reiterate what was earlier stated, a careful study of the
records of the case makes clear that the judgment as to the criminal
responsibility of appellant cannot be considered as erroneous, except that it
should be in the concept of an accomplice, thus calling for the reduction of
the penalty imposed.

1.  Reliance on the
presumption of innocence calls to mind People v. Dramayo.^[5]
As was therein pointed out: “Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous
with guilt. It is incumbent on the
prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies.”^[6]
It is specifically required that “the requisite quantum of proof necessary
for conviction be in existence.”^[7] It is thus indispensable that guilt be
established beyond reasonable doubt. Such a doctrine traces its lineage to the 1903 decision of United States
v. Reyes.^[8] Dramayo, since then, has been cited with
approval, in at least eleven cases by 1977, as noted in People v. Montero.^[9] Subsequently, it was again relied upon in
four other cases: People v. Quiazon;^[10] People
v. Nazareno;^[11] People v. Cuison;^[12] and People v. Gabilan.^[13]

2.  To bolster the contention that the consti­tutional presumption of
innocence had not been over come,
the third, fourth, and fifth assignment of errors were devoted to an analysis
of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. Appellant was quite vehement in his attack on the finding of facts that
there was a positive identification of appellant as a participant in the
crime. That was testified to by Mendel
Brandes and Arnulfo Nacional. It was
attempted in the third and fourth assigned errors to impugn their
testimony. In the fifth assigned error,
the lower court was taken to task for allegedly “not considering
the weight and real significance of the first information of Mendel Brandes to
his mother about the alleged stabbing of Adolfo Brandes in the final
determination of the case against herein appellant.”^[14] Such an approach is hardly persuasive. In a number of decisions, this Court has
reiterated the doctrine that as the trial judge had the opportunity to observe
the witnesses testify concerning the events that did take place, the conclusion
arrived at is entitled to full respect, unless, of course, it could be
demonstrated that he failed to
appreciate the significance of a relevant fact or circumstance or, what is
worse, that it was ignored. So it has
been since the opinion of Justice Moreland in United States v. Pico,^[15] a 1910 decision. Since then, this Court has been committed to such a view.^[16] Nor is such well-settled doctrine the only
obstacle to the plea of appellant to be exculpated from the offense. The appraisal of the facts in the appealed
decision is impressed with persuasiveness. It can stand the test of rigorous scrutiny – this notwithstanding the highly-commendable effort of appellant’s counsel^[17] to show that a contrary finding could have
been reached. The third, fourth, and
fifth assignment of errors are thus unavailing.

3.  An even more conclusive
proof why this appeal cannot be attended with success is the existence of an ante
mortem statement.^[18]
As early as 1906, this Court, speaking through Justice Torres, in United States
v. Montes,^[19]
held: “Hearsay testimony is not as
a rule admissible, but in a prosecution for the crime of murder
or homicide the statement of the deceased as to the cause of his death or any
circumstance connected therewith should be taken into consideration if, in the
judgment of the court, the deceased when making such statement was in imminent
danger of death and without hope of living. Such was the critical condition of the deceased, Pascual de la Cruz, in
this case when he made the said statement to his wife. He died almost immediately and it is not
probable that while in such a critical condition he would have made a false
statement or accused the defendant falsely.”^[20]
Moreover, for “a dying declaration [to] be admissible, it is not neces­sary to prove that the declarant
should state that he has given up the
hope of life. It is enough, if from the
circumstances it can be inferred with certainty that such must have been his state of mind.” So it was
expressly set forth in People v. Chan Lin Wat.^[21]
It suffices, moreover, if judging from the nature and extent of the injury
inflicted, the seriousness of his condition is so apparent to the victim that
it may safely be inferred that such declaration was made under the
consciousness of impending death.^[22]
This is merely to affirm anew what was so felicitously set forth by Justice
Street in United States v. Virrey,^[23]
a 1918 decision: “The
admissibility of the declaration, as is
thus apparent, depends on the state of the declarant’s mind at the time of
making the declaration; and the mere fact that death does not immediately
follow will not render the declaration inadmissible, provided death does ensue
as a result of the injuries which are the subject of the declaration.”^[24]
Here the deceased died two days after the stabbing incident, although he lost
consciousness the next morning. The
liberality of this Court in attaching the highest probative value to
declarations made at a time when the realization that one is about to meet his
Maker is made evident in a host of decisions.^[25]
It is equally obvious that the first
two assigned errors are devoid of merit.

