PILAR LAZARO VDA. DE JACINTO, ET AL., PETITIONERS VS. SALUD DEL ROSARIO VDA. DE JACINTO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. VDA. DE JACINTO, ET AL. VS. VDA. DE JACINTO, ET AL. RESPONDENTS

The present action filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
by Pilar Lazaro Vda. de Jacinto and her son Melchor Jacinto, Jr.,
against Salud del Rosario Vda. de Jacinto and her children, is for the
reconveyance to them of a parcel of land located in barrio Sto.
Rosario, Paombong, Bulacan, with an area of 5,94574 hectares, covered
originally by OCT. No. 12515 and at present by TCT No. 5380 issued by
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan in the name of now deceased Pedro
Jacinto.

Their complaint alleged, in substance, that the land subject mater
thereof was a portion of a bigger parcel allotted to their predecessor
in interest, Melchor Jacinto, Sr., when the estate of the deceased
spouses Andres Jacinto and Maria C. Santos was partitioned, and that
Melchor’s surviving brother, Pedro, predecessor in interest of the
defendants, had succeeded in registering it in his name through fraud
and with breach of trust, to their prejudice.

The defendants denied the allegations of the complaint and further
alleged that their predecessor in interest had acquired ownership of
the property in litigation by virtue of the provisions of Act 496
and/or by prescription.

After due trial the action was dismissed. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, however, the latter reversed the decision and rendered
judgment as follows:

“In view of all the foregoing, we find that the
errors assigned are well taken. The decision appealed from, not being
in conformity with the evidence and the law on the matter, should be,
as it is hereby reversed and another entered declaring the
plaintiffs-appellants owners of the land described in their complaint
and designated as Lot No. 5, plan S. W. C. No. 11075 under TCT No.
5830, of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, and ordering the
defendants-appellees, upon finality of this decision, to reconvey the
same to said plaintiffs-appellants. We find that appellants’ claim for
damages was abandoned by them in their appeal, and that appellees’
counterclaim, is unmeritorious. Costs is taxed against the
defendants-appellees, proportionately.”

From the above decision both parties appealed by certiorari. The
appeal of Pilar Lazaro and her son is now G. R. No. L-17955, and that
of Salud del Rosario and children is G. R. No. L-17957.

There is no dispute—and the Court of Appeals so found—that the land
in question originally belonged to the now deceased spouses Andres
Jacinto and Maria C. Santos, both of whom died intestate survived by
their children named Melchor, Sr. (husband of Pilar Lazaro and father
of Melchor, Jr.) and Pedro (husband of Salud del Rosario and father of
her coparties). Melchor, Sr. also died intestate before the estate of
his parents could be partitioned. After the estate was partitioned
(Exh. A), their surviving son, Pedro, besides receiving his share,
continued administering the properties which corresponded to the heirs
of his deceased brother. Amongst them was a riceland located in barrio
Sto. Rosario, Paombong, with an area of 11 hectares, 34 areas and 3
centiares. Pedro Jacinto himself, according to Exhibit A, received as
part of his share a riceland in the same barrio, but with an area of 3 hectares, 57 area and 69 centiares only.

In the year 1926 Pedro Jacinto delivered to the widow of his
deceased brother the properties that corresponded to the latter. This
delivery according to the Court of Appeals, was made only “in paper”
because Pedro did not make an actual delivery of the properties but
limited himself to telling his sister-in-law that there were “kasamas”
working for her. One year thereafter, although the properties composing
the estate of his deceased parents had already been surveyed since June
10, 1913, as shown by Exhibit B, Pedro caused them to be resurveyed,
this resulting in the drawing of Exhibit C. The practical result of the
resurvey—as found by the Court of Appeals— was that a portion of lot 2
described in Exhibit B which was subsequently one of the properties
alloted to the heirs of Melchor, was segregated therefrom and was
designated as lot 5 in Exh. C. After the resurvey, Pedro applied to
register, and succeeded in having lot 5 and other properties registered
in his name, for which reason ACT No. 12515 was issued covering three
lots numbered 2, 4 and 5. Lot 2 was subsequently sold, so the original
certificate of title was cancelled and TCT No. 5830 was issued.

