G.R. No. L-14500. May 25, 1960
QUIRINA PACHOCO, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. AGRIPINA TUMANGDAY AND HIGINO A. FERNANDO, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF PATNONGON, ANTIQUE, RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.
BENGZON, J.:
It appears that: on March 31, 1958, in the justice of the peace court
of Patnongon, same province, Quirina Pachoco, pleaded guilty to a
criminal charge of slight physical injuries she had inflicted on
Agripina Tumangday, and was accordingly required to pay a fine plus the
costs; she interposed no appeal; then on May 5, 1958, Agripina
Tumangday filed a civil action in the same justice of the peace court,
to recover damages from Quirina Pachoco for the identical physical
injuries that had given ground to the criminal case; the defendant
Pachoco promptly filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata,
pointing to the decision in the criminal proceeding wherein Tumangday
had not reserved her right to file a civil action; the justice of the
peace denied the motion; thereafter Pachoco filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, in the Antique court of first instance, to
stop the civil action on the principle of res judicata; the court, after hearing, dismissed the petition, explaining that as petitioner had an adequate remedy—i.e.,
to appeal if, she should be required in the civil case to pay
damages—the special civil action could not be validly sustained.
From such dismissal Quirina Pachoco appealed to this Court.
We find no merit in this appeal. The Honorable Juan de Borja, Judge,
correctly ruled that the special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition may be maintained only where petitioner had no adequate
remedy by appeal.[1] In this case, Pachoco could appeal any judgment for damages which may be rendered against her.
It is true that in some cases, this Court granted certiorari and
prohibition even if petitioner had the remedy of appealing after entry
of judgment by the respondent judge; but those were instances, wherein
the broader interests of justice or public policy required an
exception, or wherein the petitioners contention appeared to be clearly
tenable. Here the appellant’s position resting on sec. 1 of Rule 107,
and cases applying it, does not seem to agree with Article 33 of the
New Civil Code and subsequent adjudications:
“Art.
33.—In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.”“The independent civil
action for damages arising from physical injuries under Art. 33 may be
brought by the injured party even if he had not reserved the right to
file the same in the criminal case for the same injuries. (Ortaliz vs.
Echarri, 101 Phil., 947.) As a matter of fact, two different courts may
at the same time try the same accident, one from the criminal
standpoint, the other from the standpoint of Art. 33. The result of the
criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be, in such a
case, entirely irrelevant to the civil action. (Dionisio and Almodovar vs. Judge Alvendia, et al., 102 Phil., 443; 55 Off. Gaz., [25] 4633). See also (Bisaya Land Trans. Co. vs.
Mejia, et al., 99 Phil., 50; 52 Off. Gaz., [9] 4241), [Paras, Civil
Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, pages 114-115] See also Reyes vs. De la Rosa, 99 Phil., 1013; 52 Off. Gaz., [15] 6548.
In Roa vs.
De la Cruz, 103 Phil., 116, we declared that when the offended party
intervened in the prosecution of a criminal case by appearing therein
through a private prosecutor, he will be deemed to have waived the
civil action if he failed to make reservation therefor. In this case,
however, the record shows no appearance for Tumangday in the criminal
proceeding.
The dismissal is affirmed, on the ground specified by the Court a quo. Costs against appellant.
Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Endencia, J., did not take part.
[1] See case cited in Moran, Rules of Court (1957 Ed.) Vol. II p. 159.