4.  The defense is that of alibi. Appellant “testified that he was at home at 75 Magat Salamat, Project
4, Quezon City during the night of June 1, 1965. He went to bed early before 8:00 in the evening with his wife and
slept together until the next morning. He did not go out of the
house that night of June 1, 1965. He explained his going to bed early that
night by declaring that during the day he attended a party of a friend and he returned
home at about 6:00 in the afternoon, a little bit drunk and dizzy. And on arriving home, he found his brother
Domingo and his friends drinking. He
joined the group and drank with them. After a while he asked his wife to prepare supper and the two of them to
eat together. It did not take long when
he and his wife went to bed.”^[26] There was also the testimony of his wife^[27] and
his mother^[28] to corroborate his claim that he had no participation in the crime. Appellant’s brief then made this observation: “The lower court did not give credi­bility to the testimony
of appellant’s witnesses simply because they are relatives by blood relation
who will go to any extent just to save a loved one. But we respectfully ask: Who else but the immediate relatives who stay with appellant in their
house could have testified to his being in the home that night of June 1,
1965?”^[29] This excerpt from People v. Imbo,^[30] appears to be made to order: “Even discounting the bias of such
witnesses, it cannot be said that the defense was entitled to belief. For such an allegation to commend acceptance
the standard of full, clear, and satisfactory evidence must be met. There must be a showing that the accused was
at such a distance away that it would not be possible for him to have been at
the scene of the crime. Moreover,
appellant was positively identified as the perpetrator of the crime. What other conclusion can there be then than
that the defense put up by appellant must be rejected?”^[31] The answer is quite obvious for there is
positive identification from two witnesses, Mendel Brendes and Arnulfo
Nacional. Once again, this observation
from People v. Cudalina,^[32] cited in Imbo, appears to be apropos: “It
suffices to state that this Court when confronted with the defense of alibi * *
* has invariably found it unconvincing and unsatisfactory.”^[33] The defense of alibi, therefore, must fail. That is to dispose of the
remaining alleged errors imputed to the lower court.

