VERONICA RUPERTO, PETITIONER, VS. CEFERINO FERNANDO AND LUCIO M. TIANCO, JUDGE OF MUNICIPAL COURT OF RIZAL CITY, RESPONDENTS.

From the record before us, it appears that a complaint of
ejectment was filed by Ceferino Fernando, one of the respondents in this case,
against Veronica Ruperto, petitioner, with the municipal court of Rizal city, in
which the following, among others, is alleged:

“2. That the plaintiff is the exclusive and lawful lessee of a
store space at the Libertad Public Market, Rizal City, by virtue of a lease
contract executed and entered into by and between Rufino F. Mateo, Mayor, Rizal
City, and Ceferino Fernando, as lessor and lessee respectively, under date of
March 6, 1948, as per copy of the lease contract hereto attached as Exhibit A
and forming part of his complaint;”

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground (1) that
the court has no jurisdiction over the case because it is not capable of
pecuniary estimation, and (2) that the complaint does not state a cause of
action.

An opposition to motion to dismiss was filed by the plaintiff
in which the latter states the following:

“The question at issue is clear: Who is legally entitled to the
possession of the space in the Libertad Public Market? In other words: Who has a
better leasehold right? The plaintiff or the defendant? The answer is
inescapable, the plaintiff has a better leasehold right. The defendant claims
she has a better leasehold right based upon a contract exeuted by and between
the city mayor and the plaintiff. The city treasurer’s permit was issued not in
accordance with the prescribed rules, regulations and practice of the city in
awardingmarket stalls. It is the practice of the city to lease store space by
the treasurer. The court has jurisdiction, therefor. The jurisdiction of the
court in an action of forcible entry and detainer is not lost even if the
question of ownership or title is raised in the answer of the defendant as held
in the case of Mediran vs. Villanueva, 37 Phil., 752. The fundamental issue, to
repeat, in the instant case is that the justice of the peace court has
jurisdiction to adjudicate the right of possession, and the defendant in an
action before the justice of the peace to recover possession cannot deprive the
court of such jurisdiction by merely claiming ownership or title to the property
(Mediran vs. Villanueva, 37 Phil., 752).”

The municipal court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of
merit on the ground that the defendant bases his contention that the court has
no jurisdiction over the case on facts not alleged in the complaint, and hence
the filing of the present civil action of certiorari, which may properly be
considered as of prohibition, because the principal remedy sought is to prevent
the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case for lack of
jurisdiction.

The respondent to judge is not correct in holding that, in a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the defendant cannot
“base his arguments on question of facts not touched in the complaint and which
partakes the nature of special defenses, to be proved by presentation of
evidence.” A motion to dismiss under Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, is not like a
demurrer provided for in the old Code of Civil Procedure that must be based only
on the facts alleged in the complaint. Except where the ground is that the
compalint does state no cause of action which must be based only on the
allegations in the complaint, a motion to dismiss may be based on facts not
alleged and may even deny those alleged in the complaint; and that is the reason
why it is set for hearing for the presentation of evidence in support of and
against the contention of the defendant.

In the present case, although no evidence was adduced in
support of the contention of the defendant, the complaint and the opposition to
the motion to dismiss clearly show that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of the action of the plaintiff, because it is neither an action
of forcible entry nor of illegal detainer, but an action for the recognition of
the plaintiff’s preferred right to the use and occupancy of the stall in
question in the Libertad Public Market against the claim of the defendant, and
therefore not capable of pecuniary estimation. In the case of Torres vs. Ocampo
(80 Phil., 36), this Court held the following that is squarely applicable to the
present case for the determination of the nature of plaintiff’s action.

“The action of the plaintiff against the defendant is not an
action of forcible entry, for the simple reason that it is not an action
instituted by a person who was in possession of a land or building against a
person who has deprived him of the possession thereof by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth, within one year from such unlawful deprivation.
Assuming, without deciding, for the purpose of this decision that a market stall
is a building or land within the meaning of Rule 72, Rules of Court; whatever
right the plaintiff may have to occupy the market stall in question, originated
upon the alleged award to plaintiff by the City Health Officer of Manila. And
not having entered into possession under that award or lease of the market stall
in dispute, plaintiff had acquired no right in the leased property in the nature
of a right in rem, which third persons were bound to respect or not to
infringe.

“The action brought by the plaintiff against the defendant was
not an action of illegal detainer, because according to section 1, Rule 72 this
action is for the recovery of possession of nay land or building, instituted
within one year from date of illegal possession, by a person against whom the
possession of any land or building is being unlawfully withheld by another after
the right of the latter to hold possession by virute of any contract, express
or implied, with the plaintiff has expired or terminated. In the present
case, there was no contract whatsoever, express or implied, between plaintiff
and defendant for the possession of the market stall, and hence no expiration or
termination of the latter’s right to hold possession thereof under
contract.”

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the municipal
court of Rizal City has no jurisdiction over the case, and the respondent judge
is therefore ordered to desist and refrain from further proceeding in the
present case, with costs against the respondent Ceferino Fernando. So
ordered.

Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, and Reyes,
JJ., concur.

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DISSENTING

PERFECTO, J.:

We are opinion that the grounds upon which the majority have
decided to reverse the action of the municipal court of Rizal City are too
technical for purposes of substantial justice.

The complaint filed by Ceferino Fernando has raised a case of
illegal detainer and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of inferior court where
it was instituted.

The purpose of the summary proceedings outlined by the rules in
cases of illegal detainer is for expeditious settlement of controversial
possession, as such controversies may give occasion to disturbance to peace and
order. The purpose is to nip int he bud a dispute which may lead to more serious
conflicts and consequences. That purpose is defeated by the majority
decision.

We vote to deny the petition.