From all the evidence of record the Court of Appeals found that
Pilar Lazaro and her son “were always of the belief, until the latter
part of 1953, that he (Pedro) delivered to them all that which were
rightfully theirs”; that they discovered the shortage only when
Pilar—less than one year before the action was filed—decided to sell
the parcel of more than 11 hectares that she was supposed to have
received from her brother-in-law; that it was only then that she
realized for the first time that the parcel delivered to her had only
an area of 5,8820 hectares. The Court further found that the land in
question was not the same parcel alloted to Pedro Jacinto, and located
in the same barrio, which had an area of a little over three hectares
only.

On the basis of the facts stated above—which are now final and
beyond review—the Court of Appeals made the following considerations:

“It is not also controverted that upon a survey of
the property (item No. 1 of Exhibit “A”, which should have an area of
11.3403 hectares), when appellant Pilar Lazaro Vda. de Jacinto decided
to sell four (4) hectares of the supposed 11.3403 hecetares, there was
lacking 54,574 square meters therefrom which incidentally corresponded
exactly to Lot No. 5, item No. 2 TCT No. 5830, m the name of Pedro
Jacinto. Appellees claim, however, that the supposed 11.3403 hecetares
appearing in Exhibit “A”, could have been short of 54,574 square meters
and that the 3.5769 hectares appearing in the receipt Exhibit “I”, item
No. 3 thereof, could have been really 5.4574 hectares, which is not the
lot in question. The striking coincidence in the area disputed and that
registered in the name of appellees’ predecessor-in-interest, more than
catches the eye. Under the partition, the appellants were to receive a»
one of the properties, 11.3403 hectares of riceland. This being the
case, there are no reasons discernible in the records why, after an
actual survey of the said property, 54,574 meters should be lacking
therefrom. It could not be said that the area was just a product of a
calculation. When Exhibit “A” was executed, the boundaries were plainly
indicated thereon. As a mater of fact, Exhibit “A” designated the
number of hectares, area and centiares, which is indicative of the
preciseness of the area to be delivered to the respective heirs. The
fact that the lucking measurement fits exactly with Lot No. 5 of Pedro
Jacinto under TCT No. 5830, warrants the conclusion that Pedro Jacinto
had deprived the appellants herein of their just share. * * *”

“There
are sufficient proofs to show that fraud was practiced by Pedro Jacinto
against the appellants herein. When Pedro supposedly delivered the
property, he did it only in paper, without bringing plaintiff Pilar
Lazaro to the premises, although he told her that there were “kasamas”
working for her. On December 15, 1927, Pedro Jacinto caused that the
properties be resurveved, which resulted in the drawing of Exhibit “C”,
which in effect amended Exhibit “B”. Part of Lot 2 was segregated and
had been designated as Lot 5 in Exhibit “C”. And this Lot 5 has an area
exactly equal to the area which was found lacking in the 11.3403
hectares belonging to the plaintiff-appellants.” (pp. 6-7 & 8,
decision).

As a result of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals held that Pedro
Jacinto must be deemed to have registered the land in question as a
trustee for and in behalf of the widow and son of his deceased brother.
The pertinent portion of its decision reads as follows:

“Implied trusts have been said to be those which are
raised by legal implication from the facts and circumstances of the
case, to effect the presumed intention of the parties or to satisfy
demands of justice or to protect against fraud (65 C.J. 222), or those
enforced by equity because morality, justice, conscience, and fair
dealing demand that the relation be established (supra). The new Civil
Code provides that, ‘If property is acquired through mistake or fraud,
the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes’ (Art. 1456). That there was fraud on the part of Pedro Jacinto
in registering the property in his name to the prejudice of the
appellants is revealed by the records. It will be seen that on Exhibit
“C”, the amended survey of the properties which Pedro Jacinto and
Melchor Jacinto, Sr. inherited from their parents, changes were made.
This resurvey was done at the instance of Pedro Jacinto, in spite of
the fact that on June 10, 1913, the same properties were already
surveyed, divided and delineated (Exhibit “B”). The boundaries of Lot 5
as appearing in Exhibit “G” (the amended plan) are the same as those
appearing in Exhibit “B” minus the designation as Lot 5 and its
segregation from the greater mass of Lot 2. In Exhibit “E” or “I”, a
receipt of the properties inherited by Pedro Jacinto from his father
Andres, no property coincide in boundaries with the properties given to
Pedro. Under the above set of facts, it is quite evident that the
property in question rightfully belonged to the plaintiffs and that an
implied trust was created between the plaintiffs and the appellees’
father Pedro Jacinto.” (pp. 9-10, decision)

The heirs of Pedro Jacinto now contend that the Court of Appeals
erred in applying to, this case the law of implied or constructive
trusts, and, in holding that, under the facts of the case, the right of
the heirs of Melchor Jacinto to recover the property in question is
imprescriptible. We find these contentions to be without merit.

