FLORITA T. BAUTISTA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND GENERA CARDENAS, RESPONDENT.

It is quite pathetic how a petty quarrel between two supposedly well-bred
women still had to reach this Court. From an accidental brushing of their elbows, resulting to hair-pulling
and kicking, it ended in their accusing each other of committing slight
physical injuries against the other.

The case originated from the City Court of San Carlos, Negros
Occidental, wherein Florita T. Bautista was convicted in Criminal Case No. 3782
for slight physical injuries upon the complaint of one Genara Cardenas y
Buenavista, and sentenced to imprisonment of fifteen (15) days and to pay the
costs. She was further sentenced to pay
P8,000.00 as moral damages, P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation, P500.00 as
medical expenses and to pay the costs.

In Criminal Case No. 3783, accused Genara Cardenas y Buenavista
was acquitted of the charge of slight physical injuries and the civil aspect of
the case was dismissed.

On appeal to the Court of First Instance of the same Province,
the conviction of accused Florita T. Bautista was reversed and the civil aspect
of the case dismissed. The CFI gave
full faith and credit to the testimony of Mrs. Fe Olladas, the teller of the
booth where the incident took place.

Elevating the case to the Court of Appeals in CA-­G.R. No.
17652-R said court in turn
reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed insofar as it
reversed the decision of the City Court which awarded damages to the herein
appellant, and let another one be entered ordering appellee to pay the same damages
and civil indemnities awarded by the City Court, to wit: P8,000.00 as moral
damages, P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation, and P500.00 as medical
expenses. No special pronouncement as
to costs in the present instance.

“SO ORDERED.”^[1]

Hence, the Petition for Review on Certiorari by Florita T.
Bautista.

The characters in this case are Genara Cardenas y Buenavista, a
businesswoman of Canlaon City, Negros Oriental, whom We shall refer to as
“Cardenas,” and Florita T. Bautista, a teacher and the wife of then Mayor
Isidro Bautista, Jr., also of Canlaon City, whom we shall refer to as
“Bautista”. Both parties are
complainants and accused in Criminal Cases No. 3782 and 3783 filed in the City
Court of San Carlos, Negros Occidental.

Their story dates back to the 28th day of March 1973 at about
11:00 in the morning at the
cooperative of San Carlos Milling Co. Cardenas, who was then seated on the sofa
at the lobby, saw Bautista enter the building. As the latter passed her, Cardenas felt that Bautista “intended to hit”
her with a bag^[2]
she was carrying. Bautista did not hit
Cardenas, though, as she went ahead to mill with the crowd.

The next scene was at about 12:40 p.m. of the same day inside the
Philippine National Bank building, San Carlos City branch, more specifically in
front of the cage of bank teller, Mrs. Olladas. Cardenas, while leaning on the panel board before the teller’s
cage, noticed someone reach for a ball pen inside Mrs. Ollada’s cage. While the person was withdrawing her hand,
she brushed the arm of Cardenas. The
said person happened to be Bautista.

According to Cardenas, she asked Bautista, “Why did you strike me
with your elbow?” Bautista answered, “What if I strike you with my elbow? So
what?” Then Bautista grabbed her hair,
shook her head, shoved her to the floor and kicked her.^[3]

On the other hand, Bautista denied Cardenas’ version of the
incident. While admitting having
“slightly touched” the left arm of Cardenas, Bautista claimed having said “I am
sorry, excuse me.”^[4]
Despite that, Cardenas immediately struck her hard with her left elbow, grabbed
her right hand, as a result she likewise elbowed Cardenas. As Cardenas was about to bite her, she
pulled Cardenas’ hair, to parry the bite, but Cardenas grabbed her stomach, so
she kicked her on the thigh and chest to loosen her grasp.^[5]

Two issues needed to be resolved in this case, namely: 1) who
among the two instigated the fight; and 2) whether Bautista is liable
for damages.

According to the city court, Bautista was the aggressor who
initiated the attack and that if she incurred injuries it was due to Cardenas’ futile and feeble attempt
at defending herself from the persistent and effective aggression of Bautista. The city court made these conclusions on
account of the physical build of both the protagonist — Bautista being “young
and well-built,” while Cardenas is “frail and self?effacing.”^[6]

The CFI did not share the city court’s findings. It found that the rubbing or touching of the
right arm of Bautista against the left arm of Cardenas was accidental or
unintentional. The court concluded that
the ensuing scuffle and slight physical injuries sustained by both protagonists were the direct
and immediate consequences of the act of Cardenas of deliberately elbowing
Bautista, in the honest belief that the latter had deliberately touched her
left arm and provoked her into a fight.

Siding with the theory of the trial court, the Court of Appeals
pointed to Bautista as the one who gave sufficient provocation. If at all, she can only claim incomplete
self-defense, and would still be liable to pay damages as a legal consequence
thereof. It went on to conclude that
Bautista’s act of rubbing against Cardenas’ side was tainted with malice. The appellate court further said that
Bautista manifestly acted offensively in not waiting for Cardenas to leave the
counter before inserting her hand to reach for a ballpen inside the teller’s
cage, thus, hitting or rubbing Cardenas’ arm.

