PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, PETITIONER, VS. HON. FELIX R. DOMINGO AND JUAN MAFE, RESPONDENTS.

Original action for certiorari and prohibition certified to
this Court by the Court of Appeals, since it raises a purely legal question,
“as to the jurisdiction of respondent judge to issue the amendatory
decision in dispute.”

Private respondent Juan Mafe, a
mechanic in the employ of the Philippine National Railways was charged in an
information for qualified theft filed with respondent court,^[1]
for having stolen one brass bearing valued at P45.00 from his employer’s
shop.  The evidence for the prosecution
consisted of the testimonies of the Railways’ policeman who apprehended
respondent in street clothes on his way out at about 4 p. m. of July 4, 1967
with a traveling bag which contained the brass bearing, which bag, respondent
upon being stopped, had alleged to contain just dirty clothes and rags; of the
Manila Police Department patrolman who took down die respondent’s extrajudicial
confession; and of the corroborative testimony of the Railways’ security guard
who participated in respondent’s apprehension; as well as of the said objects
taken from respondent, viz, the bag and brass
bearing, and of his extrajudicial confession.

Respondent, on his part, disowned any criminal intent, claim­ing
he was on his way to return the brass bearing and repudiated his extrajudicial
confession, asserting that he was coerced into signing the same without being
allowed to read its contents, which were dif­ferent from what he stated at the
police investigation.

Respondent court, in its decision of January 18, 1969, ruled that “the
prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt” and rendered judgment “acquitting the ac­cused on reasonable
doubt.”

After promulgation on February 7, 1969 of the verdict of
ac­quittal, however, respondent-accused filed on February 19, 1969 a
motion for amendment of respondent court’s decision, alleging for the first
time that respondent had already been dismissed from the service of the
Railways as of July 4, 1967 “with prejudice to reinstatement” per the
Railways’ board of directors’ resolution of January 19, 1968,^[2]
because of the very incident subject matter of the criminal charge of which
respondent court had acquitted him, and praying that respondent court amend its
decision so as to include therein his reinstatement, with payment of back
salaries and restoration of all accrued rights and privileges.

Respondent court in its order dated March 3, 1969 set hearing of
the motion on March 15, 1969 and ordered that the parties and the general
manager of the Philippine National Railways be notified thereof,^[3]
and thereafter issued its “amendatory decision” dated March 27,
1969, noting that there was no appearance nor opposition from the Railways
at the hearing and granting respondent’s motion, by adding the following
paragraph to the dispositive part of its original
decision, as follows:

The General Manager of the Philippine National Railways, Manila, is
hereby ordered to reinstate the accused immediately to his position from which
he was dismissed on July 4, 1967 and to pay his (accused) salary in full during
the period beginning July 4, 1967 to the date of reinstatement, and to restore
the said accused to such benefits and rights and privileges arising from the
position that he held which should have accrued to him during the period
aforesaid.”

Hence, the present action filed by petitioner Philippine National
Railways, after respondent court had denied its motion to set aside the
amendatory decision on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over it and over the
subject matter of reinstatement and back salaries and of lack of due process.  Upon petitioner’s motion and bond, the Court,
issued on August 27, 1969 a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement and execution of the
amendatory decision.

The issue at bar is whether the trial court in a criminal case,
in rendering a judgment of acquittal, may properly decree the payment of
salaries during the period of the accused employee’s suspension from the
service, and where the employee was dismissed, order his reinstatement in the
service.

1.  The general rule that the
court has no such authority has long been uniformly pronounced by the
Court.  In People vs. Mañago,^[4]
involving an accused employee acquitted of the charge of malversation
of public funds, the Court held that “In a criminal proceeding against an
accused, the judgment that the law authorizes to be rendered, is either one of
acquittal or of conviction with indemnity and the accessory penal­ties provided
for by law.  The payment of salary of an
employee during the period of his suspension cannot, as a general rule, be
properly decreed by the trial court in a judgment of acquittal.”