The following findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals cannot
now be questioned: (1) after the partition of the estate of the
deceased spouses Andres Jacinto and Maria C. Santos, Pedro Jacinto,
their surviving son, continued administering the properties alloted to
the heirs of his deceased brother; (2) when he delivered the share of
the latter, he withheld delivery of the parcel in question, although it
formed part of the parcel of more than 11 hectares alloted, among
others, to his aforesaid coheirs; (3) one year thereafter he caused the
portion withheld from his cohiers to be registered in his name; (4) the
widow and son of his deceased brother did not know that the parcel of
land delivered to them by their coheir was short of 5 hectares, 45 ares
and 74 centiares, and said parties “were always of the belief, until
the latter part of 1953, that he (Pedro) delivered to them all that
which were rightfully theirs”. In view of these facts, it would be
against reason and good conscience not to hold that Pedro Jacinto
committed a breach of trust which enabled him to secure registration of
the land in question to the prejudice of his coheirs. Therefore, in an
action like the present, he may be ordered to make reconveyance of the
property to the persons rightfully entitled to it. In fact, it has been
held that even in the absence of fraud in obtaining registration, or
even after the lapse of one year after the issuance of a decree of
registration, a co-owner of land who applied for and secured its
adjudication and registration in his name knowing that it had not been
allotted to him in the partition, may be compelled to convey the same
to whoever received it in the apportionment, so long as no innocent
third party had acquired rights therein in the meantime for a valuable
consideration (Palet vs. Tejedor, 55 Phil. 790-798). Indeed, any rule
to the contrary would sanction one’s enrichment at the expense of
another. Public policy demands that a person guilty of fraud or, at
least, of breach of trust, should not be alowed to use a Torrens title
as a shield against the consequences of his own wrongdoing (Cabanos vs.
Register of Deeds, etc., 40 Phil. 620; Severino vs. Severino, 41 Phil.
343).

Lastly, the claim of the heirs of Pedro Jacinto that the latter had
acquired ownership of the property in litigation by prescription, is
likewise untenable. As we have recently held in Juan et al. vs.
Zuniga, G. R. No. L-17044, April 28, 1962, an action to enforce a
trust is imprescriptible. Consequently, a coheir who, through fraud,
succeeds in obtaining a certificate of title in his name to the
prejudice of his coheirs, is deemed to hold the land in trust for the
latter, and the action by them to recover the property does not
prescribe.

On the other hand, in their appeal Pilar Lazaro and her son contend
that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that they had abandoned
their claim for damages. We also find this to be without merit.

As stated heretofore, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, after
due trial, dismissed this case and the plaintiffs (Pilar Lazaro Vda. de
Jacinto and her son) appealed to the Court of Appeals. In rendering
judgment the latter court held that said appellants had abandoned their
claim for damages, presumably because of their failure to make in their
brief an assignment of error to the effect that the Court of First
Instance had erred in not awarding them damages. It is now their
contention that having appealed from the dismissal, they were no longer
in duty bound to make a separate specific assignment of error regarding
the courts failure to award damages, because their right to them was
entirely dependent upon the favorable resolution of the assignment of
errors made in their brief assailing the dismissal. This argument loses
force upon consideration of the fact that their right to have the
reconveyance was one thing, and their right to damages, another. There
could be reconveyance in their favor, without this necessarily
entitling them to damages, as for instance, if they produced no
evidence to prove them, or that produced does not sufficiently prove
the claim. It seems clear, therefore, that it was their duty as
appellants to bring up before the Court of Appeals, by specific
assignment of error, this particular question.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from being in accordance with law, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and Barrera, JJ., concur.