THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SEGUNDO MARQUEZ Y CASTRO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

People versus Marquez

The Case

This is a criminal appeal by Segundo Marquez y Castro, one of three men charged with theft of equipment, materials, and tools belonging to the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, valued at 3,500 pesos. After the three accused withdrew their plea of not guilty and pleaded guilty instead as accessories after the fact to the crime of theft, the trial court convicted them as such and sentenced each to four months and one day of arresto mayor. Only Marquez appealed, and he raises a single, purely legal question: whether the penalty imposed was within the range allowed by law. The case matters because it fixes, in a clean and memorable way, how the penalty for an accessory after the fact is computed — two degrees lower than the penalty for the consummated felony — and how the Court chooses between two penalties when the lowered degree leaves no middle ground.

Procedural History

The three accused were charged with theft before the Court of First Instance of Manila. Upon arraignment they entered a plea of not guilty, but on the day set for hearing they asked leave to withdraw that plea and substitute a plea of guilty as accessories to the crime of theft as alleged in the information. The prosecution did not object and in fact recommended the minimum penalty prescribed by law for the offense pleaded to. The trial court declared them guilty as accessories after the fact of theft and sentenced each to four months and one day of arresto mayor, with each to pay one-third of the costs; the stolen properties, having been recovered, were ordered returned to their owner. Only Segundo Marquez y Castro appealed, and he was allowed to appeal as a pauper. The case was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals, but because the appeal involved purely a question of law, that court forwarded the records to the Supreme Court pursuant to the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended. The appeal thus reached the Supreme Court as a question of law, not of fact.

Facts

Reynaldo Layog y Cadayday, Segundo Marquez y Castro, and Fermin Caiña y del Mundo were charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of theft for having stolen equipment, materials, and tools belonging to the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, valued at 3,500 pesos.

Upon arraignment, all three entered a plea of not guilty. On the day set for the hearing, however, they asked permission to withdraw that plea and to substitute a plea of guilty as accessories to the crime of theft as alleged in the information. The prosecution did not object to this plea of guilty to a less serious offense, and it even recommended that the minimum penalty prescribed by law for that offense be imposed.

The trial court then declared the three accused guilty as accessories after the fact of the crime of theft and sentenced each of them to four months and one day of arresto mayor, with each to pay one-third of the costs. The stolen properties were recovered and ordered returned to their owner. Only Marquez appealed, and he assigned a single error: that the lower court should have imposed destierro, not four months and one day of arresto mayor, pursuant to Article 309, paragraph 3, in relation to Articles 53 and 27, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing on the appellant, convicted as an accessory after the fact to theft, the penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor instead of the lower penalty required by law.
• Whether or not, the penalty for the consummated theft being prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, the penalty two degrees lower for the accessory is destierro in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period, and which of these two should be imposed.

Applicable Provisions

Article 309, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the decision, fixes the penalty for theft where the value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos:

The penalty provided by Article 309, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code where the value of the property stolen is more than P200 but does not exceed P6,000 is prision correcional in its minimum and medium periods.

This is the starting point: it is the penalty for the consummated felony from which the accessory's penalty is measured downward.

Article 53 of the Revised Penal Code, as invoked by the appellant, governs the penalty for accessories after the fact:

The penalty that should be imposed on each of them should be lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony.

This is the rule that lowers the penalty for the accessory by two degrees from that of the principal in the consummated felony.

The Court, applying Article 61, paragraph 5, in relation to Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act Number 217, stated the resulting range:

Two degrees lower than prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods is destierro in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period.

This defines the two penalties between which the Court had to choose, and explains why there is no middle degree to select.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the appeal is well-taken and that the penalty imposed by the trial court was above the legal range. The Solicitor General agreed with the appellant and recommended a reduction to one month and one day of arresto mayor, and the Court found that recommendation in accordance with law and with the applicable decision of the Court.

On the second issue, the Court followed its earlier ruling in Jose Cristobal versus The People of the Philippines, which resolved a question more or less identical to the one before it. There, the Court reasoned that the penalty for the consummated theft is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, and that the penalty lower by two degrees, for the accessory, is destierro in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period. Because there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the medium degree of that penalty should be imposed. But as the Court explained, the two component penalties do not meet:

Destierro in its maximum period is from four years, two months, and one day to six years of banishment; while arresto mayor in its minimum period is one month and one day, to two months of imprisonment. There is no medium or middle ground between these two penalties. So we think one month and one day of arresto mayor is preferable or more favorable to the accused.

Accordingly, the Court modified the decision as to the appellant and imposed on him one month and one day of arresto mayor instead of four months and one day.

Doctrine

An accessory after the fact to a consummated felony suffers a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony, under Article 53 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos, the penalty for the consummated theft is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods under Article 309, paragraph 3; two degrees lower is destierro in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period. Where the two degrees leave no middle ground between the component penalties, the Court chooses the penalty more favorable to the accused — here, one month and one day of arresto mayor. A penalty imposed above the legal range is an error correctable on appeal, even on a plea of guilty to a lesser offense.

Disposition

The Court granted the appeal and modified the decision as to Segundo Marquez y Castro, imposing on him one month and one day of arresto mayor instead of four months and one day, with no pronouncement as to costs.

Remember This

Memorize the rule: an accessory after the fact gets a penalty two degrees lower than that for the consummated felony, and when the lowered degree leaves no middle ground, the Court imposes the penalty more favorable to the accused. Examiners use this case to test penalty computation under Article 53 in relation to Article 309, and the principle that doubts in the range of penalties are resolved in favor of the accused.