LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWANG MAKABAYAN (LMM), PETITIONER, VS. HON. CARLOS ABIERA, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH VI, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, 12TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,…

The respect to be paid a stipulation in a collective bargaining contract,
when apparently it came into collision with a statutory right, lay at the root
of the dispute in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding now before this
Court.  Congress in 1961 amended the
pertinent provision of the Industrial Peace Act by exempting from the operation
of a closed shop or a union security shop agreement “members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization.”^[1]
The above saving clause notwithstanding, petitioner union, Lakas Ng
Manggagawang Makabayan (LMM), was able to prevail on the employer, the
Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation, to terminate the services of
private respondents,^[2]
adherents of the Iglesia ni Cristo sect, one of the tenets of which prohibits
membership in any labor organization.  To
regain their status as such employees, private respondents filed a petition for
mandamus with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental presided by
respondent Judge, the Honorable Carlos Abiera. 
They sought and were able to obtain a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, the allegations in their petition having been admitted by
petitioner Union as one of the respondents before the lower court, the sole
defense interposed being raised by it being the alleged lack of
jurisdiction.  Thus unsuccessful,
petitioner Union elevated the matter to this Court.  It raised the same fundamental question, the
absence of jurisdiction.  We find for
petitioner and proceed to explain why.

In the petition filed on September 9, 1968, the main reliance is
placed by petitioner Union on a collective
bargaining agreement with the employer, the Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corporation, entered into on November 1, 1967 and effective for three years,
one of the provisions of which required members of such Union and those who
become such thereafter to continue and remain with that status “in good
standing on a condition of continued employment.”^[3]
Reference is then made to private respondents having been members of petitioner
Union even prior to such collective bargaining agreement.^[4]
Subsequently, however, on May 7, 1968, to be more precise, and during the
effectivity of such collective bargaining contract private respondents tendered
their irrevocable resignations as such members and disauthorized the latter to
withdraw the check-off of union dues, private respondents relying on their
being adherents of the Iglesia ni Cristo sect and therefore falling within the
terms of the Republic Act earlier
referred to.^[5]
After failing in its attempts to have them resume their membership, petitioner
Union recommended to the employer their
dismissal and such recommendation was carried out “by reason, of and
[pursuant] to the particular provisions of the existing collective bargaining
contract * * *.”^[6] As a result, private respondents in turn
filed a petition for mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages
on July 15, 1968 with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental presided
by respondent Judge.^[7] There was a motion to dismiss and opposition
to the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction filed by
petitioner Union on July 22, 1968.^[8] Then came on August 5, 1968 an order
granting the prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering
their employer to reinstate private respondents and such writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction was accordingly issued on August 8, 1968.^[9] There was a motion for the dissolution of
such writ but it was denied by
respondent Judge.  Hence this petition.^[10]

This Court in a resolution of September 12, 1968 required
respondents to file an answer and at the same time issued a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the enforcement of the challenged order of August 5,
1968 as well as the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction of August 8, 1968
issued pursuant thereto.  In the answer
filed on October 8, 1968, there was an admission of the facts alleged in the
petition except as to
allegations “devoid of factual basis” and such as are “legal
conclusions of petitioner.”^[11]

The sole question before this Court then is one of
jurisdiction.  As stated at the outset,
petitioner in the light of the controlling
statutory provision could validly impugn the jurisdiction of respondent
Judge.

1.  It does not admit of doubt that the collective bargaining contract between petitioner and the
Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corporation of 1967 must be
deemed to have incorpo­rated
within its terms the 1961 amendment of the Industrial Peace Act
exempting from the operation of a closed shop or a union security
shop agreement “members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation
of their members in any such labor organization.” If it were not so, then
the collective bargaining agreement itself could be properly assailed as the
freedom of contract recognized by the Civil Code while it empowers the parties
to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient is limited by the requirement that they should not be “contrary
to law”.^[12] The principle is thus well-settled that an
existing law enters into and forms part of a valid contract without the need
for the parties expressly making reference to it.  Only thus could its validity insofar as some
of its provisions are concerned be assured. 
On the assumption then that private respondents could lay claim to the
protection of the above exemption provision, the fundamental question, the only
one before this Court, is whether such a statutory right could be vindicated in
an ordinary court as was done here or in the Court of Industrial Relations?

2.  There can be no dispute
as to the answer.  Under the Industrial
Peace Act, it is made an unfair labor practice for a labor organization, such
as petitioner here, “[t]o cause or
attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation
of subsection (a) (4) or to discriminate against an employee with respect to
whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some
ground other than the usual terms and conditions under which member­ship or continuation
of membership is made available to other members.”^[13] Reference is thus made to an earlier
subsection of said act making it
an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization.^[14] There is this proviso which as originally worded when the measure was enacted in 1953 reads thus: “That nothing in this
Act or in any other Act or statute of the Republic of the Philippines shall
preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition
of employ­ment membership therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees as provided in section twelve.”^[15] Then, as was set forth at the outset of this
opinion, came the 1961 amendment with members of religious sects as
beneficiaries and thus entitled to exemption from a closed shop or a union
security shop.  It is an integral part of
the section on what constitutes an unfair labor practice.

