RE:  CANCELLATION OF O.C.T.’S NOS. 1957 AND 1477 AND THE ISSUANCE OF NEW TITLES, BISHOP OF THE MONCADIAN CHURCH OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., PETITIONER-APPELLANT.

Direct appeal on a question of law from an
order of the Court of First Instance of Davao denying
the twin petitions of petitioner-appellant.

The twin petitions filed on
August 26, 1965 seek the reconstitution and cancellation of two original
Certificates of Title Nos. 1477 and 1957 issued by Register of Deeds of Davao
in the names of the original
owners and grantees of homestead patents and the issuance of new transfer
certificates of title in the name of petitioner as alleged purchaser of the properties covered thereby, under section
112 of Act 496.

The petitioner alleged that it is a non-profit corporation with
office address at Limao, Samal, Davao, with Fidel Acedillo
as its Supreme Bishop and that its corporate name until after the last global war was
Filipino Federation of America, Inc.

In one petition, it averred that sometime in 1939, it had bought
under its former name the
19.6151-hectare of land bearing Original Certificate of Title No. 1477 (Homestead Patent No. 35597) for the
sum of P1,500.00 from the registered owner, Atilano
Paleño, now deceased and without any known
heirs.  In the other petition, it
similarly asserted that sometime in 1942, it had bought under its former name the 23.5739-hectare parcel of
land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1957 (Home­stead Patent No.
43059) for the sum of P4,500.00 from the regis­tered owner, Tomas Doromal, now deceased and without any known heirs.

Petitioner further
alleged that upon execution of the sales (a formal deed of sale in the
case of the sale by Atilano Pateño,
acknowledged before Notary Public Tomas Doromal and a
private document in the case of the sale by said Tomas Doromal),
the lands as well as all documents, including the certificates of title thereto, were delivered to it
but the said documents and certificates of title were all lost in the custody
of the late Gen. Camilo Moncado
during the war, in Lantana, Rosario Drive, Quezon
City and could not be found despite diligent efforts; and that since the sales
up to the present time, it had been in peaceful, open, adverse, actual and continuous possession of the lands
for a period of over twenty years and had introduced considerable improvements
thereon consisting of fruit-bearing coconut and other fruit-bearing trees.

At the hearing of the petitions, on September 17, 1965, notice of which the lower court had
ordered to be posted at four public places, there was, quite expectedly, no
opposition filed by any person.  Fidel Acedillo testified on behalf of petitioner and through his
testimony and several documentary exhibits sought to support the allegations of
the petitions.  The principal exhibits established
that petitioner had been paying all taxes due on the said lands.

The lower court
thereafter issued its order of October
8, 1965 denying the petitions, specifically relying on this Court’s
decision in Zafra Vda.
de Anciano vs. Caballes.^[1]
This Court therein held under facts similar to those in the case at bar that
“(R)econstitution or reconstruction of title
literally and within the meaning of Republic Act No. 26 denotes restoration of
the instrument which is supposed to
have been lost or destroyed in
its original form and condition” and that the motion of movant-appellant for the issuance of a
“reconstituted” title in her name as alleged vendee in lieu of the
one originally issued in the name of the registered owner as alleged vendor was
properly denied, since “this motion and the opposition thereto directly
involved complicated questions of land
ownership which can only be litigated and adjudicated in an ordinary action.”

Upon petitioner’s appeal reaching the
Court, we required the Solicitor General to file a brief for the State as appellee.^[2]
The State asks for affirmance of the dismissed order,
manifesting that had it been furnished copies of the petitions in the lower
court, it could have taken proper steps to assert or protect its interest or
otherwise have the proceedings dismissed as improper.

Petitioner’s appeal is clearly without merit.

Even conceding that petitioner has complied with the requisites
of section 112 of Act 496 and that it fairly established at the hearing the
allegations of its petitions, the relief sought by petitioner – reconstitution and
cancellation of the original certificates of title still in the names of the original
registered owners and the issuance of new transfer certificates of title in its name,
when it itself admits that the deeds of sale allegedly executed in its favor were lost –
cannot be availed of and granted in the summary proceedings provided in said section 112.  The proceedings contemplated in said section
112 for erasure, alteration or amend­ment of entries on a duly issued
certificate of title are not intended for the adjudication of questions properly
pertaining to an ordinary civil action, such as those raised in the petitions
at bar.

The purpose of the proceedings is to grant summary relief to a
party whose title to the property that is covered by a certificate of title is
clearly and incontrovertibly established and against which there can be no
serious opposition.^[3]
Here, petitioner is merely seeking to establish unilaterally its title to and
ownership of
the lands, under its claim of purchase without any supporting deeds of sale
which it could otherwise have simply presented for registration and transfer of
the titles to its name.

 In the recent case of Vicente
vs. de los Santos,^[4]
we reminded parties -litigants and their counsels that “(T)ime and again, this Court has reiterated the well settled
doctrine that summary relief under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act
‘can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties or there is no
adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise, the case becomes controversial
and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the
incident properly belongs.'” Petitioner’s claims of ownership of the lands
by purchase require the impleading in an ordinary
action of the heirs or legal representatives of the alleged vendors-registered
owners, now deceased.  Said heirs must be
located and heard, for they may dispute the alleged sales and instead claim ownership by right of inheritance, or even if the
“alleged sales by their deceased predecessors were duly established, they
may have lawful defenses against the validity of the sales under section 118 of
the Public Land Act e. g. nullity of the sales if executed in violation of the
restrictions on alienation of lands
acquired under free patent or homestead provisions of the said Act.  And should the said alleged vendors be
established to have left no heirs, then the State, as
aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, may have a rightful claim to
succeed to their estate,^[5] and would be the proper adverse party as against
petitioner’s claims.

Finally, petitioner’s plea that in the absence of any known heirs
and with the loss of the alleged deeds
of sale in its favor, it is left without any remedy except through the
instant petitions is not quite correct. 
The Solicitor General has pointed out one recourse
— for it to institute administration proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the deceased vendors
and to prove their title to the lands in question.  For another, petitioner may likewise assert
and establish its claims of ownership in the escheat proceed­ings that may be
instituted by the State.

ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from is hereby
affirmed.  Without
costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, and
Villamor, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., took no part.

^[1]
93 Phil. 875 (1953).

^[2]
Resolution of Aug. 17, 1966,
Rollo, p. 37.

^[3]
Cf. Almirañez vs. Devera, L-19496, Feb. 27, 1965; 13 SCRA 343.

^[4]
L-20351, Feb. 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 1.

^[5]
Art. 1011 et. seq Civil Code.