5.  There is thus no justification for reversing the appealed decision. A modification though is indicated. The brief for the People of the Philippines
explains why: “Notwithstanding all
the foregoing, however, we are of the belief that appellant’s participation in
the stabbing incident in question was merely that of an accomplice and not as a co­-principal. ‘An accomplice
does not enter into a conspiracy with the principal by direct
participation. He does not have
previous agreement or understanding with the principal to commit a crime. But he participates to a certain point in
the common criminal design’ (People v. Aplegido, et al., 76 Phil. 571). This conclusion of ours is based on his
dearth of clear and positive evidence which could have established conspiracy
between appellant and his brother Domingo Elefaño, Jr. (the knife-wielder) to
kill the deceased Adolfo Brandes, evidence showing beyond pale of doubt that
the said brothers had previously agreed or plotted to commit said crime. The version of the prosecution on the
incident is concisely summarized by the lower court in its decision as
follows: ‘The two were walking side by
side, Domingo on the left, with his right hand on the shoulder of
Adolfo. When they were about to turn
from Jose Rizal Street to Magat Salamat Street, where the corner was well lighted,
Domingo still with his right hand on the shoulder of Adolfo, suddenly pushed
the latter. Almost simultaneously,
Alfredo Elefaño appeared from a corner store and immediately tapped Adolfo’s
shoulder and then held Adolfo’s hands from behind. At that very instant, Domingo drew a knife from his waist and
thrust it into Adolfo’s stomach. Even
as Adolfo had already been stabbed, Alfredo pushed him, causing him to fall to
the ground.’ (pp. 61-62, appellant’s brief) True that the above shows a concert
of action between appellant and the knife-wielder, his brother Domingo Elefaño,
Jr., during the assault on the deceased. But the rule is now settled ‘that neither joint nor simul­taneous action
is per se sufficient indicium of conspiracy, unless proved to
have been motivated by a common design’ (People v. Vicente, et al., G.R. No.
L-26241, May 21, 1969, 28 SCRA 247, 257; People v. Ibañez, 77 Phil. 664). And independent of the simultaneousness of
action between appellant and his brother Domingo, there appears to be no proof
that appellant’s act of holding the hands of the victim was motivated by the
very same criminal design entertained by the knife-wielder Domingo.”^[34] This is another case then where the
following excerpt from the ponencia of Justice Street, in the leading
case of People v. Tamayo,^[35] referring to Viada, finds
application: “Now although, as thus demonstrated, participation on the part of an accomplice in the
criminal design of the principal is essential to the same extent as such
participation is necessary on the part of one charged as co-principal,
nevertheless, it is evident, – and the cases above cited abundantly prove –
that, as against an accomplice, a court will sometimes draw the inference of
guilty participation in the criminal design from acts of concert in the
consummation of the criminal act and from the form and manner in which
assistance is rendered, where it would not draw the same inference for the
purpose of holding the same accused in the character of principal. This is because, in case of doubt, the courts naturally lean to the milder form of
responsibility.”^[36]
The above doctrine that the judiciary should lean towards the milder form of
responsibility was followed in People v. Tolentino^[37]
and People v. Torejas.^[38]
The recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor General merits approval.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is modified insofar
as appellant Alfredo Elefaño is concerned. As recommended by the Solicitor General, the
penalty imposed on him should be reduced to an indeterminate penalty, the
minimum term of which should be 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional
to 10 years of prision mayor and the
maximum should be within 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal. The civil liability imposed on him is like­wise reduced from P12,000.00 to
P6,000.00 and the moral damages to be paid by him reduced to P3,000.00.

Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Makasiar, J., see dissent.

^[1]
Decision of the lower court, Appendix to Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, 60-62.

^[2]
Exhibit A.

^[3]
Ibid.

^[4]
According to Section 19, Article IV of
the Constitution: “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
* * *.”

^[5]
L-21325, October 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 59.

^[6]
Ibid, 64.

^[7]
Ibid.

^[8]
31 Phil. 3 (1903). Cf. United States v. Lasada, 18 Phil. 90
(1910).

^[9]
L-33155, April 22, 1977, 76 SCRA 513.

^[10]
L-44299, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 513.

^[11]
L-45533, November 29, 1977, 80 SCRA
484.

^[12]
G.R. No. 51313, July 25, 1981, 106 SCRA
98.

^[13]
L-45245, July 2, 1982, 115 SCRA 1.

^[14]
Fifth Assignment of Error, Brief for
the Defendant-Appellant, 21.

^[15]
15 Phil. 549.

^[16]
Some of the recent cases follow: People v. Angcap, L-28748, Feb. 29, 1972,
43 SCRA 437; People v. Caran­dang, L-31012, Aug. 15, 1973, 52 SCRA 259;
People v. Cudalina, L­34969, April 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 499; People v.
Ordonio, L-33829, Dec. 19, 1975, 68 SCRA 397; People v. Sarile, L-37184,
June 30, 1976, 71 SCRA 593; People v. Velasco, L-31922, Oct. 29, 1976, 73 SCRA 574; People v. Villamala, L-41312, July 29, 1977, 78
SCRA 145; People v. Rapada, L-31243, Oct. 28, 1977, 80 SCRA 63; People v.
Gorgoles, L-40885, May 18, 1978, 83 SCRA 282; People v. Conchada,
L-39367-69, Feb. 29, 1979, 88 SCRA 638, People v. Tigulo, L-34334, Nov. 7, 1979, 94 SCRA 183; People v.
Sarmiento, L-46833, Dec. 28, 1979, 94 SCRA 944; People v. Baltazar, L-30557, Mar. 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 556;
People v. Soriano, L-46297, June 19, 1980, 98 SCRA 69.