Under the next section of the Industrial Peace Act, the
jurisdiction over an unfair labor practice case, whether on the part of
management or of a labor union, is vested with the Court of Industrial
Relations.  Thus: “The Court shall have jurisdiction over the
prevention of unfair labor practices and is empowered to prevent any person
from engaging in any unfair labor practice. 
This power shall be exclusive and shall not be affected by any other
means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by an
agreement, code, law or otherwise.”^[16] This Court then ever since the effectivity
of such Act has no choice but to adhere to the view that the Court of
Industrial Relations and not a court of first instance, is vested with juris­diction
over every kind of an unfair labor practice case.^[17] Petitioner must thus be sustained.

3.  It only remains to be added that unless the legislative act
granting the above exemption to certain religious sects remains unmodified and
no challenge is hurled against its validity resulting in its nullification, the
parties to any contract must live up faithfully to its terms.  It is a fundamental postulate that however broad the freedom of contracting parties
may be, it does not go so far as to
countenance disrespect for or failure to observe a legal prescription.  The statute takes precedence; a stipulation
in a collective bargaining must yield to it. 
That is to adhere to the rule of law.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling the
order of respondent Judge of August 5, 1968 granting the prayer of private
respondents for a preliminary mandatory injunction as well as the writ of preliminary injunction thereafter issued
on the 8th day of August, 1968. 
Respondent Judge is prohibited from proceeding further with the mandamus
petition filed by private respondents which is ordered dismissed.  The writ of preliminary injunction issued by
this Court under its resolution of September 12, 1968 is made permanent.

Reyes, Acting C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee,
Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Dizon and Makasiar, JJ.,
on leave.

^[1]
Republic Act No. 3350 amending paragraph 4, subsection (a) of Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 875.  The Industrial
Peace Act reads as follows:  “(4) Provided,
That nothing in this Act or statute of the Republic of the Philippines shall
preclude an employer froth making an agreement with a labor organization to
require as a
condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as
provided in Section twelve, but such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization.”

^[2]
The private respondents are Facundo
Tinambacan, Doroteo Pasaporte, Marcelo Navarro, Patricio Tranilla, Federico
Sabay, Manuel Panes, McArthur Maquiling, Alfredo Hallare, Gilberto Navarro and
Santos Franco, Jr.

^[3]
Petition, par. 3.

^[4]
Ibid, par. 4.

^[5]
Ibid, par. 5.

^[6]
Ibid, pars. 6 and 7.

^[7]
Ibid, par. 8.

^[8]
Ibid, par. 9.

^[9]
Ibid, pars. 10 and 11.

^[10]
Ibid, pars. 12 and 13.

^[11]
Answer, pars. 1 to 9.

^[12]
Art. 1306 of the Civil Code provides: 
“The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.”

^[13]
Section 4 (b) (2) of the Industrial
Peace Act.

^[14]
Section 4 (a) (4), Ibid.

^[15]
Section 4 (a) (4), Ibid.

^[16]
Section 5 (a), Ibid.

^[17]
Cf. National Labor Union v. Dinglasan, 98 Phil. 649 (1956); PAFLU v.
Tan, 99 Phil. 854 (1956); Reyes v. Tan, 99 Phil. 880 (1956); Dee Cho
Lumber Workers’ Union v. Dee Cho Lumber Co., 101 Phil. 417 (1957); Phil.
Sugar Institute v. CIR, 106 Phil. 401 (1959); Velez v. PAV
Watchmen’s Union; 107 Phil. 689 (1960); Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. v. OSCO Workers Fraternity Labor Union, L-15826, Jan. 23, 1961, 1 SCRA
21; National Labor Union v. Insular-Yebana Tobacco Corp., L-15363, July
31, 1961, 2 SCRA 924; Phil. Am. Cigar & Cigarette Factory Workers
Independent Union v. Phil. Am. Cigar & Cigarette Mfg. Co., Inc.,
L-18364, Feb. 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 375; United States Lines Co. v. Assoc.
Watchmen & Security Union, L-15508, June 29, 1963, 8 SCRA 326; Phil.
Land-Air-Sea Labor Union v. Sy Indong Trading Co. Rice & Corn Mill, L-18476, May 30, 1964, 11 SCRA
277; Manila Railroad Co. v. Kapisanan Ng Mga
Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad Co., L-19728, July 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 546; Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v.
Baldo, L-17739, Dec. 24, 1964, 12
SCRA 599; Visayan Bicycle Mfg. Co. ,
Inc. v. National Labor Union, L-19997, May 19, 1965, 14 SCRA 5; Magalit v.
CIR, L-20448, May 25, 1965, 14 SCRA 72; Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. CIR,
L-17411, Dec. 31, 1965, 15 SCRA 660; Industrial-Commercial-Agricultural
Workers’ Org. v. CIR, L-21465, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 562; Pan
Am World Airways, Inc. v. CIR, L-20434, July 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 813;
Rizal Labor Union v. Rizal Cement Co., Inc., L-19779, July, 30, 1966, 17
SCRA 858; Bay View Hotel Inc. v. Manila Hotel Workers’ Union, L-21803,
Dec. 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 946; Allied Free Workers’ Union v. Compania
Maritima, L-22951-52, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 258; Salunga v. CIR,
L-22456, Sept. 27, 1967, 21 SCRA 216; Security Bank Employees Union-NATU v.
Security Bank and Trust Co., L-28536, April 30, 1968, 23 SCRA 503; Federacion
Obrera v. Mojica, L-25059, Aug. 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 936; Veterans Security
Free Workers’ Union v. Cloribel L-26439, Jan. 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 297.