TALISAY-SILAY MILLING CO., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND TALISAY EMPLOYEES AND LABORERS ASSOCIATION, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for, review of a decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations dated June 25, 1953 declaring illegal Pthe strike staged on December
17, 1952 by the members of the Talisay Employees and Laborers Association (TELA)
who were working with the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. and ordering the
strikers who were excluded to return, in accordance with the, stipulation
entered into between the parties to be reinstated to their former’ positions
without payment of their back salaries.

On December 3, 1952, the Talisay Employees and Laborers Association,
hereafter referred to as labor union submitted to the management of the
Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., hereafter referred to as the company, an
eighteen point demand among which was the reinstatement of seven laborers who
were dismissed for having stolen certain rails of the company giving said
company a warning that it no satisfactory answer was given within 72 hours from
receipt of the demand, the members of the union would declare a strike.

On December 7, the members of the union held a meeting wherein they voted to
declare a strike in the event that the management fails to answer favorably the
demands of the union. Notwithstanding the above decision to strike Felipe B.
Lacson, the president of the union, went to Manila to seek the intervention of
the Department of Labors in an effort to make the management act on the demands
and, acceding to the request, the labor office set the date of the conference
for their deliberation on January 7, 1953, at Baqolod City, But before the
arrival of said date, or on December 17, 1952, the union made good its threat to
strike.

On December 24, 1952, the company filed a petition in the Court of Industrial
Relations asking that the strike be declared illegal. On December 26, 1952, the
union in turn filed a petition asking the court to compel the company to act on
its eighteen-point demand and to Slider the reinstatement of the 39 laborers
allegedly discharged by the company. On the same date, the union, also filed a
petition to restrain the company from employing strike-breakers and to require
it to allow the striking laborers to immediately return to their work. And after
the company and the union had filed their answers to their respective petitions,
the case was set for hearing with due notice to both parties.

On the first day of the hearing, it was agreed by the parties, with the
approval of the court, that the same would first be confined to the legality of
the strike and to the issues presented in the motion filed by the union praying
for a writ of preliminary injunction, and, in an effort to settie the strike and
eventually effect the return of the strikers, the parties entered into a
stipulation providing for a temporary settlement of their controversy. The gist
of this stipulation. is that, pending the determination of their controversy,
the strikers should be allowed to return to their work except those who in the
opinion of the management had committed acts of sabotage against the properties
of the company, with the understanding that such arrangement should not in any
manner affect the demands of the union. The right to do the screening of those
who should be excluded was left to the discretion of the General Manager of the
company, Mr. Mariano Castañeda. This stipulation was immediately implemented and
on February 20, 1953 the laborers chosen were allowed to return subject to the
conditions agreed upon in the stipulation.

After the parties had presented evidence on hee question relative to the
legality of the strike, the industrial court found that “the strike was for no
apparent good reasons, trivial and unjustified and it was stage only to harass
the company at such a critical period of the milling season and incidentally to
force the granting of the 18-point demand,” and, consequently, it declared the
strike illegal. However, the court refused to take disciplinary action against
the laborers who staged the strike on the ground that, while they were present
at the meeting called for that purpose and actually voted to declare a strike,
they merely did so in obedience to the suggestion or instigation of their
leaders and, therefore, the latter are the ones who should be held responsible
“following the theory set forth in the implied condition provided in section 19
of Commonwealth Act No. 103.” And having in view this theory, the court ordered
the return of the strikers who had been excluded without back pay, whereupon the
company interposed the present petition for review.

Considering that the petitioning company is now disputing the findings of
fact made by the industrial court in the sense that they are not borne out by
the evidence and that there is need of revising the same in order that a proper
and correct conclusion may be drawn therefrom for the proper determination of
the rights and equities of the parties, we have taken pains to review the
evidence even if the general rule applicable to a petition for review would
authorize us merely to look into the questions of law and to consider the
questions of fact as a settled matter, (De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil.,
15)

We will begin by stating that the finding that the members of the labor union
declared a strike on December 17, 1952 not of their own accord but merely to
follow the desire of their leaders, more particularly the president and
secretary-treasurer, is not borne by the evidence, for it clearly appears that
in the two occasions where a meeting was called for the. purpose of discussing
the grievance of ithe union against the company, those who initiated the same
were tne members themselves who were apparently impatient in taking, action in
view of the apparent indifference of the management in connection with thejr
eighteen-point demand aggravated by their impression that about thirty-nine of
their fellow laborers were dismissed without sufficient justification. And the
evidence shows that in those two occasions the two officials of the union were
merely invited to address the meeting in order to explain the consequence of a
strike. These leaders never informed them that their grievance against the
company has already been brought to the knowledge of the Department of Labor who
agreed to intervene in order to bring about a settlement of their differences.
It cannot therefore be freely concluded that the ones most responsible for the
strike were the leaders and not the members themselves considering that all of
them had actually participated and voted for the declaration of the strike.

Another finding made by the respondent court is with regard to the purpose of
the strike. The court found that this had its origin in the eighteen-point
demand presented by the union with the warning that if within a period of 72
hours no favorable action is taken, the union would stage a strike, and as this
period had elapsed without the company taking action thereon but instead, in the
opinion of the union, proceeded to dismiss thirty-nine laborers affiliated to
the union, ,the union decided to strike on December 17, 1952. While these facts
were proven by the union, they were not however considered by the respondent
court to be enough justification for the union to strike it appearing that the
refusal of the company to entertain the demand was because it doubted the right
of the union to enter into a collective bargaining with the company and
because,—as the company explained,—over the thirty-nine laborers were not
exactly dismissed but were merely placed on a rotation service during the
milling season. The responded court also found that the decision reached by the
union to stage a strike has already been abandoned when its president took up
the matter with the Department of Labor and this office agreed to mediate and to
Tiear the parties on January 7, 1953, and so, in the opinion of the court, the
strike was unwarranted and illegal.

We are constrained to differ from this opinion of the respondent court. When
the union submitted its eighteen- point demand with the warning that if action
thereon is not taken within 72 hours it would stage a walkout, the union was
merely exercising, a right which is given to it by law to promote its interest.
It was ah,action within the province of the law. In so doing, the union had a
right to expect that the company would act according to the request and if it
cannot do so, would at least give the union an explanation of its failure. The
company not only failed to act but took a retaliatory measure by placing.
thirty-nine laborers on rotation service. The company practically ignored the
demand when it did not even take the trouble of answering or explaining its
stand on the matter. This silence was considered by the union as a rejection of
its demand with the result tBat the laborers got together and defined their
stand. They cannot therefore be blamed if they decided to strike. This attitude
is clearly reflected in the letter of the president of the union to the
Secretary of Labor dated December 11, 1952 wherein he asked the latter to
intervene (Annex A).

On the other hand, the finding of the respondent court that the union has
abandoned its decision to strike when it requested the intervention of the
Department of Labor and the latter agreed to intervene is not also supported by
tne evidence for it clearly appears that the leaders of the union never informed
the laborers of such official intervention and much less that the labor office
had already agreed to hear their complaint, on January 7, 1953. Had they been
informed of such intervention, they would not have probably carried out their
decision to strike. . As this was not done, they cannot therefore be blamed for
the action they have taken.

We are therefore of the opinion that the respondent court, notwithstanding
our diverging point of view, did not err in ordering the reinstatement of the
strikers who were excluded by the management without back pay, and, hence, we
affirm the decision appealed from, without pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Jugo, Labrador, Concepcion, and
Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.