^[17]
Attorney Jose G. Recaido.

^[18]
Exhibit F.

^[19]
6 Phil. 443.

^[20]
Ibid, 446. Cf. U.S. v. De la Cruz, 12 Phil. 87 (1908); U.S. v.
Castellon, 12 Phil. 160 (1908); U.S. v. Gil, 13 Phil. 530 (1909); U.S. v.
Javellana, 14 Phil. 186 (1909); U.S. v. Jakan Tucko, 20 Phil. 235
(1911); U.S. v. Mallari, 29 Phil. 14 (1914); U.S. v. Virrey, 37
Phil. 618 (1918); U.S. v. Singson, 41 Phil. 53 (1920); People v.
Dizon, 44 Phil. 267 (19.2); People v. Abellera, 47 Phil. 731 (1925);
People v. Pereja, 47 Phil. 525 (1925); People v. Gallos,
47 Phil. 994 (1925); People v. Almendralejo, 48 Phil. 268 (1925).

^[21]
50 Phil. 182, 191 (1927).

^[22]
Cf. People v. De Gracia,
L-21419, September 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 197 and People v. Brioso, L-28382,
January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 336.

^[23]
37 Phil. 618.

^[24]
Ibid, 625.

^[25]
Cf. People v. Salahuddin, 51
Phil. 840 (1928); People v. Babiera, 52 Phil. 97 (1928); People v. Reyes, 52 Phil. 538
(1928); People v. Silang Cruz, 53 Phil. 635 (1928); People v.
Ancasan, 53 Phil. 779 (1928); People v. Abedosa, 53 Phil. 788 (1928);
People v. Lara, 54 Phil. 96 (1929); People v. Ortiz, 55 Phil.
993 (1931); People v. Alviar,
56 Phil. 98 (1931); People v.
Serrano, 58 Phil. 669 (1933); People v. Siojo, 61 Phil. 305 (1935); People v. Diokno, 63 Phil. 601 (1936); People v.
Mabasa, 65 Phil. 568 (1938); People v. Makandili, 70 Phil. 199 (1940);
Cruz v. People, 71 Phil. 259 (1941); People v. Tacod, 72 Phil. 157
(1941).

^[26]
Brief for the Defendant-Appellant,
43-44.

^[27]
Ibid, 44-48.

^[28]
Ibid, 48-49.

^[29]
Ibid, 49.

^[30]
L-36759, August 31, 1982, 116 SCRA 355.

^[31]
Ibid, 360-361.

^[32]
L-34969, April 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 499.

^[33]
Ibid, 507. After Cudalina, reference may be made to People v. Cawili,
L-30543, July 15, 1975, 65 SCRA 24; People v. Villamala, L-41312, July 29, 1977, 78 SCRA 145; People
v. Yutila, L-32791, January 27, 1981, 102 SCRA 265; People v. Arias, L-40531, January 27,
1981, 102 SCRA 303; People v. Terrobias, L-48944, February 26, 1981, 103
SCRA 321; People v. Boado, L-44725, March 31, 1981, 103 SCRA 607.

^[34]
Brief for the Appellee, 12-14.

^[35]
44 Phil. 38 (1922).

^[36]
Ibid, 54.

^[37]
L-29419, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 514.

^[38]
L-29935, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 158.
Cf. People v. Custodio, L-30463, October 30, 1972, 47 SCRA 289; People v.
Nierra, L-32624, February 12, 1980, 96 SCRA 1; People v. Realon,
L-30832, August 29, 1980, 99 SCRA 422; People v. Doble, L-30028, 11 SCRA
131.

175

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