In the analogous case of Manila Railroad Co. vs. Baltazar,^[5]
where the two accused employees were acquitted of qualified theft, the Court
further elaborated that “(I)n criminal cases courts of first in­stance
may dismiss an information, try and acquit or convict and impose upon the
defendant the penalty provided by law. 
The only civil respon­sibility that may be imposed by the court is that
which arises from the criminal act. 
[Articles 100-111 of the Revised Penal Code.] The acquittal of the
defendant does not mean necessarily that he is not civilly liable unless the
verdict and judgment of acquittal is that he did not commit the crime charge.  The owner of a stolen property in a case of
qualified theft is a party in the case if he does not reserve his right to
bring a separate civil action.  In that
event the court will order the de­fendant criminally liable to return the
property stolen, to repair the damage caused or done, if any, and to indemnify
the offended party for consequential damages. 
But whether a defendant acquitted of a criminal charge is entitled to
his salary during suspension is not within the power of the court to grant in
the criminal case where the defendant is acquitted.  Neither the Revised Penal Code nor the Rules
of Court on criminal procedure vests in the court authority to grant such a
relief.  [Sections 1 and 2, Rule 116,
Rules of Court.] No issue was joined on whether the defendants were entitled
to the payment of their salary during suspension and the issue joined by the
plea of not guilty was whether the defendants committed the crime charged in
the information.”

Thus, in People vs. Daleon,^[6]
Mr. Justice Reyes so reiterated for the Court its previous jurisprudence and
the rationale therefor:  “(T)he question is not new.  In at least three cases previous­ly decided
by this Court (People v. Mañago, 69 Phil. 496; Pueblo
v. Lagutan, 70 Phil. 481; Manila Railroad Co. v. Baltazar, et al., G.R. No. L-5451, September 14, 1953), we
have ruled that the trial court, in a criminal action for malversation of public funds wherein the accused is
acquitted, is without power to order the payment of his salary during the
period of his suspension.  The reason is
that the only issue joined by the plea of not guilty is whether or not the
accused committed the crime charged in the information, and in such case, the
only judgment that the court is legally authorized to render is either one of
acquittal or of conviction with the indemnity to the injured party and the
accessory penalties pro­vided for by law.

“Appellee Daleon
cites several cases wherein we upheld the right of an accused of the crime of malversation, in case of acquittal, to back salaries and
reinstatement, but these cases are not in point because they involved appeals
either from civil actions or from adminis­trative proceedings seeking such
remedies.  In other words, while an
accused acquitted of malversation may claim payment
of back salaries during the period of his suspension and reinstatement, his
relief lies not in the same criminal case wherein he is acquitted but in the
proper administrative or civil action prescribed by law.“

2.  People vs. Consigna,^[7]
relied upon by respondent court for its challenged amendatory decision,
provided an exceptional case out of the general rule.  There, Consigna was
acquitted of the charge of malversation of public
funds “for absolute lack of evidence” which amounted to a judicial
declaration that he was innocent and did not commit the act charged.

The Court expressly distinguished Consigna
from the doctrine reiterated in Daleon:  in that the Court reiterated adherence to the
ruling of Daleon that “the court has no
authority to order payment of [the acquitted employee’s] salaries because his
right to the same was not involved in the case,” but because it had been
found that Consigna was innocent “for absolute
lack of evidence” and yet had been unfairly dismissed administratively as
property clerk with the office of the Surigao del
Norte Superintendent of Schools for the same non-existent offense, ruled as an
exceptional case that it was but just and equitable that reinstatement should
follow his acquittal, as follows: 
“This ruling [of Daleon] does not apply
to defendant’s right – in case of acquit­tal – to reinstatement to the position
he was occupying at the time of his suspension, because, as we have said
heretofore, this matter would seem to be involved in the case of malversation – albeit as a mere incident -because
conviction of the offense charged results necessarily in a denial of such right
to reinstatement in view of the penalty of disqualification provided by
law.  If this is the inevitable result of
conviction, reinstate­ment should also follow acquittal.”

Consigna clearly had no
applicability in the case at bar, for herein respondent had been acquitted
merely “on reasonable doubt” unlike Consigna
who was found innocent “for absolute lack of evidence.”^[8]

3.  People vs. Villanueva,^[9]
likewise relied upon by respon­dent court, affords respondent no comfort.  There, again, the Court, through Mr. Justice Zaldivar, expressly reaffirmed the doctrine of Daleon: 
“This Court has held, however, that it is not within the power of
the court, in the event of an acquittal, to order the payment of the salaries
and other emoluments which the accused has failed to receive during the period
of his suspension from office” – since this matter falls within the
province of the administrative authorities, who are not parties in the criminal
case and who exercise control and supervision over the accused in connection
with his employment.  There, the Court
merely upheld the trial court’s order lifting the suspension of the acquitted
post office employee – charged of infidelity in the custody of documents and
acquitted for insufficiency of evidence – since the employee was merely under administrative
suspension pending the outcome of the criminal case, and his acquittal
consequently entitled him to lifting of the suspen­sion and reinstatement for
the time being, pending outcome this time of the administrative case against
him, which would now proceed to final disposition and could result in his
eventual dismissal, if administrative­ly found guilty.