The Court of Appeals went further to state that Bautista cannot
cite Rule 111, Sec. 3 [now Rule
111, Sec. 2 (b)]^[7]
because:

“In the first place, the judgment appealed from cannot be
considered a final judgment within the meaning of the aforequoted provision (cf
Soriano vs. Albanog, 98 Phil. 785)^[8]. In the second place, the judgment appealed from has not declared that the fact
from which the civil action might
arise did not exist. The fact from
which such action may arise is the injuries inflicted by appellee upon
appellant. The judgment appealed from
did not state that such injuries did not exist. . .”^[9]

We agree with the above pronouncement of the Court of
Appeals. It is the fundamental
postulate of our law that “every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.” And even if an accused
is acquitted of the crime charged, such will not necessarily extinguish the
civil liability, unless the court declares in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.^[10]

The acquittal of Bautista by the CFI because of the failure of
the prosecution to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, does not
necessarily mean her exoneration from civil liability for damages, if any,
suffered by Cardenas. The question as
to civil damages may still be appealed.

However, from Our reading of the records of this case, We note
that Cardenas even at the onset appeared to be paranoid of Bautista,
particularly when she testified that she felt Bautista intended to hit her with
a bag, while they were at the cooperative building. It is therefore not difficult to conclude that when Bautista
“accidentally” brushed the elbow of Cardenas, the latter assumed that Bautista
was making good her supposed “earlier threat” to inflict physical harm on her.

Assuming arguendo that Bautista intentionally went to the
counter where Cardenas was, is that act, sufficient provocation? We think
not. The law requires that the
provocation be sufficient or proportionate to the act committed and adequate to
arouse one to its commission. It is not even enough that the
provocative act be unreasonable or annoying. In the present case, Bautista had as much right as Cardenas to be before
the same teller’s booth, considering that it is the Bank’s practice to allow more than one customer to transact business
with a teller at any given time.^[11] We
are even more inclined to believe that
it was Cardenas who initiated the aggressive act of intentionally
elbowing Bautista. Being the aggressor
herself, she cannot claim compensation for the injuries she suffered.

Petitioner also questions
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in reviewing and reversing the findings of the CFI citing Sec. 45 of R.A.
269 (Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended) which provides:

“x       x           x

“In cases falling under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of municipal and city courts which are appealed to the courts of
first instance, the decision of the latter is final. Provided. That the
findings of facts contained in said decision are supported by substantial
evidence as basis thereof, and the conclusions are not clearly against the law
and jurisprudence x x x.”

Although the above provision is no longer applicable, the same
should be interpreted to mean that it is well within the discretion of the
Court of appeals to determine whether the findings of the then Court of First
Instance are supported by substantial evidence and the conclusions are within
the law and jurisprudence.

In a minute resolution dated April 27, 1970^[12]
the Court held that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to consider petitions
of cases falling under Sec. 45 of R.A. 296 as amended by R.A. 6031, giving due
course thereto or dismissing the same in accordance with the criteria
established in the aforequoted provision of the Judiciary Act. As a matter of fact, the Court of Appeals in
this case reversed the decision of the CFI. Moreover, petitioner should have assailed the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals at the first instance. Having
participated actively in the proceedings, petitioner can no longer seek protection
under the above provision.

As We have earlier stated, the circumstances in this case are
quite petty that the parties and their counsels deserve to be admonished for
unnecessarily clogging the docket of this court. This case should have been settled once and for all at the
earliest stage of the litigation. The
Court has far more important legal matters to attend to than to be tasked to
assuage the wounded pride of the parties.

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the judgment
appealed from is hereby reversed. Respondent being as much at fault, as the petitioner, is not entitled to
any award of damages. Let petitioner
and respondent bear their own expenses.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melo, J., no part.

^[1]
Pacifico P. De Castro, ponente, concurred in by Justices Luis B.
Reyes and Vicente G. Ericta., Rollo, pp. 59-66.

^[2]
TSN, September 12, 1973, p. 7.

^[3]
Ibid, pp 17-18.

^[4]
TSN, October 19, 1973, pp. 15.

^[5]
Ibid, pp. 16-18.

^[6]
Trial Court’s Decision, p. 9; Rollo, p. 22.

^[7]
Rule 111, Sec 2 (b) reads:

“Extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist.”

^[8]
The correct title of the case is
“Testate Estate of Doña Perpetua A. Vda. de Soriano, Albornoz v.
Albornoz.”

^[9]
C.A. Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 65.

^[10]
Calalang v. IAC, G.R. No. 74613, 194 SCRA 514 (1991).

^[11]
TSN, October 19, 1973, pp. 27-28, 50.

^[12]
R & R Realty Co., Inc. v. Hon. Jose M. Leuterio, etc., et al.,
UDK-329.