Here, respondent’s acquittal “on reasonable doubt”
could not overturn the verdict of guilty in the administrative case, by virtue
whereof he had already been dismissed.

4.  Respondent court,
therefore, had no authority or power in the criminal case below to order the
general manager of the Philippine National Railways to reinstate respondent to
the position from which he had been duly dismissed, much less to order the
payment of his wages in full from the date of his suspension and effective date
of dismissal on July 4, 1967 to date of reinstatement with restoration of all
accrued benefits, rights and privileges, and the petition must be granted as
prayed for.  Besides, respondent court
had no authority nor jurisdic­tion to issue its “amendatory decision”
dated March 27, 1969
granting such reinstatement with back wages, since its original decision of ac­quittal
became immediately final, upon promulgation on February 7, 1969 and could no longer be recalled
for amendment or modification.^[10]

5.  The rule governing cases
of this nature may be restated as follows:

– The Court’s jurisprudence uniformly holds that the trial court
in the criminal case, has no authority, in the event of an acquittal of the
accused employee, to order payment of back salaries.

– Daleon’s doctrine is hereby
reaffirmed.  While an acquitted accused
may in appropriate cases claim payment of back salaries during the period of
his suspension, or reinstatement in the case of his dismis­sal, his relief lies
not in the same criminal case wherein he is acquitted but in the proper
administrative or civil action prescribed by law.

– The reason for the rule is that generally acquittal in the
criminal case does not carry with it relief from administrative liability.  The administrative case may generally proceed
against a respondent independently of a criminal action for the same act or
omission and re­quires only a preponderance of evidence to establish
administrative guilt as against proof beyond reasonable doubt of the criminal
charge, as in the analogous cases provided by Art. 33 of the Civil Code.^[11]

ACCORDINGLY, the writs of certiorari and prohibition
are granted as prayed for.  The
amendatory decision dated March 27,
1969 and order dated May
30, 1969 of respondent court are annulled and set aside, and the
writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against their enforcement is
here­by made permanent.  SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Barredo, Villamor,
and Makasiar,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Criminal Case No. 86597 of the Court of First instance of Manila,
entitled “People of the Phil. vs. Juan Mafe y Dimaculangan.”

^[2]
The board resolution transcript, as submitted with respondent’s motion
reads:  “Dismissed from the service
for the offense of dishonesty for stealing one (1) piece of brass bearing
inside the Manila Yard compound on July 4, 1967, which prejudice to reinstate­ment;
and to forego the idea of prosecuting the criminal case against him now pending
in court, as approve by the Board or Directors on January 19, 1969.”

^[3]
Notice of the hearing was actually served on the Philippine National Railways
at 1:05 p.m. of March 14, 1969.

^[4]
69 Phil. 496 (1940).

^[5]
93 Phil. 715 (1953), emphasis supplied.

^[6] 1
SCRA 759 (1961), emphasis supplied

^[7]
14 SCRA 962 (1965).

^[8]
At any rate, to the extent that Consigna is in
conflict with the present decision and the prevailing rule and doctrine of Daleon as expressly reaffirmed herein, (see infra,
paragraph 5), Consigna should be deemed pro
tanto abandoned.

^[9]
17 SCRA 272 (May 27, 1966).

^[10] Cea vs. Cinco, 96 Phil.
131 (Nov. 18, 1954);
People vs. Sison, 105 Phil. 1249 (Jan. 30, 1959).

^[11]
Art. 33, Civil Code, provides that “In cases of defama­tion, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.  Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.” Section 13 of Rep. Act No. 3019 (Anti-graft Law) likewise
recognizes that administrative proceedings may proceed independently against
the accused, in providing that “SEC. 13. 
Suspension and loss of benefits. 
– Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.  Should he be convicted by final judgment, he
shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is
acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.”
(emphasis supplied)

Further analogy is found in the
provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, in relation to Rule 111, sec. 3,
par. (c), which permit a separate civil action for, damages after acquittal of
the accused in the criminal case on the ground of the prosecution’s failure to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt except where the penal action is
extinguished with a declaration in the final judgment that the fact from which
the civil action might arise “did not exist.” The pertinent
legal provisions read:

“Art. 29.  When the accused in a cri­minal prosecution
is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond rea­sonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted.  Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence.  Upon motion
of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer
for damage, in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.  x x x ” (Civil Code)

– – –

“(c)   Extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist. In other cases, the person en­titled to the civil action may
institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the
person who may be liable for restitu­tion of the thing and reparation or
indemnity for the damage suffered.” (Rule 111, sec. 3).